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FOREWORD
This volume developed as a result of the interest shown by readers of 
Chapter 6 of the “CPA Handbook,” on the legal responsibility and 
civil liability of certified public accountants. That chapter referred to 
various American and English court cases and included numerous quota­
tions therefrom. This has suggested the practical value of reprinting 
these judicial opinions, for the most part in their entirety, so that prac­
ticing accountants might explore the subject further without the need 
for searching for this material in a law library.
Familiarity with the facts and the law involved in these cases will 
serve to give the accountant a much better understanding of the legal 
responsibility inherent in the practice of public accountancy. The re­
sulting awareness of the hazards which have arisen in the past should 
equip the accountant to avoid such difficulties in the future.
The full text of the chapter in the “CPA Handbook” is reprinted in 
slightly re-arranged form as a further convenience to the reader.
I wish to extend my thanks to Alan F. McHenry, director of the Legal 
Department of the American Institute of Accountants, and to Irving 
Novick, member of the Editorial Board of the New York University Law 
Review, for their assistance in connection with the editing and compila­
tion of the collection of cases.
S. L.
New York, New York
September 1954
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PART ONE
An Analytical Survey
CHAPTER 1
FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
There are certain fundamental considerations with which the account­
ant is confronted. Some of these matters apply in general to practitioners 
in all professional fields, and some have special importance and special 
emphasis only in relation to accounting activities.
This preliminary phase will be approached from the following four 
angles:  
  1. Certified public accountants are members of a skilled and learned profession 
and as such are subject generally to the same responsibilities as members of 
other skilled professions.
2. Public accountancy is a relatively new profession, the status of which has 
been growing steadily in importance in these recent decades of dynamic 
economic change.
3. The nature of accounting services has an important relation to questions 
of legal responsibility.
4. Numerous parties other than clients often rely upon the opinions of ac­
countants.
Members of a Skilled Profession
The general principles affecting the responsibilities of members of 
learned professions, and, for that matter, the responsibility of anyone who 
undertakes employment because of his possession of exceptional skill, 
have been concisely summarized in Cooley’s Torts, which is nearly always 
quoted as the primary authority on this subject. So many essential aspects 
of the accountant’s problem are here touched upon that the quotation 
itself bears repetition:
  In all those employments where peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers his 
services, he is understood as holding himself out to the public as possessing 
the degree of skill commonly possessed by others in the same employment, 
and if his pretensions are unfounded, he commits a species of fraud upon 
every man who employs him in reliance on his public profession. But no 
man, whether skilled or unskilled, undertakes that the task he assumes shall 
be performed successfully, and without fault or error; he undertakes for 
good faith and integrity, but not for infallibility, and he is liable to his 
employer for negligence, bad faith, or dishonesty, but not for losses con­
sequent upon mere errors of judgment.1
1. 3 Cooley, T orts 335 (4th ed. 1932).
3
4 ACCOUNTANTS’ LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
The relatively recent Restatement of the Law of Torts, (1938) in dis­
cussing negligent misrepresentations, comments upon “expectable care 
and competence” in the following language:
Where the information concerns a fact not known to the recipient, he is 
entitled to expect that the supplier will exercise that care and competence 
in its ascertainment which the supplier’s business or profession requires and 
which, therefore, the supplier professes to have by engaging in it. . . . Where 
the information consists of an opinion upon facts supplied by the recipient 
or otherwise known to him, the recipient is entitled to expect a careful con­
sideration of the facts and competence in arriving at an intelligent judgment 
thereon.2
These principles have long been applied to public accountants in juris­
dictions abroad where the accounting profession has an older history and 
where the principles of common law govern. In the United States, as early 
as 1905, there was specific judicial recognition “that public accountants 
now constitute a skilled professional class, and are subject generally to 
the same rules of liability for negligence in the practice of their profession 
as are members of other skilled professions.” 3
Certified public accountants have always recognized their professional 
responsibility for care and competence in the performance of their work. 
However, the precise boundaries of civil liability have posed many prac­
tical problems as well as highly technical legal questions, many of which 
will be dealt with in this chapter. The general attitude of the profession 
in the relatively early years of its growth and development was set forth 
by J. E. Sterrett, in a paper read at the annual meeting of the American 
Economic Association in 1908, from which the following is quoted:
It must be borne in mind that a balance sheet of any large corporation is 
not a statement of facts that can be demonstrated with mathematical ac­
curacy so much as it is an expression of an honest and intelligent opinion. 
In this expression of opinion the public accountant is now being recognized 
as an authority, and what is being widely done through the voluntary action 
of corporations that desire to deal fairly with their investors will doubtless 
become a legal requirement, and before many years the independent audit 
of all corporations offering their securities to the public will be firmly es­
tablished.
With this, or possibly preceding it, will also come a civil liability on the part 
of the accountant for the faithful and diligent performance of his duties. 
As yet there are no decisions in this country upon the question of the liability 
of an auditor, but under the English law his liability both civil and criminal 
is pretty well established. . . .
Civil liability on the part of the accountant is, I believe, certain to come 
in this country, and while each member of the profession may well pray 
that the offense shall not come by him, it is, nevertheless, true that the effect 
of a clearly defined civil liability will be salutary. It will give confidence
2. 3 Restatement, Torts §552, comment c (1938).
3. Smith v. London Assurance Corp., 109 App. Div. 882, 96 N.Y. Supp. 820 (2d Dep’t 
1905). R eprinted at p. 71 infra.
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to the business public in the accountant’s certificate as nothing else will do, 
and while the best accountants to-day recognize their moral responsibility 
quite as much as it will ever be necessary for them to recognize any legal 
responsibility, the knowledge that a civil and possibly a criminal liability 
attaches to them will deter the careless or the indifferent.4
This statement by one of the most distinguished leaders in the account­
ing profession is remarkable for its prophetic anticipation of the present 
Federal regulation of securities and the vital role of public accountancy 
in connection with it. It also expresses a positive and constructive accept­
ance of legal responsibility growing out of the work which accountants do, 
an attitude which is as relevant to the accounting profession today as 
it was when expressed. It recognizes the fact that civil liability is a normal 
aspect of professional status and that being subject to it is an inevitable 
attribute of the development of the profession. It follows that the ac­
countant’s understanding of the problem is an essential part of his educa­
tional equipment for the performance of his technical functions.
Public Accountancy, a Relatively New Profession
When speaking of public accountancy as a learned profession it must be 
realized that in this country, at any rate, it is a relatively new profession, 
one, however, which has been steadily growing in importance and useful­
ness in these recent decades of dynamic economic change. All of this has 
been so generally recognized in the business community that it hardly 
requires documentation.5
Legal precedents involving public accountants in the United States 
are relatively few and are closely tied up with the facts involved in each 
situation and with the then existing practices of the profession. Even at 
this date, the standards are still in a state of development and clarification. 
As members of a skilled profession, it is the right of every accountant to 
be judged by the standards of the accounting profession. Correlatively, 
it is the duty of the accountant to establish and clarify these standards, 
not only for the public but for themselves. Otherwise, standards not of 
their own making will be imposed upon them.6
Expanding opportunities to serve inevitably create broader responsibili­
ties. This has been recognized in the continuing drive within the profes­
sion to measure up to growing obligations. W ithout further elaboration, 
the following lines of endeavor have been followed:
4. Sterrett, The Present Position and Probable Development of Accountancy as a 
Profession, 7 J ournal of Accountancy 272 (1909).
5. Brundage, Milestones on the Path of Accounting, 29 H arvard Business R eview 
71 (1951); Brundage, Roadblocks in the Path of Accounting, 29 H arvard Business 
Review, 110 (1951).
6. Levy, Accountants’ Liability, Wartime Accounting 146 (papers presented at the 
55th annual meeting of the American Institute of Accountants 1942). R eprinted at 
p. 72 infra.
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1. The movement for obtaining legislative recognition and control of our pro­
fessional activities has already resulted in CPA laws in all forty-eight states.7 
The accountant should continue to seek improvement of these laws, based 
upon judgment and experience. In many states there has been a transition 
from the permissive type of legislation to a form of regulatory statute which 
places accountants in a status more closely comparable to that of the medical 
and legal professions.
2. The development of higher educational standards and techniques for a 
professional career in accountancy, and the contemporaneous lifting of edu­
cational requirements for admission to the profession.
3. The development, acceptance and enforcement of a code of ethical conduct 
consistent with professional ideals and essential for the protection of the 
public interest. While this is a usual feature in the case of the regulatory 
type of statute, there is a trend to provide for an enforceable code of pro­
fessional conduct in permissive statutes as well. In 1952, a statute of this 
latter type was enacted in the State of New York.
4. The growth in size, influence and effectiveness of professional societies de­
voted to the clarification and codification of ethical and technical standards 
and the extension of the usefulness of the profession in terms of the public 
interest. The expanding program of the American Institute of Accountants 
is addressed toward these objectives. More than twenty thousand members 
are co-operating actively in this endeavor.
The Nature of Accounting Services
Although accountants render many other types of services, it is chiefly 
the auditing work which differentiates the problem of legal responsibility 
from that of other professions. Accountants review, examine into, and 
consider the factual representations of management or others, and report 
thereon in the form of a professional opinion (where the accountant so 
believes) that the statements of management fairly present financial posi­
tion and results of operations.
The accountant’s responsibility is for the expression of a professional 
opinion in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles as 
the result of an examination conducted in accordance with generally ac­
cepted auditing standards.8 The accountant does not make factual rep­
resentations as to the content of financial statements; that is the function 
of management. He does not insure, guarantee, or warrant the accuracy 
of management’s representations, which in turn include matters of esti­
mate, judgment and opinion. He does assume responsibility for his own 
opinions, and represents, that in order to place himself in a position to 
express such opinions, he has complied with generally accepted auditing 
standards,9 which provide for:
7. Accountancy Law Reporter (Commerce Clearing House) gives full text of all 
legislation for states, territories and the District of Columbia.
8. Accounting Series Release No. 62, Securities and Exchange Commission, Wash­
ington, 1947.
9. T entative Statement of Auditing Standards, American Institute of Accountants, 
1947; Codification of Statements on Auditing Procedure, American Institute of 
Accountants, 1951.
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1. An expert opinion —  implying adequate technical training, proficiency and 
due care in the performance of the audit;
2. An independent opinion —  the result of an objective, impartial, and unbiased 
mental attitude;
3. An informed opinion —  the result of a proper study and evaluation of in­
ternal control as a basis for reliance thereon and for determining the extent of 
tests in the application of auditing procedures; and based upon competent 
evidential matter sufficient to supply a reasonable basis for the expression of 
an auditor’s opinion;
4. A technical opinion —  that the statements are presented in accordance with 
generally accepted principles of accounting applied on a basis consistent with 
that of the previous year;
5. A candid opinion —  that the financial statements are reasonably informative 
as to all material facts, unless otherwise stated.
Parties Other Than Our Clients Often Rely Upon Accountant's Opinions
In many instances the opinions which are expressed and the reports 
which embody such opinions reach innumerable interested parties other 
than the clients by whom the accountant has been engaged. The occa­
sional claims of such “third parties” against accountants have raised some 
difficult problems of legal responsibility. Some of the leading cases dealing 
with such claims will be dealt with in considerable detail later in this 
text.
The potential and largely undefined duty under the common law to 
third parties has led to statutory rules of civil liability to investors, which 
go far beyond the limitations of the common law in such matters as duty, 
proof of reliance and burden of proof as to negligence or fraud.
It is in this area particularly that the accountant must realize the grow­
ing need for informing the public as to the nature of the services rendered 
and the standards by which such services should be judged.
CHAPTER 2
LIABILITY TO CLIENTS
In order to obtain a better understanding of possible civil liability, both 
to clients and to third parties, it is helpful to draw upon decided cases 
which may serve as legal precedents in future situations.
W ith respect to clients, there is a contractual relationship which is the 
foundation of the accountants’ responsibilities and rights. This contract 
may be formalized in a very explicit writing. More than likely, however, 
if a writing exists, it is apt to be very general in its terms, setting out little 
more than the period to be covered, the arrangement concerning fees, 
with a statement that an audit is to be made in accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards. Compliance with such standards ordinarily 
would be implied even if not expressly included in the writing. In this 
regard, recent literature of the American Institute of Accountants10, 
serves a most useful function in defining the nature and content of what 
the accountant undertakes to do in making the usual audit which is to 
culminate in the expression of an opinion on financial position and op­
erating results. Not so long ago, it was often an open question as to 
whether a so-called cash audit, a balance sheet audit, a detailed audit or 
some other variety of examination was contemplated. Not only was the 
accountant lax in definitely confirming the scope of his work at the outset 
of an engagement, but there was great variety and often little clarity in 
the form of certificate or opinion that was issued at the end of the en­
gagement.11 When the public accountant became involved in litigation 
concerning his work, the heart of the controversy often related to what 
he had agreed to do. Courts were inclined to take the accountant to task 
if he had failed to be explicit in his engagement writing. This judicial 
attitude is illustrated in the following admonition by the court in the case 
of Maryland Casualty Co. v. Jonathon Cook 12, where the court said:
I think that it is high time for accountants to know that if they want a 
particular contract which they enter into to be measured in the technical
10. See note 9 supra and the following publications of the American Institute of 
Accountants: Accounting Research Bulletins; Case Studies in Auditing Procedure; and 
Audits by Certified Public Accountants, 1950.
11. Levy, T he Legal Liability of Public Accountants in its Relation to a Standard 
Classification o f Accounting Services, 12 Certified Public Accountant 695 (1932). 
Reprinted at p. 81 infra.
12. 35 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Mich. 1940). Reprinted a t p. 84 infra.
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terms of a cash audit, or a balance sheet audit, or a detailed audit, they 
should insist that their contract and the specifications which they agree to 
comply with in their contract should plainly state the facts.
So I interpret this contract with its specifications according to the plain 
language used.
The witnesses have all agreed that no technical terms or language has been 
used in either the contract or the specifications. Ordinary, everyday English 
has been used. It is easily understood and interpreted. If accountants wish 
a contract construed in accordance with their own technical language, then 
they must see to it that their technical language is used in their contracts. 
(Emphasis added)13
This case dealt with an audit of the accounts of a municipal treasurer 
where the engagement had been accepted subject to “specifications for 
audit” which had been prepared by the client, which provided, among 
other things, that “any other duties or procedures which ordinarily be­
come a part of a complete audit although not specifically stated herein 
shall be deemed a part of these specifications.” The defendant-accountant 
sought to construe the vague expression “complete audit” in terms of 
the more technical concepts of a cash audit, a balance sheet audit, or a 
combination of the two. Such efforts were unavailing for the reason stated 
above. There was a further attempt by the defendant to construe the 
audit contract in the light of prior conversations and instructions. The 
court disposed of this effort in the following manner:
The defendant, Jonathon Cook testified that on receiving these specifications 
and on reading the specifications, he did not know just what work was re­
quired to be performed for the City of Flint and so he went to the City of 
Flint and had a talk with the Director of Finance and thereafter entered 
into the contract in reliance upon that conversation had prior to the execu­
tion of the contract. The conversation with the Director of Finance does not 
mean a thing. The contract was with the City of Flint and not with the 
Director of Finance. It is the contract which Jonathon Cook made with 
the City of Flint which must be construed and not conversations or oral 
agreements reached with independent officers of the City prior to the execu­
tion of the contract. Those prior conversations, in order to become binding. 
should have been embodied in the written contract and signed pursuant to 
proper authority. Therefore, the court has no alternative but to hold this 
defendant to performance in accordance with the terms of his written con­
tract. Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 237.14
This case emphasizes the need for being explicit if the accountant is 
to rely upon technical terms and technical concepts in defining the scope 
of his duty. Obviously the use of such vague terms as “complete audit” 
or “detailed audit” must be avoided. If technical terms such as “generally 
accepted auditing standards” are used the security of the accountant’s 
position depends upon the extent to which such terms have been clarified 
by accountants in their own practices and in the literature of the account- 15
15. Id. at 164-165.
14. Id. at 165.
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mg profession. While established standards of today 15 afford substantially 
better grounds for reliance than they did during the years 1931-1932 
(which were involved in the above quoted case) it is important to realize 
that the situation has improved only relatively. Accountants must con­
tinue to develop and clarify their own standards so that they may be 
judged by professional criteria of their own making and not by the factual 
findings of juries of laymen.
Another fairly recent case which involved construction of a contract for 
audit services was that of O’Neill v. Atlas Automobile Finance Corp.16 
Here the firm of certified public accountants contended that their con­
tract was for a limited examination and a financial review of the client’s 
books without verification. The client contended that the engagement 
“contemplated the making of a complete and detailed audit and the fur­
nishing of certified reports which should have uncovered the shortage” 
here involved. It was admitted that the original retainer had been under 
an oral contract. The accountants testified that it was not agreed or con­
templated that “certified reports” would be issued and in support of 
their testimony offered the letters of transmittal of their reports which 
used this phraseology:
We have prepared from the records of Atlas Automobile Finance Corpora­
tion and information submitted to us a balance sheet as of (designated month 
and year) and a comparative statement of profit and loss based on the month 
of (name of month) together with relating schedules. (Italics by Court)
When the accountants were re-engaged, the extent of their undertaking 
was set forth by them in a letter to the client which was accepted by it as 
satisfactory. The letter read, in part:
Confirming our recent conversation we agree . . .  to make a monthly 
examination of the transactions and submit monthly reports in substantially 
the same form as heretofore. . . . (Italics by Court)
The accountants produced an expert witness who corroborated their own 
testimony with respect to the difference between “an ordinary audit and 
report and a certified one verified from independent sources.” The client 
offered no expert testimony to contradict that offered by the accountants. 
Because the contract was partly oral and partly written and its terms were 
disputed, the trial court submitted the question of its construction to the 
jury. The jury accepted the accountants’ version of the terms of the audit 
contract and the nature of the accountants’ duties under it. Incidentally, 
the appellate court confirmed the charge to the jury on the following 
points, citing Cooley’s Torts 17 as one of the supporting authorities:
Magee, Liebman, and O’Neill, as accountants, are not guarantors or in­
surers of the correctness of their accounts. 156
15. Smith, Written Contract With Client Should Not Be Necessary to Define Audit 
Engagement, 93 Journal of Accountancy 210 (1952).
16. 139 Pa. Super. 346, 11 A.2d 782 (1940). Reprinted at p. 95 infra.
17. See note 1 supra.
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Magee, Liebman and O’Neill as accountants, do not say to the public “Let us 
examine your books and vouchers, and we will with absolute certainty dis­
cover any dishonesty, every mistake, that exists in those books, and we will 
protect you against that.” That is not what they undertook to do. They 
agreed to use such skill in the performance of their agreement as reasonably 
prudent, skillful accountants would use under the circumstances.
The result in this case, in comparison with that in the Maryland
Casualty Company case,18 does not support a conclusion that the account­
ant is likely to be better off with an oral agreement than with a detailed 
contract specifying particular procedures. The weakness of the ac­
countant’s position in the Maryland Casualty Company case was that 
there was an omnibus provision which used the vague term “complete 
audit.”
Had the more technical phraseology “generally accepted auditing 
standards” been used, the court doubtless would have given greater weight 
to technical literature and expert testimony as an aid to the interpretation 
of the contract. Of special interest in the O’Neill case are the facts that 
there was a course of conduct in performing prior audits which was con­
tinued by specific reference in the letter of arrangements with the client, 
and there was further confirmation of the client’s acceptance of the scope 
of prior audits in the letters of transmittal which were an integral part of 
the audit reports. All of this was persuasive corroboration of the testi­
mony of the accountant as to the limited scope of his engagement.
In  this branch of the subject, namely the accountant’s possible liability 
to clients, the claims usually are based upon the failure of the auditor to 
discover defalcations or other similar irregularities. It may be the client 
who presses the claim. It may be a surety company that is the plaintiff, 
having been subrogated to the rights of the client upon payment of a loss 
under the terms of a fidelity bond.
Where it is claimed that the accountant was negligent in the perform­
ance of his duty, and that the loss occasioned by the dishonesty of the 
client’s employee or agent went undiscovered and unrecovered because of 
that negligence, the controversy concerning the accountant’s work usually 
raises these basic factual questions:
1. What was the scope of the audit for which the accountant was engaged and 
which he agreed to make?
2. Was the negligent conduct of that audit responsible for the failure to un­
cover the defalcations and for the resulting loss?
3. Were there circumstances present which aroused or should have aroused 
the suspicion of the accountant and should have resulted in a more search­
ing inquiry than would have been obligatory in the absence of suspicious 
circumstances?
The responsibility of the accountant in this situation is limited neces­
sarily to the competent performance of the audit which he has been en­
18. See note 12 supra.
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gaged to make. This usually involves compliance with generally accepted 
auditing standards. The accountant does not insure or guarantee the 
client against loss through the dishonesty of his employees, nor does he 
warrant that the audit will uncover any and every irregularity. The audit 
is nevertheless likely to safeguard the client against dishonest manipula­
tion of his accounts. Such protection to the client might well result from 
the work of the auditor in reviewing the system of internal accounting 
control and suggesting needed improvements therein. An audit will deter 
dishonest practices because, from the culprit’s viewpoint, it enlarges the 
danger of discovery. Very often an audit results in the actual discovery 
and exposure of dishonest practices when they do occur. All of these ad­
vantages to the client are substantial and add measurably to the value of 
an audit. They should not be minimized in any of the discussions of the 
limitations of the accountant’s responsibility. On the other hand, it 
should be recognized that in the usual audit the primary purpose is not 
the discovery of defalcations but rather the expression of a professional 
opinion concerning financial position and operating results. The audit 
program involves a judicious amount of testing and sampling. It does 
not contemplate an all-inclusive detailed examination of all transactions 
and all entries with respect thereto. Thus it is not intended or designed 
for the purpose of uncovering or preventing all conceivable irregularities 
in the accounts. It should be accepted and relied upon for what it is, an 
examination not unlimited in scope but adequate for the purpose of ex­
pressing an opinion concerning financial position and operating results. 
All this has been summarized recently by the committee on auditing pro­
cedure of the Institute, as follows:
The well-established custom of making test checks of accounting records 
and related data and, beyond that, relying upon the system of internal con­
trol after investigation, through appropriate checks, of its adequacy and 
effective functioning, has with very few exceptions proved sufficient for the 
purpose of expressing an opinion.
The ordinary examination incident to the issuance of an opinion respecting 
financial statements is not designed and cannot be relied upon to disclose de­
falcations and other similar irregularities, although their discovery frequently 
results. In a well-organized concern reliance for the detection of such irregu­
larities is placed principally upon the maintenance of an adequate system of 
accounting records with appropriate internal control. If an auditor were to 
attempt to discover defalcations and similar irregularities he would have to 
extend his work to a point where its cost would be prohibitive. It is generally 
recognized that good internal control and surety bonds provide protection 
much more cheaply. On the basis of his examination by tests and checks, 
made in the light of his review and tests of the system of internal control, 
the auditor relies upon the integrity of the client’s organization unless cir­
cumstances are such as to arouse his suspicion, in which case he must extend 
his procedures to determine whether or not such suspicions are justified.
In no sense is the independent certified public accountant an insurer or 
guarantor, nor do his training and experience qualify him to act as a
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general appraiser, valuer, or expert in materials. Obviously his functions 
do not include matters of law which require the judgment of an attorney.19
The foregoing is implied in the standard short-form of accountant’s 
report or certificate which defines the scope of the audit in the following 
general terms:
Our examination was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards, and accordingly included such tests of the accounting records and 
such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circum­
stances.
It should be noted, however, that while the report or opinion of the 
accountant is always evidence of what he understood the scope of his 
audit to be, and while it is always evidence of what was the client contract, 
it is not necessarily conclusive evidence. Unless confirmed by a writing 
signed by the client, either in the form of a letter of arrangements before 
the commencement of the audit or included in the letter of representa­
tions of the client at the conclusion of the audit, it would be a self-serving 
document which the client might dispute. Of course, it also might be 
confirmed by a continuous course of conduct over a series of prior years 
when the same type of audit had been made, reported upon in the same 
way, and the reports had been accepted by the client. This is what hap­
pened in the O’Neill case 20 mentioned previously.
There has recently been some difference of opinion among leading ac­
countants as to whether there is adequate protection for the accountant 
against unfair claims for failure to discover defalcations unless the limited 
responsibility of the accountant in this area has been defined and con­
firmed in an explicit written contract signed by the client. Some ac­
countants have gone so far as to state specifically in letters to clients 
outlining the conditions under which an engagement is accepted, “that 
their examination cannot be relied on to disclose defalcations and other 
irregularities of the same general nature, and they therefore do not assume 
responsibility for detecting such irregularities.” 21
Other accountants have felt that a disclaimer, so worded, is too broad 
and unqualified, and consequently it might reflect unfavorably on the 
value of the ordinary audit. They would contend that our position should 
be that such examinations cannot be relied upon to disclose all defalca­
tions, and that therefore the accountant does not assume responsibility 
for detecting irregularities where he has complied with generally accepted 
auditing standards and the irregularities have nevertheless remained un­
discovered. Furthermore, while it may be desirable to have a written 
agreement or letter of arrangements confirmed by the client, it is argued
19. Codification of Statements on Auditing Procedure, American Institute of 
Accountants, 1951, p. 12.
20. See note 16 supra.
21. Independent Audits and Defalcations, 91, J ournal of Accountancy 387 (1951).
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that it should not be considered mandatory to have such a letter. In many 
instances, the audit engagement is renewed from year to year in a more or 
less informal manner. The scope of the examination is evidenced by a 
continuous course of conduct by the accountant and the acceptance of 
his work by the client on the basis of the representations concerning the 
scope of the audit as set forth in the standard short-form certificate or 
opinion. The practice with respect to formalizing the audit contract 
varies to such an extent that the preferences of those who consider an 
explicit written client contract desirable should not, by implication, leave 
unprotected the accountant who chooses to place his chief reliance upon 
our professional standards and his compliance with them. The latter 
viewpoint is discussed fully in a recent article which quotes many rele­
vant statements from authoritative literature and concludes with the 
following:
It should be evident to all thinking people that the work of the independent 
public accountant is not intended to take the place of, or duplicate the 
protection afforded by, a system of internal control supplemented by various 
types of dishonesty insurance. The fact that accountants have an under­
standable fear of the publicity resulting from legal action may have motivated 
those who have suffered losses from defalcations and similar irregularities to 
threaten suit against an accountant who did not assume responsibility for 
discovery of the losses. Such tactics should be resisted by the profession. A 
written contract with each client, however, does not go to the root of the 
problem. In any case, the problem seems to call for a uniform position on 
the part of the profession, and the above citations would appear to mean 
that the profession has taken a position which it has repeatedly and con­
sistently promulgated in its authoritative statements of auditing procedure. 
If further clarification seems desirable, the place for that clarification is in 
our published statements defining generally accepted auditing standards. 
These standards are the yardstick of our professional responsibility and for 
this reason are specifically incorporated in our opinions. Our contractual 
relations with clients as well as our third party responsibility will, in any 
event, depend upon our adherence to our generally accepted auditing 
standards.22
It should be added, however, that in any situation where there are limi­
tations upon the scope of the ordinary audit, such as the requested omis­
sion of the independent confirmation of receivables or the omission of 
the usual procedures with respect to observation and checking of in­
ventory, it is without doubt advisable to confirm such limitations in a 
writing which is countersigned or acknowledged by the client. If the 
engagement contemplates the preparation of statements without audit, 
obviously it is advantageous, if not altogether necessary, to reduce such 
an engagement to some explicit form.
In Great Britain there is the distinction between the type of audit which 
the accountant is required to make to fulfill his obligations under the
22. Smith, Written Contract W ith Client Should N ot Be Necessary to Define Audit 
Engagement, 93 Journal of Accountancy 213 (1952).
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Companies Act as against the varying types of work he may be engaged 
to perform for so-called private companies. There it is urged that in the 
latter situations an explicit client contract is essential. This warning was 
repeated in a recent edition of one of the leading English texts on The 
Principles of Auditing, where it was stated:
In the case of a company, the auditor’s responsibilities are governed by 
statute, and it is impossible for the auditor to limit his responsibilities. In 
the case of a private concern, the auditor’s responsibilities are governed 
by the terms of the contract with his client and therefore his responsibilities 
can be limited by agreement, but in practice it is feared that in many cases 
there is no written evidence of the exact terms of the contract. This position 
is fraught with grave danger, and in every case the practitioner is strongly 
advised to see that the exact terms of the contract are clearly understood by 
both his client and himself, and that these terms are recorded in writing.
In the event of a loss through fraud occurring and remaining undetected by 
the auditor he may be placed in a position of grave difficulty. It is easy to be 
wise after the event and to see what audit tests must have revealed the fraud. 
On the other hand it is so difficult to define exactly what is reasonable care 
and skill, which is governed by the general standard of the profession. In a 
case before the courts expert evidence would be called, but here again the 
expert would have knowledge of the exact form the fraud took, and it is 
therefore very easy to see what checks should have been applied in order to 
detect the fraud and to form the opinion that one would without question 
have adopted them.23
English Cases
Although adjudicated cases in the courts of the United States involving 
claims of clients against accountants are limited in number, they are of 
great significance. The earlier English cases supply important legal back­
ground and have usually been cited as authority in the opinions of Ameri­
can judges. These English cases are quite numerous and go back more 
than sixty years. Apparently the profession in Great Britain has directed 
considerable attention to these precedents. This is reflected by the fact 
that Dicksee’s Auditing, the leading English text, in its seventeenth edi­
tion, published in 1951, assigns almost three hundred pages of fine print 
to a collection of some fifty-seven cases, reprinting most of the opinions 
in full. Numerous other cases are referred to and discussed elsewhere in 
the text. Apparently the British practitioner considers this source ma­
terial an indispensable part of his technical equipment.
Those English cases which deal with claims arising out of defalcations 
add little, if anything, to the law established by our own leading cases. 
For the most part, the English cases deal with the responsibilities of ac­
countants functioning under the authority and jurisdiction of the English 
Companies Act. In such situations, the accountant is held to be an officer 23
23. DePaula, T he Principles of Auditing 244 (11th ed. 1951).
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of the corporation and is responsible as such to its stockholders. This 
relationship, of course, is technically different from that assumed by the 
auditor of the accounts of a corporation in the United States, even of a 
corporation whose stock is publicly held and traded in on a stock ex­
change. However, since the enactment of the Federal Securities Act of 
1933 and the Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, statutory obliga­
tions have been imposed upon the independent accountant (to be con­
sidered later in this chapter) which make some of these English cases 
significant in relation to our possible liability to investors. This is all the 
more so in view of the absence of adjudicated cases under our own statutes.
Some of the pronouncements of the English cases concerning their un­
derstanding of the responsibilities of public accountants have been cited 
so frequently that they have acquired the status of classic utterances. 
Thus, in 1895, it was said of the auditor in the famous London and Gen­
eral Bank case: 24
His business is to ascertain and state the true financial position of the 
company at the time of the audit, and his duty is confined to that. But then 
comes the question: How is he to ascertain such position? The answer is, 
by examining the books of the company. But he does not discharge his 
duty by doing this without inquiry and without taking any trouble to see 
that the books themselves shew the company’s true position. He must take 
reasonable care to ascertain that they do. Unless he does this his audit would 
be worse than an idle farce . . . An auditor, however, is not bound to do 
more than exercise reasonable care and skill in making inquiries and investi­
gations. He is not an insurer; he does not guarantee that the books do cor­
rectly shew the true position of the company’s affairs; he does not guarantee 
that his balance sheet is accurate according to the books of the company. If 
he did, he would be responsible for error on his part, even if he were himself 
deceived without any want of reasonable care on his part, say, by the fraudu­
lent concealment of a book from him. His obligation is not so onerous as 
this. Such I take to be the duty of the auditor; he must be honest—i.e., he 
must not certify what he does not believe to be true, and he must take 
reasonable care and skill before he believes that what he certifies is true. 
What is reasonable care in any particular case must depend upon the cir­
cumstances of that case. Where there is nothing to excite suspicion very 
little inquiry will be reasonably sufficient, and in practice I believe business 
men select a few cases at haphazard, see that they are right, and assume that 
others like them are correct also. Where suspicion is aroused more care is 
obviously necessary; but, still, an auditor is not bound to exercise more than 
reasonable care and skill, even in a case of suspicion, and he is perfectly 
justified in acting on the opinion of an expert where special knowledge is 
required. . . .
. . .  A person whose duty it is to convey information to others does not dis­
charge that duty by simply giving them so much information as is calculated 
to induce them, or some of them, to ask for more. Information and means of 
information are by no means equivalent terms. . . . [A]n auditor who gives 
shareholders means of information instead of information respecting a com­
24. In  re London and General Bank, [1895] 2 Ch. 678 (C.A.), 21 Acct. L. R. 173, 
Dicksee’s Auditing 584 (17th ed. 1951). R eprinted a t p. 100 infra.
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pany’s financial position does so at his peril and runs the very serious risk of 
being held judicially to have failed to discharge his duty.25
This was followed shortly thereafter by the Kingston Cotton Mill 
Co. case 26 which exonerated the accountants from responsibility concern­
ing the independent verification of inventory and approved the account­
ants’ acceptance of and reliance upon the management’s certificate with 
respect thereto in the absence of circumstances which would arouse sus­
picion. This case is no longer an authority for American practictioners 
with respect to inventory verification, since it has been superseded by our 
own extensions of auditing procedure which impose mandatory obliga­
tions in this area. However, it will continue to be quoted as a basic 
authority for the reasonable limitations upon the responsibility of 
accountants where an audit has failed to uncover defalcations and other 
similar irregularities. In this connection it was there stated:
It is the duty of an auditor to bring to bear on the work he has to perform 
that skill, care, and caution which a reasonably competent, careful and 
cautious auditor would use. What is reasonable skill, care and caution must 
depend on the particular circumstances of each case., An auditor is not 
bound to be a detective, or as was said, to approach his work with suspicion 
or with a foregone conclusion that there is something wrong. He is a watch­
dog, but not a bloodhound. He is justified in believing tried servants of the 
company in whom confidence is placed by the company. He is entitled to 
assume that they are honest, and to rely upon their representations, provided 
he takes reasonable care. If there is anything calculated to excite suspicion 
he should probe it to the bottom; but in the absence of anything of that 
kind he is only bound to be reasonably cautious and careful.
. . . Auditors must not be made liable for not tracking out ingenious and 
carefully laid schemes of fraud when there is nothing to arouse their suspicion, 
and when those frauds are perpetrated by tried servants of the company and 
are undetected for years by the directors. So to hold would make the position 
of an auditor intolerable.27
It remained for the Irish Court of Appeal in The Irish Woollen Co. Ltd. 
v. Tyson 28 to indicate how precarious it is to rely upon a figure of speech 
as a substitute for a more technical statement of legal principle, when it 
stated in discussing the foregoing quotation from the Kingston Cotton 
Mill Co. case:
Now, time after time, this passage about the “watch-dog and the bloodhound” 
has been made use of, and I would wish to say a word regarding it, too. His 
lordship then read from Lord Justice Lindley’s judgment the passages deal­
ing with the duties of auditors, in one of which it was laid down that “an 
auditor was a watch dog, but not a bloodhound.” This, Lord Justice Fitz-
25. Id. at 682-685.
26. In  re Kingston Cotton Mill Co., [1896] 2 Ch. 279 (C.A.), 22 Acct. L.R. 77, 
Dicksee’s Auditing 598 (17th ed. 1951). Reprinted at p. 119 infra.
27. Id. at 288-290.
28. 26 Acct. L.R. 13 (1900) (Irish C.A.), Dicksee's Auditing 608 (17th ed. 1951). 
Reprinted at p. 122 infra.
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gibbon remarked, was very unfair to the bloodhound, who was just as little 
likely to have his sense of suspicion aroused as the watch-dog. Applying this 
instance of the dogs to the present case, was not the watch dog bound to bark? 
and if, when sniffing round, you hit upon a trail of something wrong, surely 
you must follow it up, and there is just as much obligation on the auditor, 
who is bound to keep his eyes open, and his nose, too. As in the case of 
the hound, the auditor will follow up this trail to the end, and the first things 
he will “root up” are those statements of account, and then the fraud is dis­
covered.29
Attention will now be directed to outstanding American cases which 
have dealt with the responsibility of public accountants.
Craig v. Anyon 30
The plaintiffs in this action were members of a firm of brokers in 
stocks and commodities operating on the New York, New Orleans and 
Chicago exchanges. Their accounts were audited by the defendant firm 
of accountants during the years 1913 to 1917, under an arrangement which 
provided for quarterly audits and reports. The business was apparently 
prosperous. In May 1917, through the confession of Moore, an employee 
in charge of their commodities department, following an office investiga­
tion, the plaintiffs learned that their prosperity had been an illusion. 
Their books had been falsified by Moore throughout a period of nearly 
five years during which time they had been defrauded of over one million 
dollars. In this action they alleged that the audits by defendants had been 
negligently made and that had the audits been made with reasonable care 
the falsification of the books would have been discovered and the losses 
would not have occurred.
The case was tried in May 1922 in the Supreme Court of New York 
County, before a jury, to whom were submitted the following two specific 
questions:
1. Were the defendants negligent in the performance of their agreement with
Craig and Co.?
2. If so, what damages to the plaintiffs resulted directly and proximately from 
such negligence?
The trial judge charged that if the defendants were found to be liable, 
the verdict must be either for $2,000, the aggregate amount paid as com­
pensation for the defendants’ services, or for $1,177,805.26, the amount 
of plaintiffs’ actual loss as proved. The jury found the accountants negli­
gent and brought in a verdict for $1,177,805.26. Upon motion, the court 
then directed a general verdict for the plaintiffs in an amount limited to 
$2,000 “on the ground that as a matter of law the only loss which resulted
29. Id. at 17.
30. 212 App. Div. 55, 208 N.Y. Supp. 259 (1st Dep’t 1925), afl’d without opinion, 
242 N.Y. 569, 152 N.E. 431 (1926). Reprinted at p. 131 infra.
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directly and proximately from negligence of the defendants was the 
sum of $2,000.” Thereupon the case was carried on appeal to the Ap­
pellate Division, which affirmed the trial court. Three judges concurred 
in this result. The presiding justice dissented and set out his views in a 
short dissenting opinion, to which reference will be made later. The liti­
gation was then carried to the Court of Appeals, the highest appellate 
tribunal, which in turn affirmed the judgment and the order of the Trial 
Court and the Appellate Division, without opinion, with a single judge 
again dissenting. This final decision on appeal was handed down in 
April, 1926.
Upon the trial the defense rested without offering evidence in its own 
behalf, thus limiting its own proof to the cross-examination of the wit­
nesses produced by the plaintiffs. The chief issue in the case became the 
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs themselves. Did such negligence 
contribute predominantly or materially to the loss sustained, or were 
the damages the proximate result of the accountants’ negligence? The 
accountants had been paid an annual fee of only $500 for four quarterly 
audits. There was no independent confirmation of customers’ accounts 
nor was any attempt made to compute the status of the open contracts 
which would have been necessary in order to calculate the actual liability 
of customers at the time of each audit. Plaintiffs testified that many years 
before it had been agreed that the audit would include this work, as a 
member of the accounting firm himself had said: “We have to make that 
calculation both for straddles and open accounts before we can tell you 
what is the actual standing of the firm.” The alleged arrangement was 
oral and the member of the accounting firm who made it was no longer 
living at the time of the trial. However, plaintiffs admitted that they were 
aware that these calculations had not been made by the accountants for 
many years nor during any part of the period when the defalcations 
occurred.
The losses arose in a single account in the commodities department. 
This was a discretionary account operated by Moore, who was in charge 
of the department. It had been started with a margin of only $200 with 
instructions that it be closed as soon as the losses exceeded that amount. 
These facts had not been communicated to the accountants nor did they 
become aware of them in the course of their audits. The accounting 
records relating to commodities were all kept in the commodities depart­
ment and under the control of Moore. This had been done over the 
objections of the accountants, who protested that a certain ledger pre­
viously maintained in the general office was a check on this subsidiary 
commodities department and should not be transferred to it. The ac­
count involved was so active that it represented between 75% and 85% 
of the firm’s Chicago commodities business. Between audit dates plain­
tiffs paid out large sums of money from day to day and executed orders
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from hour to hour without any investigation or examination of the 
account or check on the sufficiency of margin, relying implicitly upon 
the honesty of Moore. The Appellate Division found that the plaintiffs 
could have prevented the loss by the exercise of reasonable care and that 
“they should not have relied exclusively on the accountants.” I t  was 
further stated:
We think the damages cannot be said to flow naturally and directly from 
defendants’ negligence or breach of contract. Plaintiffs should not be allowed 
to recover for losses which they could have avoided by the exercise of reason­
able care. . . .
The plaintiffs in effect contend that defendants are chargeable with negli­
gence because of failure to detect Moore’s wrongdoing, wholly overlooking 
the fact that, although they were closely affiliated with Moore, who was con­
stantly under their supervision, they were negligent in failing properly to 
supervise his acts or to learn the true condition of their own business and 
to detect his wrongdoing.31
It should be noted that the Appellate Division did affirm the verdict of 
the jury that the accountants had been negligent in the performance of 
their audit. This was so in the face of the court’s instructions to the jury 
that these auditors did not guarantee the correctness of their accounts; 
that they do not say to the public: “Let us examine your books and 
vouchers, and we will with absolute certainly discover any dishonesty, 
every mistake that exists in those books, and we will protect you against 
that”; that that is not what the auditors undertook to do; that they agreed 
to use “such skill in the performance of their agreements as reasonably 
prudent, skillful accountants would use under the circumstances”.
In limiting the recovery of the client to the amount of the fees paid, the 
courts followed through on the theory that the client was damaged to 
that extent by the failure of the accountants to render competent serv­
ices,32 but that any additional losses were the result of the client’s own 
negligence. However, a decision relieving the accountants from liability 
cannot be regarded as the inevitable result where contributory negligence 
is proved. The result in Craig v. Any on must be confined to the ex­
traordinary facts of this case, which nevertheless failed to impress the jury 
before whom the case was tried. The question as to what damage was 
proximately caused by the negligence of the accountants, as well as the 
question as to whether the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs was 
predominantly the cause of the damage, are ordinarily factual issues for 
the jury. All this was emphasized in the National Surety Corporation 
case which is about to be discussed.
31. Id. at 66-67, 208 N.Y. Supp. at 268-269.
32. Even in the absence of proof that the client suffered any other damage, if the 
audit report was one which involved defective performance on the part of the ac­
countant, it has been held that the client was damaged to the extent of the fees paid. 
Board of County Comm’rs v. Baker, 152 Kan. 164, 102 P. 2d 1006 (1940). Reprinted 
at p. 139 infra.
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Particularly in the light of the adverse verdict of the jury, it should be 
obvious how vital to the accountant it is to clearly define and evidence 
his own limited responsibility in situations where the client insists upon 
limiting the scope of the examination. Such limitations should be con­
firmed in writing at the outset of the audit and should be reiterated in 
the letter of representations signed by the client before the completion 
of the audit. They should again be set out explicitly in the report of the 
accountant on the audit. If the limitations are as material as they were 
in this case, there should be an express denial of an opinion on the state­
ment as a whole.33 Our present-day standards and practices make all of 
this mandatory. Had these standards been observed in the Craig v. Anyon 
case the accountants would have been in a position to put in an affirmative 
defense and the jury’s verdict in the first instance might have been favor­
able to the accountants.
Before concluding the discussion of this case, it would be well to quote 
the dissenting opinion of Presiding Justice Clarke:
I dissent from the affirmance of so much of the judgment as sets aside the 
verdict of the jury assessing the damages at $ 1,177,805.26. The contract of 
audit was not one merely to discover if inadvertent clerical errors had been 
made in the bookkeeping, but was one of protection of the plaintiffs’ firm 
from their own failure to find any error in their books of account. This con­
tract the defendants failed to perform. Admitting the neglect of the plain­
tiffs to discover the embezzlement and falsification of the accounts through 
an examination of the books on their own part, the defendants’ work in 
pursuance of the contract, owing to the manner in which it was performed, 
failed to save plaintiffs from the consequences of such failure and neglect, 
which was the very subject of the contract.34
This minority viewpoint seemed to influence the court in the later 
National Surety Corporation case, which now follows.
National Surety Corporation Case 35
The plaintiff in this action was the surety company on a fidelity bond 
issued by them to the stock brokerage firm of Halle & Stieglitz under the 
terms of which the surety had paid the losses sustained through the de­
falcations of the cashier in the main office of Halle & Stieglitz. The 
defendants were members of three different firms of certified public 
accountants who had at different times, during the years 1928 to 1933 
audited the books of account of the stock brokerage firm. The plaintiff 
claimed that the losses which its assignor had incurred had resulted from 
the failure of the accountants to discover and report substantial cash
33. See Codification of Statements on Auditing Procedure, American Institute of 
Accountants, 1951.
34. Craig v. Anyon, 212 App. Div. 55, 67-68, 208 N.Y. Supp. 259, 269-270 (1st Dep’t 
1925).
35. National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand, 256 App. Div. 226, 9 N.Y.S. 2d 554 (1st Dep’t 
1939). Reprinted at p. 146 infra.
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shortages, which had continued during all of these years and had finally 
amounted to a total of $329,300.
Four separate causes of action were stated as against each of the three 
firms, namely: breach of contract in the alleged faulty performance of 
the audit, breach of warranty in representations in their reports as to cash 
in bank, negligence in the conduct of the audit, and fraud in the alleged 
misrepresentation of material facts in their reports.36
The case was tried before a judge and jury in the Supreme Court, New 
York County, in May, 1937. At the conclusion of the case, and before its 
submission to the jury, the trial judge dismissed the complaint and dis­
charged the jury, stating that “the Court is unable to discover anything 
in the testimony indicating a violation of the obligations of an expert 
accountant’’, and on the further ground that “the principle laid down in 
Craig v. Any on . . .  is the one to be here applied”. It appeared obvious 
to the trial judge that “more glaring than any negligence on the part of 
the defendants is the contributory negligence of the plaintiff’s assignor,” 
and accordingly that the loss incurred could not “be said to flow naturally 
and directly from defendants’ negligence or breach of contract.”
An appeal was taken to the Appellate Division, where the dismissal 
below was reversed and a new trial was ordered. The court could not 
have been more closely divided; three judges voted for reversal, and two 
judges dissented and voted to affirm. This appeal did not dispose of the 
issue of negligence on its merits. It merely decided that on the whole 
record plaintiff had established a prima facie case which should have 
been submitted to the jury, and that the trial judge was in error in 
not so doing. It was pointed out also that it was for the jury to say whether 
the defendants were liable for defalcations subsequent to their audits 
“depending upon whether such losses could reasonably have been antici­
pated at the time they were engaged in the performance of the work.”
36. In Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 115 Fla. 541, 156 
So. 116 (1934) the court held that in these situations, causes of action for breach of 
contract, for negligence and for fraud might exist simultaneously. The action was held 
to be not for the mere nonperformance of the contract but was said to be based “. . . 
upon an alleged breach of duty to skillfully perform and truly report the condition of 
accounts. . . .” The court quoted from 26 R.C.L. (Ruling Case Law) 758: “Whenever a 
negligent breach of a contract is also a violation of a common-law duty, an action ex 
delicto will lie. Accompanying every contract is a common-law duty to perform the 
thing agreed to be done with care, skill, reasonable expediency, and faithfulness, and 
a negligent failure to observe any of these conditions is a tort, as well as a breach of 
the contract. If the transaction complained of had its origin in a contract which placed 
the parties in such a relation that in attempting to perform the promised service the 
tort was committed, then the breach of the contract is not the gravamen of the suit. The 
contract in such case is mere inducement, creating the state of things which furnishes 
the occasion of the tort. And in all such cases the remedy is an action on the case. 
Based on the principle above indicated, the firmly established rule is that for injuries 
resulting from unskillful or otherwise negligent performance of a thing agreed to be 
done, an action ex delicto will lie, notwithstanding the act complained of would also 
be ground for an action ex contractu.” Reprinted at p. 153 infra.
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The court also dealt at some length with the question of contributory 
negligence. Not only did it hold that this defense presented a factual 
issue which should have been submitted to the jury, but it discussed and 
interpreted the rule of Craig v. Any on 37 and stated views with respect 
thereto which would indicate that such a defense might not be effective 
unless the facts relating to it were extraordinary, as they were in Craig v. 
Anyon. In this connection it was said:
The defendants assert that they are not liable, no matter how negligent 
they may have been, because Halle & Stieglitz were guilty of contributory 
negligence. If it be true that Halle & Stieglitz so conducted their business as 
to make possible Wallach’s defalcations, it did not necessarily excuse the 
defendants from the consequences of their negligence in failing to discover 
and report the facts. The action here, it must be remembered, is not to re­
cover for the thefts committed by Wallach as it would be if it were against 
Wallach or against the surety. The action is for errors of the accountants 
in failing to discover Wallach’s defalcations, thereby making further defal­
cations possible and rendering more difficult recovery for defalcations of the 
past. The measure of damages in two such classes of actions is not the same.
We are, therefore, not prepared to admit that accountants are immune from 
the consequences of their negligence because those who employ them have 
conducted their own business negligently. . . Accountants, as we know, are 
commonly employed for the very purpose of detecting defalcations which 
the employer’s negligence has made possible. Accordingly, we see no reason 
to hold that the accountant is not liable to his employer in such cases. 
Negligence of the employer is a defense only when it has contributed to the 
accountant’s failure to perform his contract and to report the truth. Thus, 
by way of illustration, if it were found that the members of the firm of 
Halle & Stieglitz had been negligent in connection with the transfer of 
funds which occurred at about the time of each audit and that such neg­
ligence contributed to the defendants’ false reports it would be a defense 
to the action for it could then be said that defendants’ failure to perform 
their contracts was attributable, in part at least, to the negligent conduct of 
the firm. That was the principle applied in Craig v. Anyon, . . . where the 
embezzler had been negligently represented to the accountants as a person 
to be trusted. In the present case, the loss consisted of thefts by a cashier 
not so represented “whose own account of his receipts and payments could 
not reasonably be taken by an auditor without further inquiry.” (Matter of 
Kingston Cotton Mill Company, No. 2 [1896] L.R. 2 Ch. Div. 279). (Emphasis 
added)38
While this decision was not carried to the Court of Appeals, and there­
fore it cannot be said to overrule Craig v. Anyon which was affirmed by 
the higher court, nevertheless it lends support to those who have con­
tended that the result in Craig v. Anyon was to be limited to its facts and 
was not to be construed as a holding that contributory negligence, as a 
matter of law, would necessarily limit the plaintiff’s recovery to the 
amount of fees paid.
37. See note 30 supra.
38. National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand, 256 App. Div. 226, 235-236, 9 N.Y.S. 2d 554, 
563 (1st Dep’t 1939).
LIABILITY TO CLIENTS 2 5
This case also is of interest to the profession because of the method 
employed by the embezzler in concealing his abstractions from petty cash. 
The shortages thus created were in the first instance covered up by tem­
porarily placing in the petty cash box checks which should have been 
promptly deposited. This resulted in a series of delayed and substituted 
bank deposits from day to day. During the period involved, Halle & 
Stieglitz maintained about twenty-seven accounts, nine of which were in 
New York City. Wallach, the cashier, apparently knew when audits were 
to be made and boldly resorted to “kiting” from one bank to another at 
the audit date. Through the use of this system of “lapping” deposits 
almost from day to day, and “kiting” checks at the audit date, he suc­
ceeded in avoiding detection for a period of years, while his defalcations 
mounted steadily. It was contended that these fraudulent practices were 
well known to all accountants and that the normal audit procedures 
usually employed in the verification of cash to guard against such prac­
tices were negligently omitted. The court made the following reference 
to this phase of the case:
The evidence in this case discloses similar conditions at the time of all 
the audits in question. It was for the jury to say whether the practice of 
“lapping” and “kiting” of checks should have put the defendants upon inquiry 
which would have led to discovery of the defalcations, and whether, if de­
fendants had exercised ordinary care and used proper methods of accounting 
as established by the expert testimony, they would have observed checks 
drawn out of numerical order. If they had checked “outstandings” they would 
have noted that the check or checks by Wallach at the audit dates were 
returned with the cancelled vouchers accompanying the next bank statement. 
Again, if there had been any substantial compliance with the requirements 
for verifying cash in banks, the cash shortages would have been detected, as 
the jury might have found. Their representations that there had been a 
verification of cash was a pretense of knowledge when they did not know 
the condition of the bank accounts and had no reasonable basis to assume 
that they did. This, the jury could have found, amounted at least to a con­
structive fraud. (Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 190, 191; State 
Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, supra, page 112.) 39
Flagg v. Seng40
This was an action by a trustee of a bankrupt corporation for damages 
for alleged fraud where the defendants, who were accountants, were em­
ployed by the corporation to make periodic audits of its books and re­
ports to its directors. The case was tried on the issue as to whether the 
defendant-accountants knowingly submitted false reports which deceived 
the directors and which caused them to declare dividends which could 
not be legally declared. The trial court found in all respects in favor of
39. Id. a t 235, 9 N.Y.S.2d a t 562.
40. 16 Cal. A pp£d 545, 60 P.2d 1004 (1936). R eprinted a t p. 163 infra.
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the defendants. The judgment in favor of the accountants was affirmed 
on appeal.
The case is of special interest because of the activity and knowledge of 
the directors who were alleged to have been deceived and because of the 
reliance of the accountants upon the opinion of the attorney for the cor­
poration concerning matters which, upon the trial of the case, were alleged 
to be illegal. These aspects of the case are discussed in the following ex­
cerpts from the court’s opinion:
Appellant’s main contention seems to be that stock in the corporation was 
exchanged for real estate in violation of the permit issued by the state cor­
poration department and that when a parcel of real estate was exchanged 
for other property at a price in excess of its original cost, the difference was 
entered on the books as a profit before the second piece was sold. The matter 
last referred to represents an established policy on the part of the directors, 
the books were thus kept on their order, and they were in no way deceived 
by anything done by the respondents in this connection. With respect to the 
other matter it appears that stock was, in effect, exchanged for real property. 
This was done by putting through escrows whereby the corporation’s check 
was given in payment for the land and the other party’s check was given in 
payment for the stock. While there is some evidence that certain papers 
in the files of the corporation indicated the true situation, although the same 
was not indicated by the books of the corporation, there is other evidence to 
the effect that this could not be learned from an examination of the books 
and records of the corporation, that it was unknown to the respondents ex­
cept in one instance, and that in that case the respondents took the matter 
up with the attorney for the corporation who assured them that the matter 
was perfectly legal. It further appears that whatever illegality existed and 
whatever harm arose therefrom was caused directly by the action of the board 
of directors, and that all such exchanges were made with their full knowledge 
and consent and in accordance with their fixed policy, and no inference could 
be drawn that anything done by the respondents had any casual relation to 
any part of this situation. (Emphasis added)
Not only are the findings sustained by the evidence, but we are unable to 
see how the matters particularly relied upon by the appellant can justify or 
compel any other conclusions than those drawn by the court. Conceding that 
certain sales of stock were illegally made this was not only well known to the 
directors but was intentionally done by them. They were not only not 
deceived by the audits and reports but they had intentionally handled the 
transactions in such a manner as to make them appear on the books as a cash 
transaction. While the court found upon sufficient evidence that the re­
respondents had no knowledge of those parts of these transactions which had 
been thus covered up and conceding, for the sake of argument, that the 
respondents might have found out the true situation by a more extensive 
investigation, it in no way appears that any discovery they might have made 
would have affected the result. The method pursued by the directors was 
followed on the advice of their attorneys and although the same has since 
been declared illegal, no such blame can be attached to the respondents, 
under the circumstances here appearing, as would justify a reversal of the 
judgment.41
41. 60 P.2d at 1007-1008.
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Suits by Surety Companies
Where losses occur as the result of defalcations by an employee of the 
client or through similar irregularities, it often happens that the client 
is protected by a fidelity bond. As a result, the surety company which 
issued the bond will indemnify the client for such losses to the extent of 
the fidelity bond coverage. Upon such payment, the surety company be­
comes subrogated to whatever claims the client may have had against the 
accountant for alleged negligence or fraud in the performance of auditing 
services. That is to say, a surety company, to the extent that it has made 
good such losses, succeeds to whatever rights the client may have had 
against the accountant for the failure of the accountant to discover such 
defalcations. This equitable principle of subrogation is defined as fol­
lows in Section 141, Restatement of Security:
Where the duty of the principal to the creditor is fully satisfied, the surety 
to the extent that he has contributed to this satisfaction is subrogated . . .  (c) 
to the rights of the creditor against persons other than the principal whose 
negligence or wilful conduct has made them liable to the creditor for the 
same default. . . .
Whether the surety company asserts a claim against the accountant by 
way of subrogation or assignment, this gives the surety company no greater 
rights than the client himself would have had, had he become the party 
plaintiff. Accordingly, the defense of the contributory negligence of the 
client may be asserted against the surety company.
Furthermore, the surety company cannot be neglectful in enforcing its 
remedies against the primary obligor (the defaulting employee) to the 
detriment of the accountant. Thus, in the fairly recent case of Fidelity 
& Deposit Co. v. Atherton,42 where the County Treasurer was primarily 
responsible for the defalcations of his deputy, he had made substantial 
payment to the surety company on account of the loss and had given his 
note for the balance, secured by a mortgage on property valued in excess 
of the amount due the surety company. The surety company had made no 
attempt to collect on this note, though it was long past due. The court 
held that the negligence of the surety to collect from the County Treasurer 
(the man who was primarly liable for the loss) was a sufficiently equitable 
ground for estopping the surety from attempting to collect the unpaid por­
tion of its loss from the accountants.
In recent years, it has become increasingly clear to the business com­
munity and to surety companies that while an audit offers a large meas­
ure of protection as a preventive of loss resulting from defalcations, the 
accountant does not undertake to uncover all such irregularities. Circum­
stances may arise where such frauds are perpetrated and remain unde­
tected despite the fact that the audit complied with generally accepted
42. 47 N.M. 443, 144 P.2d 157 (1943). Reprinted at p. 168 infra.
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auditing standards. In such circumstances, the accountant does not as­
sume the responsibility of an insurer. This is the function of the surety 
company and generally it is recognized as such by all parties involved.
This problem of the division of responsibility between the accounting 
profession and the surety companies has been widely discussed over the 
years. Such discussions culminated in December, 1945 in an agreement 
between the American Institute of Accountants and some twenty-three 
of the companies issuing fidelity bonds, by the terms of which, the surety 
companies agreed that it was not their intention to assert claims against 
accountants, except on the basis of affirmatively dishonest or criminal 
acts or gross negligence on the part of the accountants.43 It was stipu­
lated that prior to asserting such claim, the matter would be submitted 
to an impartial committee of three persons who were not accountants, 
who would consider the evidence relating to the audit performed. It 
was agreed by the surety companies that unless the committee concluded 
that the claim involved an affirmatively dishonest or criminal act or 
gross negligence on the part of the auditor, the surety company would 
not press any claim by way of subrogation against the accountant. Sub­
sequent to 1945, an additional number of surety companies became 
parties to this arrangement. It is encouraging to note that the use of 
this quasi-arbitration machinery has not yet been invoked. However, it 
has served to clear the atmosphere in defining the respective responsi­
bilities of the accounting profession and of surety companies in these 
situations. It does not relieve accountants from their responsibility to 
comply with generally accepted auditing standards. It does, however, 
recognize the fact that accountants are not insurers against loss by de­
falcation and that an audit, as valuable as it may be, is not the legal 
equivalent of a fidelity bond.
43. See Carey, Defalcation in Relation to A udit, Internal Control, and Fidelity Bonds, 
83 J ournal of Accountancy 353 (1947), also in 15 T he Controller 127 (1947). Re­
printed at p. 172 infra.
CHAPTER 3
LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES 
AT COMMON LAW
The legal responsibility of accountants and auditors to parties other 
than their clients (herein referred to as third parties) has been dealt with 
in a number of highly important American cases. These cases have 
defined and limited the accountant’s responsibility for negligence, but 
they have emphasized the accountant’s exposure to claims of third parties 
on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or deceit. These cases have also 
influenced the enactment of legislation which has broadened the re­
sponsibility for negligence where the claims of investors or securities 
purchasers are involved. These statutory rules will be outlined at a later 
point in this text.
The landmark cases relating to accountant’s liability to third parties 
now will be discussed.
The Landell C ase 44
This was an action brought against a firm of certified public account­
ants by a plaintiff who claimed that he had suffered loss through the 
purchase of shares of the Employers’ Indemnity Company, in reliance 
upon their financial statement which had been audited and certified to 
by the defendant-accountants. The complaint further alleged that the 
financial statement was false and untrue, that the stock purchased by 
him turned out to be valueless, that the loss he sustained was due to the 
negligence of the accountants in the conduct of their audit and that they 
were consequently liable for the loss he had sustained. The court below 
entered judgment for the defendants on the ground that, as a matter of 
law, the complaint failed to state a cause of action. On appeal, this judg­
ment for the defendants was affirmed, for the following stated reasons:
There were no contractual relations between the plaintiff and defendants, 
and, if there is any liability from them to him, it must arise out of some 
breach of duty, for there is no averment that they made the report with intent 
to deceive him. The averment in the statement of claim is that the defendants 
were careless and negligent in making their report; but the plaintiff was a 
stranger to them and to it, and, as no duty rested upon them to him, they
44. Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 Atl. 783 (1919). Reprinted at p. 175 infra. 
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cannot be guilty of any negligence of which he can complain: Schiffer v. 
Sauer Co. et al., 238 Pa,. 550, 86 Atl. 479, This was the correct view of the 
court below, and the judgment is accordingly affirmed.45
The Ultramares Case 46
The Ultramares case is undoubtedly the leading American case dealing 
with the legal responsibility of accountants. Early in 1924, the defendants, 
a firm of certified public accountants, had audited the books of account 
of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., who were importers and dealers in rubber, and 
had certified to their balance sheet as of December 31, 1923; the said 
certificate of the accountants reading as follows:
We have examined the accounts of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the year 
ending December 31, 1923, and hereby certify that the annexed balance sheet 
is in accordance therewith and with the information and explanations given 
us. We further certify that, subject to provision for federal taxes on income, 
the said statement, in our opinion, presents a true and correct view of the 
financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1923.47
The accountants supplied their clients with thirty-two copies of the 
certified balance sheet, knowing in a general way that it would be ex­
hibited by their client to banks and other creditors. The plaintiff in this 
action was one of the creditors to whom the balance sheet was later sub­
mitted, who claimed that he relied upon it in making substantial ad­
vances to Fred Stern & Co., Inc. It was not known to the accountants 
that the balance sheet would be submitted to this specific creditor.
The balance sheet as certified, showed a net worth of approximately 
$1,070,000, when, as a matter of fact, the corporation was at the time in­
solvent and its liabilities exceeded its assets by approximately $200,000. 
The assets had been overstated by the inclusion of over $950,000 of fic­
titious and nonexisting accounts receivable. The liabilities had been un­
derstated by over $300,000 through failure to record accounts payable 
covering merchandise which had been purchased, received, and dealt 
with as assets of the business. The audit had failed to detect these fraudu­
lent entries, and for the loss suffered by the plaintiff-creditor it brought 
this action against the accountants.
The action was brought in November, 1926. It was not until April, 
1929 that it was tried before a judge and jury in the Supreme Court of 
New York County. In its inception the complaint alleged a single cause
45. Ibid.
46. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 229 App. Div. 581, 243 N.Y.Supp. 179 (1st Dep’t 
1930), rev’d, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). Both opinions reprinted at pp. 175 and 
179.
47. See Beardsley v. Ernst, 47 Ohio App. 241, 191 N.E. 808 (1934), where the certif­
icate was specifically based upon statements received from abroad with respect to 
foreign constitutent companies. The case was distinguished from the Ultramares case 
on that ground. Reprinted at p. 192 infra.
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of action based upon the alleged negligence of the accountants. Upon 
the trial the complaint was amended to add a second cause of action in 
fraud. At the conclusion of the trial the complaint was dismissed as to 
fraud. However, the trial judge reserved decision on the motion to dis­
miss the negligence action and submitted the question of negligence to 
the jury. The jury brought in a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount 
of $187,576.32. The trial judge thereupon dismissed the complaint and 
set aside the verdict based on negligence, stating that his decision was 
based on the law and not on the facts. The case was taken to the Appel­
late Division which unanimously affirmed the dismissal of the cause of 
action for fraud, but, by a divided court of three to two, reversed the 
dismissal of negligence and reinstated the verdict.
The case was then taken on cross appeals to the Court of Appeals, 
which handed down its unanimous decision in 1931, reversing the Appel­
late Division on both causes of action. As to the cause of action for negli­
gence, the judgment of the trial judge was affirmed, dismissing the cause 
of action as a matter of law. As to the second cause of action, based on 
fraud, the judgment of dismissal was reversed and a new trial granted. 
The opinion for the unanimous court was written by Judge Cardozo. 
The court expressed the view that the evidence supported a finding that 
the audit was negligently made, but it reached the conclusion that even 
if negligence existed, it did not create liability to the plaintiff in the 
circumstances of this case. In this connection, the court stated:
The defendants owed to their employer a duty imposed by law to make 
their certificate without fraud, and a duty growing out of contract to make 
it with the care and caution proper to their calling. Fraud includes the 
pretense of knowledge when knowledge there is none. To creditors and in­
vestors to whom the employer exhibited the certificate, the defendants owed 
a like duty to make it without fraud, since there was notice in the circum­
stances of its making that the employer did not intend to keep it to himself. 
. . .  A different question develops when we ask whether they owed a duty 
to these to make it without negligence. If liability for negligence exists, a 
thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath 
the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an 
The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class, 
enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that 
exposes to these consequences. (Emphasis added)48
In this connection the court distinguished the facts in this case from 
those in Glanzer v. Shepard.49 In that case a public weigher, hired by 
the seller of beans, issued a false certificate of weight which was re­
lied upon by the purchaser. The purchaser sued the weigher on the 
ground of negligence and was permitted to recover. This earlier case 
was not reversed by the Court of Appeals. It was merely distinguished
48. 255 N.Y. at 179-180, 174 N.E. at 444.
49- 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). Reprinted at p. 194 infra.
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on its facts and not considered applicable to the Ultramares case. Ac­
cordingly, it is thought by many that if a case should arise where the 
third party who relies upon an accountant’s statement was specifically 
identified and known to the accountant as one for whose primary benefit 
the audit was made, then there might be liability even for negligence 
to such a third party.80 In comparing the facts of the Ultramares case, 
the court stated:
In Glanzer v. Shepard, the seller of beans requested the defendants, public 
weighers, to make return of the weight and furnish the buyer with a copy. 
This the defendants did. Their return, which was made out in duplicate, 
one copy to the seller and the other to the buyer, recites that it was made by 
order of the former for the use of the latter. The buyer paid the seller on 
the faith of the certificate which turned out to be erroneous. We held that 
the weighers were liable at the suit of the buyer for the moneys overpaid. 
Here was something more than the rendition of a service in the expectation 
that the one who ordered the certificate would use it thereafter in the opera­
tions of his business as occasion might require. Here was a case where the 
transmission of the certificate to another was not merely one possibility among 
many, but the “end and aim of the transaction,” as certain and immediate 
and deliberately willed as if a husband were to order a gown to be delivered 
to his wife, or a telegraph company, contracting with the sender of a mess­
age, were to telegraph it wrongly to the damage of the person expected to 
receive it. . . . The bond was so close as to approach that of privity, if not 
completely one with it. Not so in the case at hand. No one would be likely 
to urge that there was a contractual relation, or even one approaching it, 
at the root of any duty that was owing from the defendants now before 
us to the indeterminate class of persons who, presently or in the future, might 
deal with the Stern Company in reliance on the audit. In a word, the service 
rendered by the defendant in Glanzer v. Shepard was primarily for the in­
formation of a third person, in effect, if not in name, a party to the contract, 
and only incidentally for that of the formal promisee. In the case at hand, 
the service was primarily for the benefit of the Stern Company, a convenient 
instrumentality for use in the development, of the business, and only inci­
dentally or collaterally for the use of those to whom Stern and his associates 
might exhibit it thereafter. Foresight of these possibilities may charge with 
liability for fraud. The conclusion does not follow that it will charge with 
liability for negligence. (Emphasis added)50 1
In thus limiting the liability of accountants to third parties for mere 
negligence, the court indicated how negligence might of itself be evi­
dence from which an inference of fraud could be drawn. In this connec­
tion, the court stated:
Our holding does not emancipate accountants from the consequences of 
fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit has been so negligent as to 
justify a finding that they had no genuine belief in its adequacy, for this 
again is fraud. It does no more than say that, if less than this is proved, if 
there has been neither reckless misstatement nor insincere profession of an
50. See Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix N at’l Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574 (1930). 
This case was distinguished from the situation in Ultramares and held to be inappli­
cable thereto. Reprinted at p. 197 infra.
51. 255 N.Y. at 182-183, 174 N.E. at 445-446.
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opinion, but only honest blunder, the ensuing liability for negligence is one 
that is bounded by the contract, and is to be enforced between the parties 
by whom the contract has been made. We doubt whether the average busi­
ness man receiving a certificate without paying for it, and receiving it merely 
as one among a multitude of possible investors, would look for anything 
more.62
In dealing with the question of the possible liability of the account­
ants on the second cause of action, for fraud, the court concluded that 
in this case the certificate of the accountants involved both the repre­
sentation of fact and the expression of opinion. Thus it found that the 
accountants “certified as a fact, true to their own knowledge, that the 
balance sheet was in accordance with the books of account.” As to this, 
it was held, as a matter of law, that if their statement of fact was false, 
they were not to be exonerated because they believed it to be true. The 
court further concluded that there was ample evidence from which the 
jury might hold such a statement to be false. The court discussed this 
point further, stating:
Correspondence between the balance sheet and the books imports some­
thing more, or so the triers of the facts might say, than correspondence be­
tween the balance sheet and the general ledger, unsupported or even con­
tradicted by every other record. The correspondence to be of any moment 
may not unreasonably be held to signify a correspondence between the state­
ment and the books of original entry, the books taken as a whole. If that 
is what the certificate means, a jury could find that the correspondence did 
not exist, and that the defendants signed the certificates without knowing it 
to exist and even without reasonable grounds for belief in its existence.63
In reviewing the facts in the record concerning the audit that was 
made, the court dwelt upon the grounds for suspicion which existed, as 
reflected in the working papers of the accountants, and felt that a jury 
might have held that in the circumstances the limited testing and sam­
pling employed was entirely inadequate. The following quotation from 
the court’s opinion indicates how neglect to follow through with the most 
searching inquiry when suspicions are aroused may readily present a 
question for the jury as to whether there was a sincere belief in the 
opinion expressed:
How far books of account fair upon their face are to be probed by account­
ants, in an effort to ascertain whether the transactions back of them are in 
accordance with the entries, involves to some extent the exercise of judgment 
and discretion. Not so, however, the inquiry whether the entries certified as 
there, are there in very truth, there in the form and in the places where men 
of business training would expect them to be. The defendants were put on 
their guard by the circumstances touching the December accounts receivable 
to scrutinize with special care. A jury might find that with suspicions thus 
awakened, they closed their eyes to the obvious, and blindly gave assent.54 52 53 54
52. Id . a t 189, 174 N.E. a t 448.
53. Id. a t 189-190, 174 N.E. at 448.
54. Id. at 192, 174 N X  a t 449.
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On the whole record the Court of Appeals concluded that a jury might 
find that the accountants, in certifying to the correspondence between 
the balance sheet and the accounts, made a statement of fact as true to 
their own knowledge when they had no knowledge on the subject; also 
that a jury might find that the accountants acted “without information 
leading to a sincere or genuine belief when they certified to an opinion 
that the balance sheet faithfully reflected the condition of the business.” 
Accordingly the dismissal of the cause of action in fraud was reversed and 
a new trial was granted.
The State Street Trust Company Case 55
The principles enunciated in the Ultramares case were soon to be 
applied in two other cases now to be discussed. The action in the State 
Street Trust Company case was commented in December, 1932, subse­
quent to Judge Cardozo’s opinion in the Ultramares case. Accordingly 
the complaint was based on allegations of fraud although the evidence 
from which the jury was asked to find fraud involved gross negligence 
for the most part.
The audit covered the operations of Pelz-Greenstein Co. for the year 
1928 and their financial position as at December 31, 1928. This company 
was engaged in the factoring business, a form of commercial financing. 
They loaned money to firms who were manufacturers and merchants 
and made a profit from charging interest, commissions, deducting in­
terest, discounts, et cetera, in connection with the loans which they made 
to others and the collection of the accounts receivable assigned to them 
by their customers. Pelz-Greenstein Co. in turn obtained most of their 
own working capital from some seventeen banks to whom they were in­
debted in the aggregate amount of $4,275,000 on December 31, 1928. 
The plaintiff in this action was one of the said bank creditors who 
claimed that they had made loans in reliance upon the financial state­
ments certified to by the defendant-accountants, which were here at­
tacked as fraudulent misrepresentations.
The basic factual issues were different from those in the Ultramares 
case. Here it was claimed that the reserves set up for bad and doubtful 
accounts were grossly inadequate. Furthermore, it was contended that, 
in a long-form report which the accountants later submitted to their 
client only, material facts were revealed which indicated that the ac­
countants knew that the financial position was not fairly presented in 
the condensed report which they had issued for distribution to the banks. 
It was further claimed that the long-form report to the client was quali­
fied by making it subject to comments which were omitted from the
55. State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938). Reprinted 
at p. 203 infra.  
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condensed statement, whereas the condensed statement carried with it 
the unqualified certificate of the accountants. The certificate which was 
attached to the short-form report (described as “condensed statement”) 
read as follows:
We hereby certify that we examined the books of account and record (sic) 
pertaining to the assets and liabilities of Pelz-Greenstein Co., Inc., New York 
City, as of the close of business December 31, 1928, and, based on the records 
examined, information submitted to us, and subject to the foregoing notes 
[not here material], it is our opinion that the above condensed statement 
shows the financial condition of the company at the date stated and that the 
related income and surplus account is correct.
In comparison with the accountants’ certificate involved in the Ultra­
mares case, it is interesting to note (a) there was no reference to the 
statement being in accordance with the books, (b) the certificate em­
braced the “related income and surplus account,” as well as the balance 
sheet.
The case was tried in March, 1936 before a judge and jury in the 
Supreme Court of New York County. At the close of plaintiff’s case, 
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial judge reserved 
decision. The defendants thereupon rested without calling any wit­
nesses, renewed their motion to dismiss and also moved for a directed 
verdict. The trial judge reserved decision again and submitted the case 
to the jury. The jury rendered a verdict for plaintiffs in the amount of 
$246,000. Thereupon the trial judge granted a motion to set aside the 
verdict and directed a verdict for defendants on the ground that the 
jury’s verdict was not supported by the evidence. The Appellate Division 
unanimously affirmed (without opinion) 50 the directed verdict for de­
fendants, making it necessary for the plaintiffs to obtain permission from 
the Court of Appeals to carry the case to that court. The Court of Ap­
peals by a vote of four to two reversed the judgments below and granted 
a new trial.
The Court of Appeals reiterated the principles laid down in the Ultra­
mares case, which it summarized as follows:
We have held that in the absence of a contractual relationship or its equiva­
lent, accountants cannot be held liable for ordinary negligence in preparing 
a certified balance sheet even though they are aware that the balance sheet 
will be used to obtain credit. (Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170). 
Accountants, however, may be liable to third parties, even where there 
is lacking deliberate or active fraud. A representation certified as true to the 
knowledge of the accountants when knowledge there is none, a reckless mis­
statement, or an opinion based on grounds so flimsy as to lead to the con­
clusion that there was no genuine belief in its truth, are all sufficient upon 
which to base liability. A refusal to see the obvious, a failure to investigate 
the doubtful, if sufficiently gross, may furnish evidence leading to an in­
ference of fraud so as to impose liability for losses suffered by those who 56
56. 251 App. Div. 717, 298 N.Y.Supp. 176 (1st Dep’t 1937).
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rely on the balance sheet. In other words, heedlessness and reckless disregard 
of consequence may take the place of deliberate intention.
In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche (255 N.Y. 170) we said with no uncertainty 
that negligence, if gross, or blindness, even though not equivalent to fraud, 
was sufficient to sustain an inference of fraud. Our exact words were: “In 
this connection we are to bear in mind the principle already stated in the 
course of this opinion that negligence or blindness, even when not equivalent 
to fraud, is none the less evidence to sustain an inference of fraud. At least 
this is so if the negligence is gross.” (Emphasis added) 57
I t  would seem that the apparent inconsistency between the long-form 
report later submitted to the client and the short-form report upon which 
the plaintiff had relied was of itself the crucial evidence which the Court 
of Appeals felt supported the jury verdict of fraud. In the following 
discussion the court refers to this long-form report as “a letter of ex­
planation.” In the absence of an affirmative defense by the accountants 
the court seemed to attach sinister significance to the fact that a certified 
report should be supplemented by a more detailed document which 
went only to the client and that the detailed report was not released 
until after a delay of thirty days. This view is indicated in the following 
quotation from the opinion:
The record is, indeed, replete with evidence, both oral and documentary, 
to make a prima facie case against the defendants. In the first place, we have 
these accountants guilty of an act which is the equivalent of active misrepre­
sentation. On April 2, 1929, they sent to Pelz-Greenstein the certified balance 
sheet, with ten additional copies, knowing that it was to be used to obtain 
credit. "Nothing was said as to the persons to whom these counterparts would 
be shown, or the extent or number of the transactions in which they would 
be used. . . . The range of the transactions in which a certificate of audit 
might be expected to play a part was as indefinite and wide as the possibili­
ties of the business that was mirrored in the summary.” (Ultramares Corp. v. 
Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174.) Not until thirty days later did the accountants 
send to Pelz-Greenstein a letter of explanation of this balance sheet, and then 
apparently only one copy. So important was this covering letter in the minds 
of defendants that, although the balance sheet attached to the covering letter 
was in other respects substantially identical with the original balance sheet, it 
contained the following notation, which did not appear at all on the original 
balance sheet released thirty days earlier: "This balance sheet is subject to the 
comments contained in the letter attached to and made a part of this report.” 
One of the copartners, testifying before trial, said: “We wanted to try to pre­
vent anyone using this balance sheet, without knowing the scope of the exam­
ination which we made, which is set forth in paragraph 2 of the full report. 
. . . We have had cases where our entire covering letter had been deleted 
from these reports and just the balance sheet used.” Yet, in effect, these 
defendants themselves did just this. They held back this covering letter for 
thirty days and issued the balance sheet alone to the world of possible lenders. 
The loan by the plaintiff was made long before this important covering letter 
was even sent.
The above act of the accountants, in placing in circulation a certified balance *57
57. 278 N.Y. at 111-112, 15 N.E.2d at 418-419.
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sheet which they practically conceded should not be used without knowing 
the scope of the examination set forth in the covering letter, and then allow­
ing a period of thirty days to elapse before sending the covering letter, and 
then only one copy, whereas there had been ten copies of the certified balance 
sheet issued, was itself gross negligence and an important piece of evidence 
raising an inference of fraud.58
There was considerable additional evidence before the jury indicating 
that the accountants accepted the assurances of their client concerning 
the collectibility of accounts when the records before them should have 
aroused their suspicion to a point where independent inquiry was manda­
tory. From this evidence to support the allegation of gross negligence, 
the jury might have inferred that the expression of opinion concerning 
financial position (embracing the adequacy of reserves for bad and 
doubtful accounts) was a mere fraudulent pretense and that the ac­
countants did not entertain a sincere and honest belief in the opinion 
which they expressed. On this phase of the case the court stated:
The defendants urge that these defendants were excused from investigation 
because of a letter from Leon S. Pelz, treasurer of Pelz-Greenstein, in which 
he stated that Pelz-Greenstein had in its possession “sufficient saleable mer­
chandise to completely liquidate” these accounts. In other words, defendants 
were content to certify a balance sheet knowing it would be used to secure 
bank credit which contained an item of over $125,000 59 of apparently dead 
accounts on the uninvestigated and unsupported statement of the party seek­
ing the credit that these accounts were amply secured, although it appeared 
on the face of the books that there had been no realization upon this security 
for years. Where the books indicate the likelihood of a substantial loss, a 
failure to indicate this on the balance sheet can be justified only by an actual 
check-up. It does not suffice to rely instead upon the statement of an officer 
of the firm the books of which are being examined. If an accountant may 
disregard a situation which indicates substantial losses because he is informed 
by the person whose books are being examined that there is adequate secur­
ity, the balance sheet issued by the accountant, by its failure to point this 
out, contains a misrepresentation. The very purpose of the bank in seeking 
the balance sheet prepared by the accountant is to check any possible fraud 
on the part of the person seeking the loan. Yet these accountants contend 
that they may accept as true a statement by the party whose books are being 
examined, make no check-up or investigation on their own part, and issue 
a statement omitting entirely any mention of the reason why investigation of 
the security was omitted.
We have explicit expert testimony, uncontradicted, that under these circum­
stances it was improper accounting practice for defendants to accept a letter 
from Pelz-Greenstein, and that they should have investigated these accounts 
very fully to ascertain whether the companies were still in business and to 
ascertain definitely and independently what security, if any, Pelz-Greenstein 
held for the payment of these accounts.60
The opinion of the Court of Appeals also indicates that they were un­
58. Id. at 113-114, 15 N.E.2d at 419-420.
59. Sic, should clearly be $215,000.
60. 278 N.Y. at 118-119, 15 N.E.2d at 421-422.
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favorably impressed with the fact that the defendants rested without call­
ing any witness, “although there would naturally be available the men 
who made the audit, those who prepared or supervised the preparation 
of the working papers or the certified balance sheet and experts to refute 
the testimony offered by the experts called by plaintiff.” The conclusion 
to reverse the judgments below and grant a new trial was thus expressed:
The foregoing presents abundant evidence from which a jury could find 
that defendants knew facts which vitally affected the financial worth of Pelz- 
Greenstein, and which defendants totally suppressed on the certified balance 
sheet but disclosed to Pelz-Greenstein alone in the one copy of the covering 
letter sent thirty days later. The jury further could have found that the 
computation of reserves on the certified balance sheet was a misrepresentation 
which did not reflect the facts as known to defendants, and which they in 
good faith should have revealed. Where the record shows acts on the part 
of the accountants, as outlined above, we cannot say, as a matter of law, 
that plaintiff has failed to make out a case for the jury.61
There was an interesting dissenting opinion representing the views of 
two of the six judges who sat on this appeal. They stressed the fact 
that the only representation of fact here involved was the statement by 
the accountants that they had examined the books of account, which was 
undisputed. I t also pointed out that the defendants did not war­
rant or certify the accuracy of the balance sheet; they represented only 
that the balance sheet was “in their opinion” correct. W ith respect to 
the expression of such an opinion, the minority of the court went on 
to state:
The defendants are not liable for error of judgment; they are not liable 
even for lack of care in arriving at their opinion. They are liable only if 
the opinion expressed was not only erroneous, but was fraudulently expressed. 
Actual bad faith and intent to deceive is not always, it is true, an essential 
element in a cause of action for deceit. Such a cause of action may be estab­
lished against the defendants without proof that they expressed an opinion 
which they knew was incorrect; at least, however, there must be evidence of 
a ruthless disregard of whether the opinion was correct or not — the ex­
pression of an opinion where “the grounds supporting it are so flimsy as to 
lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief back of it.” (Ultra­
mares Corp. v. Touche . . .) 62
The discussion in this dissenting opinion of the inadequacy of reserves 
particularly warrants quotation:
Judge FINCH [who wrote the majority opinion] has, in his opinion, re­
ferred to the evidence upon which he bases his conclusion that it establishes 
fraud. I shall try to avoid repetition of that evidence. The most important 
of the alleged errors in the balance sheet is the failure to provide sufficient 
reserves for the collection of “commission accounts receivable.” The amount 
of reserves which should be set aside to take care of loss that may be suffered 
by reason of inability to collect such accounts is a matter of judgment. The
61. Id. at 121, 15 N.E.2d at 423.
62. Id. at 125, 15 N.E.2d at 424-425.
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defendants knew of circumstances which it is said pointed clearly to the 
conclusion that a reserve of $21,000 is insufficient to take care of these ac­
counts of over $2,043,337.81. Perhaps the defendants here showed a lack of 
caution. Their letter sent thirty days after the certified balance sheet was 
sent, shows that they knew that the reserve might prove insufficient. None 
the less, the amount of probable loss even with these circumstances known 
remained uncertain; the estimate of one per cent loss was doubtless over- 
optimistic, yet the estimate was based on facts which were not “so flimsy as 
to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief back of it” . . .
The next error which, it is argued, shows negligence so gross as to indicate 
a lack of honest belief based on substantial grounds is that no allowance was 
made for “commission account advances.” Many of these accounts were old. 
Again there are circumstances which perhaps should have acted as a warning 
signal to a cautious accountant. The defendants saw the signal — that is 
shown by the supplementary letter — but decided, nevertheless, to make no 
allowance. Again it would, doubtless, have been better if the defendants had 
given to those who might rely upon the balance sheet, the warning signal 
they had seen. They did, however, give notice on the balance sheet that ac­
counts were “inactive and in liquidation” and they removed them from the 
current assets of the business and placed them “below the line.” The owners 
of the business, men who at that time had a fine reputation, assured the 
defendants that they had sufficient security to liquidate these dead accounts. 
T can find here no justification for any argument that a balance sheet which 
shows that no allowance or reserve has been made for inactive accounts in 
liquidation may be held to be a fraudulent representation that no allowance 
or reserve is necessary.63
The minority concluded:
The jury might find that the defendants’ judgment was bad, but the court 
pointed out in the Ultramares case that liability cannot be predicated upon 
error however great in the exercise of judgment. The error of judgment does 
not indicate a willful expression of a false opinion, or an expression of 
opinion based on grounds so flimsy that the jury might conclude that the 
opinion was not based on genuine belief. To permit recovery in a case 
where the evidence does not sustain such a conclusion is to wipe out the 
distinction which this court has always drawn and which it reiterated in 
the Ultramares case.64
When one considers the views expressed in the minority opinion to­
gether with the fact that six judges in the courts below all felt the evi­
dence did not support the jury’s verdict of fraud, it would seem that the 
adverse decision in this litigation may have turned upon the existence of 
a long-form report which made the condensed statement seem misleading 
by comparison, coupled with the fact that the accountants chose not to 
defend their own work. This thought emphasizes the inherent danger, 
from an evidentiary standpoint, of the coexistence of a condensed and 
a detailed report.
63. Id. at 126-127, 15 N.E.2d at 425.
64. Id. at 128, 15 N.E.2d at 426.
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The O'Connor Case 65
This case involved an action by a group of persons who had pur­
chased shares of the preferred stock of G. L. Miller & Company, Inc., 
during 1925 and 1926, in alleged reliance upon a balance sheet dated 
August 31, 1925, which was stated to present the financial position after 
giving effect to proposed new financing, namely, the sale of thirty 
thousand shares of preferred stock at par, an aggregate offering to the 
public of $3,000,000. The balance sheet was published on the letterhead 
of defendant-accountants and was reprinted and incorporated in the 
prospectus which was used in the sale of the stock. At the bottom of the 
balance sheet, over the signature of the accountants, appeared the fol­
lowing certificate:
Our audit of the books and accounts of the G. L. Miller & Company, In­
corporated, discloses that the net earnings of the Company for the year ended 
December 31, 1924, were in excess of 2½ times the dividend requirements of 
the contemplated issue of 30,000 shares of 8% cumulative preferred stock, and 
that the net earnings for the eight months ended August 31, 1925, were in 
excess of 3 times the dividend requirements of said stock for the said eight 
months.
The corporation was adjudicated bankrupt in 1926. Its assets were in­
sufficient to pay the allowed claims of creditors and therefore the 
plaintiff-stockholders lost their entire investment. The action against the 
accountants was begun in 1928; it did not come to trial until 1934. Dur­
ing this period of time, the final decision in the Ultramares case was 
handed down. Shortly thereafter, the complaint in this case was amended 
so as to state a cause of action in fraud against the accountants, instead 
of negligence. Owing to the diversity of citizenship of the plaintiffs, the 
action was brought in the Federal District Court for the Southern Dis­
trict of New York. After a 13-week trial before a judge and jury, the 
jury brought in a verdict for the defendants, in May 1934. Several of the 
plaintiffs carried the case on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals 
where, in August 1937, by the unanimous decision of the court of three 
judges, the judgment for the defendants entered upon the jury verdict 
in the lower court was affirmed. Plaintiffs’ petition to the Supreme 
Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari, requesting that body 
to review the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals, was denied.
The business of G. L. Miller & Company, Inc. consisted in under­
writing mortgage bonds on real estate, usually on buildings to be con­
structed, acting as trustees under the mortgage indentures, and selling 
the bonds to the public. The criticism of the audit and the “certified” 
balance sheet involved a great many very complicated transactions and
65. O’Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 758 (1937). 
Reprinted at p. 214 infra.
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technical legal relationships growing out of the manifold functions of 
the client as underwriter, trustee, and disbursing agent in connection 
with the business which it conducted.
The main issues which emerged were the contentions of the plaintiffs 
that:
1. The audit and balance sheet were claimed to be “intentionally fraudulent 
in not adequately disclosing the amount of cash held in trust.”
2. Payments made by Miller & Company to complete the construction of mort­
gaged buildings were falsely shown in the balance sheet to be “Secured.”
3. Miller & Company itself guaranteed to bondholders the completion of build­
ings under construction, and the balance sheet made no mention of such con­
tingent liabilities.
4. The defendants made a false certificate as to the net earnings of Miller & 
Company.
The defendants and members of their staff who worked on the audit 
testified at great length as to the work done. Voluminous working papers 
supplied further evidence of the audit procedures followed and the ac­
counting evidence upon the basis of which their opinion was expressed. 
The testimony of experts was offered both on behalf of plaintiffs and 
defendants. There was a sharp conflict on the basic issue as to whether 
the audit was so conducted that a jury might infer that the accountants 
did not entertain a sincere and honest belief in the opinion which they 
expressed.
Accordingly, the judge carefully explained the applicable law and sub­
mitted the entire case to the jury. The circuit court commented as fol­
lows upon the charge to the jury:
The charge which Judge Patterson delivered to the jury was an exceptionally 
clear exposition of the applicable law. Since there was no contractual re­
lationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants, liability could be im­
posed only for fraud: a mistake in the balance sheet, even if it were the result 
of negligence, could not be the basis of a recovery. Ultramares Corp. v. 
Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 74 A.L.R. 1139. Fraud 
presupposes not only an untrue statement but also a fraudulent intent. On 
the question of falsity of the representations the jury was told that the issue 
was whether the defendants’ representations, “in the sense to be taken by an 
ordinary reasonable man,” were, in fact, true or untrue — whether a true or 
a false impression was created. On the question of intent, the jury was 
told that fraud may be established by showing that a false representation has 
been made, either knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or in reckless 
disregard of whether it be true or false; and that the issue was whether the 
defendants had an honest belief that the statements made by them were true. 
“If they did have that honest belief, whether reasonably or unreasonably, 
they are not liable. If they did not have an honest belief in the truth of 
their statements, then they are liable, so far as this third element [scienter] 
is concerned.” The jury was also told that an intent to deceive may be inferred 
from a lack of honest representation; and that, so far as alleged concealments 
or omissions were concerned, the issue was whether the omission to state 
certain matters was deliberate and intended to conceal. It was further
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charged that, if the audit made “was so superficial as to be only a pretended 
audit and not a real audit, then the element of knowledge of falsity of their 
representations is present, and they may be held liable.” Reading the charge 
as a whole, it seems to be in strict conformity with the established law . . .66
Upon this appeal the issue relating to the item “Notes and Accounts 
Receivable and Accrued Interest — Secured,” was particularly crucial. 
The trial judge stated that these assets were not secured as a matter of 
law. The plaintiffs contended that the defendants knew they were not 
secured. The defense maintained that they honestly, if erroneously, be­
lieved them to be secured. W ith respect to this issue the trial judge 
charged:
As matter of law it is my opinion, and I charge you, that these advances 
to complete unfinished buildings are not the kind of advances that are 
secured under the trust deeds. The point, however, is not so clear that per­
sons reading such parts of the deed might not, in good faith, entertain differ­
ent opinions; and the good faith of the defendants in representing these ad­
vances as secured is one of the questions of fact for you to determine under 
all the evidence applicable to these notes, and under the rules which I will 
later explain to you.67
The plaintiffs requested the trial judge to charge the jury that if they 
should find that the statement as to security was false and “that the de­
fendants represented to the plaintiffs that this was true to their own 
knowledge, as distinguished from belief or opinion, they were guilty of 
making a false balance sheet, even if they believed it to be true.” This 
request to charge was denied, and the denial became one of the important 
grounds for appeal. The circuit court supported the position of the 
trial judge, dealing with the question in the following language:
Accountants profess to speak with knowledge when certifying to an agree­
ment between the audit and the entries in books audited, but there is no 
suggestion in the cases relied upon that a statement by an auditor that notes 
are secured by the provisions of a trust deed is an assertion of knowledge 
rather than an expression of opinion. To suggest that a title examiner was 
guilty of fraud if he erroneously certified a title because he had honestly 
misconceived the legal significance of a provision in a deed would doubtless 
horrify counsel for the appellants no less than other members of the legal 
profession. There is no reason to hold accountants to a higher standard, 
when they deal with legal documents. The issue of the defendants’ good 
faith was rightly left to the jury.68
As to the alleged omission of contingent liabilities, it was stated:
T he charge called attention to the conflicting testimony and instructed the 
jury to weigh it. The refused requests were to the effect that omission of 
the contingent liabilities made the balance sheet false. In view of the con­
flicting testimony, such a charge was properly refused. Even if it were an abuse 
of good accounting practice to omit them, such an abuse was not fraud unless
66. Id. at 53-54.
67. Quoted in circuit court opinion, id. at 55.
68. Id. at 56.
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accompanied by an intent to conceal. The issue of fraudulent concealment 
was fairly put to the jury in the general charge. (Emphasis added) 69 
The circuit court concluded that a full and fair trial had been had;
that the instructions given to the jury as to the applicable law were cor­
rect; that the factual issues had been properly submitted to the jury 
and that the verdict of the jury for the accountants should not be 
disturbed.
General Comments
A comparative study of the foregoing three leading cases dealing with 
accountants’ legal responsibility to third parties supports the following 
general conclusions.
In the absence of special statutory rules (such as the Federal Securities 
Act soon to be discussed) there is no liability for mere negligence. How­
ever, the Ultramares case did not reverse such authorities as Glanzer v. 
Shepard and Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix National Bank, where it 
had been held that there would be such liability if there was a suffi­
ciently intimate relationship between the third party and the defendant. 
Thus, we still have the possibility of liability for mere negligence if the 
particular third party, or a limited group of which he was a member, 
was known to the accountant with sufficient definiteness as a party for 
whose primary benefit the certified statement of the accountant was 
intended.70
The Ultramares case held that a false representation of fact as of 
knowledge creates liability even if believed to be true. This rule em­
phasizes the vital distinction between representations of fact and ex­
pressions of opinion. It was a major issue in the Ultramares case in 
relation to the alleged representation that the balance sheet was in ac­
cordance with the books, and it was one of the major issues resulting in 
the reversal which sent the case back for a new trial. Plaintiffs in the 
O’Connor case sought unsuccessfully to have the court submit to the 
jury the question of whether or not the characterization “Secured” in 
relation to assets in the balance sheet was a representation of fact as of 
knowledge. However, it was there held that the use of this term involved 
only the expression of opinion concerning what was essentially a legal 
concept.
69. Ibid.
70. It should be noted, however, that the Court of Appeal in England, early in 
1951, dealt with just such a situation and on the authority of a line of earlier English 
cases held that the accountant was not liable for mere negligence to a plaintiff, other 
than his client, even though the accountant know definitely that his report was in­
tended for the use of and reliance upon by that specific plaintiff. The court divided 
two to one on the result, but the majority felt that the English precedents dictated a 
result in favor of the defendant accountant. The provisions of the English Companies 
Act were not involved Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co. [1951] 2 K.B. 164 (C.A.). For a 
full discussion of this case, see Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., Negligent 
Misrepresentation by Accountants, 67 L.Q. Rev. 466 (1951). Reprinted at p. 221 infra
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The principles that there is liability for fraud to persons outside the 
privity of contract, that gross negligence may be evidence of fraud, that 
even the expression of opinion may be a fraudulent representation if 
there is not a sincere and honest belief in that opinion — are all long 
established in the law.70a Only the application of such principles to the 
accountants’ situation is novel. It has shifted the strategy of third party 
plaintiffs from the battleground of negligence to that of fraud. How­
ever, it has not eliminated the legal distinction between fraud and negli­
gence, nor has it eliminated that distinction as a practical matter. But 
for the ruling in the Ultramares case, the O’Connor case would have 
been fought out on the issue of negligence and the jury would not have 
had to rest its decision upon the basic issue of the good faith of the 
accountants and their sincere belief in their opinion, even if erroneously 
held.
These cases highlight the decisive role of the jury in determining the 
legal responsibility of accountants. In Ultramares it was held that the 
case on fraud should have gone to the jury. In the State Street Trust 
case it was held that the verdict of the jury for plaintiff should not have 
been set aside. In the O’Connor case it was held that the jury verdict for 
defendants should prevail. Not only do the questions of negligence and 
fraud present factual issues to be passed upon by the jury, but so does 
the question of the reliance of plaintiff upon the work of the accountants, 
as well as the question of damage to plaintiff, if any, resulting from the 
fault of the accountants.
In the absence of a defense of his work, the jury is likely to assume 
a consciousness of fault on the part of the accountant. This may have 
been an important factor in the State Street Trust case. Similarly, if the 
testimony of plaintiffs’ experts is uncontradicted, it carries maximum 
weight with both court and jury.
Questions of auditing standards and accounting principles are matters 
of fact and not of law. If there is conflicting expert testimony, it is for 
the jury to decide which testimony it should follow. In this connection, 
where the cause of action is in fraud, the jury, in order to render a 
verdict for the accountants, does not have to do more than conclude that 
the accountant had an honest belief in his expressed opinion on these 
technical matters, even if such belief might have been erroneous. On 
the other hand, in areas where standards and principles have not been 
clearly defined, the lay jury may be misled and reach a conclusion 
disastrous to the defendants. Hindsight wisdom 71 lends plausibility to 
the arguments of plaintiff and is always a serious threat to the defense.
70a. For a recent application by a New York referee of the rules of the Ultramares 
and State Street T rust cases, see Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N. Y. Law J ournal 
7 (April 29, 1954). Reprinted at p. 247 supra.
71. As Justice Brewer observed in United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 
167 U.S. 224, 261, “Anybody could have discovered America after 1492."
CHAPTER 4
LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES 
BY STATUTE
The common law liability of accountants to third parties has been 
substantially affected by the enactment of the Federal Securities Act of 
1933 72 and the Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934.73 Insofar as the 
work of the accountant falls within the jurisdiction of the 1933 Act there 
can be liability for mere negligence as well as for fraud, to certain large 
classes of third parties, namely, the purchasers and owners of securities. 
As was said of the 1933 Act shortly after its enactment:
To say the least the Act goes as far in protection of purchasers of securities 
as plaintiff in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche unsuccessfully urged the New York 
Court of Appeals to go in the protection of a creditor. The change which that 
court thought so “revolutionary” as to be “wrought by legislation” has been 
made. And the duty placed on experts such as accountants has not been 
measured by the expert’s relation to his employer but by his service to 
investors.74
The Federal Securities Act of 1933 regulates the offering of securities 
for sale to the public through the use of the mails or in interstate com­
merce. It provides for the prior filing of a so-called Registration State­
ment with the Securities and Exchange Commission, in which there is 
disclosure of all material facts concerning the securities to be offered. In­
cluded in the Registration Statements are the relevant financial state­
ments of the issuer of the securities. These statements are required to be 
certified by independent public accountants who are usually certified 
public accountants. Section 11 (a) of this statute in part provides:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became ef­
fective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state 
a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the state­
ments therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it 
is proved that at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or 
omission) may, either at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdic­
tion, sue — . . .
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession 
gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been
72. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1946).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1946).
74. Douglas and Bates, T he Federal Scurities Act o f 1933, 43 Yale L.J. 171,198 (1933).
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named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, 
or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used in 
connection with the registration statement, with respect to the statement in 
such registration statement report, or valuation, which purports to have been 
prepared or certified by him; 75
It is further provided that no person, other than the issuer, shall be 
liable who shall sustain the burden of proof that:
as regards any part of the registration statement purporting to be made 
upon his authority as an expert or purporting to be a copy of or extract from 
a report or valuation of himself as an expert, (i) he had, after reasonable 
investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such 
part of the registration statement became effective, that the statements therein 
were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to 
be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, 
or (ii) such part of the registration statement did not fairly represent his 
statement as an expert or was not a fair copy of or extract from his report or 
valuation as an expert; 76
With respect to the amount of damages which the plaintiff may recover 
under the statute, it is stated:
Provided, That if the defendant proves that any portion or all of such dam­
ages represents other than the depreciation in value of such security resulting 
from such part of the registration statement, with respect to which his liability 
is asserted, not being true or omitting to state a material fact required to be 
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, 
such portion of or all such damages shall not be recoverable.77
The effect of the statute, as indicated by the above quotations, insofar 
as it relates to financial statements prepared or certified to by an inde­
pendent public accountant and included with his consent in the Registra­
tion Statement, may be summarized as follows:
1. Any person acquiring securities described in the Registration
Statement may sue the accountant, regardless of the fact that he is 
not the client of the accountant.
2. His claim may be based upon an alleged false statement or 
misleading omission in the financial statements, which constitutes 
his prima facie case. The plaintiff does not have the further burden 
of proving that the accountants were negligent or fraudulent in 
certifying to the financial statements involved.
3. The plaintiff does not have to prove that he relied upon the 
statement or that the loss which he suffered was the proximate re­
sult of the falsity or misleading character of the financial statement.
4. The accountant has thrust upon him the burden of establish­
ing his freedom from negligence and fraud by proving that he had, 
after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and 
did believe that the financial statements to which he certified, were
75. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1946).
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
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true not only as of the date of the financial statements, but beyond 
that, as of the time when the Registration Statement became ef­
fective.
5. The accountant has the burden of establishing by way of de­
fense or in reduction of alleged damages, that the loss of the plaintiff 
resulted in whole or in part from causes other than the false state­
ments or the misleading omissions in the financial statements. 
Under the common law it would have been part of the plaintiff’s 
affirmative case to prove that the damages which he claims he sus­
tained were proximately caused by the negligence or fraud of the 
accountant.
It should be noted that Section 13 of the 1933 Act bars any action under 
its provisions unless brought “within one year after the discovery of the 
untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have 
been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence.” 78 In no event can 
such an action be brought “more than three years after the security was 
bona fide offered to the public.”
No court cases against accountants have been reported under this Act 
since 1933 based upon alleged falsity or misleading omission as of financial 
statement dates. It would seem clear, however, that proof of compliance 
with generally accepted auditing standards would be an adequate and 
effective defense insofar as the statements speak as of their purported 
dates. It is the vague extension of responsibility beyond the financial 
dates and down to the “effective date” of the Registration Statement 
(which may be months later) which poses a difficult and unresolved prob­
lem. W hat constitutes the “reasonable investigation,” within the mean­
ing of the statute, that the accountant should undertake, covering the 
period from the completion of his audit down to the subsequent effective 
date, is still relatively an open question. Whereas generally accepted 
auditing standards have been promulgated with reasonable clarity, such 
standards are not applicable to the “reasonable investigation” covering 
this post-audit period. There is considerable difference of opinion as to 
what work the accountant should perform after the completion of his 
audit, to assure himself that the statements which are a fair presentation 
upon the completion of his audit work are also a fair presentation upon 
the subsequent effective date of the Registration Statement. It is generally 
considered essential to take the following steps:
1. Inspect the minutes down to a date reasonably close to the effective date.
2. Address inquiries to the management as to whether there have been significant 
events down to that date.
3. Inspect available unaudited financial statements dated subsequent to the 
audited statement dates.
T he “reasonable investigation” outlined above is far less than an audit, 
falls far short of compliance with generally accepted auditing standards,
78. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1946).
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and is not intended to afford a basis for the expression of an opinion as 
to any period or any transaction subsequent to the audited statement 
dates. It does serve, however, as a reasonable inquiry by the accountant, 
within the practical limits of the situation, to place him in a position 
where he feels justified in relying upon a presumption of continuance as 
to the fairness of presentation to which he certified as of the audited 
statement dates. On the other hand, if the accountant does have actual 
knowledge, however obtained, of material subsequent events, it  is gen­
erally considered to be his responsibility to insist that such facts of which 
he has actual knowledge are adequately disclosed.
The only recorded court case involving a claim against accountants 
under the Federal Securities Acts dealt with the failure to disclose a con­
tingent liability which had developed between the date of certification 
and the effective date. The case 79 was dismissed against the accountants 
as well as against the other defendants. The case arose in 1939 and is 
inconclusive for a number of reasons. The opinion of the court seemed 
to ignore any responsibility on the part of the accountants for events 
subsequent to the date when they certified the financial statements. The 
peculiar situation existed where the Registration Statement became ef­
fective on a given date but as of a prior date, which prior date coincided 
with the date on the accountants’ report. Furthermore, the action was 
dismissed on the additional grounds of a failure by the plaintiff to prove 
damages. The statute of limitations was also invoked. The decision was 
criticized in law reviews 80 on varying grounds and contributed very little 
toward the clarification of accountants’ responsibility under the statute. 
This case was recently discussed at some length in The New York Certified 
Public Accountant.81 *
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 relates in general to the regula­
tion of securities exchanges and the securities there traded in and listed. 
I t  provides, among other things, for the filing of annual reports with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, including financial statements cer­
tified by independent public accountants. Section 18 of the 1934 Act 
deals with the liability for misleading statements and is applicable to 
accountants involved in the certification of such statements. This Section 
provides as follows:
(a) Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any 
application, report, or document filed pursuant to this title or any rule 
or regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration 
statement as provided in subsection (d) of section 78o of this title, which state­
ment was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it 
was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall be liable
79. Shonts v. H irlim an, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1939). Reprinted at p. 253 infra.
80. 38 Mich. L. Rev. 1103 (1940); 50 Yale L.J. 98 (1940)
81. Rappaport, Accountants’ Liability Under the Securities Act, 21 N.Y. Certified
Public Accountant 763 (1951).
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to any person (not knowing that such statement was false or misleading) 
who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security 
at a price which was affected by such statement, for damages caused by such 
reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he acted in good faith and 
had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading. A person 
seeking to enforce such liability may sue at law or in equity in any court of 
competent jurisdiction. In any such suit the court may, in its discretion, re­
quire an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit, and assess 
reasonable costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, against either party 
litigant.82
The Statute of Limitations relating to actions under the 1934 A ct83 
contains 1-year and 3-year provisions which are substantially similar to 
those under the 1933 Act.
It will thus be seen that the provisions of Section 18 of the 1934 Act 
differ in the following significant respects from the comparable provisions 
of Section 11 of the 1933 Act:
1. There is no provision similar to the “effective date” require­
ment of a Registration Statement. In contrast, it is provided in the 
1934 Act that to be actionable, the statement must be false or mis­
leading “at the time and in the light of the circumstances under 
which it was made.” It would seem from this that the accountant is 
not obligated to extend his examination or inquiry beyond the 
completion of his audit work, even though the filing with the Secur­
ities and Exchange Commission may take place at some subsequent 
date. In the case of the 10-K report covering a calendar year, this 
is required to be filed on or before April 30th following the close of 
the year. It usually includes financial statements, the audit work on 
which may have been completed two or three months earlier. The 
accountant’s report usually bears the date of the completion of his 
audit and it would seem that his responsibility would be limited to 
his compliance with generally accepted auditing standards applied 
down to the date of the completion of the audit. However, if the 
accountant has actual knowledge of the occurrence of subsequent 
events which are of material significance, it would be incumbent 
upon him to insist upon adequate disclosure in the report.
A similar view was expressed in a paper read at the 1951 annual 
meeting of the American Institute of Accountants by the present 
chairman of its committee on auditing procedure, from which the 
following is quoted:
It should be recognized as entirely proper that there are situations in con­
nection with which we may acquire no knowledge of what has occurred after 
the date of our examination and, in the absence of any such knowledge, are 
able to release a standard form certificate within a reasonable period after 
the completion of our field work with no fear of responsibility for what might 
have happened in the interim period concerning which we had no contact 
with the client or his affairs. It would appear that this should apply in the 
case of an annual report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
83. Ibid.
82. 15 U.S.C. §78r (1946).
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or any similar body. If, for instance, the field work for a printed annual 
report is completed and the report is certified on February 14, and the work­
ing papers then contained necessary data for checking the company’s report 
to be rendered in April to the Commission, the independent accountant 
should check such report in April and furnish his certificate to accompany 
it with no responsibility for events which had occurred between February 15 
and April unknown to him.84
2. The plaintiff must prove his reliance upon the financial state­
ment and prove damages that were caused by such reliance.
3. While the plaintiff does not have the burden of proving negli­
gence or fraud on the part of the accountant, the accountant is given 
the statutory defense “that he acted in good faith and had no knowl­
edge that such statement was false or misleading.” This quoted 
language is consistent with freedom from fraud rather than freedom 
from negligence. It would seem, therefore, that the rule of the 
Ultramares case has been here enacted and that there would not be 
liability to third parties for mere negligence where the good faith 
of the accountant is established.
The civil remedies under the Federal Securities Acts apply only to 
purchasers and owners of securities and do not include claims of creditors 
who are not bondholders or the owners of similar securities. Securities 
transactions which are strictly intrastate matters would not be covered. 
Most of the states have their own so-called Blue Sky laws which regulate 
the issuance of securities and which do not contain specific provisions 
modifying the legal responsibility of the accountant under the common 
law. However, in the case of the State of Florida, the remedies of the 
Federal Securities Acts have been incorporated into their own state law 
by the following statutory enactment:
The same civil remedies provided by laws of the United States now or here­
after in force, for the purchasers of securities under any such laws, in inter­
state commerce, shall extend also to purchasers of securities under this 
chapter.85
84. Hill, Auditor’s Responsibility for Events after Balance-Sheet Date, Five New 
Guides to the Auditor’s R esponsibility 9 (papers presented at 64th annual meeting 
of the American Institute of Accountants 1951).
85. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 517.23 (West 1943).
Chapter 5
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
Situations may occasionally arise where the work of the accountant 
may be subjected to serious critical attack which nevertheless does not 
involve legal responsibility or civil liability. Though the claim may be 
made that an audit was performed or reported upon fraudulently or in­
competently, the claimant may be unable to prove that he sustained 
damages. Therefore he cannot maintain any action, either at common 
law or under the Federal Securities Acts. He may be a third party who 
cannot even sue for the recovery of a fee. In such circumstances, he may 
resort to the filing of a complaint seeking disciplinary action against the 
accountant involved. Though such a complaint may not include the 
threat of a judgment for money damages, it may place in jeopardy the 
reputation of the accountant, or even the retention of his CPA certificate. 
From this latter viewpoint it would seem relevant to include in this 
chapter some mention of disciplinary proceedings.
Disciplinary powers over accounting practitioners are vested in:
1. Professional societies such as the American Institute of Ac­
countants and the various state societies. These organizations have 
established codes of professional conduct for the breach of which a 
member may be expelled or suspended from membership, or cen­
sured.
2. Under the authority of state statutes regulating certified public 
accountants there is generally provision for the revocation or sus­
pension of the CPA certificate or the censure of the CPA where, 
after due notice and a proper hearing, the constituted authorities 
find evidence of specified professional misconduct.
3. The Securities and Exchange Commission in Rule II (e) of 
its Rules of Practice has provided:
(e) The Commission may disqualify, and deny, temporarily or permanently, 
the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person 
who is found by the Commission after hearing in the matter
(1) Not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; or
(2) To be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in un­
ethical or improper professional conduct.
It is significant to note that fraud and gross negligence in the practice 
of public accountancy have been included in the broad concept of pro­
fessional misconduct subject to disciplinary action. By way of illustration
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it is pertinent to quote Rule 5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of 
the American Institute of Accountants:
In expressing an opinion on representations in financial statements which 
he has examined, a member may be held guilty of an act discreditable to the 
profession if
(a) he fails to disclose a material fact known to him which is not disclosed 
in the financial statements but disclosure of which is necessary to make 
the financial statements not misleading; or
(b) he fails to report any material misstatement known to him to appear 
in the financial statement; or
(c) he is materially negligent in the conduct of his examination or in 
making his report thereon; or
(d) he fails to acquire sufficient information to warrant expression of an 
opinion, or his exceptions are sufficiently material to negative the 
expression of an opinion; or
(e) he fails to direct attention to any material departure from generally 
accepted accounting principles or to disclose any material omission 
of generally accepted auditing procedure applicable in the circum­
stances.
CHAPTER 6
WORKING PAPERS
Relevancy From an Evidentiary Viewpoint
In any case brought against an accountant on the ground that negli­
gence or fraud was involved in his work, it is altogether likely that the 
working papers relating to the audit will be offered in evidence in whole 
or in part. The evidence may be offered by the plaintiff to support his 
allegations of fraud or negligence. On the other hand, it may be the 
accountant who will introduce his working papers to establish the 
adequacy of his audit and the fairness of the opinion which he expressed 
in his report thereon.
To be more specific, the working papers may be relevant on one or 
more of the following issues which may arise in the case:
1. The working papers will constitute a record of the audit work performed, 
both from a qualitative and quantitative standpoint. That is to say, they 
will constitute proof of what records were examined, what inquiries were 
made, what confirmations were undertaken, etc. At the same time they may 
constitute a record of the amount of testing and sampling that was performed, 
which, in the judgment of the accountant, was adequate in the circumstances.
2. The extent to which the audit work was properly planned and supervised 
may be evident from the working papers.
3. The nature and extent of the review of the client’s system of internal control 
and its effective operation may appear in the working papers, and therefore 
the extent to which the accountant relied upon his appraisal of internal con­
trol in planning and carrying out his audit program.
4. The scope of his inquiries addressed to the client and the extent to which 
the accountant relied upon the client’s representations may be recorded in 
the working papers.
5. Working papers may contain information which the plaintiff claims should 
have aroused the suspicion of the accountant and resulted in an extension of 
his audit procedures beyond the work which was done.
6. The working papers in their entirety may be offered by the accountant as 
evidence of his compliance with generally accepted auditing standards in 
support of the opinion expressed in his report.
7. The working papers may contain information which the plaintiff claims 
should have been disclosed and the omission of which, it is claimed, makes 
the report of the accountant misleading.
8. Where the genuineness of the accountant’s belief in the opinion which he 
has expressed is put in issue, the working papers may offer persuasive evi­
dence of the thinking of the accountant in the development and formulation 
of his opinion.
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Even where the working papers themselves are not put in evidence, 
they may be used to refresh the recollection of the accountant as to sig­
nificant occurrences during the course of the audit and as to the circum­
stances existing in connection with his work which influenced his judg­
ment in many important ways. On the other hand, an inspection of the 
working papers by the plaintiff’s representatives may supply leads for 
inquiry and material for the cross-examination of the accountant.
Ownership of Working Papers — The Ipswich Mills Case
In view of the potential importance of the accountant’s working papers, 
many states have confirmed their ownership by the accountant through 
specific statutory enactment.86 Even in the absence of such statutory pro­
visions, however, the courts have recognized and upheld such ownership 
by the accountant.
The leading case on this point is Ipswich Mills v. Dillon,87 decided 
in 1927 by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. That was a case 
brought by a corporation against certified public accountants, the cor­
poration seeking to gain possession of certain documents held by the 
accountants, who had theretofore been employed by the corporation to 
make annual audits, prepare tax returns and statements for banks, and 
to represent the corporation in a Federal tax matter before the Bureau 
of Internal Revenue. There had been no special agreement between the 
client and the accountants as to the ownership of the documents. The 
papers were divided into the following categories for purposes of this 
litigation:
Group A consisted of papers that originated in the client’s offices or in 
the offices of its selling agents or of someone associated with them. The ac­
countants conceded that the client was the owner of these papers.
Group B included a copy of the amended Federal tax returns of the plain­
tiff for the year 1918 and certain papers (not work sheets) relating thereto.
Group C included copies of the client’s tentative and amended tax return 
for 1919 with work sheets and correspondence in connection therewith.
86. The states of California, Florida, Kentucky, Missouri, New Hampshire, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia and Washington, and Puerto Rico, have included such a pro­
vision in their statutes regulating the practice of public accountancy. In some instances 
the provision relates only to certified public accountants. In other instances, it relates 
to certified public accountants and public accountants. In all other respects, these 
provisions are substantially identical. The Virginia statute is quoted by way of illustra­
tion: “All statements, records, schedules and memoranda made by a certified public ac­
countant or a public accountant, or by an employee or employees of a certified public 
accountant, or public accountant, incident to or in the course of professional service to 
clients by such certified public accountant, or public accountant, except reports sub­
mitted by a certified public accountant, or public accountant, to a client shall be and 
remain the property of such certified public accountant, or public accountant, in the 
absence of a written agreement between the certified public accountant, or public ac­
countant, and the client, to the contrary.” Va. Code Ann. §54-101 (1950).
87. 260 Mass. 453, 157 N.E. 604 (1927). Reprinted at p. 263 infra.
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Group D consisted of papers and work sheets of revaluation of the client’s 
plant assets.
Group E consisted of the accountants’ work sheets of their July, 1922 report. 
Group F included papers, reports, returns, copies, work sheets, data, cor­
respondence and memoranda respecting the tax case, together with some
letters originating in the client’s office.
The trial judge had ruled that the client was the owner of all of the 
above enumerated papers, except those in Group F, and entitled to their 
immediate possession. As to Group F, he ruled that the client and the 
accountants were jointly interested in those papers, with the right in the 
client to take them temporarily from the accountants.
On appeal, this decision was reversed and it was held that except for 
group A (which the accountants conceded belonged to the client) all 
enumerated papers and documents belonged to the accountants. The 
appellate court stressed the fact that the accountants were not mere em­
ployees of the client but were independent contractors functioning in a 
professional capacity. The court also was impressed with the necessity 
for the accountants retaining possession of all of these documents “if the 
accuracy of their work was questioned.” The following quotations from 
the court’s opinion further explain the decision reached:
The carbon copies of the defendants’ letters to the collector of internal 
revenue did not belong to the plaintiff. Whatever right it may have to ex­
amine these copies, or take copies of them, which point we are not called 
upon to decide, the defendants’ copies did not belong to the plaintiff; they 
were owned by the defendants. The fact that the copies of these letters con­
cern the plaintiff is not a sufficient reason for depriving the defendants of 
their property. In writing the letters the defendants were not the plaintiff’s 
servants.
In group C there are copies of Federal tax returns. These, as we under­
stand from the record, were the defendants’ office copies. The record shows 
that copies of all returns and schedules prepared by the defendants for the 
plaintiff were sent to the plaintiff. Even if the plaintiff has a right to require 
further copies, a question not involved in this suit, it has no right to demand 
of the defendants the surrender of these office copies. They were the property 
of the defendants.
The work sheets, as defined by the trial judge, were the defendants’ property.
They were made by them while engaged in their own business. The paper 
on which the computations were made belonged to them. They were not 
employed to make these sheets. The sheets were merely the means by which 
the work for which the defendants were employed might be accomplished. 
The title to the work sheets remained in the defendants after the computa­
tions were made. In the absence of an agreement that these sheets were to 
belong to the plaintiff, or were to be held for it, they were owned by the 
defendants. It may be that these papers contained information confidential 
in its nature and of importance to the plaintiff; but the defendants did not 
receive this information as the plaintiff’s servants. . . . The interest of the 
plaintiff in the information collected and copied by the defendants and the 
confidential nature of this information do not give title to the plaintiff of
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the defendants’ working papers. They were made by the defendants solely 
for their own assistance in preparing the tax returns.
With reference to group F, the letters addressed to the defendants, copies of 
letters written by the defendants, copies of returns furnished to the plaintiff, 
and work sheets relating to the tax case, are the sole property of the defend­
ants, and this is true of the papers and reports collected by the defendants in 
the preparation of the tax case. The plaintiff is not jointly interested with the 
defendants in these documents. We do not understand that any of these 
reports, papers and returns were property of the plaintiff which had been 
placed in the defendants’ custody by the plaintiff or merely delivered to the 
defendants. If there are any papers belonging to the plaintiff which were 
lent to the defendants, the plaintiff is entitled to them; but as we construe 
the record, the papers referred to in group F were gathered and collected 
by the defendants in the course of their business, and were not papers of the 
plaintiff placed by it in the defendants’ possession.88
The New York Surrogate's Court Case 89
A case arising in the New York Surrogate’s Court in 1936 indicated 
that the property rights of the accountant in his working papers may be 
qualified or limited in certain circumstances. A certified public account­
ant, who had been an individual practitioner for a number of years prior 
to his death in 1933, in his will bequeathed to his secretary “all of my 
office files and records.” Upon the proceeding to settle the accounts of 
the executrix, the Surrogate’s Court was called upon to decide whether 
the language in the will included working papers and if it did, whether 
or not the testator had a legal right to dispose of them by will. The Sur­
rogate held that no such right existed, but in so holding, it did not differ 
with the Ipswich Mills case.
The Ipswich Mills case did not deprive the client of the right to prevent 
the accountant from disclosing to other persons the confidential informa­
tion in his working papers. In other words, the title of the accountant to 
his working papers was always subject to his obligation to deal with 
the information there contained in compliance with the confidential 
relationship of client and accountant. This legal principle was not 
abrogated by the Ipswich Mills case, nor could it have been, without 
doing violence to the rights of the client implied in the client-accountant 
relationship.
If the deceased accountant had been a member of a partnership and 
had bequeathed his interest in the partnership papers to any one or all 
of his surviving partners, the question presented in this case would not 
have arisen. The confidential nature of the working papers would have 
been safeguarded despite the transfer of ownership of the interest in them
88. Id. a t 457-458, 157 N.E. at 606-607.
89. Estate of William H. Dennis, 95 N.Y. Law J ournal 827 (Surr. Ct. Feb. 15, 1936). 
Excerpt reprinted a t p . 266 infra.
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possessed by the decedent. But this was the case of an individual practi­
tioner who had no surviving partners. If the court had recognized an 
unqualified right in the testator to deal with his working papers as he 
would with other assets of his estate, then his legatee in turn could dispose 
of them to anyone else, even to a competitor of the client. Similarly, if 
the ownership of these working papers was to be regarded in the same 
category as the ownership of other assets, it would have been necessary 
to recognize the paramount right of creditors who might assert their 
claims against the working papers and dispose of them by sale for the 
satisfaction of the debts of the decedent.
The Surrogate wisely held that after the executrix had assured herself 
that there was no basis for claims against the estate which would require 
the retention and preservation of the working papers for the protection 
of the accountant’s estate, she was to return to the respective clients all 
working papers which had originated in their offices and to destroy all 
working papers which the deceased accountant himself had prepared.
This important case, which bristles with undecided and unresolved 
implications, is not recorded in the official reports. It has been rescued 
from obscurity, so far as accountants are concerned, through the very 
comprehensive discussion of it which appeared contemporaneously in The  
Journal of Accountancy.90 91The comments on the case in this chapter are 
based upon that discussion.
The Frye Case 91
This case was decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio in May, 1951. 
It is of special interest to practicing accountants for at least three reasons:
1. It is an illustration of the uncomfortable predicament of an 
accountant who is not a party to a litigation brought against his 
client, but who, nevertheless, is compelled by legal process to testify 
against his client’s interests by divulging the contents of his working 
papers.
2. While reaffirming the Ipswich Mills case, it holds that the mere 
possession of legal title to his working papers does not give the ac­
countant the legal right to refuse to disclose their contents to parties 
other than his client, where such disclosure is ordered by the courts 
incidental to litigation or for other reasons.
3. It clarifies the legal limitations affecting the confidential 
nature of his working papers and the qualified obligation of the 
accountant to refrain from disclosing the contents thereof.
The client in this case was being sued by a sales agent who had been 
in its employ, who claimed commissions to be computed on a percentage
90. 61 J ournal of Accountancy 246 (1936).
91. In  re Frye, 155 Ohio St. 345, 98 N.E.2d 798 (1951). R eprinted a t p. 267 infra.
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basis. The accountant, who had audited the books of the client, was 
served with a subpoena duces tecum requiring the production by the ac­
countant of “all records or copies of records in your possession relating to 
the financial condition or operation of [the client] from the date of its 
organization to the present day; including copies of all . . . tax returns, 
state or federal . . .”
The accountant appeared for examination, testified that she had been 
the client’s auditor since its organization, and presented and identified 
some thirty separate exhibits consisting of audit reports, financial state­
ments, and commission statements. At a subsequent hearing the account­
ant appeared with counsel who objected to the introduction in evidence 
of the accountant’s working papers previously identified or of “photo­
static replicas” thereof. To lay a foundation for such objection, she 
testified that she did work for the defendants as an independent con­
tractor in the capacity of auditor; that she had no records which belonged 
to the defendant; that the records which she had previously identified 
were her own personal records; that when she made out the tax returns 
for the client, she gave it the originals and copies for its files and that the 
client did the filing of the tax returns. Upon her persistent refusal, she 
was cited for contempt and put under technical arrest. The legal issues 
thus raised finally came before the Ohio Supreme Court on appeal.
The court held against the accountant and ruled that she was lawfully 
obligated to produce the documents for use in evidence. It was held 
that the Ipswich Mills case did not apply to this situation, the court 
stating:
In that case the papers were not under subpoena in the hands of the account­
ants to produce them in court. Doubtless they were subject to subpoena 
but this question was in no way before the court. The sole question deter­
mined was the ownership of the papers. Doubtless in a proper case a court 
will protect the owner of papers and documents so far as their custody is 
concerned by requiring the party calling for them for evidential purposes 
to make photostatic or other proper copies of the same so that the owner 
may retain the originals. Such an offer was made to Frye by the plaintiff 
in the instant case but the offer was rejected.92
The accountant also contended that the documents sought in evidence 
related to the income tax returns of the client and that their production 
by the accountant would be in violation of the United States Internal 
Revenue Code which provided:
It shall be unlawful . . . for any person to print or publish in any manner 
whatever not provided by law any income return, or any part thereof or 
source of income, profits, losses, or expenditures appearing in any income 
return. . . .93
92. Id. at 351, 98 N.E.2d at 802.
93. 26 U.S.C. §55f (1946).
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The court disposed of this contention in the following ruling:
Furthermore, there is no infraction of the statute involved in this proceeding.
The latter part of the statute above quoted prohibits any person from print­
ing or publishing tax returns or sources of income, profit, losses or expendi­
tures appearing in any income tax return, in any manner “not provided by 
law.” This statute does not and could not legally inhibit the disclosure, as evi­
dence in a proper judicial inquiry or where required by law, of the operative 
financial data relating to the business of a taxpayer, even though such data 
comprehends the elemental facts and information from which his income tax 
return is necessarily made up. The law could never sanction such a sweeping 
prohibition of disclosure of the essential facts of the business world. It must 
be evident that the statute in question has no such purpose or intent.94
The broad question of the duty of the accountant not to disclose the 
information involved because of its confidential nature, was dealt with 
by the court in the following terms:
In the absence of a privilege created by constitution or statute not to disclose 
available information, a witness may not refuse to testify to pertinent facts 
in a judicial proceeding merely because such testimony comprehends a com­
munication or report from himself as agent to his principal or as independent 
contractor to his employer, no matter how confidential may be the character 
of the communication itself or the relationship between the parties thereto. 
See 146 A.L.R. 966. And where one possesses knowledge of facts which are 
pertinent to a judicial inquiry, he may be required to testify or to produce 
papers and documents as to such facts. In discussing this subject, 58 American 
Jurisprudence, 40, Section 32, states the rule as follows: “It is a general rule 
that a witness possessing knowledge of facts material to the vindication of 
the rights of another may be compelled by judicial process to appear and give 
evidence in behalf of that other party, notwithstanding the evidence thus 
coerced may uncover the witness’s private business. This rule is also gen­
erally held applicable when the information sought is contained in books 
and papers. Accordingly, it has been held that it is no ground for the refusal 
of a witness to produce books and papers, when required by lawful author­
ity, that they are private. The duty of witnesses to disclose the details of their 
private business for the benefit of third persons when required in the adminis­
tration of justice, is one devolving on them as members of a civilized com­
munity.” . . .95
The above quoted language of the court defines and limits not only 
the legal obligation but the ethical duty of the accountant concerning 
the confidential relationship existing between himself and his client, a 
relationship which has been set forth in the Institute’s Rule 16 of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. The legal position of the accountant 
with respect to the question of privileged communication status (which 
will be dealt with in the following pages) was only indirectly involved 
in the Frye case.
94. 155 Ohio St. at 352, 98 N.E.2d at 802.
95. Id. at 354, 98 N.E.2d at 803.
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In the Frye case it was emphasized that neither the confidential nature 
of an accountant’s working papers nor the personal ownership of them 
by the accountant was sufficient legal reason for a refusal by the ac­
countant to divulge their contents in a judicial proceeding to which they 
were relevant. A different result might have been reached by the court 
had the relationship of accountant and client conferred upon these docu­
ments the status of privileged communications.
Such a status of privilege has been recognized under the common law 
as to confidential communications between attorney and client, and be­
tween husband and wife, and by statute generally as to confidential com­
munications between physician and patient and between priest and 
penitent. Statutes have also codified and to some extent limited the com­
mon law privilege accorded to the attorney-client and the husband-wife 
relationship. W ith special reference to the accountant-client relation­
ship, however, it has been held that no such privilege ever existed under 
the common law and that none will be recognized in the absence of a 
statute specifically creating such a status.
The leading case which so held was that of In re Fisher?96 decided in 
1931 in the Federal District Court of the Southern District of New York 
(a state which has no accountant privilege statute). The question arose 
during the course of bankruptcy proceedings. The witness involved was 
both a certified public accountant and a lawyer. He had acted as the 
bankrupt’s accountant for a number of years and, after his later admis­
sion to the bar, also acted as the bankrupt’s attorney. He refused to an­
swer questions relating to the bankrupt’s books of account or to produce 
working papers prepared by members of his accounting staff in the course 
of auditing the bankrupt’s books. It would appear that he relied upon 
the privilege arising from the attorney-client relationship with the bank­
rupt, but the court, in directing the witness to testify, gave consideration 
as well to the fact that the evidence involved was obtained by the witness 
in his capacity as accountant. In support of its conclusion, the court 
stated:
There is no privilege with regard to communications made to accountants.
The information given to the witness and to the accountants in his employ 
for the purpose of making financial statements and doing other work charac­
teristically performed by accountants is not privileged, despite the fact that
96. 51 F.2d 424 (S.D. N.Y. 1931). Reprinted at p. 273 infra.
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the witness may also have rendered legal advice on the basis of such data. See
Matter of Robinson, 140 App. Div. 329, 125 N.Y.S. 193, where it was held 
that an attorney for a corporation, who was one of its directors, could not 
refuse to disclose information about corporate affairs by claiming his pro­
fessional privilege.
Furthermore, the privilege accorded to an attorney is the privilege of the 
client and not of the attorney. Baumann v. Steingester, 213 N.Y. 328, 107 
N.E. 578, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 1071. For this reason the attorney cannot claim 
privilege where the client has already disclosed the substance of the commu­
nication. Baumann v. Steingester supra. Nor can he claim privilege where 
the communication was made with the understanding that it was to be im­
parted to third parties. Rosseau v. Bleau, 131 N.Y. 177, 30 N.E. 52, 27 Am. St. 
Rep. 578.
In the case at bar it appears that the bankrupt has already testified with re­
spect to the matters contained in his books and records. And the income tax 
returns and financial statements drawn up from the communications made 
by bankrupt to the witness were obviously intended to be communicated 
to others.
For these reasons, the witness should be directed to testify with regard to the 
bankrupt’s books and to produce in evidence the monthly work sheets made 
by the accountants.97
In the case of Himmelfarb v. United States,98 decided in 1949 in the 
Federal courts of California (a state which has no accountant privilege 
statute) it was again held that privileged communications are not recog­
nized as between a client and his accountant. In that case the certified 
public accountant had been employed by the client’s attorney during 
the pendency of an investigation by the special agents of the Intelligence 
Unit of the Treasury Department. The accountant attended numerous 
conferences with the attorney and the client and also examined the client’s 
records. In an effort to work out a settlement, the attorney and the ac­
countant had supplied the Treasury agents with considerable docu­
mentary material which the accountant had assembled from the books 
and records. On the trial which followed, the accountant was subpoenaed 
and identified the documents, which were then put in evidence over the 
objection of the client’s attorney. The court held that even if the ac­
countant had obtained some of the information by being present at con­
ferences between the client and the attorney, such communications were 
not privileged. The accountant’s “presence was not indispensable in 
the sense that the presence of an attorney’s secretary may be. It was a 
convenience which, unfortunately for the accused, served to remove the 
privileged character of whatever communications were made. Of course, 
communications made by the client to such a third party in the presence 
of the attorney are not within the privilege.” 99
97. Id. at 425.
98. 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949). Excerpt reprinted at 
p. 274 infra.
99. Id. at 939.
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It was held that, from any viewpoint, the documents prepared by the 
accountant were properly admissible. To the extent that they were based 
upon information given to the accountant directly by the client or ob­
tained from the client’s records, there was no privilege growing out of 
the accountant-client relationship. Insofar as the documents were based 
upon information overheard by the accountant at conferences between 
the client and the attorney, which would otherwise have been privileged, 
the presence of the accountant destroyed the privilege.
It was similarly held in the later income tax evasion case of Gariepy v. 
United States100 that under the common law there is no accountant-client 
privilege. In this instance the Michigan statute creating an accountant- 
client privilege was expressly inapplicable in a criminal case.
The Himmelfarb case was specifically cited and followed in  1951, in 
the Federal courts in Pennsylvania, in the case of United States v. 
Stoehr.101
Although all of these cases arose in the Federal courts in connection 
with criminal or bankruptcy matters, they consistently support the propo­
sition that, in the absence of statutory provision, there is no status of 
privilege applicable to the confidential communications between client 
and accountant similar to that which applies to the communications 
between attorney and client.
Statutes which confer the status of privileged communications upon 
information obtained by accountants during the course of their work 
have now been enacted by twelve of our states and by Puerto Rico. These 
statutes fall roughly into three groups:
1. Arizona,102 Iowa,103 Maryland,104 Michigan and Tennessee105 
specifically provide that the privilege is not applicable in situations 
involving criminal or bankruptcy laws. All of this group, except 
Tennessee, apply to certified public accountants and public account­
ants. The Tennessee statute mentions only certified public ac­
countants. These are other variations within this group, but the 
Michigan statute may be quoted as a fair example:
Except by written permission of the client, or person, or firm, or corporation 
employing him, or the heirs, successors or personal representatives of such 
employer, a certified public accountant, or a public accountant, or a person 
employed by a certified public accountant or by a public accountant shall not 
be required to, and shall not voluntarily, disclose or divulge information of 
which he or she may have become possessed relative to and in connection 
with any examination of, audit of, or report on, any books, records, or ac-
100. 189 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1951). Excerpt reprinted at p. 276 infra.
101. 100 F. Supp. 143 (M.D. Pa. 1951), aff’d, 196 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 
344 U.S. 826 (1952). Excerpts reprinted at p. 277 infra.
102. Ariz. Code Ann. § 67-609 (1939).
103. Iowa Code Ann. §116.15 (West 1949).
104. Md. Ann. Code Art. 75A, § 11 (1951).
105. T enn, Code Ann. § 7097.12 (Williams Replacement Volume 1941).
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counts which he or she may be employed to make. The information derived 
from or as the result of such professional service shall be deemed confidential 
and privileged: Provided, however, That nothing in this paragraph shall be 
taken or construed as modifying, changing or affecting the criminal or bank­
ruptcy laws of this state or of the United States.106
2. Florida,107 Illinois,108 Kentucky,109 Louisiana, New Mexico110 
and Puerto R ico111 do not exclude criminal or bankruptcy matters 
from the provisions of this statute. The Louisiana statute is quoted 
as an example of this group:
No certified public accountant, public accountant, or person employed by 
certified public accountant or public accountant, shall be required to, or vol­
untarily disclose or divulge, the contents of any communication made to him 
by any person employing him to examine, audit, or report on any books, 
records, or accounts, or divulge any information derived from such books, 
records or accounts in rendering professional services except by express per­
mission of the person employing him or his heirs, personal representatives 
or successors.112
3. Colorado and Georgia may be considered a third group which, 
like the second group, does not exclude criminal and bankruptcy 
matters from the statutes, but mentions certified public accountants 
only. As these statutes create a status not recognized under the 
common law, they would be strictly construed and therefore would 
exclude from their provisions accountants who were not certified 
public accountants. However, there are very important differences 
in wording between the Colorado and Georgia statutes, and for this 
reason it is advisable to quote both.
The Colorado statute provides:
Who may not testify without consent. There are particular relations in which 
it is the policy of the law to encourage confidence and to preserve it inviolate; 
therefore, a person shall not be examined as a witness in the following 
cases: . . .
Sixth —  A certified public accountant shall not, without the consent of his 
client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him in 
person or through the media of books of account and financial records, or 
his advice, reports or working papers given or made thereon in the course 
of professional employment, nor shall a secretary, stenographer, clerk or assist­
ant of a certified public accountant be examined without the consent of the 
client concerned concerning any fact, the knowledge of which he has acquired 
in such capacity.113
106. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 18.23 (Callaghan 1937).
107. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 473.15 (West 1952).
108. I I I .  Ann. Stat. Ch. 110½, §22 (Smith-Hurd 1935).
109. Ky. R ev. Stat. § 325.440 (1953).
110. New Mexico Stat. Ann. §51-1736 (Cum. Supp. 1941).
113. Colo. Stat. Ann. Ch. 177, §9  (Replacement Volume 1949).
111. Laws of 1945, Act No. 293, § 19.
112. La. R ev. Stat. Ann. §37.85 (West 1951).
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The Georgia statute provides:
Any communications to any practicing certified public accountant trans­
mitted to such accountant in anticipation of, or pending, the employment 
of such accountant shall be treated as confidential and not disclosed nor 
divulged by said accountant in any proceedings of any nature whatsoever. 
This rule shall not exclude the accountant as a witness to any facts which 
may transpire in connection with his employment.114 15
It should be reiterated that there are other important variations in 
wording in the statutes within the other groups. This should be kept in 
mind in considering the legal problems which may arise in any particular 
engagement.
There is frequently the question as to whether the federal or the state 
rule will govern in any particular case. This question was raised in a 
proceeding before the Securities and Exchange Commission, where the 
Commission held that it was not inhibited by the Illinois statute from 
admitting in evidence a confidential communication contained in the 
accountant’s working papers. The following is quoted from the Com­
mission’s release in that case:
Registrant also asserts that the Kuiper memorandum was erroneously ad­
mitted in evidence because of an Illinois statute which provides that a pub­
lic accountant is not required to testify as to information obtained by him in 
his capacity as a public accountant (2 Ill. Stat. Ann. (Jones) Sec. 1.19).
It is clear that the common law never recognized any privilege in the account­
ant-client relationship (In re Fisher 51 F. (2d) 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1931)). More­
over, state legislation purporting to create such a privilege is given no effect 
in federal courts outside the state (Doll v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 138 Fed. 
705 (C.C.A. 3d, 1905)). While, in this case, the Kuiper memorandum was 
introduced during a session held in Illinois, the hearing was originally ordered 
to be held in Washington, D.C., and a large portion of the hearing was actu­
ally conducted in that city. Since it is clear that such a statutory privilege is 
not recognized outside the state and that no objection based on such a privi­
lege could have been directed to the introduction of the Kuiper memorandum 
during that portion of the hearing held in Washington, D.C., it would be 
manifestly absurd to hold that the memorandum must be excluded because 
of the fortuitous circumstance that it was introduced while the hearing was 
being conducted in Illinois. Moreover, while the question need not be re­
solved here, we have some doubt whether state limitations on the admissibility 
of evidence which go beyond the common law rules of evidence can be bind­
ing in any case in hearings of a tribunal having no fixed situs analogous to 
that of the federal district courts. For the underlying basis for the conformity 
statutes, such as 28 U.S.C. § 631, is to achieve a uniformity of evidentiary rules 
in forums which are permanently fixed within a single state and has no appli­
cability to the hearings of tribunals which have no fixed situs within that 
state.115
114. Ga. Code Ann. §84-216 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
115. In  the matter of Resources Corporation International, 7 S.E.C. 689 (1940) 
(footnote 47 at p. 741).
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A more recent instance of an apparent conflict between the Illinois 
statute and Federal court decisions was disposed of in Petition of Borden 
Co.116 where the Federal court refused to give effect to the state statute 
because it conflicted with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In 
other words, the Federal court in effect attached to the Illinois statute a 
proviso that it did not apply to a criminal proceeding in the Federal 
court. The following is quoted from the court’s opinion:
It is contended that the reports made by public accountants for The Borden
Company, called for by the subpoena duces tecum in question, are privileged.
Section 51, Chapter 110½, Illinois Revised Statutes 1947, provides: “A public 
accountant shall not be required by any court to divulge information or evi­
dence which has been obtained by him in his confidential capacity as a public 
accountant.”
It is doubtful whether the privilege granted by this section to a public 
accountant extends to his written report after he has released it, but it is 
unnecessary for the court to decide whether the privilege created by the 
section does extend to the report after its release for the reason that Rule 26 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. following section 
687, provides: “The admissibility of evidence and the compentency and privi­
leges of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these 
rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as they may 
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and 
experience.”
At common law the reports of public accountants are not privileged. No act 
of Congress and no one of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides 
otherwise. Accordingly, the court concludes that the reports of public account­
ants are not privileged.117
In another very recent case, Falsone v. United States,118 where an ac­
countant was summoned to testify and bring records to an Internal 
Revenue agent investigating the accountant’s client, the court held that 
the accountant must produce the records even though the state (Florida) 
statute119 made them privileged communications, and even though the 
tax statute of limitations had run on some of the years for which the 
records were demanded. In support of its holding the court quoted from 
United States v. Murdock, “Investigations for Federal purposes may not 
be prevented by matters depending upon state law.” 120
There is also the interesting question (raised by the dictum in the Bor­
den case) as to whether the client does not waive the privilege as to 
accountant’s reports which he has released to third parties. It may well 
be argued that such reports have lost their confidential character, which 
is the foundation of the privilege. If the accountant’s report has lost its
116. 75 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Ill. 1948). Excerpt reprinted at p. 279 infra.
117. Id. at 859-860.
118. 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 74 Sup. Ct. 103 (1953). Reprinted at p. 280
infra.
119. Fla. Stat. Ann. §473.15 (West 1952).
120. 284 U.S. 141, 149 (1931).
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character as a privileged communication protected by statute, it would 
then seem to follow that the working papers of the accountant, which 
were compiled in connection with the preparation of that report, have 
similarly been released from the prohibition of the statute.
It has been argued that even though the “accounting statements are 
designed for exhibition to others generally and would not therefore con­
stitute a communication in confidence . . ., the working papers generally 
contain confidential matters never revealed in the financial statements.” 121 
This is undoubtedly so, yet the relevancy of the working papers to the 
financial statements which are published is so intimate and important 
that it is highly doubtful that courts would draw the distinction urged 
above. It would seem more likely that the courts would hold that the 
client, by publishing his financial statement, waives his privilege not 
only with respect to that statement but with respect to the underlying 
working papers assembled by the accountant in the course of preparing 
or examining the financial statement in question.
Furthermore, the accountant might have to resort to the working 
papers to defend himself against critical attack. Certainly if the client 
himself attacks the work of the accountant, it is inconceivable that the 
client would not have waived any right he might have previously had to 
prevent the accountant from putting the working papers in evidence. If 
a waiver on the part of the client were not implied in such a situation, 
the result obviously would be unconscionably unjust.
For the same reason, if a third party brings an action against the ac­
countant, based on the accountant’s report published by the client, the 
accountant should not be prevented from offering his working papers in 
evidence in defense of his work merely because his client’s consent thereto 
cannot be obtained. Under Section 22 of the Federal Securities Act of 
1933,122 state courts and Federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction in all 
actions brought to enforce any liability created under the statute. Such 
an action might be brought against an accountant in the courts of the 
state where there is a statutory accountant privilege. The plaintiff might 
be a third party security owner who brings an action against the account­
ant based upon prima facie proof of a false statement in the balance 
sheet audited and certified to by the accountant. The accountant would 
have the burden of proof of showing that after reasonable investigation 
he had reason to believe, and did believe, that the financial statement 
was true. W ithout recourse to his working papers, the accountant might 
not be able to sustain this burden of proof. I t  is most unlikely that in 
such a situation the state court would hold that the accountant could not 
put his working papers in evidence or testify concerning their contents 
without the consent of his client. The only reasonable and just attitude
6 7
121. R ich, Legal R esponsibilities and R ights of Public Accountants 180 (1935).
122. 15 U.S.C. §77v (1946).
68 ACCOUNTANTS’ LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
which the courts could take in such a situation would be that when the 
client caused the financial statement (based upon these very working 
papers) to be made available to the public through its inclusion in the 
Registration Statement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commis­
sion, he waived the statutory privilege, and, by implication, consented to 
the accountant’s use of his working papers to defend his work, if need be.
One other case should be noted which dealt with the accountant’s 
privilege under the Colorado statute. This was the case on appeal in 
Hopkins v. The People,123 which involved the conviction for embezzle­
ment of the administrator of a decedent’s estate. On the trial a certified 
public accountant, employed by the prosecution, testified to certain facts 
obtained through an examination of the records of the estate. The de­
fendant objected to the testimony because of the Colorado statute pro­
viding that a certified public accountant, under certain circumstances, 
should not be examined as a witness without the consent of his client. 
The court held that the statute had no application to this situation since 
the defendant who invoked the statute was not the client of the certified 
public accountant who testified, and therefore the defendant’s consent 
was not required.
123. 89 Colo. 296,1 P .2d 937 (1931). Excerpt reprinted at p. 288 infra.
PART TWO
Cases and Articles
SECTION 1
FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
SMITH v. LONDON ASSURANCE CORP.* 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department, 1905. 
109 App. Div. 882, 96 N. Y. Supp. 820
H ooker, J. The action is to recover for services rendered to the 
defendant by the plaintiffs in their capacity as public accountants. The 
answer admits a small payment on account, as alleged in the complaint, 
avers that such payment was in full of the plaintiffs’ claim, and includes 
a counterclaim for a large sum of money embezzled by one of the de­
fendant’s employees, which embezzlement the defendant claims would 
not and could not have occurred except for a breach of plaintiffs’ contract 
of employment. The plaintiffs demurred to the counterclaim on the 
ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of 
action, the demurrer was overruled, and plaintiffs appeal.
The plaintiffs do not challenge the proposition of law advanced by 
the defendant that public accountants now constitute a skilled profes­
sional class and are subject generally to the same rules of liability for 
negligence in the practice of their profession as are members of other 
skilled professions. And such is doubtless the law. Cooley states the rule 
governing the measure of such liability in this language: “Every man who 
offers his services to another and is employed, assumes the duty to 
exercise in the employment such skill as he possesses with reasonable 
care and diligence. In all those employments where peculiar skill is 
requisite, if one offers his services he is understood as holding himself 
out to the public as possessing the degree of skill commonly possessed 
by others in the same employment, and if his pretensions are unfounded 
he commits a species of fraud upon every man who employs him in 
reliance on his public profession. But no man, whether skilled or 
unskilled, undertakes that the task he assumes shall be performed suc­
cessfully and without fault or error; he undertakes for good faith and 
integrity but not for infallibility, and he is liable to his employer for 
negligence, bad faith or dishonesty, but not for losses consequent upon 
mere errors of judgment.” (Cooley Torts [2d ed.] 777. See, also. 
Carpenter v. Blake, 50 N.Y. 696; S. C., 75 id. 12; Link  v. Sheldon, 136 
id. 1; Pike v. Honsinger, 155 id. 201.)
Although the counterclaim is inartistically drawn and deficient in 
logical order, we believe that it does state sufficient facts to make out a 
cause of action. In the 10th paragraph of the answer, near the final 
statements of the counterclaim, is to be found an allegation that in the
* This case is cited at p. 4 supra.
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agreement between the parties it "was expressly stipulated that there 
should be a frequent checking by the plaintiffs of the cash account of 
the New York branch of the defendant, and a verification of the items 
appearing thereon." Reverting to the first words of the 9th paragraph 
an averment is found that the plaintiffs "have negligently and will­
fully failed to examine and check in particular the cash account of the 
New York fire office of the defendant and have failed to verify the said 
cash and agency accounts.” Then follows the allegation that Scott, its 
cashier, from time to time embezzled large amounts of money paid to him 
as such cashier, the embezzlement being assisted by his falsifying entries 
in defendant’s books and practically its cash books. In the 11th paragraph 
it is alleged that the defendant’s losses from Scott’s embezzlements and 
defalcations were due to the negligence of the plaintiffs to perform their 
agreement with the defendant in the manner stipulated.
These allegations, with the facts that may be implied from them by 
reasonable and fair intendment, sufficiently plead a valid contract, its 
breach and the resultant damage, and require a reply from the plain­
tiffs. Had an examination and checking of the New York office cash 
account, performed with that degree of skill and care demanded by the 
rule which has been noticed, resulted in preventing defendant’s loss, 
in whole or in part, the plaintiffs should respond in damages; for it must 
have been within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the 
time of making the contract, and so it is inferentially alleged in the 
counterclaim that one of the objects of the frequent checking of the 
defendant’s cash account of the New York branch and a verification of 
the items thereof was to prevent, or at least arrest, just such practices 
as it is claimed Scott indulged in, and the loss the defendant has sus­
tained naturally flows from the breach of the contract it has plead.
The interlocutory judgment should, therefore, be affirmed * * *.
ACCOUNTANTS’ LIABILITY*
By Saul Levy, C.P.A. and Member of the New York Bar
The subject of accountants’ liability is as broad as the scope of our 
professional activity and the content of the opinions which we issue in 
the course of our work. It involves our relations with the government, 
the general public, our clients, and with each other. This paper will 
attempt to deal with only one phase of the subject. It will discuss the 
question of legal liability from the standpoint of its intimate relation 
to the development by our profession of its own technical criteria.
During the past several years the American Institute of Accountants 
through its committees and its members has been dealing aggressively 
and effectively with accounting and auditing standards, procedures, 
principles and terminology. Insofar as these matters are crystallized into 
a form or formula which has the general approval or acceptance of the
* A paper presented at the 55th annual meeting of the American Institute of 
Accountants, 1942. Published in wartime accounting 146 and n. y. certified public 
ACCOUNTANT 10 (1942).
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profession, we succeed in establishing technical criteria “by which facts, 
principles, opinions and conduct are tried in forming a correct judg­
ment respecting them.” This paper is presented from the viewpoint of 
those who believe it is the function of every profession worthy of the 
name to establish its own technical criteria. The desirability of doing 
so in its relation to the question of legal liability will be here considered.
In recent years, considerable attention has been focused on the dual 
responsibility of the client and the independent public accountant. 
Responsibilities arise simultaneously through the publication or issuance 
by the client of statements whereby the client makes certain repre­
sentations concerning his financial position and operating results, to 
which statements is attached the certificate or opinion of the independent 
public accountant. In an effort to clarify the situation, members of our 
profession have raised the question “Whose Balance Sheet is it?” Many 
have strenuously insisted that it is the balance sheet of the client and 
that it sets forth the primary representations of the client. Others have 
pointed to instances where the public accountant himself prepared the 
statements, where the public accountant was engaged to do so, and where 
the credit grantor and others have regarded the resulting statement as the 
accountant’s balance sheet.
A third viewpoint has been recently asserting itself which seems to 
carry us along a little further toward a clearer understanding of the 
respective responsibilities of client and public accountant. It is pointed 
out that certified financial statements are the statements both of the 
client and of the accountant.
Insofar as such statements set forth the financial position or the oper­
ating results of the client, they are obviously the statements of the client. 
The client assumes responsibility for the factual representations they 
contain and for the accuracy of the accounting records upon which they 
are based. He does not relieve himself of such responsibilities by engag­
ing a public accountant to audit his records and to express an opinion 
concerning his statements.
In a different sense, the statements are at the same time those of the 
accountant. It is through the medium of these statements that the 
accountant expresses a professional opinion concerning the financial 
position and operating results of the client. The statement becomes an 
integral and inseparable part of the accountant’s opinion. That opinion 
may serve to support and tend to corroborate the representations of the 
client, but it does not involve the assumption by the accountant of re­
sponsibility for the factual representations of the client. From this view­
point, it would seem to be immaterial whether the client or the account­
ant prepared the financial statements in the first instance. In either case, 
the accountant, in expressing an opinion concerning the statements, 
assumes responsibility for whatever opinion he expresses. The legal 
liability of the accountant for the expression of a professional opinion 
is governed by the nature of that opinion, and a finding (by whatever 
trib u n a l has the function  of m aking  such a finding) as to w hether or 
not that professional opinion is reasonably well-founded in terms of 
auditing standards and procedures and accounting principles and 
terminology.
While the respective responsibilities of the client and the public 
accountant may arise out of the same financial statements, they are sepa­
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rate, distinct and different types of responsibility. If we speak of the 
primary responsibility of the client, we are in danger of implying that 
public accountants have a related secondary liability. This may put us 
in the undesired position of assuming secondary liability for factual 
representations, when we have done no more than express an opinion.
Since the Ultramares case, which was decided in 1931, we have given 
a great deal of thought to the fundamental distinction in our work be­
tween representations of fact and expressions of opinion. A representation 
of fact by the accountant is virtually warranted to be true. As was stated 
by the Court in the Ultramares case:
“The defendants certified as a fact, true to their own knowledge, 
that the balance sheet was in accordance with the books of account. 
If their statement was false, they are not to be exonerated because 
they believed it to be true * * * accountants * * * by the very nature 
of their calling profess to speak with knowledge when certifying to 
an agreement between the audit and the entries.”
In certifying to the statements with respect to the client’s financial 
position or operating results, accountants usually profess to do no more 
than express an opinion. This is clearly indicated in the form of cer­
tificate, report or opinion now in general use by the profession. Never­
theless, an element of fact still remains in our certificates, though it 
relates to the scope of review or examination made, upon which our 
opinion is predicated. As Mr. Spencer Gordon stated at the 1939 annual 
meeting of this Institute:
“If the form of report recommended by the special committee on 
auditing procedure is to be used it would appear that the only state­
ments of fact will be as to the scope of the examination made. Under 
the doctrine promulgated by Judge Cardozo it would seem to follow 
that if the accountant has not made the examination that he states 
that he has made, he may be held in an action of deceit by any third 
party who has relied on the report, but the proposed form of report 
does not appear to involve any statement of fact as to the result of the 
examination. T hat the balance-sheet and the related statements of 
income and surplus fairly present the position of the company and 
the result of its operations is to be stated as a matter of opinion.” (1)
Any such factual representation concerning the scope of review or 
examination which has been made, is likely to appear in very general 
terms, leaving much to implication and exploration should controversy 
arise. The scope of the examination made is so essential a prerequisite 
for the expression of the opinion which is founded upon it, that from 
the standpoint of legal liability the examination and the opinion usually 
merge into each other. This becomes apparent when we consider some 
of the characteristics of the professional opinion of the independent 
public accountant.
The Ultramares case also drew a distinction between negligence and
(1) Spencer Gordon, Liability Arising from Accountant’s Report (Papers on Auditing 
Procedure, etc., presented at the Fifty-second Annual Meeting of the American Institute 
of Accountants, 1939, page 53).
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fraud. It held that whereas the negligence of the accountant might 
create liability to his client, it would not result in liability to a third 
party relying upon the accountant’s opinion. At the same time, however, 
the Court held that there would be liability to third parties for the fraud 
of the accountant and that such fraud might grow out of the expression 
of an opinion. In this connection the Court stated:
“Even an opinion, especially an opinion by an expert, may be 
found to be fraudulent if the grounds supporting it are so flimsy as 
to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief back of it. 
Further than that this Court has never gone. Directors of corporations 
have been acquitted of liability for deceit though they had been lax 
in investigation and negligent in speech * * *. This has not meant, to 
be sure, that negligence may not be evidence from which a trier of the 
facts may draw an inference of fraud * * * but merely that if that 
inference is rejected, or, in the light of ail the circumstances, is found 
to be unreasonable, negligence alone is not a substitute for fraud.’’
  * * * *  
“Our holding does not emancipate accountants from the conse­
quence of fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit has been so 
negligent as to justify a finding that they had no genuine belief in 
its adequacy, for this again is fraud.”
  * * * *
“In this connection we are to bear in mind the principle already 
stated in the course of this opinion that negligence or blindness, even 
when not equivalent to fraud, is none the less evidence to sustain an 
inference of fraud. At least this is so if the negligence is gross.”
The Ultramares opinion has been followed without modification in 
subsequent cases both in the New York and Federal Courts. It remains 
our leading authority on accountants’ liability. Although it drew a 
distinction in principle between negligence and fraud, it also established 
the rule that negligence may be offered as evidence of fraud. In con­
sequence, a jury may hold that an accountant’s opinion is a fraudulent 
pretense, merely because, in that jury’s judgment, the underlying audit 
or examination was grossly negligent. Whether there was such negligence, 
and whether such negligence was sufficient to sustain an inference of 
fraud, are questions of fact for the jury to decide. In four of the leading 
cases(2) relating to accountants’ liability, beginning with the Ultramares 
case, our appellate courts have consistently recognized and upheld the 
right of juries to pass upon these questions. Where trial courts have 
ruled that there was not sufficient evidence from which a jury might find 
fraud and where a jury verdict adverse to the accountant has been set 
aside by a trial judge, the appellate courts have reversed the trial courts 
and have sent these cases back for new trials. On the other hand, where 
a jury, after listening to all of the evidence, has found the accountants 
free from liability, the appellate court has been unwilling to disturb
(2) Ultramares Corporation v. Touche (1931) 255 N. Y. 170; O’Connor v. Ludlum 
(1937) 92 F. (2d) 50; State Street T rust Co. v. Ernst (1938) 278 N. Y. 104; National 
Surety Corp. v. Lyndbrand (1939) 256 App. Div. 226.
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that finding. The significance of this is that the question of liability 
in any litigated case is likely to be a question of fact to be passed upon 
by a jury of laymen. The jury will examine the opinion of the account­
ant, pass upon its meaning, determine whether the opinion was properly 
based upon adequate examination or whether it was so negligently con­
ceived that its expression amounted to fraud.
Some of the characteristics of the professional opinion of the public 
accountant which may become issues of fact for a jury to pass upon are 
the following. It will be seen that each of these characteristics involves 
an evaluation of difficult technical matters concerning which most laymen 
have had no previous knowledge or experience.
W ithout attempting a definitive description or analysis thereof, it 
may be pointed out that the accountant’s opinion is (1) a technical 
opinion, (2) an informed opinion, (3) an expert opinion, (4) a candid 
opinion and (5) an independent opinion.
1. It is a technical opinion. The conclusions of the accountant are 
presented in the technical form of the balance sheet, income or operating 
statement, surplus account and supporting schedules. The opinion relates 
to financial position in the accounting sense and does not purport to 
appraise the enterprise in its entirety or evaluate any of the fixed assets. 
It does not guaranty the accuracy of the client’s representations of fact.
This technical aspect of the accountant’s opinion is further indicated 
in the following comments:
“Some important elements of financial position are altogether be­
yond measurement and statement in terms of money values. Other 
elements frequently involve judgments and approximations which 
may be formulated or made within comparatively wide areas of reason­
ableness. This is particularly true, as the committee pointed out, of 
income statements prepared to cover the short period of a single year 
where, in a going concern, many items of unfinished business exist 
at the close of the year and where the direction of long-term trends 
is not fully apparent.
“As for the balance-sheet, the   committee has a full realization of 
the wide-spread misconception of the document as a measure of value 
or present worth and has repeatedly pointed out that its basic function 
is to measure investment rather than value. The current studies on 
the use of the term ‘surplus’ seem to indicate an unfortunate asso­
ciation, in the minds of many, of surplus and value.”(3) *
2. It is an informed opinion. It is predicated upon an examination 
of the books of account, supporting records, system of internal control, 
tests of inventory, independent confirmation of facts recorded and such 
other examinations or tests as the accepted and established practices of 
the profession require. Such procedures and practices prescribe the 
minimum of examination to be followed. In many important respects, 
the amount of detail to be reviewed, as well as the choice of method, are 
matters of expert judgment within the discretion of the accountant.
(3) James L. Dohr, Reflections on the Development of Accounting Procedures, Jour­
nal of Accountancy, July, 1942, pages 43 and 44.
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3. It is an expert opinion. It is the work of one well-trained for the 
particular task, who performs the prerequisite examination of accounts 
and the interpretation thereof in a competent manner.
The most frequently quoted statement of the general rule of law 
applicable to the rendition of expert services is the following:
“Every man who offers his services to another and is employed 
assumes the duty to exercise in the employment such skill as he 
possesses with reasonable care and diligence. In all those employ­
ments where peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers his services, he 
is understood as holding himself out to the public as possessing the 
degree of skill commonly possessed by others in the same employment, 
and, if his pretentions are unfounded, he commits a species of fraud 
upon every man who employs him in reliance on his public pro­
fession. But no man, whether skilled or unskilled, undertakes that 
the task he assumes shall be performed successfully, and without fault 
or error. He undertakes for good faith and integrity, but not for 
infallibility, and he is liable to his employer for negligence, bad faith, 
or dishonesty, but not for losses consequent upon mere errors of 
judgment.”(4) 
The Chief Accountant of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
recently discussed this matter and stated:
“The new rules ask for a positive representation as to whether 
the audit made was in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards applicable in the circumstances. The propriety of such 
a requirement, as opposed to a requirement merely for a statement 
of the accountant’s opinion on the point, was the subject of a good 
deal of debate and was adopted only after full consideration of 
opposing views. As I see it, an unqualified certificate contains an 
implied representation that the accountant has lived up to the stand­
ards which are generally approved by his colleagues. Such a repre­
sentation, indeed, is implicit, I think, to all professions—that one 
who holds himself out as a professional man represents that he has 
and has exercised that skill and knowledge common to his calling. 
The new rule merely makes explicit what was before implicit.”(5)
4. It is a candid opinion. It sets forth its conclusions in such form 
that material factors are not concealed or suppressed. If the opinion 
is subject to any important mental reservation or if facts have come to 
the notice of the accountant which have an adverse bearing upon the 
conclusion reached, such negative factors are either set forth explicitly 
as qualifications, reservations or exceptions, or (in the judgment of the 
accountant) are so material that he refrains from expressing any opinion. 
In this connection, the following is quoted from the bulletin of the 
Institute on Extensions of Auditing Procedure (Statements on Auditing 
Procedure—No. 1, issued October, 1939):
“In explanation of the general principles governing the auditor’s 5
(4) Cooley on Torts, 2nd Edition, page 277.
(5) W illiam W. W emtz, Some Current Deficiencies in Financial Statements, Journal 
of Accountancy, January, 1942. page 27.
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opinion, with particular regard to explanations and exceptions, it is 
pertinent to state that the auditor satisfies himself as to the fairness 
of the statements ‘by methods and to the extent he deems appropriate’ 
in general conformity with the auditing procedures recommended in 
the Institute’s bulletin Examination of Financial Statements. Ordi­
narily, if he has so satisfied himself, he is in a position to express an 
unqualified opinion. However, if he considers it in the interest of 
clear disclosure of material fact to include explanations of procedures 
followed, he is free to do so. If, on the other hand, such disclosures 
are made by reason of any reservation or desire to qualify the opinion, 
they become exceptions and should be expressly stated as such in the 
opinion paragraph of the auditor’s report. As previously stated, if 
such exceptions are sufficiently material to negative the expression of 
an opinion, the auditor should refrain from giving any opinion at all, 
although he may render an informative report in which he states that 
the limitations or exceptions relating to the examination are such as 
to make it impossible for him to express an opinion as to the fairness 
of the financial statements as a whole.
“It is desirable as a general rule that exceptions by the independent 
certified public accountant be included in a paragraph separate from 
all others in the report and be referred to specifically in the final para­
graph in which the opinion is stated. Any exception should be 
expressed clearly and unequivocally as to whether it affects the scope 
of the work, any particular item of the financial statements, the 
soundness of the company’s procedures (as regards either the books 
or the financial statements), or the consistency of accounting practices 
where lack of consistency calls for exception.’’
5. It is an independent opinion. It is an unbiased and disinterested 
opinion. The accountant impliedly represents that he has no conflicting 
interest which may raise a doubt as to his independence of judgment. 
This vital question of independence was recently discussed at some length 
by a former president of the Institute, who stated, among other things:
“Evidently it has always been considered an attribute so indis­
pensable to the public practice of accounting that it was taken for 
granted, and it never occurred to anyone to attempt to define it or 
to create rules requiring it.”
“Independence is the certified public accountant’s stock in trade. 
He invites public criticism which may result in his professional dis­
aster if he permits circumstances to arise which cast doubt on his 
independence, even though he may be sure that his state of mind is 
as independent as it could be. In this case the appearance of impro­
priety is only slightly less dangerous than the impropriety itself.”(6)
Limitations of space and time prevent a more amplified discussion of 
the foregoing elements and characteristics of accountant’s opinion. It
(6) Frederick H. Hurdman, Independence of Auditors, Journal of Accountancy. 
January, 1942, page 55 and page 60.
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must be obvious, however, that any one of these elements may become 
a crucial issue which cannot be resolved intelligently without passing 
judgment upon one or more technical questions of accounting and audit 
ing principles, procedures, practices, standards, conventions, precedents, 
rules, forms, definitions and the like. The conclusions and findings of 
juries will be based upon the evidence presented of what the accountant 
did and what he should have done. If our profession itself has failed 
to agree upon these matters, there is most likely to be a confusing conflict 
of expert testimony, raising controverted issues concerning which juries 
will have the final word. On the other hand, to the extent that these 
technical matters are sufficiently clarified and established by the profes­
sion itself, it is likely that juries will accept the criteria of the profession 
and not impose upon us their own inexpert conclusions as to the account 
ant’s duty in any given case.
There has already been reference to the fact that in four leading cases 
the appellate courts have indicated a consistent disinclination to disturb 
the findings of juries in cases involving the alleged negligence and fraud 
of accountants. Certainly that policy of the appellate courts will persist 
in situations where the existence or the content of professional criteria 
is seriously disputed. We have reason to expect, however, that if these 
matters are sufficiently clarified and established by the profession itself, 
courts of law will be placed in a position to set aside adverse jury 
verdicts as contrary to the weight of evidence when such verdicts are in 
conflict with recognized and accepted professional standards and criteria 
as testified to by experienced and reputable members of the profession.
Such clear-cut professional standards may be exacting in the matter 
of minimum requirements and in that way to some extent may restrict 
the free use of judgment on the part of the accountant. This fear has 
been picturesquely pointed up by one of our distinguished members 
in warning us that “it is easier to get into a straitjacket than to get out 
of it.” Others have taken what is urged in this paper to be the more 
far-sighted view. An eminent expression of this latter viewpoint is the 
following quotation from a recently published article on Accounting 
Standards by Mr. Victor H. Stempf:
“It follows that objective standards narrow the sphere of individual 
judgment and personal opinion as to what the standards are, but it 
does not follow that they restrict reasonably free judgment and indi­
vidual opinion as to the propriety of applications of such standards. 
In respect of these the accountant’s work must still be judged by what 
other competent accountants would have done under the same cir­
cumstances in conformity with the standards set by the profession. 
The immediate need is for the accelerated formulation of these objec­
tive standards.”(7)
We owe it to our profession to guide and instruct its members in 
the performance of their important functions. We also have a duty to 
the public and to ourselves to enlighten all interested parties as to what 
is the technical nature of the services we render and what is the scope 
of the responsibility we assume in performing such services. These are
(7) Victor H . Stempf, Accounting Standards, Journal of Accountancy, January, 1942, 
page 67.
8o ACCOUNTANTS’ LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
paramount considerations. Furthermore, any standards or criteria which 
we establish are likely always to permit wide latitude for the exercise 
of expert judgment. Even if such latitude is not to be unlimited, any 
apparent disadvantage to us will be far outweighed by the sound pro­
tection afforded accountants in the face of threatened liability. Only 
through well-established professional standards and criteria can account­
ants assure themselves of judgment by their peers. The legal liability of 
accountants should be confined within the framework of professional 
standards and criteria. If that framework is not constructed by the 
profession itself, it will be rudely fashioned for us by juries of laymen 
out of the unfortunate material presented to them in the extreme situa­
tions which are occasionally litigated.
SECTION 2
LIABILITY TO CLIENTS
THE LEGAL LIABILITY OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS IN 
ITS RELATION TO A STANDARD CLASSIFICATION 
OF ACCOUNTING SERVICES *
By Saul Levy, C.P.A. and Member of the New York Bar
The movement now well under way throughout the profession of 
accountancy to adopt and establish a standard Classification of Account­
ing Services and Appropriate Certificates may well be discussed from the 
standpoint of the legal relationships and the legal hazards involved in 
the practice of accountancy. The general subject of the legal responsi­
bility of accountants to clients and to others has received considerable 
attention in recent months, particularly in connection with an attempt to 
interpret and apply the opinion of Judge Cardozo in the well-known 
Ultramares case.
It would seem that a very close connection exists between the account­
ant’s liability arising out of services rendered and the need for a Classi­
fication of Accounting Services and Appropriate Certificates. Perhaps it 
will serve to emphasize that close connection if the subject is presented 
from the hybrid viewpoint of the accountant-lawyer.
Accountants, like practitioners in other skilled professions, undertake 
to render personal services to members of the public. The nature of the 
services to be rendered as well as the terms and conditions under which 
the accountant undertakes his retainer should be found in a contract or 
agreement with the client. This agreement may be written or oral. Its 
terms may be expressed in great detail or left largely to inference and 
implication. Whatever be its form, however explicit or implicit its terms, 
a contract must always exist in legal contemplation whenever an account­
ant undertakes a professional engagement. Whatever questions may later 
arise concerning the work performed by the accountant, the interested 
parties and the court or jury to which their controversy ultimately may 
be submitted, must look to that contract for a definition of the rights and 
duties of the parties involved.
Curiously enough, the controversy relating to this accountant-client 
agreement may involve complaining parties who are not parties to the 
original agreement. The accountant-client relationship has always been 
a somewhat unique one from a legal standpoint and has never occupied 
quite the same status as the client relationship in other professions. 
Neither the common law of England nor that of the United States has seen 
fit to confer upon the communications between accountant and client the
* Published in 12 Certified Public Accountant 695 (1932).
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protection of privilege accorded to similar communications between 
lawyer and client, physician and patient, priest and penitent. An account­
ant must regard information obtained by him during the course of the 
professional engagement as a sacred trust of confidence, and it would be 
a serious breach of professional duty for him on his own initiative and 
of his own volition to violate that confidence. Nevertheless, when that 
confidential information becomes relevant in a legal proceeding, the 
accountant may be subpoenaed to court and, on penalty of contempt of 
court, compelled to testify and divulge that information. Under similar 
circumstances a lawyer, physician or priest may remain silent, claiming 
that the information came to him as a confidential communication in his 
professional capacity and that it is his privilege under the law to deem 
himself incompetent to testify concerning it. Not so the accountant. 
From this it becomes at once apparent that the accountant may become 
involved in litigation to which he is not a party. The work that he has 
performed and the conditions surrounding its performance may be in­
directly in issue. The accountant, however reluctantly, may be drawn into 
someone else’s controversy, yet find himself in the position of vindicating 
his own work. His reputation may be as much at stake as it would be in 
a litigation to which he is directly a party.
Accountants themselves have frequently pointed out a fundamental dis­
tinction between their professional function and that of the attorney. 
The attorney is an advocate, a partisan, a special pleader. By contrast, the 
accountant (at least in the performance of audit work) is primarily con­
cerned in ascertaining facts and in expressing an impartial opinion with 
respect thereto. Our profession has always recognized its ethical responsi­
bility to the general public. How far that ethical responsibility goes 
beyond the limits of legal responsibility has been a much mooted question.
The Ultramares case dealt directly with this very question of the legal 
responsibility of accountants to others than clients. The decision in the 
New York Court of Appeals has restricted liability for ordinary negligence. 
It would seem, however, that in practical effect the court has broadened 
the liability for fraud. It has held that where there is gross negligence a 
jury may find such negligence so flagrant that a representation of fact 
could not have been made in good faith because there was no knowledge 
of the fact and that an expression of opinion under the circumstances was 
a fraudulent pretense. As the court there stated:
“Even an opinion, especially an opinion by an expert, may be found 
to be fraudulent if the grounds supporting it are so flimsy as to lead 
to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief back of it.”
Thus it would seem that while the court has held that for their negli­
gence there is no liability on the part of accountants to the general public, 
it has at the same time held that there is such liability for fraud. And 
going further, it has held that there is a type of fraud which may be in­
ferred from negligence. To quote again from the opinion of Judge 
Cardozo:
“Our holding does not emancipate accountants from the conse­
quences of fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit has been so 
negligent as to justify a finding that they had no genuine belief in its 
adequacy, for this again is fraud. It does no more than say that if less 
than this is proved, if there has been neither reckless misstatement nor
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insincere profession of an opinion, but only honest blunder, the ensuing 
liability for negligence is one that is bounded by the contract, and is 
to be enforced between the parties by whom the contract has been 
made.”
Thus we must be brought to the realization that when we undertake 
a professional engagement we may become answerable therefor not only 
to our client, not only to the authorities who govern the practice of our 
profession, but also to some member of the general public who claims to 
have been injured because of the manner in which we have performed 
our work. The very heart of the controversy is likely to be left for deci­
sion to a jury of laymen involving findings of fact by them concerning 
the following basic propositions:
1. W hat audit work did the accountant undertake to perform?
2. Did he perform that work adequately and competently, i.e. without 
negligence?
3. If not, was he so grossly negligent that he could not have issued his 
certificate in good faith? That is to say, did his gross negligence 
amount to fraud within the meaning of the opinion in the Ultra­
mares case?
The jury system is a condition that confronts us and not a theory. With 
all its imperfections and obvious limitations it has somehow withstood 
the criticism of centuries and is still with us. As it operates in this day 
and age with reference to the accountancy profession, it comes to this. 
The professional standing and financial fate of the ablest and best quali­
fied accountant in the land may hang in the balance while twelve men 
in the jury box sit in judgment upon technical questions of accounting 
procedure. The likelihood is that not one of those twelve jurors is a 
competent accountant. The lawyers on both sides of the litigation may 
manage between them to excuse from service on the jury any individual 
whose background suggests that he may be technically qualified. The 
jurors who are impanelled will probably represent a cross section of the 
commercial community and may include amongst its number salesmen 
and sales executives, retired business men whose active experience dates 
back a long time, shipping clerks, architects, real estate brokers, install­
ment house bill collectors, theatrical press agents, insurance agents, ad­
vertising experts, manufacturing executives and many other types, each 
intelligent enough in his own restricted field, but most, if not all of them, 
utterly uninformed with respect to accounting and auditing practice. 
What this oddly assorted jury is likely to have in common is a firm con­
viction that certified public accountants are a breed of infallible super­
men whose work should not be judged by ordinary mortal standards. 
The existence of error is almost sufficient of itself to create a presumption 
of fault on the part of the accountant.
The predicament in which we find ourselves is clearly unsatisfactory. 
What is there to be done about it? One obvious line of attack would be to 
attempt to change the jury system so that accountants might be judged 
by those understanding accountancy. Ultimately some such reform may 
come to pass. But that avenue of solution seems to promise results far 
too remote and far too uncertain to warrant our further consideration 
at this time.
Another and more promising field of reform is equally obvious. Since
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all questions of fact to be found by the jury relate in a basic way to the 
original contract giving rise to the work of the accountant and to the 
certificate or report of the accountant covering his work, why not make 
that contract so explicit in its terms and make the work of the accountant 
and the certificate based thereon so obviously and strictly a compliance 
with that contract that technical questions are removed, as far as possible, 
from the consideration of the jury. The largest part of the difficulty has 
been that most of the essential terms of the accountant’s contract have 
been left to inference and implication. The accountant’s certificate has 
likewise shed little light upon the scope of the underlying audit work. 
In making a fetish of the short unqualified certificate accountants have 
borrowed a great deal of trouble for themselves. As a consequence, it is 
too often left for the jury to discover through the evidence just what it 
was the accountant did and what his agreement and the standards of his 
profession required him to do.
Accountants should be judged by the recognized and accepted stand­
ards of their own profession and not by the purely adventitious standards 
of a jury of laymen, whose mental processes are being manipulated by 
adroit and persuasive trial counsel. In order to obtain adequate considera­
tion for such authentic standards accountants must first put their own 
professional house in order.
From the vantage point of legal liability, which has been my approach, 
the problem may be outlined in the following terms:
1. To standardize accounting and auditing technique and terminology, 
so far as such matters will submit to standardization without impairing 
their essential usefulness.
2. To make the client contract as explicit as may be feasible in terms 
of standardized procedure.
3. To express the accountant’s conclusions and/or findings, whether 
of opinion or fact, in a certificate which clearly predicates such conclu­
sions and findings upon the standardized procedure involved.
Important pioneer work along these specific lines has already been 
accomplished by the technical committees of accountancy societies 
throughout the country. Opinion may differ as to how far the classifica­
tions and standard forms thus far promulgated serve the practical require­
ments of the situation. Many difficult problems begin to emerge only as 
the discussion proceeds. The desired progress in the right direction cannot 
be made without the active interest and cooperation of the profession at 
large. Perhaps when accountants better realize why they should be con­
cerned with the subject of a standard classification of accounting services 
and appropriate certificates, they will then more readily apply themselves 
toward the solution of the many technical problems involved.
MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. v. COOK *
District Court of the U nited States, E. D. Michigan, 1940. 
35 F. Supp. 160.
T uttle, District Judge. Dexter G. Conklin was appointed city treasurer 
by the City of Flint, Michigan. This appointment was confirmed by the
* This case is discussed at p. 9 ff. supra.
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City Commission. The period of employment was continuous, beginning 
April 5, 1928, and ending October 24, 1935. The employment was dis­
continued by resignation. The resignation was given by reason of and 
immediately following the discovery of misappropriations and embezzle­
ments by said Dexter G. Conklin.
In this suit the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company of Balti­
more, Maryland, a Maryland Corporation, is designated as defendant. 
While it is designated as defendant, actually it appears in these proceed­
ings presenting a statement of a cause of action as against Jonathon Cook, 
d/b/a Jonathon Cook & Company of Chicago, Illinois, and the Com­
mercial Casualty Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, analogous 
to the statement of the cause of action of the Maryland Casualty Company 
of Baltimore, Maryland. Both the Maryland Casualty Company and 
the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company present claims which are 
identical, excepting as to amounts, and both are therefore plaintiffs.
The City of Flint carried fidelity bond insurance for its protection, 
said fidelity bonds providing that if Dexter G. Conklin should embezzle, 
misappropriate or misapply funds belonging to the City of Flint then 
the surety on such fidelity contracts was to be chargeable for such loss.
During the period of time involved in this case the surety companies 
protected the city of Flint against embezzlement by Dexter G. Conklin 
as city treasurer. The dates of coverage and the amount of coverage were 
as follows:
Maryland Casualty Company, 6/1/31 to 6/1/32 $200,000.00
“ “ “ 6/1/32 to 6/1/33 200,000.00
“ " “ 6/1/33 to 7/30/34 200,000.00
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 7/30/34 to 8/19/35 200,000.00
Maryland Casualty Company, 8/19/35 to 10/24/35 200,000.00
By reason of its contracts of fidelity insurance, the Maryland Casualty
Company, a Maryland Corporation, was required to pay, and did pay, to 
the City of Flint on account of losses incurred by the City of Flint by 
reason of fraud, misappropriation and embezzlements of Dexter G. 
Conklin, City Treasurer, the amount of $12,969.15.
By reason of its contract of fidelity insurance the United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Company, a Maryland Corporation, was required to pay, 
and did pay, to the City of Flint on account of losses incurred by the City 
of Flint by reason of fraud, misappropriation and embezzlements of 
Dexter G. Conklin, City Treasurer, the amount of $3,148.21.
On effecting such payments, the Maryland Casualty Company and the
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company became subrogated to and 
were assigned all of the rights of the City of Flint to the extent of the 
payments as by them effected.
The City of Flint had prepared “specifications for audit” for the year 
period beginning July 1, 1931, ending June 30, 1932. These specifica­
tions for audit were submitted to any certified public accountant who 
cared to make a bid for the doing of the work as required thereby. The 
specifications provided in part as follows:
“The City of Flint, Michigan, is requesting bids for a complete audit of 
the transactions of its various boards, departments and offices on a monthly 
basis for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1931, and ending June 30, 1932, 
subject to the following conditions which will become a part of any con­
tract entered into;
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“1. The examination shall be a complete monthly audit. Cash bal­
ances shall be verified at the beginning of the fiscal period. Cash counts 
shall be made each month at irregular periods. All cash receipts shall be 
verified by a deposit in one of the depositories of the City. Disbursements 
shall be verified for the legality of same. Purchase orders shall be verified 
for charter provision in regards thereto, as well as, ordinance governing 
purchasing. Commission proceedings shall be checked for compliance 
with the various authorizations, agreements, allowances, contracts or other 
procedures contained therein. Cash balances shall be verified at the close 
of the fiscal period. Any other duties or procedures which ordinarily be­
come a part of a complete audit although not specifically stated herein, 
shall be deemed a part of these specifications.
“2. It will not be considered the duty of the contracting auditors to 
bring into balance any ledger or other book of record during this engage­
ment. It shall be their privilege to request the Director of Finance to have 
brought into balance any book of record which should have been in bal­
ance for their convenience.
* * * * * *
“5. * * * No payments will be made by the city before the completion 
and acceptance of the work for the fiscal year unless a surety bond for 
faithful performance of contract has been filed, and then only after the 
approval by resolution of the City Commission.
“6. A letter of certification shall be filed with the City Clerk monthly 
as a matter of record that the monthly audit has been made. The report 
of the contracting auditors for the fiscal year shall be a certified report 
stating briefly but clearly what their examination consisted of, with the 
necessary exhibits and schedules in support thereof. It should show par­
ticularly the exact financial condition of the various funds of the City, a 
proper accounting for the cash receipts and disbursements for the year, a 
verification of deposits, and a reconciliation of bank balances.
* * * * * *
“8. The contracting auditor’s report for the fiscal year shall be made 
for all departments, boards and offices of the City as of June 30, 1932. The 
report shall be made with bound imitation leather covers, and delivered 
as follows: one copy containing a complete report of all departments, 
boards and offices, to the City Clerk, one copy containing a complete report 
of all departments, boards and offices, to the Director of Finance, one copy 
containing the board report only, to the Recreation and Park Board, one 
copy containing the board report only, to the Board of Hospital Managers, 
two copies bound separately to contain departmental reports only, to the 
Justice Courts and the Water Department respectively. The reports shall 
be submitted not later than July 30, 1932.
* * * * *  *
“10. The following departments, offices and boards are to be included 
in this audit engagement:
“1. Director of Finance
“2. City Treasurer.”
Defendant Jonathon Cook, of Chicago, Illinois, an individual, doing 
business as Jonathon Cook & Company, submitted his bid to the City of 
Flint in accordance with these specifications. This provided in part:
“We are submitting herewith our sealed bid on the audit of the books 
and records of the various departments of the City of Flint, Michigan, 
for the period from July 1, 1931 to June 30, 1932, in accordance with
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specifications issued by you, for a total sum not to exceed ($2,975.00) Two 
Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars including all expenses.
* * * * * *
“Jonathon Cook & Company have been bonded at numerous times in 
similar cases and shall be pleased to furnish same as requested.”
* * * * * *
Subsequently a contract was entered into by and between defendant; 
Jonathon Cook and the City of Flint, which contract provided in part as 
follows:
“This Agreement, made this 20th day of August, A. D., 1931, by and 
between Jonathon Cook & Company of Muskegon, Michigan, hereinafter 
called The Company, and the City of Flint, a municipal corporation, in 
the County of Genesee, State of Michigan, hereinafter called the City.
“* * * No payments will be made by the City before the completion 
and acceptance of the work for the fiscal year unless a surety bond for 
faithful performance of contract has been filed before any monies are paid, 
and then only after the approval by resolution of the City Commission.
“Witnesseth: The Company hereby agrees to audit the books and 
accounts of the various boards, departments and offices of the City of 
Flint on the monthly basis for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1931 and 
ending June 30, 1932 subject to the conditions and in accordance with the 
specifications hereto attached, which specifications are made a part hereof 
as fully as if written herein.”
In accordance with such specifications, the Commercial Casualty In­
surance Company, a New Jersey corporation, a hired surety for profit, 
executed bond on behalf of Jonathon Cook & Company to the benefit of 
the City of Flint in the sum of $2,975, the condition of their said bond 
being as follows:
“Whereas, said Principal has been awarded a contract under specifica­
tions for audit of the official records of the City of Flint, Michigan, for a 
period beginning July 1st, 1931 and ending June 30th, 1932.
“Now, Therefore, if the said Principal shall make audits of the official 
records of the various departments of the City of Flint, Michigan, in ac­
cordance with the specifications of audit for the period beginning July 
1st, 1931, and ending June 30th, 1932, then this obligation to be void; 
otherwise to remain in full force and effect.”
This bond was typed on the letterhead stationery of the Commercial 
Casualty Insurance Company; was executed in Chicago by the agent of 
the Commercial Casualty Insurance Company, and was sent to the City of 
Flint and countersigned by a Michigan agent of the Commercial Casualty 
Insurance Company. It was approved by the City Attorney, and I find as 
a fact that the bond and the language thereof were prepared by the Com­
mercial Casualty Insurance Company.
I now proceed to discuss the various issues of fact and law as are pre­
sented as to the obligations of the several defendants.
First, as to Dexter G. Conklin, defendant herein. He was dishonest and 
embezzled moneys belonging to the City of Flint during each and all of 
the years in question. He had different ways of embezzling and misap­
propriating the money. Principally, such moneys collected by him and 
misappropriated by him were delinquent personal property taxes owing 
to the City of Flint. For one example, he collected delinquent taxes vol­
untarily paid by the taxpayer and then issued what has been termed a
8 8 ACCOUNTANTS’ LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
temporary receipt and no record was made of the tax payment in his office 
whatever. For another example, he issued the official receipt of the City 
of Flint, but duplicate copies of such receipt supposed to be recorded in 
his office were destroyed and no record of the taxpayer having paid such 
item was made. For another example, he, as permitted by the statutes of 
the State of Michigan, seized personal property of the taxpayers and by 
authorization of law sold these assets of the taxpayers who were delinquent 
for the purpose of satisfying the tax indebtedness. Having done this, he 
issued the so-called temporary receipt and no record of payment of the 
taxes appeared in his office.
For another example, he altered the delinquent tax rolls by increasing 
the amount shown to be owing in an amount sufficient so that his books 
balanced by reason of his collection of the tax money which he had 
embezzled.
Dexter G. Conklin embezzled money for a large and substantial amount. 
He undoubtedly embezzled money to an extent greater than the City of 
Flint was able to prove. I say this because of the lapse of years and the 
impossibility of locating certain of the taxpayers shown by the books as 
delinquent, many of whom undoubtedly had paid their taxes.
The embezzlements and misappropriations resulted in a loss to the 
Maryland Casualty Company of $12,917.30. T hat is the amount of their 
payment to the City of Flint. In addition thereto, expenses have been 
incurred by the Maryland Casualty Company investigation of $51.85, 
making a total loss to this company of $12,969.15.
The embezzlements and misappropriations resulted in a loss to the 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company of $3,148.21. T ha t is the 
amount of their payment to the City of Flint. In addition thereto, ex­
penses have been incurred by the United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Company in investigation of $11.35 making a total loss to this company 
of $3,159.56.
These losses to the Maryland Casualty Company and to the United 
States Fidelity 8c Guaranty Company resulted entirely by reason of the 
fraud and embezzlements of Dexter G. Conklin, in an official capacity 
and while acting as fiduciary for the City of Flint. Hence, although this a 
chancery action it sounds in wilful, malicious and intentional tort and 
not in assumpsit, and if the proceedings were on the law side of the court 
the finding as against Dexter G. Conklin would be in wilful, malicious 
and intentional tort to the amount and extent as before mentioned. This 
fact is particularly mentioned and found as a fact for the benefit of the 
Maryland Casualty Company and United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Company, and in order to prevent a discharge of these debts in the event 
that Dexter G. Conklin should attempt to secure a discharge of these ob­
ligations in bankruptcy.
As to Jonathon Cook, d /b /a  Jonathon Cook 8c Company.
Subrogation of the Sureties to the Right of Action of the City of 
Flint as Against Public Accountants.
The Maryland Casualty Company, and the United States Fidelity 8c 
Guaranty Company, sureties on fidelity bonds on behalf of Dexter G. 
Conklin, City Treasurer, on the making good of his defalcations, are subro­
gated pro tanto to the City of Flint’s right of action as against Jonathon 
Cook, d /b /a  Jonathon Cook 8c Company, Public Accountants, for his 
negligence in the auditing of the books of the City of Flint, in consequence
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of which negligence the earlier defalcations of Dexter G. Conklin as City 
Treasurer were not discovered, and the City Treasurer, Dexter G. Conklin, 
was left in a position to commit subsequent defalcations. Dantzler Lum ­
ber fa Export Co. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 115 Fla. 541, 156 So. 116, 
95 A.L.R. 258. Annotation 95 A.L.R. 269.
Construction of the Contract and Specifications.
I have quoted at length hereinbefore from the specifications for the 
audit and the contract for the audit. The contract made the specifications 
a part of the audit and required that the audit engagement be performed 
in accordance with the specifications.
W hat is the meaning to be given to this contract and specifications? 
Am I to interpret them by the usual literal meaning of the words, or am I 
to place an interpretation upon this contract and the specifications as 
requested by this defendant on the basis of accounting terms? These 
technical accounting terms have been referred to as a cash audit, as a bal­
ance sheet audit, and as a detailed audit. Some of the accountants here 
testifying have said that this contract and specifications required a cash 
audit. Some have said it required a balance sheet audit. Some have said 
it required a combination of a cash and balance sheet audit, and some 
others have said that it required a detailed audit.
In the first place, the Director of Finance for the City of Flint in draw­
ing these specifications and drawing this contract had no knowledge of 
technical auditing terms. Neither did the City Commission, which had 
the authority to make the contract with the specifications, have any such 
knowledge. They did not know what a cash audit meant or what a de­
tailed audit meant or what a balance sheet audit meant. They did not 
have these technical terms in mind. They knew they wanted a complete 
audit. They knew of some things that they wanted done for the City by 
these accountants, so they put those things down first. Then when they 
mentioned the specific details that they knew they wanted covered, they 
went on and used general language to include everything else that was 
ordinarily required to be done in the making of a complete audit.
Accordingly, I reach the determination, and it is my opinion, that this 
contract and these specifications should be interpreted according to their 
literal and usual meaning. There is nothing to indicate that a partial 
or limited audit was intended. The language calls for a complete audit. 
Why should I attempt to call this audit engagement by some technical 
term as the defendant accountant urges me to do? Neither the contract 
nor the specifications use any such technical terms. There is nothing to 
guide me in an effort to classify it as a cash audit, a balance sheet audit, or 
a detailed audit. If I so classified this audit contract, I would necessarily 
then have to reach a conclusion as to exactly what work that classification 
called for. The net result of such reasoning would lead me to an interpre­
tation contrary to the plain, ordinary, everyday meaning which this con­
tract and these specifications disclose for themselves.
Therefore, I reach the conclusion that this audit engagement is not 
limited; that it should be interpreted according to its literal meaning, its 
actual meaning, its plain everyday, common-sense meaning. Restatement, 
Contracts, Secs. 230 to 235 (a).
I think that it is high time for accountants to know that if they want 
a particular contract which they enter into to be measured in the technical 
terms of a cash audit, or a balance sheet audit, or a detailed audit, they
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should insist that their contract and the specifications which they agree 
to comply with in their contract should plainly state the facts.
So I interpret this contract with its specifications according to the 
plain language used.
The witnesses have all agreed that no technical terms or language has 
been used in either the contract or the specifications. Ordinary, everyday 
English has been used. It is easily understood and interpreted. If ac­
countants wish a contract construed in accordance with their own tech­
nical language, then they must see to it that their technical language is 
used in their contracts.
The defendant, Jonathon Cook, testified that on receiving these speci­
fications and on reading the specifications, he did not know just what 
work was required to be performed for the City of Flint and so he went to 
the City of Flint and had a talk with the Director of Finance and thereafter 
entered into the contract in reliance upon that conversation had prior to 
the execution of the contract. That conversation with the Director of 
Finance does not mean a thing. The contract was with the City of Flint 
and not with the Director of Finance. It is the contract which Jonathon 
Cook made with the City of Flint which must be construed and not con­
versations or oral agreements reached with independent officers of the 
City prior to the execution of the contracts. Those prior conversations, in 
order to become binding, should have been embodied in the written 
contract and signed pursuant to proper authority. Therefore, the court 
has no alternative but to hold this defendant to performance in accordance 
with the terms of his written contract. Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 237.
On this point there is an additional thing that should be mentioned. 
Once that contract was executed and signed by the parties, no individual 
officer, agent or employee of the City of Flint was authorized to alter or 
vary the terms of that written instrument. T hat cannot be done by any 
individual unless the City has lawfully delegated the authority to a partic­
ular individual. In this case, the City Commission of the City of Flint, the 
law-making body of the City of Flint, established the requirements of 
this audit engagement, and unless they agreed to a change or an alteration 
of the terms of that audit engagement and authorized an alteration, the 
audit engagement is to be performed in accordance with the terms of the 
contract. No such change was made or authorized. Restatements, Con­
tracts, Sec. 408 (a).
Negligence of Accountants or Auditors.
While I have reached the conclusion and interpreted this contract for 
the audit to require a complete audit within the broad aspects of the 
meaning of that word, it does not make any difference in deciding as to 
negligence or non-negligence whether I interpret it as a complete audit 
within the broad aspects of this contract or whether I say it is a combina­
tion cash and balance sheet audit. I say that because if I follow the testi­
mony in this case of all of the certified public accountants who have 
testified they all agree that reasonable care should be used in test check­
ing or in some other way to see that the figures in the controls are in 
balance with the detailed ledgers. There was not a reasonable careful 
audit performed by the defendant auditor on either basis, whether it be 
on the basis of the complete audit or on the basis of the combination cash 
and balance sheet audit. I reach that conclusion for several reasons as 
follows:
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1. The auditor made no attempt to circularize the delinquent accounts 
outstanding. If there had been any attempt made, the probabilities are 
that the discrepancies would have been discovered. Certainly there should 
have been some attempt made at circularization. It would not necessarily 
have been a 100 per cent. circularization, but there should at least have 
been a test circularization. The delinquent accounts should have been 
canvassed and selected persons contracted either by personal call, by tele­
phone, or by a form letter.
2. Alteration of the tax rolls. There were many items of alterations 
of the tax rolls. The alterations were very crude. He did not even use the 
same kind of ink. There are many ways in which these alterations could 
have been discovered by this defendant auditor. The particular rolls 
could have been totalled and then compared with the rolls in the assessor’s 
office, which were not altered, and the discrepancies would have im­
mediately come to light. This auditor paid no attention to the original 
assessor’s rolls. Those rolls are a part of the books and records of the 
City of Flint, and hence were required to be audited and examined.
3. When this defendant auditor or his representatives started to make 
his monthly audits and his annual audits it was incumbent upon him to 
audit various delinquent tax rolls including the current tax roll. He 
should have carefully examined the 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929 and 1930 de­
linquent tax rolls as well as the 1931 tax rolls. He should have determined 
whether or not the delinquent balance outstanding on each and every 
one of those tax rolls balanced with the controls. It is my belief and find­
ing that this was not done. The auditor was unable to produce work 
sheets. The auditor said he thought that the delinquent tax rolls for 
several years were totalled in their entirety, and that then the totals taken 
from the controls for the corresponding years added and the two then 
compared. Even if done, this, in my judgment, is not reasonably prudent 
or careful auditing work.
4. This defendant auditor found the delinquent balances outstanding 
from these tax rolls on the basis of the total obtained over the period of 
years to be out of balance on the basis of the total obtained from the 
controls over the period of years. He says that the only thing that he did 
was to mention it verbally to the Director of Finance, and then he pro­
ceeded in the annual report to certify the exact balance to be a stated 
figure on the delinquent taxes, when actually it was not true, and he 
had no knowledge whatsoever of what the delinquent balance outstand­
ing was. The auditor did not balance these books or require the City 
to do so. He should have required the City of Flint to bring these books 
into balance. It was not done.
5. When this auditor ran tapes, he used figures superimposed upon the 
tax roll in lead pencil. By that I mean this City Treasurer’s office for 
their convenience had placed out at the extreme edge of the page in lead 
pencil what they claimed represented the delinquent balances outstanding, 
and when this auditor ran his tapes he used those pencil figures without 
checking those figures with the figures in ink to determine whether or not 
the pencil figures were accurate. Many of them were not accurate and a 
careful check would have so disclosed.
6. This auditor failed to audit the control as maintained in the City 
Treasurer’s office, either with the control in the Director of Finance’s office
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or with the tax rolls themselves. Had he audited such book in comparison 
with either the controls or the rolls, he would have found the records 
decidedly out of balance. It is the failure to do these things that forces 
me to the conclusion that this auditor failed to faithfully perform his 
audit engagement. W ith a reasonable degree of care the many defalcations 
would have been discovered. It is the failure upon the part of the auditor 
to do these things which makes it clear that he did not make the audit he 
had contracted to make, and he did not do what a reasonably prudent 
auditor would and should have done under the circumstances. He was 
negligent.
For the failure to perform this audit engagement in accordance with the 
terms of this contract as a reasonably prudent and careful auditor would 
and because of such negligence, this defendant auditor, Jonathan Cook, 
must respond in damages, Fox & Sons v. Moorish Grant & Co., 1918, 35 
Times Law Report, 126; Leeds Estate Building & Investment Co. v. 
Shepherd, 36 L. R. Chancery Div. 787; Smith, et al. v. London Assurance 
Corp., 109 App. Div. 882, 96 N. Y. S. 820; National Surety Corp. v. 
Lybrand et al, 256 App. Div. 226, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 554; Dantzler Lumber & 
Export Co. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 115 Fla. 541, 156 So. 116, 95 A. L. R. 
258; Ultramares Corp. v. George A. Touche et al., 225 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 
441, 74 A .L .R . 1139.
Is the negligence of the defendant auditor the proximate cause of the 
damage for which this suit against Jonathan Cook is brought?
The evidence as to all of the shortages and peculations which appear 
upon the books and records of the City of Flint during the yearly audit 
engagement of the defendant auditor must be considered. Those marks of 
irregularity were there in the record.
An auditor performing an audit on the basis of this contract and these 
specifications and doing his work as a reasonably prudent, careful auditor 
would have done his work, would have, and should have, discovered some 
of these many, many irregularities; and, having discovered some of them, 
all of the others would have been found.
One of the purposes of the audit was to determine whether or not any of 
the employees of the City of Flint, including the City Treasurer, were 
embezzling or misappropriating or defrauding the City of Flint of its 
money. These irregular items were apparent from the books. If they had 
been brought to the attention of the City of Flint by the auditor, the 
Treasurer’s services would have been terminated and the City would then 
not have been put to the further loss suffered by it by reason of the sub­
sequent misappropriations and peculations by this City Treasurer occur­
ring after the negligent performance of the contract by the auditor. Re­
statement, Contracts, Sec. 330.
It was fairly within the contemplation of the parties to this contract that 
this work should be properly done. It was negligently done and thus the 
defaulting City Treasurer was permitted to continue on in his work. The 
auditor is obligated to respond in damages for the amount of the shortages 
accruing after the negligent performance of the audit engagement. Hadley 
v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145; Fox & Son  v. Moorish Grant & Co.,supra; 
Leeds Estate Building & Investment Co. v. Shepherd, supra; Smith, et al. v. 
London Assurance Corp., supra; National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand, supra; 
Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v. Columbia Casualty Co., supra; Ultra­
mares Corp. v. George A. Touche et al., supra.
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The Maryland Casualty Company and the United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Company having reimbursed the City of Flint for such loss and 
damage are subrogated to the rights of said City as against Jonathon Cook.
Of the particular loss as sustained by the Maryland Casualty Company 
on its payment to the City of Flint, the amount of $11,169.09 occurred 
subsequent to the negligent performance of the contract by the defendant 
Jonathon Cook.
Of the particular loss as sustained by the United States Fidelity & Guar­
anty Company on its payment to the City of Flint, the amount of $2,809.61 
occurred subsequent to the negligent performance of the contract by the 
defendant Jonathan Cook.
As to the Commercial Casualty Insurance Company.
W hat is the obligation of the bond of the defendant Commercial 
Casualty Insurance Company? The obligation clause of that bond 
provides:
“Whereas, said Principal has been awarded a contract under specifica­
tions for audit of the official records of the City of Flint, Michigan, for a 
period beginning July 1st, 1931, and ending June 30th, 1932.
“Now, Therefore, if the said principal shall make audits of the official 
records of the various departments of the City of Flint, Michigan, in 
accordance with the specifications of audit for the period beginning July 
1st 1931 and ending June 30th, 1932, then this obligation to be void; 
otherwise to remain in full force and effect.”
Therefore, in determining the obligation of the Commercial Casualty 
Insurance Company there must be determined the obligation of the de­
fendant Jonathon Cook & Company as per the contract and the specifica­
tions, and the requirements as set forth and enumerated by the contract 
and the specifications as to the obligation of the surety bond.
The specifications say, in part: “No payments will be made by the 
City before the completion and acceptance of the work for the fiscal year 
unless a surety bond for faithful performance of contract has been filed.”
The contract says, in part: “No payments will be made by the City 
before the completion and acceptance of the work for the fiscal year unless 
a surety bond for faithful performance of contract has been filed.”
This bond cannot be read by itself separately without reading and 
construing the specifications and the contract, and there is no question 
but that the specifications and the contract require the principal on the 
bond to faithfully perform his audit engagement, and if he does not 
faithfully perform the audit engagement then the bond has been breached. 
In fact, the specifications and contract specifically and definitely define 
the auditor’s bond to be given as a “bond for faithful performance.” 
Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 238 (a).
The defendant auditor, the principal on this bond, did not faithfully 
perform his audit engagement. Therefore, the bond has been breached. 
Therefore, the Commercial Casualty Insurance Company is holden on 
their bond.
It is argued by the Commercial Casualty Insurance Company that its 
bond is a completion bond only; that it was not required to be conditioned 
upon anything other than that the principal, this defendant auditor, 
should be there twelve times a year and make an audit, irrespective of 
how made, and then give a report at the end of the year irrespective of 
what was contained in the report.
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The position which the Commercial Casualty Insurance Company 
would like this court to take in construing this bond cannot be taken 
because it is apparent that if that were all that was required by the bond, 
then the words “faithful performance of the contract” would not have 
been written in the specifications and would not have been written in the 
contract.
Further, both the specifications and the contract use the language, 
“before the completion and acceptance of the work.” If this were merely 
a completion bond, on the basis of the argument of the Commercial Casu­
alty Insurance Company the words “and acceptance” would not have been 
inserted in either contract or specifications.
There is nothing in the bond, there is nothing in the specifications, 
and nothing in the contract which would justify the conclusion that this is 
a completion bond without any regard for faithful performance of the 
work which was to be completed. The specifications and the contract 
definitely describe the bond to be given as “a surety bond for faithful per­
formance of contract.”
Counsel for the Commercial Casualty Insurance Company predicates 
his argument upon verbal testimony given by a former Director of Finance 
of the City of Flint and the City Clerk of the City of Flint. Obviously, 
their testimony does not alter the terms or conditions of this bond or of 
the contract or of the specifications, because no authority was ever con­
ferred upon the Director of Finance or the City Clerk to decide what the 
obligation of the bond should be. The obligation of that bond was set 
by the law-making body of the City of Flint, the City Commission. No 
officer, agent, or employee had authority to alter or amend in any way or 
manner the mandate of the City Commission as to the requirements of 
this bond.
Further, we have the very definite proposition that, this defendant 
surety being a hired surety for profit and having drawn its own form of 
bond, any ambiguity in the bond would be construed as against it. I do 
not think this bond, the contract, or the specifications are ambiguous. 
They are as clear as the English language is capable of making them. 
Therefore, there is nothing to construe; but if we were to take the 
argument of this surety as to ambiguity, we must of necessity construe that 
ambiguity against it. Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 236 (d).
Lastly, we have this fact for consideration, and it cannot be refuted. 
If this is only a completion bond; if it only required the defendant auditor 
to be there twelve times annually and to submit a report at the end of 
the year without any regard for what work was to be done, or how the 
work was to be done, or the accuracy of the report when given at the end 
of the year, the bond would be worthless.
The Commercial Casualty Insurance Company is accordingly obligated 
on its bond to the Maryland Casualty Company and United States Fidelity 
& Guaranty Company.
Decree may enter finding for the Maryland Casualty Company and 
against Dexter G. Conklin as follows:
Payment to the City of F lin t .........................................................  $12,917.30
Cost of investigating c la im ............................................................  51.85
Cost of investigation—witness fees—payments to expert wit­
nesses incidental to this suit......................................................  1,187.45
$14,156.60
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Interest may also be computed at the rate of 5 per cent per annum from 
December 15, 1936, as to the first and second items only.
Decree may enter finding for the United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Company and against Dexter G. Conklin as follows:
Payment to the City of Flint ........................................................  $3,148.21
Cost of investigating claim ...........................................................  11.35
$3,159.56
Interest may also be computed at the rate of 5 per cent per annum from 
September 29, 1936.
Decree may enter finding for the Maryland Casualty Company as 
against Jonathon Cook in the sum of $11,169.09. Interest may be com­
puted on this sum at the rate of 5 per cent from December 15, 1936.
Decree may enter finding for the United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Company as against Jonathon Cook in the sum of $2,809.61. Interest may 
be computed on this sum at the rate of 5 per cent from December 15, 1936.
Decree may enter finding as against the Commercial Casualty Insurance 
Company in the amount of $2,975.00 together with interest at the rate 
of 5 per cent per annum from June 28, 1937, to date of entry of decree, 
said decree to provide that the Maryland Casualty Company and the 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company recover from the Commercial 
Casualty Insurance Company as follows: Maryland Casualty Company, 
$2,377.76, together with interest thereon at the rate of 5 per cent per 
annum from June 28, 1937; The United States Fidelity & Guaranty Com­
pany, $597.24, together with interest thereon at the rate of 5 per cent per 
annum from June 28, 1937.
The decree shall provide that on satisfaction by the Commercial Cas­
ualty Insurance Company the obligation of Jonathon Cook to the Mary­
land Casualty Company and the United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Company shall be reduced in proportion. The decree shall further pro­
vide that on satisfaction of decree by Jonathon Cook the obligation of 
Dexter G. Conklin to the Maryland Casualty Company and United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Company shall be reduced in proportion.
The decree shall further provide that the Maryland Casualty Company 
and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company be permitted their costs 
as against Dexter G. Conklin, Jonathon Cook and the Commercial Cas­
ualty Insurance Company.
This opinion shall stand as findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Proposals for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law may be 
filed at any time prior to final decree.
O’NEILL v. ATLAS AUTOMOBILE FINANCE CORP.*
Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1940. 139 Pa. Super. 346, 11 A.2d 782.
Cunningham, Judge. The proceeding below was assumpsit by a firm 
of certified public accountants against the defendant finance corporation 
to recover $677.50, alleged to be due for professional services.
* This case is discussed at p. 11 ff. supra.
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Plaintiffs’ statement of claim included three separate items, each 
founded upon an alleged oral contract with defendant—$75 for an exami­
nation of defendant’s transactions and a report thereon for the month of 
June, 1936; $456.25 for a detailed examination to determine the extent 
of certain embezzlements by a bookkeeper; and $146.25 for selecting and 
training a new bookkeeper. These services were alleged to have been 
rendered during July and August, 1936.
The defendant, in its pleadings, not only denied liability for any of the 
items set out in plaintiffs’ statement, but also set up a counterclaim for 
damages in the net amount of $927.30 alleged to have been suffered by it 
by reason of the asserted negligence of plaintiffs in failing to discover 
that defendant’s bookkeeper had been misappropriating various sums of 
money over a period of three years prior to July, 1936. During the trial, 
defendant conceded that plaintiffs were entitled to recover the first item 
of $75. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of 
$487.03; the court below denied defendant’s motions for judgment n. o. v., 
or a new trial, and entered judgment upon the verdict; this appeal by the 
defendant followed.
The defendant having admitted liability for the first item sued upon, 
and the second and third items being based upon contested oral contracts, 
alleged to have been made subsequent to the discovery of the shortage, 
these issues of fact arose: (a) Did defendant make these contracts, and if so 
what were their terms? (b) Did plaintiffs perform the work called for by 
them? (c) Were the charges for the services performed reasonable? Each 
issue was necessarily one of fact to be determined by the jury.
As to the second item it was not disputed that the examination was 
carefully and properly made, but it was contended plaintiffs volunteered 
these services because of their failure to discover the shortages of the book­
keeper while making prior examinations, hereinafter discussed. On behalf 
of plaintiffs, O’Neill testified defendant’s president employed them to 
investigate the circumstances and amount of the shortage and agreed to 
pay for the work, although no specific sum was mentioned.
W ith respect to the third item, it was denied by defendant that it had 
ever agreed to pay plaintiffs for any services of that character.
An examination of the record discloses a number of conflicts in the evi­
dence bearing upon these issues, but it also discloses that plaintiffs ad­
duced sufficient competent evidence to take each issue to the jury. They 
were submitted in a manner concerning which no complaint is made in 
the assignments. The verdict was evidently a compromise over the inclu­
sion or rejection of certain items claimed by plaintiffs and the reasonable­
ness of some of their charges, but the matters at issue were exclusively for 
determination by the jury. We find no error upon this record which would 
justify the granting of a new trial with respect to these items.
We turn, therefore, to the consideration of defendant’s counterclaim. It 
was not contended by defendant that plaintiffs had been guilty of any 
negligence in the performance of the contracts upon which they sued; the 
counterclaim was founded upon the charge that plaintiffs had negligently 
failed, while rendering prior accounting services to defendant, to discover 
that the totals upon the tapes submitted by the bookkeeper were false.
Except for a period from January to May, 1935, during which another 
firm of accountants was employed by defendant, plaintiffs rendered ac­
counting services from December of 1929 up to May 31, 1936. About the 
middle of July, 1936, it was discovered the bookkeeper had been embez-
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zling funds of the defendant and had concealed her thefts in the following 
manner; Defendant’s business involved the keeping of accounts with a 
large number of lessees of automobiles who had obligated themselves to 
pay it monthly rentals. The greater part of its “accounts receivable” con­
sisted of such rentals. A card was prepared for each lessee and payments 
entered thereon as made. The total of these accounts appeared in the gen­
eral ledger. On the occasion of each of defendant’s monthly audits, the 
bookkeeper ostensibly totaled the accounts receivable from the cards on 
the adding machine, so that the total might be compared by the plaintiffs 
with the ledger entry. The bookkeeper’s peculations began in 1933 and 
her method of concealing them was by “plugging the tapes” of the adding 
machine. When about to run a tape, she first tabulated the amount she 
was short without making any figures on the tape and then proceeded to 
run the tape in the usual way. The result was that the totals on the tapes 
included not only the sum of the figures appearing thereon but also the 
amounts she had embezzled.
The dispute between plaintiffs and defendant is with regard to the 
extent of the undertaking on the part of plaintiffs, under the terms of 
their employment, during the years they had been examining defendant’s 
books and making reports thereon. Plaintiff’s contention is that their con­
tract was for a limited examination, and a financial review of defendant’s 
books, without verification. Defendant’s contention is that the terms of 
plaintiffs’ employment contemplated the making of a complete and 
detailed audit and the furnishing of certified reports which should have 
uncovered the shortage.
One of the plaintiffs, O’Neill, testified his original employment was 
under an oral contract (a fact conceded by defendant) and that “the 
nature of the work was to review [defendant’s] transactions, guide the 
bookkeeper, preparation of Federal and State Tax Returns, advise with 
the management of the concern in financial affairs,” and that it was not 
agreed or contemplated that “certified reports” would be issued. In 
describing the services rendered he said: “Monthly we would visit the 
office of the Atlas, make a revision of the transactions, not verifying the 
data considered, we would instruct the bookkeeper in the handling of 
technical transactions, we would prepare from the trial balance submitted 
by the bookkeeper a statement of the condition and a profit and loss 
statement. We would review that statement with the management, upon 
the submission of the typewritten report.”
The letters of transmittal of the reports used this phraseology: “We have 
prepared from the records of Atlas Automobile Finance Corporation and 
information submitted to us balance sheet as of (designated month and 
year) and a comparative statement of profit and loss based on the month 
of (name of month) together with relating schedules.” (Italics supplied.)
The services shown by the testimony to have been rendered were accu­
rately described by the learned trial judge, Brown, Jr., J., in his opinion 
supporting the judgment, as having “consisted of making a review of 
defendant’s transactions, guiding the bookkeeper in handling of tech­
nical transactions, preparing a statement of condition and a profit and 
loss statement from the trial balance submitted by defendant’s book­
keeper, preparing Federal and State Tax Returns, and advising defendant 
in financial matters. The monthly reports submitted to defendant were 
uncertified and unverified. * * * The accountants’ practice was to accept 
the totals set forth in defendant’s general ledger, without checking the
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individual items that made up the totals. It was stated in letters accom­
panying the accountants’ reports that they were ‘prepared from the rec­
ords of Atlas Automobile Finance Corporation and information sub­
mitted to us?'"
When plaintiffs were reengaged in July, 1935, the extent of their under­
taking was set forth by them in a letter addressed to the president of the 
defendant company and accepted by it as satisfactory. The letter read:
“Confirming our recent conversation we agree, with respect to the 
Atlas Automobile Finance Corp, and the Universal Auto Loan Co., to 
make a monthly examination of the transactions and submit monthly re­
ports in substantially the same form as heretofore and to prepare annually 
the Federal Income Tax Return, Pennsylvania State Income Tax Returns, 
and the Pennsylvania Capital Stock and Corporate Loans Report. In 
addition to the above, we will also prepare your personal Federal Income 
Tax Return and your Pennsylvania State Income Tax Return. This work 
is to commence with the transactions on June 1, 1935, and continue until 
May 31, 1936, for the total sum of $1,050.00, payable in twelve equal 
monthly amounts as reports are submitted. Please indicate your agree­
ment to this arrangement by signing the duplicate of this letter in the 
space provided below and return to us.” (Italics supplied.)
It was agreed that the share of the total compensation chargeable to the 
defendant company would be $75 a month. This contract by its terms 
expired May 31, 1936. The compensation therein provided for was paid 
up to and including the report for May, 1936. The reference in the letter 
to the submission of “monthly reports in substantially the same form as 
heretofore,” is not without significance in view of the rejection by the 
jury of the entire counterclaim. The subsequent verbal contract made in 
July, 1936, and involving the first item in plaintiffs’ claim of $75 for an 
examination of defendant’s transactions and a report thereon for the 
month of June, 1936, was, as plaintiffs contend, for an examination and 
report similar to those theretofore rendered. The report was made in the 
usual form and defendant’s concession at the trial of liability for that 
item may have been considered by the jury as some confirmation of plain­
tiff’s contention relative to the extent of their duties.
In support of plaintiff’s version of their responsibilities under the con­
tract, they called, as an expert witness, Henry S. McCaffrey; no objection 
was made to his competency. His testimony corroborated that of O’Neill 
with respect to the difference between an ordinary audit and report and 
a certified one, verified from independent sources. Defendant offered no 
expert testimony to contradict that introduced by plaintiffs.
It is apparent from what has been said that the services rendered up to 
May 31, 1936, were rendered under a contract partly oral and partly 
written. It is well settled that the terms and construction of such a con­
tract are for the jury where, as here, its terms are disputed. Philadelphia 
v. Stewart, 201 Pa. 526, 530, 51 A. 348; Bastian v. Marienville Glass Co., 
281 Pa. 313, 316, 126 A. 798; and Dougherty et al. v. Proctor & Schwartz, 
Inc., 317 Pa. 363, 366, 176 A. 439. The jury evidently accepted plaintiffs’ 
version of the terms of their contract and the nature of their duties under 
it.
The conflicting evidence relative to the counterclaim was necessarily 
for the jury and the twelfth assignment, based upon the refusal of the 
trial judge to give binding instructions for the defendant, is without
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merit. The court below, therefore, did not err in subsequently denying 
defendant’s motion for judgment, n. o. v.
Defendant’s other assignments of error are directed to the refusal of a 
new trial. The first five allege errors in the admission of the above men­
tioned expert testimony and evidence of a similar nature.
We adopt the following excerpts from the opinion of the trial judge as 
justifying the admission of that evidence:
“The qualifications of these witnesses (O’Neill and McCaffrey) were 
not challenged. The fact that O’Neill was a party did not, of course, dis­
qualify him as an expert witness in his own behalf. Beck v. Philadelphia 
Automobile Trade Ass’n, 59 Pa. Super. 145, 147. Nor was any objection 
made to the form of the questions put to them. It was contended, how­
ever, that in testifying as they did they were interpreting the legal effect 
of the contract and were thereby usurping the function of the court. With 
this we were unable to agree. * * * The witnesses, moreover, did not 
testify as to the legal effect of the contract between the parties. They were 
called to explain the significance of the type of reports which plaintiffs 
submitted, over an extended period of time, in performance of the con­
tract. It has frequently been decided that the construction placed upon 
a disputed contract by the parties thereto, as shown by their acts or decla­
rations, will ordinarily be adopted, and will certainly be referred to in 
determining the true nature of the agreement. Philadelphia, Trustee v. 
Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 290 Pa. 87, 94, 138 A. 94; Armstrong v. Standard 
Ice Co., 129 Pa. Super. 207, 213, 195 A. 171. Aside from this, however, in 
explaining the nature of plaintiffs’ performance of their obligations under 
the contract, the testimony aided the jury in determining whether such 
performance complied with the terms of the contract. For this purpose 
it was clearly admissible.”
Complaint is made in the eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh assignments 
of the disposition made by the trial judge of certain points for charge. 
The eighth and ninth alleged error in affirming plaintiffs’ second and 
third points, reading:
“2. Magee, Liebman & O’Neill, as accountants, are not guarantors or 
insurers of the correctness of their accounts.
“3. Magee, Liebman & O ’Neill, as accountants, do not say to the 
public ‘Let us examine your books and vouchers, and we will with absolute 
certainty discover any dishonesty, every mistake, that exists in those books, 
and we will protect you against that.’ T hat is not what they undertook 
to do. They agreed to use such skill in the performance of their agree­
ment as reasonably prudent, skillful accountants would use under the 
circumstances.”
In our opinion, these points were properly affirmed. The language of 
the third was taken from Craig v. Anyon, 212 App. Div. 55, 208 N.Y.S. 
259, affirmed, 242 N. Y. 569, 152 N.E. 431. Reference may also be made to 
In re London and General Bank, 2 Ch.Div. (Eng) 673; Cooley, Law of 
Torts (2d Ed.) 277.
The tenth and eleventh assignments complain of the refusal of defen­
dant’s second and third points:
“2. If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiffs were employed 
to make a detailed monthly examination and audit of defendant’s busi­
ness transactions and books, and by reason of the plaintiffs’ failure so to
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do a loss or losses resulted, which might otherwise have been prevented, 
the plaintiffs are liable to the defendant for such losses.
“3. If the work for which the plaintiffs are suing was made necessary 
because the plaintiffs failed to comply with their contract of employment, 
then the plaintiffs cannot recover for those services in default of an agree­
ment by defendant to pay.”
These points were refused, and we think properly, upon the ground 
that they were too comprehensive and would require extensive qualifi­
cation “to present the matters referred to adequately to the jury.” It must 
also be noted that the trial judge affirmed the following points submitted 
by the defendant:
“ 1. If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiffs were employed 
to make a detailed monthly examination and audit of defendant’s busi­
ness transactions and books, then it was the duty of the plaintiffs to 
ascertain the accuracy of the Accounts Receivable of the defendant and 
to ascertain whether the books balanced and to make a true and accurate 
statement of the same to the defendant.
“4. If you find that the plaintiffs broke their contract and if you 
find that the loss could have been prevented by the plaintiffs’ careful and 
efficient work under their contract, the defendant is entitled to a verdict 
for the amount of the loss occurring after the date upon which a discovery 
of embezzlements and thefts should have been made.”
The substance of the points refused was covered in those affirmed. 
Moreover, in the concluding portion of the charge the trial judge, after 
instructing the jury to determine whether plaintiffs had been “careless, 
negligent and inefficient,” added: “If they were, that is if they were so 
neglectful in the performance of their work of examination and audit that 
the embezzlements, which extended over a period of years, were not dis­
covered, and the failure to discover them resulted in this loss which the 
defendant company sustained, which has been reduced by payments to 
$927.30, then it seems to me you would be justified in rendering a verdict 
in the defendant’s favor against the plaintiffs for that amount, less of 
course the $75 which defendant now concedes plaintiffs are entitled to 
receive.”
We have examined the other assignments relative to the admission of 
testimony objected to by counsel for defendant and are satisfied no re­
versible error was committed by the trial judge in his rulings upon the 
admission or rejection of evidence.
We think the counterclaim was submitted to the jury in a manner as 
favorable to the defendant as it had any right to expect. As the jury re­
jected the entire counterclaim, nothing further need be said. The assign­
ments of error are severally overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
In re LONDON AND GENERAL BANK *
Court of Appeal, 1895. 2 Ch. 673.
Lord Justice Lindley: This is an appeal by Mr. Theobald, one of 
the auditors of the London and General Bank, which is being wound up,
* This case is discussed a t p . 17 supra.
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against an order made by Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams, under Section 
10 of the Companies Act, 1890. By this order Mr. Theobald and the 
directors of the bank are declared jointly and severally liable to pay to 
the Official Receiver of the company two sums of £5,946 12s. 0d. and 
£8,486 11s. 0d., being respectively the amounts of dividends declared and 
paid by the bank for the years 1890 and 1891, with interest on those 
sums. The grounds on which this order was made on Mr. Theobald 
are that these dividends were paid out of capital, and that such payment 
was made pursuant to resolutions of the shareholders based upon recom­
mendations of the directors of the bank and upon balance sheets pre­
pared and certified by Mr. Theobald, and which did not truly repre­
sent the financial position of the company.
Mr. Theobald’s appeal was supported by arguments to the effect: (1) 
that Mr. Theobald was not an officer of the company within the meaning 
of Section 10 of the Winding-up Act, 1890; (2) that the balance sheets 
and certificates given by Mr. Theobald were in accordance with the books 
of the bank, and that Mr. Theobald’s duty as auditor was confined to 
framing the balance sheets, which showed the position of the bank as dis­
closed by its books; (3) that the dividends in question were not really 
paid out of capital and that, however imprudent and reckless it may have 
been to pay them, Mr. Theobald, as auditor, is not legally responsible 
for such payment; (4) that even if Mr. Theobald, as auditor, failed ade­
quately to discharge his duty, and even if the dividends were paid out of 
capital, his failure to discharge his duty was the remote and not the 
proximate cause of the non-payment (sic) of the dividends, and that he, 
consequently, is not legally liable to make good the amount so paid; (5) 
that at any rate the order is wrong in declaring him liable jointly and sev­
erally with the directors to repay the dividends in question.
The first of these contentions was argued and decided last April, and 
the Court then held that an auditor of a banking company governed by 
the Companies Act, 1879, and by such articles as regulated the present 
company, was an officer of the company within the meaning of Section 10 
of the Winding-up Act, 1890, and was liable to have proceedings taken 
against him under that section. This point, having been thus decided, 
was, of course, not again raised, and nothing further need be said about it.
It remains, however, to consider what the duties of an auditor are as 
respects companies governed by the Companies Act, 1879, and by such 
articles as regulate this particular company. I t will be convenient to do 
this before examining the facts relied upon by the liquidator as making 
Mr. Theobald liable to make good the dividends which he has been 
ordered to pay. Section 7 of the Companies Act of 1879, clauses 1, 5 and 
6, are material. ‘7.— (1) Once at least in every year the accounts of every 
banking company registered after the passing of this Act as a limited 
company shall be examined by an auditor or auditors, who shall be elected 
annually by the company in general meeting.’ Then clause 5 is: ‘Every 
auditor shall have a list delivered to him of all books kept by the com­
pany, and shall at all reasonable times have access to the books and 
accounts of the company; and any auditor may, in relation to such books 
and accounts, examine the directors or any other officer of the company.’ 
Then there is a proviso, which one need not read, about banks beyond 
the limits of Europe. Then 6 is: ‘The auditor or auditors shall make a 
report to the members on the accounts examined by him or them, and
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on every balance sheet laid before the company in general meeting during 
his or their tenure of office; and in every such report shall state whether, 
in his or their opinion, the balance sheet referred to in the report is a 
full and fair balance sheet properly drawn up, so as to exhibit a true 
and correct view of the state of the company’s affairs, as shown by the 
books of the company, and such report shall be read before the com­
pany in general meeting.’ Then ‘7. The remuneration of the auditor or 
auditors shall be fixed by the general meeting appointing such auditor 
or auditors, and shall be paid by the company.’ It is necessary also to 
read articles 106, 107 and 114. Article 106, which is under the head ‘Ac­
counts,’ runs thus: ‘At every ordinary meeting the directors shall lay 
before the meeting a balance sheet showing the financial state of the 
company for the previous financial year, duly audited, and every such 
balance sheet shall be accompanied by a report of the directors as to the 
state and condition of the company, and as to the amount which they 
recommend to be paid out of the profits by way of dividend or bonus to 
the shareholders, after allowing for any interim dividend which the di­
rectors may have declared, and any sum which they may have set aside 
under article 116 hereof.’ Then article 107, which is under the head 
‘Audit,’ runs thus: ‘The accounts of the company shall be from time to 
time examined and the correctness of the statements shall be from time 
to time ascertained, by two or more auditors, in accordance with these 
presents.’ Then article 114, which, I think, is the only further one I need 
read at this moment, runs thus: ‘The auditors shall be supplied with 
copies of the statement of accounts intended to be laid before the meeting, 
and it shall be their duty to examine the same with the accounts and 
vouchers relating thereto.’ These are the enactments and regulations 
which bear directly on the duties of the auditors, and although articles 
107 and 114 are in terms more explicit than Section 7 of the statute as 
regards the duty of the auditors to examine and ascertain the correctness 
of the statements laid before them, and of the accounts laid before the 
shareholders, yet it is tolerably plain from the language of Section 7 
of the Act, clause 5, that the articles add little, if anything, to the duties 
imposed on the auditors by the statute alone.
In connection with these articles, and in order to save repetition, it 
should be stated that by the articles of this bank it is the duty of the 
directors, and not of the auditors, to recommend to the shareholders the 
amounts to be appropriated for dividends; and it is the duty of the 
directors to have proper accounts kept so as to show the true state and 
position of the company. Lastly, it is for the shareholders, but only on 
the recommendation of the directors, to declare a dividend.
It is impossible to read Section 7 of the Companies Act, 1879, without 
being struck with the importance of the enactment that the auditors are 
to be appointed by the shareholders, and are to report to them directly, 
and not to, or through, the directors. The object of this enactment is 
obvious. It evidently is to secure to the shareholders independent and 
reliable information respecting the true financial position of the com­
pany at the time of the audit. The articles of this particular company are 
even more explicit on this point than the statute itself, and remove any 
possible ambiguity to which the language of the statute, taken alone, 
may be open if very narrowly criticised.
It is no part of an auditor’s duty to give advice either to directors or 
shareholders as to what they ought to do. An auditor has nothing to do
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with the prudence or imprudence of making loans with or without secur­
ity. It is nothing to him whether the business of a company is being 
conducted prudently or imprudently, profitably or unprofitably; it is 
nothing to him whether dividends are properly or improperly declared, 
provided he discharges his own duty to the shareholders. His business 
is to ascertain and state the true financial position of the company at the 
time of the audit, and his duty is confined to that. But then comes the 
question: How is he to ascertain such positions? The answer is: By exam­
ining the books of the company. But he does not discharge his duty by 
doing this without inquiry and without taking any trouble to see that the 
books of the company themselves show the company’s true position. He 
must take reasonable care to ascertain that they do. Unless he does this, 
his duty will be worse than a farce. Assuming the books to be so kept as 
to show the true position of the company, the auditor has to frame a 
balance sheet showing that position according to the books, and to certify 
that the balance sheet presented is correct in that sense. But his first 
duty is to examine the books, not merely for the purpose of ascertaining 
what they do show, but also for the purpose of satisfying himself that 
they show the true financial position of the company. This is quite in 
accordance with the decision of Mr. Justice Stirling in The Leeds Estate 
Company v. Shepherd in 36 Chancery Division, page 802. An auditor, 
however, is not bound to do more than exercise reasonable care and skill 
in making inquiries and investigations. He is not an insurer; he does not 
guarantee that the books do correctly show the true position of the 
company’s affairs; he does not guarantee that his balance sheet is accurate 
according to the books of the company. If he did he would be responsible 
for an error on his part, even if he were himself deceived, without any 
want of reasonable care on his part—say, by the fraudulent concealment 
of a book from him. His obligation is not so onerous as this.
Such I take to be the duty of the auditor; he must be honest—that is, 
he must not certify what he does not believe to be true, and he must take 
reasonable care and skill before he believes that what he certifies is true. 
What is reasonable care in any particular case must depend upon the 
circumstances of that case. Where there is nothing to excite suspicion, 
very little inquiry will be reasonable and sufficient; and in practice, I 
believe, business men select a few cases haphazard, see that they are 
right, and assume that others like them are correct also. Where sus­
picion is aroused more care is obviously necessary, but still an auditor 
is not bound to exercise more than reasonable care and skill even in a 
case of suspicion; and he is perfectly justified in acting on the opinion of 
an expert where special knowledge is required.
Mr. Theobald’s evidence satisfies me that he took the same view as my­
self of his duty in investigating the company’s books and preparing his 
balance sheet. He did not content himself with making his balance sheet 
from the books without troubling himself about the truth of what they 
showed. He checked the cash, examined vouchers for payments, saw that 
the bills and securities entered in the books were correct, took reasonable 
care to ascertain their value, and in one case obtained a solicitor’s opinion 
on the validity of an equitable charge. I see no trace whatever of any 
failure by him in the performance of this part of his duty. It is satis­
factory to find that the legal standard of duty is not too high for business 
purposes, and is recognised as correct by business men.
The balance sheet and certificate of February, 1892, that is, for the year
1891, was accompanied by a report to the directors of the bank. Taking 
the balance sheet, the certificate, and report together, Mr. Theobald 
stated to the directors the true financial position of the bank, and if this 
report had been laid before the shareholders, Mr. Theobald would have 
completely discharged his duty to them. Unfortunately, however, this 
report was not laid before the shareholders, and it becomes necessary to 
consider the legal consequences to Mr. Theobald of this circumstance.
A person whose duty it is to convey information to others does not 
discharge that duty by simply giving them so much information as is 
calculated to induce them, or some of them, to ask for more. Information 
and means of information are by no means equivalent terms. Still, there 
may be circumstances under which information given in the shape of a 
printed document circulated amongst a large body of shareholders would 
by its consequent publicity be very injurious to their interests, and in 
such a case I am not prepared to say that an auditor would fail to dis­
charge his duty if, instead of publishing his report in such a way as to 
ensure publicity, he made a confidential report to the shareholders, and 
invited their attention to it, and told them where they could see it. The 
auditor is to make a report to the shareholders, but the mode of doing 
so, and the form of the report, are not prescribed. If, therefore, Mr. Theo­
bald had laid before the shareholders the balance sheet and the profit 
and loss account accompanied by a certificate in the form in which he 
had prepared it, he would perhaps have done enough, under the peculiar 
circumstances of the case. I feel, however, the great danger of acting on 
such a principle, and in order not to be misunderstood, I will add that 
an auditor who gives shareholders means of information instead of in­
information in respect of a company’s financial position does so at his 
peril, and runs the very serious risk of being held, judicially, to have 
failed to discharge his duty.
In this case I have no hesitation in saying that Mr. Theobald did fail 
to discharge his duty to the shareholders in certifying and laying before 
them the balance sheet of February, 1892, without any reference to the 
report which he laid before the directors, and with no other warning 
than is conveyed by the words ‘The value of the assets as shown on the 
balance sheet is dependent upon realisation.’ The most important asset 
on that balance sheet is put down as ‘Loans to customers and other securi­
ties, £346,975,’ and on those a full and detailed report was made to the 
directors, showing the very unsatisfactory state of these loans and securi­
ties, and it is impossible to read the oral evidence, the report of Mr. 
Balfour and Mr. Brock, dated the 22nd December, 1891, and the report 
of the auditor to the directors of the 3rd February, 1892, without coming 
to the conclusion that the entry of that large sum as a good asset without 
explanation was unjustifiable. It is a mere truism to say that the value of 
loans and securities depends upon their realisation. We are told that a 
statement to that effect is so unusual that the mere presence of those 
words is enough to excite suspicion. But, as already stated, the duty of 
an auditor is to convey information, not to arouse inquiry, and although 
an auditor might infer from an unusual statement that something was 
seriously wrong, it by no means follows that ordinary people would 
have their suspicions aroused by a similar statement if, as in this case, its 
language expresses no more than any ordinary person would infer with­
out it.
But Mr. Theobald relies on the fact that he was induced to omit from
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his certificate all reference to the report which he made to the directors 
because Mr. Balfour, the chairman, promised to mention such report in 
his speech to the shareholders, and he did so. But although Mr. Balfour 
twice alluded to the report, he did so in such a way as to avoid attracting 
attention to it. The second time he mentioned it was after a dividend 
had been declared, and when a motion to reappoint the auditors was 
before the meeting. The truth is that not a word was said to convey to 
the shareholders the substance of the information contained in the report, 
or to induce them to ask any question about it. The balance sheet and 
the profit and loss account were true and correct in this sense, that they 
were in accordance with the books. But they were, nevertheless, entirely 
misleading, and misrepresented the real position of the company. Under 
these circumstances, I am compelled to hold that Mr. Theobald failed 
to discharge his duty to the shareholders with respect to the balance sheet 
and certificate of February, 1892. Possibly he did not realise the extent 
of his duty to the shareholders as distinguished from the directors, and 
he, unfortunately, consented to leave the chairman to explain the true 
state of the company to the shareholders instead of doing so himself. The 
fact, however, remains, and cannot be got over, that the balance sheet 
and certificate of February, 1892, did not show the true position of the 
company at the end of 1891, and that this was owing to the omission by 
the auditor to lay before the shareholders material information which he 
had obtained in the course of his employment as auditor of the company, 
and to which he called the attention of the directors.
But then it is contended that, even if this be so, there was, after all, 
no payment of a dividend out of capital; and further that, even if there 
was, still that such payment was not the natural or immediate result of 
Mr. Theobald’s certificate, and of the accounts which he prepared.
Whether the payment was made out of capital or not is a question of 
fact. It was professedly made out of profits made by the bank by charging 
its customers with interest and commission on loans and discounts. The 
books showed such profit, but the question is, where did the money come 
from with which the dividends were paid? The money came from cash 
at the bankers or in hand, but this cash could not be properly treated as 
profit, and the directors and auditors knew this perfectly well. This part 
of the case has been most carefully investigated by the learned judge 
whose decision we are reviewing, and after attending most attentively 
to the observations of counsel on the reasonings and conclusions contained 
in the judgment appealed from, I see no reason whatever for dissenting 
from them. On the contrary, I entirely agree with him in saying that the 
profits for the year 1891 never really existed except on paper—that, to 
use his words, ‘Whatever may be the right line to draw as to when profit 
not received may be carried to profit for the purpose of the annual revenue 
account, it is plain that there was no justification for so doing in the pres­
ent case’. The real truth is that the assets of the bank were put down in 
the balance sheet at far too high a figure, and this entry, though not 
misleading if explained (as it was to the directors), was seriously mislead­
ing in the absence of explanation. Mr. Theobald says that he regarded 
the assets of the bank as only locked up, but his report and the schedule 
to it go far beyond this. The value of the principal asset depended on 
the probability of the Balfour group of companies and some of the other 
large borrowers repaying their loans. They were financing each other, 
their indebtedness to the bank increased largely during the year, the
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securities held by the bank for these loans were, to say the least, of very 
doubtful character, and yet the total amount due to the bank in respect 
of these loans is inserted in the balance sheet as a good asset without any 
deduction, and without a word of explanation to the shareholders. We 
now know that these assets have realised a comparatively small sum, and 
we were very properly warned against the danger of doing injustice by 
being wise after the event. But disregarding the result of realisation and 
attending only to what was known to the auditors in February, 1892, 
the entry in the balance sheet of the sum of £346,975 as a good asset was 
wholly unjustifiable unless explained.
We are now in a position to understand the true meaning of a passage 
contained in the auditors’ report to the directors of the 3rd February, 
1892, and which runs thus: ‘We cannot conclude without expressing our 
opinion unhesitatingly that no dividend should be paid this year’. I find 
it impossible to treat this as a statement by the auditors that there are 
profits divisible among the shareholders, but that the auditors cannot 
recommend a dividend. I can only regard the passage as meaning that 
there are no funds out of which the dividend can properly be paid, and, 
therefore, no dividend ought to be paid this year. A dividend of 7 per 
cent. was, nevertheless, recommended by the directors, and was resolved 
upon by the shareholders at a meeting furnished with the balance sheet 
and profit and loss account certified by the auditors, and at which meet­
ing the auditors were present, but silent. Not a word was said to inform 
the shareholders of the true state of affairs. It is idle to say that these 
accounts are so remotely connected with the payment of the dividend as 
to render the auditors legally irresponsible for such payment. The bal­
ance sheet and account certified by the auditors as showing a profit avail­
able for dividend were, in my judgment, not the remote, but the real 
operating cause of the motion for the payment of the dividend which 
the directors improperly recommended. The auditors’ account and certifi­
cate gave weight to such recommendation and rendered it acceptable to 
the meeting. It was wholly unnecessary for the Official Receiver to call 
a shareholder to say that he was induced by the auditors’ certificate to 
concur in the resolution to pay a dividend. As to this part of the case 
res ipsa loquitur.
The point was made that the form of the order was wrong. But there 
was nothing in this. Mr. Theobald could obviously be sued alone in an 
action at law for breach of his statutory duty as auditor, and the measure 
of damages would be the sum which he has been ordered to pay. Whether 
a similar action at law could be maintained against him and the directors 
jointly is more open to question. I am by no means satisfied that it could 
not, seeing that the wrongful payment of the dividend was caused by his 
improper certificate and accounts, and by the use made of them by the 
directors. But, be this as it may, there was a clear breach of trust by 
the directors, facilitated, and, indeed, only rendered possible by the audi­
tor, who failed in discharging his own duty to the shareholders; and I 
have no doubt that in equity both he and they could be held jointly and 
severally liable for the misapplication of the company’s moneys, which 
constituted a breach of trust. In respect, therefore, to the sum of £8,486 
11s. wrongfully paid as dividend in 1892 in respect of the alleged profits 
made in 1891, the appeal in my opinion fails.
I pass now to the accounts and balance sheet prepared by the auditors 
in February, 1891, and showing the state of affairs in 1890. A profit for
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that year was shown and a dividend of £5,946 12s. was declared and paid, 
and Mr. Theobald has been held liable for this sum also. I agree with 
Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams in holding that the dividend for 1890 was 
in fact improperly declared and paid. But the evidence that Mr. Theo­
bald was guilty of any breach of duty in certifying the accounts in Febru­
ary, 1891, is far less cogent than that which presses so heavily against him 
with reference to the accounts of February, 1892. The truth is that the 
conviction that the bank’s affairs were every year getting worse and worse 
grew upon him year by year. This state of things was shown by the 
decrease of its reserve capital and the increase of its loans to customers. 
But the loans to customers were, speaking roughly, £100,000 less at the 
end of the year 1890 than at the end of 1891, and seeing that the accounts 
prepared by the auditors did accurately represent the position of the 
company as shown by the books, and that it is not proved that Mr. Theo­
bald really knew, or ought then to have known, that the position of the 
bank was not correctly shown by the books, I think Mr. Justice Vaughan 
Williams has gone too far in holding Mr. Theobald liable for this sum. 
The reasons which induced the learned judge to decide that Mr. Theobald 
was not liable for the dividends paid in 1889 and 1890 appear to me to 
apply also to the dividends paid in 1891 in respect of the profits of 1890. 
No doubt the change made by the auditors in 1886 in the form of the 
certificate that they gave is really significant, and, unexplained, leads to 
the inference that the auditors did not believe that the books of the 
company and the balance sheet prepared from them correctly showed 
the position of the bank. But Mr. Theobald’s evidence does, in my opin­
ion, show that in February, 1891, matters were not known or believed to 
be so bad as to lead him to the conclusion that there were then no 
profits out of which a dividend could properly be paid. It is true that 
the position of the bank was very unsatisfactory in 1890, and the auditors 
knew it to be so. This, however, appeared from the balance sheet and 
accounts which they laid before the shareholders. It is known now that 
the assets were put down at too high a figure; but it is not proved that 
the auditors knew it or ought to have known it. The Balfour group of 
companies, though dependent upon each other, were by no means in so 
tottering a state as they were a year later. Mr. Wilkinson’s debt was still 
treated by the directors as bearing interest and as a good, or at all events 
not a bad, debt. Mr. Benham’s debt was unsatisfactory, but the auditors 
can hardly be blamed for treating it as good, having regard to the solici­
tor’s statement as to the security held for it. This part of the case is very 
near the line, but having carefully considered it, I do not think that the 
evidence is sufficiently strong to establish a case of misfeasance on the part 
of Mr. Theobald in February, 1891. I am not satisfied that he was then 
guilty of more than an excusable error of judgment; although now that 
all the facts are known the error is seen to have been very serious in its 
consequences. As to the sum of £5,946 12s. 0d., therefore, the appeal 
must be allowed. As regards costs, Mr. Theobald’s appeal has resulted 
in reducing the sum for which he has been held liable; but, in other 
respects, and as regards his main contention, it has failed. Under these 
circum stances he ough t n o t to receive or pay any costs of the appeal, and
the only order as to costs will be that the Official Receiver be paid his 
costs out of the assets of the company.
Lord Justice Lopes has read and considered this judgment and concurs 
in it.
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Lord Justice R igby: I have had the advantage of reading and consider­
ing the judgment just delivered by Lord Justice Lindley, and I might 
have confined myself to saying I concur in it, but as I have gone carefully 
into the evidence as against the appellant, I think that I shall do well to 
show how I have come to the conclusion on which my judgment is 
founded. I shall not attempt to repeat all that is contained in Lord 
Justice Lindley’s judgment. Where no reference is made to a particular 
topic it must be taken that I have nothing to add, though I do not wish to 
detract from anything said. The appeal is against that part of the order 
of the 20th December, 1894, of Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams, which finds 
Mr. Theobald liable as one of the auditors of the London and General 
Bank Ltd. to make good to the assets of the company, jointly with other 
persons, and severally the amount with interest from the date of the order 
of two sums, £6,768 6s. 9d. and £9,328 17s. 4d., being the dividends with 
interest thereon down to the date of the order recommended by the 
directors and declared by meetings of the company in the years 1891 and 
1892 for the years 1890 and 1891. I have not taken the same figures as 
Lord Justice Lindley did, because there has been added to the dividends 
the amount of interest down to the date of the order. I think it will be 
the exact figure.
The order was made on a summons taken out by the liquidator of the 
company in the matter of the Companies Acts and in the matter of the 
bank, asking, so far as is material for the present appeal, for a declaration 
of the joint and several liability of the directors and auditors of the com­
pany on the ground that the dividends before mentioned were not paid 
out of profits but out of capital, and so far as the auditors were concerned 
on the ground that they certified and reported that the balance sheets 
which were laid before the company at the said meetings purported to 
show profits in excess of the sum paid as dividends. I understand the 
application to have been in substance an application against the auditors 
as officers of the company under the 10th Section of the Act of 1890 to 
compel them to contribute to the assets of the company by way of 
compensation for their misfeasance, such sums as the Court may think just.
The main issues, therefore, seem to be whether the auditors have been 
guilty of any misfeasance in relation to the company; whether the mis­
feasance has occasioned loss to the company for which compensation 
ought to be directed to be made. This will involve the question whether 
the dividends were, in fact, paid not out of profits, but out of capital, and 
whether such payment was the fault of the auditor. Then there will be 
the question of the amount of compensation which ought to be directed. 
To determine the first question, I think it will be necessary to consider in 
some detail the position and duties of the auditors, what they ought to 
have done, and what they have done. Then I refer to subsection 6 of 
Section 7 of the Companies Act of 1879, and to those articles of association 
which have been referred to by Lord Justice Lindley. I do not think it 
necessary here to read them out. The articles of association cannot absolve 
the auditors from any obligation imposed upon them by the statute, and 
it may be that they do not in this case impose any greater obligations as 
to the balance sheet, though they make it clear that similar obligations 
extend to all accounts placed before the company, including profit and 
loss account as well as the balance sheet. Under the statute, the members 
of the company are entitled to have the safeguard of an expression of 
opinion of the auditors to the effect, first, that the balance sheet is a full
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and fair balance sheet; and, secondly, that it, the balance sheet, is properly 
drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the 
company’s affairs. The words ‘as shown by the books of the company’ 
seem to me to be introduced to relieve the auditors from any responsibility 
as to affairs of the company kept out of the books and concealed from 
them, but not to confine it to a mere statement of the correspondence of 
the balance sheet with the entries in the books. Now, a full and fair 
balance sheet must be such a balance sheet as to convey a truthful state­
ment as to the company’s position. It must not conceal any known cause 
of weakness in the financial position, or suggest anything which cannot 
be supported as fairly correct in a business point of view. The provision 
as to the balance sheet being properly drawn up so as to exhibit a correct 
view of the state of the company’s affairs is taken from, though it does 
not go quite so far as, article 94, Table A, of the schedule to the Com­
panies Act of 1862. Treated as an addition to the requisition of a full and 
fair balance sheet, it may not be easy to define the full extent of the 
obligation which it imposes, nor is it necessary to do so in this case, for 
it certainly requires, as will hereafter appear, a more detailed statement 
of facts, or a more detailed explanation of the affairs of the bank, than is 
contained in any of the balance sheets of this company.
It will be important to see what information the auditors actually 
acquired as to the business of the company, and the way in which they 
reported upon the successive balance sheets. Mr. Theobald and Mr. 
Timms were auditors of the bank from its incorporation in 1882, and 
they made the audit for successive years down to and including the audit 
for 1891.
The reports of the auditors to the members always took the form of a 
certificate or memorandum written on the balance sheet for the year. 
Their reports on the accounts for the years 1882 and 1883 contained a 
statement to the effect that in their opinion the balance sheet exhibited a 
true and correct view of the position of the bank. In their report on the 
accounts of 1885 a somewhat less emphatic statement to the same effect 
appears, but in the subsequent report no such statement is to be found. 
In a report to the directors dated the 11th February, 1886, which refers 
to the accounts for 1885, Mr. Theobald, after noticing that the first-class 
investments, kept by bankers for quick realisation in case of need, stood 
at a considerably reduced sum, and that more than the whole capital of 
the company was invested in four accounts, viz. the accounts of the 
Liberator, the Lands Allotment Co., the House and Land Co., and the 
Building Estates Co., and that these investments could not be easily 
realised in critical times, proceeds to say: ‘You are doubtless aware that 
it is a rule with bankers to have at hand in cash or easily realisable 
securities an amount equal to at least one-third of the customers’ current 
accounts. Considering the whole amount of uncalled capital, I consider 
that in this case the proportion is scarcely sufficient.’ There can be no 
doubt that even at this time Mr. Theobald was aware that the state of 
affairs of the bank was unsatisfactory in the important points of lock-up 
of capital and consequent deficiency of realisable securities. At this date 
the cash in hand appeared to be £28,000—I only give the round figures— 
and the easily realisable securities were worth £12,600, making together 
£41,000 odd, while the current accounts and deposit accounts of customers 
together reached £107,000. I have not been able to distinguish the 
separate amounts of current and deposit accounts at that time. In  the
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balance sheet for 1891, more particularly dealt with hereafter, the cash 
had fallen to £25,000, and the easily realisable securities to £7,820, making 
together £32,000 odd; hardly more than one-sixth of the sum due to 
customers on current accounts alone, which had increased to £189,000 odd, 
the amount due on current and deposit accounts taken together being 
£282,000. No other report of the auditors to the directors is put in 
evidence until that of 1892 as to the accounts of 1891. The report of the 
auditors to the members on the accounts for 1886 to 1890, both inclusive, 
are simply to the effect that the cash and bills receivable are correct, that 
securities had been produced for the investments and loans (no informa­
tion being given as to the securities so produced) and that the balance 
sheet is a correct summary of the accounts recorded in the books. In the 
last-mentioned report is contained for the first time a statement, ‘The 
value of the assets as shown on the balance sheet is dependent on 
realisation.’
Great stress has been laid on this by counsel for the appellants. They 
argue that it was sufficient to put members upon inquiry, and that from 
the course taken at the trial they were debarred from giving the evidence 
of experts as to the importance and signification of this. I may at once 
say that it was the duty of the auditors to convey in direct and express 
terms to the members any information which they thought proper to be 
communicated, that the words of the statement are perfectly clear in their 
meaning, but also entirely unimportant, amounting to a mere truism, and 
that no evidence of experts would have been of the slightest use for the 
purpose of giving them a greater importance or signification than they 
possessed in themselves, even if such evidence were admissible. To me it 
appears that all the reports from 1886 onwards were imperfect, and that 
the auditors in giving reports in such form failed entirely to fulfil the 
statutory duties imposed upon them. Counsel for the appellants argued 
that such a failure would not amount to misfeasance but only to 
negligence, and that the appellant is not charged by the summons with 
negligence, but I cannot admit the cogency of this argument. The reports 
were made in order to fulfil the statutory obligation, and to be read to the 
meetings in accordance with the statute. Mr. Theobald, with reference to 
this matter, says at page 74 of the evidence, ‘My evidence means the same 
as the Act’. Then he is asked, ‘Do you say you could have given the 
certificate required by the Act of 1891?’ (I think that question must have 
been meant and understood to mean, ‘Could you have given the certificate 
for 1891 required by the Act?’) ‘ (A), Yes, certainly. (Q) Then why did you 
not do so? (A) Because I was not aware that it was considered necessary 
for me to give the certificate either in the words of the Act or not at all.’ 
Mr. Theobald’s interpretation of his own certificate cannot be received 
either in his favour or against him, and we should not unduly press against 
him apparent admissions made in the course of a very trying cross- 
examination. But this evidence of his does, I think, go so far as to show 
that the certificates were in fact given as reports under the Act, and 
independent of that evidence I think there can be no doubt that they were 
intended to be and were received and acted upon as reports under the Act.
I consider the giving of the certificates (assuming them to be to the 
knowledge of the auditors misleading certificates, a question which I shall 
deal with separately) to be a misfeasance within the meaning of Section 10 
of the Act of 1890, and not a mere act of negligence; and that this was a 
fair meaning of the charge contained in the summons I can have no doubt,
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having regard to the terms of the certificates given and the explanations 
of Mr. Theobald himself, that there was a strong and growing feeling of 
dissatisfaction in the mind of Mr. Theobald at the state of the affairs of 
the bank as shown by the books, and I find no sufficient communication 
of the facts causing this dissatisfaction in the reports. The balance sheets 
when examined do not in my opinion fulfil the statutory requirements of 
being full and fair balance sheets, and they are not properly drawn up so 
as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the company’s affairs 
as shown by the books of the company. To establish this, I think it is 
necessary to give a short summary of the evidence, as to the years 1889, 
1890 and 1891, the only years as to which we have sufficient evidence to 
be able to arrive at definite conclusions. From the tables set out at page 7 
of the Official Receiver’s report it appears that during the years 1889,
1890 and 1891, the greater part of the business of the bank consisted in 
making loans to and discounting bills for a group of companies, nine in 
number, conveniently referred to as the Balfour group, or the Balfour 
companies. Loans were also made or discounting facilities afforded to 
other companies allied to the Balfour companies, to certain directors of 
the bank, and customers, including Wilkinson and Benham, who are 
named in the table, by reason of special considerations affecting their 
accounts. These accounts of allied companies and the persons last men­
tioned are for convenience hereinafter referred to as ‘the special accounts.’
The balances due from the Balfour companies at the end of the years 
1889, 1890 and 1891 were, for 1889 £119,000, for 1890 £218,000, and for
1891 £308,000. Corresponding balances in the ‘special accounts’ were, 
for 1889 £77,000, for 1890 £112,000, for 1891 £121,000, the aggregate 
balances from the Balfour companies and on the special accounts being 
for 1889 £196,000, for 1890 £321,000, for 1891 £429,000. The correspond­
ing balances due from all other customers and persons were, for 1889 
£135,000, for 1890 £103,000, for 1891 £100,000. Roughly speaking, the 
proportion of what may be called the outside business that with the 
Balfour companies and on the special accounts was, at the end of 1889 
two-thirds, at the end of 1890 one-third, and at the end of 1891 one-fourth. 
The paid-up capital increased in 1890 by about £67,000, and in 1891 by 
about £43,000, or altogether £120,000, but the whole of this, and con­
siderably more than £100,000 in addition, had been absorbed into the 
accounts of the Balfour companies and the special accounts.
It has already been pointed out that the amount of cash and easily 
realisable securities at the end of 1891 was hardly more than one-sixth 
of the amount due to customers on current accounts, or about one-half 
of what Mr. Theobald had in 1886 pointed out to be required according 
to the usual practice of bankers.
These figures show an alarming absorption during the three years of 
the available assets of the company in advances to the Balfour companies 
and on the special accounts, and a perilous diminution of easily realisable 
assets. As is usual with banking companies, profits alleged to have been 
earned by the bank consisted, with unsubstantial exceptions, of interest 
on loans, discounting of bills, and commissions.
The gross profits entered in the books as having been earned from 
the Balfour companies, between the incorporation of the bank and the 
end of 1891, amounted to upwards of £84,000. The amount distributed in 
dividends during the same period was upwards of £58,000 and the amount 
carried to reserve fund £13,000. I include there £3,000 carried to reserve
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fund in accordance with the report on the accounts of 1891, making 
together £71,000.
The reserve fund, however, was not required by the articles of associa­
tion to be kept separate, and was not kept separate from the general funds 
of the bank. It was employed in the bank’s business, quite rightly, no 
doubt.
Subject to an argument as to appropriation of payments dealt with 
hereafter, the profits supposed to have been earned from the Balfour 
companies were not actually paid, but they were only debited in the 
accounts current of the different companies, and, speaking generally, the 
moneys owing by the different companies went on increasing from year 
to year. It is evident that, unless these profits could be fairly treated as 
not only earned but payable within a reasonable time, there would at the 
end of 1891 be no profits out of which a dividend could be paid, but, on 
the contrary, a large deficiency.
The learned judge, after a careful consideration and investigation of 
the evidence before him, has found, as a fact, that the credits of these 
companies at the end of each year were generally credits created 
temporarily for the purpose of audit, and that such credits, in the majority 
of cases, were created either by the discounting of bills of companies like 
Hobbs & Co., which bills constituted a mere paper asset, or by loans 
direct or indirect from the bank itself, the bulk of which were ill- 
secured.
I see no reason to differ from this conclusion, but it is a conclusion 
arrived at to an important extent from comparing the books of the bank 
with the books of other companies of the Balfour group to which the 
auditors had no access, and it is only to the extent to which it is founded 
on entries in the books of the bank itself that it can be used for the 
purpose of charging the appellant with knowledge of the facts, though it 
is very important on the question whether the dividends were really paid 
out of capital or not. The books themselves show that in many instances 
the accounts were put in credit in the manner described by the learned 
judge, but in other cases, and especially with reference to the indirect 
loans, that is to say, loans made by the bank to one of the companies out 
of which that company made an advance to another of the group for the 
purpose of putting the accounts of the latter in credit at the end of 
the year, the auditors would have no sufficient means of tracing the 
transactions.
Having made these general observations I will go on to examine more 
completely the important case of the accounts for the year 1891. For that 
purpose, as being more fair to the auditors, I will assume without at all 
deciding that, down to the end of 1890, no knowledge that the former 
balance sheets were misleading has been brought home to the auditors, 
and will endeavour to ascertain what additional information the auditors 
acquired during the audit for 1891. In the year 1891 the indebtedness 
of the Balfour companies to the bank as appearing by the bank books 
was increased by the sum of between £89,000 and £90,000 without any 
additional securities of importance being given, though, no doubt, to a 
considerable but unascertained extent money was expended on buildings 
already charged to the bank, which would make the property charged, 
though not necessarily the charges in favour of the bank, more valuable.
The securities consisted in the main of charges on buildings being con­
structed under building agreements, on which large sums had already
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been charged in priority to the bank. The buildings were unfinished, and 
required further expenditure of very large sums before they could 
advantageously be disposed of, and in my judgment there was abundant 
evidence to show that these securities of the bank were very insufficient, 
and not realisable at all without the expenditure of further money, which 
the bank was unable to advance. The sums due on the special accounts 
had increased from £102,000 to £121,000, that is to say, between £18,000 
and £19,000. W ith regard to these special accounts, I do not think it 
necessary to go in detail through the list, but I find that the auditors 
comment very unfavourably on the security for the following debts: That 
of William Blewitt for £7,849; that of Blewitt and Balfour for £2,148; 
and that of Balfour for £12,000. I think, however, that they may have 
considered the personal security in these cases sufficient, and I do not 
found anything on those cases. Wilkinson, at the end of 1890, was 
indebted to the bank in the sum of £24,000 practically unsecured. Mr. 
Theobald complained about interest being debited on the ground that 
the directors had then more definite information as to the security. This 
was going through the audit for 1890. The fact is that the security con­
sisted of debentures of a tramway company whose tramway was never 
built. Interest accordingly ceased to be debited to this account in March, 
1891. When Mr. Theobald was pressed to explain why the full sum was 
returned as an asset, he replied that it would have to be provided for out 
of the reserve fund. He further explained that he thought the account 
wanted watching, but that it was likely to turn out all right. In examina­
tion before the judge with reference to this debt, he said that he had 
conferred with the manager, who knew all about the circumstances. 
‘First of all,’ says he, ‘I suggested the whole should be written off, but 
afterwards, Mr. Brock, I think it was, sent for Mr. Blewitt. We had a very 
serious conference about it, and they convinced me that the time had not 
come to do that (write off the whole), and they might yet get the whole of 
the amount back, but I thought it was not wise to charge interest.’
This, I think, falls very far indeed short of showing that the auditor 
believed, or could have believed, that the debt was a good debt, though 
it might have justified the carrying of it to a suspense account, instead 
of writing it off as bad. The importance of the case depends upon the 
fact that if the debt had not been entered in the balance sheet as a good 
debt, there would have been no profit at all to show for the year 1891. 
At the end of 1891, Mr. Wilkinson’s debt, which had risen from discount­
ing bills, all of which would appear by the dates to have been dishonoured, 
was reduced to £16,000 on account of discount by a loan of £10,000, 
but the indebtedness remained unaffected. W ith regard to Benham’s debt 
which increased in the year 1891 from £31,635 to £47,745, it was proved 
that in 1891 Mr. Theobald refused to pass the security for another year, 
and, to satisfy him, a letter purporting to come from Benham’s solicitor, 
Mr. Waring, containing an undertaking to pay off £15,000 within a week, 
was produced. He had also been told, during the audit for 1890, that 
there was a security under a supposed will which had not been proved, 
and that they expected to get the will proved very soon. During the audit 
for 1891 he ascertained that the debt had increased from £31,000 to 
£47,000, that the £15,000 promised to be repaid had not been repaid, and 
that the alleged will had not been proved—indeed, it turned out after­
wards that such a will never existed. The explanation of Mr. Theobald, 
that he trusted to the solicitor seeing that the security was all right, is not,
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under circumstances, altogether satisfactory, but I think it is safer to 
allow Mr. Theobald the benefit of the defence, though his own report 
sufficiently shows that he was not himself thoroughly satisfied. I wish to 
make it plain, so far as I can, that I am only relying on matters which Mr. 
Theobald ought to have known and must be presumed to have known. 
The debt of £7,300 from the Medway Portland Cement Co. had, like 
Wilkinson’s, ceased to be charged with interest, and could not properly 
have been treated as a fund for the payment of dividend. W ith reference 
to that of the Public Works Co. Ltd., amounting to £8,105, the auditors, 
in their schedule to their report to the directors, say this: ‘The realisation 
of this is very doubtful.’ There could, therefore, be no justification for 
treating this as a fund for payment of dividend. Whilst Mr. Theobald 
was engaged upon the audit of the accounts for 1891, or previously, a 
report of Messrs. Balfour & Brock, dated 22nd of December, 1891, was 
produced to him as to the way of putting into credit current accounts of 
Hobbs & Co. Ltd., George Newman & Co. Ltd., the London, Edinburgh & 
Glasgow Insurance Co., and C. H. Wilkinson, by loans from the bank. 
W ith reference to Mr. Wilkinson’s account, the proposal ‘that the over­
draft should be made in part by a loan and in part by fresh acceptances 
of both secured as may be arranged, we think the further loan should be 
£10,000 on loan and £15,000 on bills’. The loan was made, and, appar­
ently, £16,000 was left on security of acceptances, but it does not appear 
that any security was then arranged for or given, or that Mr. Theobald 
investigated this matter. Attention was, therefore, called in this particular 
case to the mode in which the accounts were put in credit as found by 
the learned judge. Several facts which appear to me to be most material 
with reference to the debt of 1891 are to be gathered from the text of 
the report. I have dealt, to a certain extent, with the schedule in the 
remarks I have previously made, but as to the text of the report of the 
auditors of February, 1892, almost every sentence is full of serious mean­
ing. In it they state ‘that they are unable to give a more satisfactory 
certificate than the one set forth,’ which is a mere statement that the 
balance sheet is a correct summary of the accounts as recorded in the 
books, followed by a statement that the value of the assets as shown on 
the balance sheet is dependent upon realisation, which I have already 
commented upon, an important sentence: ‘On this subject we have 
reported specifically to the board.’ This may mean they have reported 
as to the value of the assets, or as to their realisation, or (as I think is the 
true construction) as to both. The auditors were induced to withdraw 
this sentence, which, though it would have given no information of the 
slightest value to the members, yet would have been calculated to put 
them upon inquiry. They go on: ‘We are not qualified, nor is it the 
province of the auditors, to estimate with exactitude the value of the 
securities.’ The words ‘with exactitude’ seem to me to be emphatic, and 
to point out that they had, as appears by the report, made a general 
estim ate of the securities, which was very unfavourable. They say, ‘Never­
theless, we feel it our duty to send you herewith a schedule of the 
securities amounting to £487,000, which we desire should have the special 
and very serious consideration of the directors.’
In the £487,000 are included every one of the sums owing by the 
Balfour companies and on the special accounts, and nearly £60,000 more 
out of the £100,000 owing by other customers of the bank. Auditors who 
feel it their duty to call the special and very serious consideration of their
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directors to £487,000 out of a total of £530,000 of the debts due to the 
bank must indeed have arrived at the opinion that the state of affairs of 
the company was critical and dangerous, but, as will appear, Mr. Theo­
bald does not deny this, though he attempts, unsuccessfully, I think, to 
explain it away by saying that all his anxiety arose from the fact of the 
assets being locked up. Further on in the report the auditors say, ‘The 
gravity of the situation is enhanced by the fact, as we believe it to be, 
that the board is in many cases powerless to decline further help because 
they are powerless to realise.’ This appears to me to be a very just but 
a very serious statement. The Balfour companies were indeed so much 
bound up with one another by a system of inter-financing, and some of 
them had committed themselves so deeply in the building schemes of 
Hobbs & Co., Newman & Co. and others, that they would only be kept 
going in the future, as they had been in the past, by continued advances 
from the funds of the bank. The last quoted extract from the report 
seems to me to show that the auditors fully appreciated this view of the 
state of affairs of the company. They continue as follows: ‘We beg also 
respectfully to point out that the quarters from which the bank obtains 
by far the larger proportion of its business’—meaning, I conclude, the 
Balfour companies, and some of the special accounts—‘are such that the 
constitution of the board must make it difficult, if not impossible, to 
obtain a sufficiently independent judgment upon many vital questions 
which have to be decided in its management.’ No doubt this refers to the 
fact that some members of the board of the bank, the financing company, 
were members also of the board of different Balfour companies requiring 
advances, and the difficulty arising from this is obvious and serious. Then 
follows a sentence which forms an appropriate ending to such a report: 
‘We cannot conclude without expressing the opinion unhesitatingly that 
no dividend should be paid this year.’ The auditors were, unfortunately, 
persuaded by Mr. Balfour, assisted by Mr. Brock, to strike out this clause, 
I believe, before the report reached the hands of the other directors of the 
bank. Mr. Theobald explains this by saying that he came to the con­
clusion that it was beyond the province of the auditors to express an 
opinion as to the policy of declaring a dividend, and if that were all, I 
should be disposed to agree with him. It is no part of the auditors' duty 
to consider what is good or what is bad policy. They have only to 
examine into facts and see that the members have their opinion as to the 
balance sheet showing the state of affairs of the company. But the context 
seems to oblige me to read the excised sentence as meaning not that it was 
impolitic, but that it would be improper, having regard to the state of 
affairs of the company, to declare a dividend. Having regard to the 
explanations given by Mr. Theobald in his evidence, I think the post­
script to this report very significant. It runs thus: ‘We do not wish it to 
be understood that we consider all the accounts in the schedule are 
unsecured, but as a whole the capital therein represented is locked up.’ 
That is the defence, that all their alarm arose from the capital being 
locked up. This is not, I think, the language that would have been used 
if the auditors had thought that the only mischief was in the locking-up, 
and an examination of the schedule to my mind confirms this conclusion. 
To a great extent the memoranda in the schedule explain themselves, and 
I have already dealt with many of the items. The accounts of each one 
of the Balfour companies is referred to in such a way as to show the 
unsatisfactory state of the securities Mr. Theobald now says that he had
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no doubt as to the solvency of any of the Balfour companies, and in a 
certain sense I am ready to believe this; that is to say, he thought that 
if they continued to be financed in the future as they had been in the 
past, and so were enabled to complete the buildings which had been 
commenced, they might ultimately be able to repay the advances to them 
with interest and commission. But this is not the meaning of solvency 
in a legal or business sense, and it is quite plain that Mr. Theobald knew 
perfectly well that some at least of these companies were, and were likely 
to remain for an indefinite period, unable to meet their liabilities as they 
became due. In no other way can the memoranda as to the want of 
security, or the defective nature of the securities, of the several Balfour 
companies be explained. Similar observations apply to the memoranda 
as to the special accounts. Notwithstanding this report, every item of the 
£487,000 was entered as a good debt in the balance sheet for 1891. No 
valuation was made of any one of the debts, or of the securities for them. 
If any such valuation had, in fact, been made, I think it plain that there 
could have been no profit shown for the year. Mr. Theobald gave 
evidence several times over to the effect that whilst he was engaged in 
the audit for 1891 he felt that it was a very important crisis in the bank’s 
affairs, and that if they could only get over the next month or so they 
would save it. His explanation of his withdrawal of the words in the 
proposed report to the members is that on this point he had reported 
specifically to the board. In explanation he gave, among other carefully 
prepared and considered reasons, the following: That ‘Mr. Balfour was 
so thoroughly aroused to the necessity for taking the affairs of the bank 
resolutely in hand as to lead me to believe that he would do so, and being 
a man of great financial resource, he would be able to save the bank’; 
and that Mr. Balfour also spoke of an amalgamation. ‘Mr. Balfour said 
that, while doing this, he would confer with me continuously, and that 
no interim dividend should be paid without consultation with me.’ The 
first intimation received of payment of the interim dividend was an 
announcement in the Press of an interim dividend for 1892, for which 
it is not suggested Mr. Theobald was in any way liable. This would have 
given twelve months to work, during which time it would have been 
quite possible for Mr. Balfour to obtain very large repayments from the 
borrowing companies with which he was connected, and thus for the bank 
to be saved. T hat is a very important point to make.
In  another place he says, ‘My main point is this, that the bank could 
be saved if many of these accounts were collected. Mr. Balfour had 
absolute power over most of these companies, and he was so thoroughly 
alarmed that I quite believed that if we could only tide over that period 
he would use his influence over other companies to bring the money into 
the bank. I quite imagined he would do that, even if it meant that some 
of the other companies would have to go to the wall. W hat becomes of 
his statement that he thought the companies were solvent? He says it is 
a critical time; if you can tide over the next month or two—as to which 
he never expresses an opinion—if you can do that, then the resources of 
Mr. Balfour are so great, his influence with the other companies so great, 
that it is quite possible he may collect a number of the accounts, even if 
the other companies have got to go to the wall. I think it is impossible 
to avoid the conclusion that Mr. Theobald, when about to make his 
report on the accounts of 1891, was thoroughly alarmed at the critical 
position of the bank, as he thought it more than likely the bank would
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not tide over another month or two, but that if it did, it could only be 
saved by extraordinary exertions on Mr. Balfour’s part, and that in the 
process some of the other Balfour companies might have to go to the 
wall. He represents Mr. Balfour as fully sharing his alarm. If we turn 
to the balance sheet to see whether the state of the company’s affairs, as 
apprehended by Mr. Theobald, was in any way indicated therein, we 
shall, I think, be obliged to answer the question in the negative.
The liabilities appear to be sufficiently set forth. It is the statement of 
the assets which most calls for criticism. The cash at the bank was cor­
rectly stated and so are the bills receivable, though the amount of £180,000 
there appears only to have been arrived at by transferring £58,000, on 
31st December, 1891, from bills receivable to a loan account for unpaid 
expenses. Disregarding the small item for stamps, the only other items 
on the credit side are as follows: ‘Investments including reserve fund’— 
the reserve fund at that time was £10,000—‘2¾  per cent. Consols and 
Prescott and Arizona Railway bonds, £7,820.’ That could not be the 
investments which included the reserve fund of £10,000. ‘Loans to 
customers and other securities, £346,000.’ In the two items, ‘bills receiv­
able’ and ‘loans to customers and other securities,’ are, as above pointed 
out, included the whole of the sums, amounting to £487,000, the subject 
of the report of the auditors to the directors, at their full value. This 
item, ‘loans to customers and other securities,’ is, of course, altogether 
inaccurate and may be very misleading. W hat the £346,000 really con­
sists of is ‘loans to customers partly secured,’ which is a very different 
matter. It would be open to any ordinary reader of the balance sheet to 
suppose that there were securities to an indefinite amount apart from 
loans to customers, and available to meet moneys due on the current 
accounts of customers. I am at a loss to understand for what purpose this 
item could have been so entered. It was not through inadvertence, for it 
was a correction of a still more misleading entry occurring in former 
balance sheets. It was suggested that such an item frequently appears 
in balance sheets. It may be so for anything I know, but it is none 
the less improper in the particular balance sheet which we have to 
consider. In short, the balance sheet, as it stands, would have given 
no hint to any ordinary reader of the critical position arising either 
from the locking-up of capital or from the doubtful nature of many 
of the debts entered at their full value. In reporting this balance sheet 
without explanation the auditors were, in my judgment, guilty of a 
misfeasance within the meaning of the 10th Section of the Act of 1890, 
as charged in the summons, and were in this case, at any rate thoroughly 
alive to the unsatisfactory state of the affairs of the bank as shown by the 
books. The next question is whether the misfeasance was the cause of 
loss to the company. On examination of the evidence there set forth, 
I should be led to the conclusion that the auditors did not know that 
a dividend could not properly be paid out of profits.
See how the figures stand from another point of view. The profit and 
loss account shows a gross profit of £24,000. After making provision for 
bad and doubtful debts, and after deduction of £6,600 for expenses of 
management and other charges, there is carried over to the balance sheet 
a net profit of £18,000 odd, out of which there had already been applied 
£6,000 and more in payment of an interim dividend, leaving a balance of 
between £11,000 and £12,000 and nothing more. £3,000 of that was to 
be carried to reserve; so you have only about between £8,000 and £9,000,
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according to the books, for dividends. But of the gross profits for the year 
1891 shown by the books £16,788 were book entries debited to the 
Balfour companies, £2,462 a book entry debited to Benham’s account, and 
£275 a book entry debited to Wilkinson’s account. That, of course, was 
in the early part of the year, Wilkinson’s account being treated as a debit. 
Assuming all the Balfour companies, and Benham and Wilkinson, to have 
been able to pay the whole sums due from them, except the amount 
debited in 1891 for interest and commission, not only the profits available 
for dividend would be swept away, but of the reserve fund itself little or 
nothing would be left. Such an assumption however, in my judgment, 
would have been extravagantly favourable to the auditors, and it only 
required that one of the debts owing by Mr. Wilkinson (I leave out 
Benham because I do not want to found on Benham any charge against 
Mr. Theobald), or almost any one of the Balfour companies should turn 
out to be bad, it would exhaust everything belonging to the bank which 
was not capital. It turned out that each of the Balfour companies as 
well as Wilkinson and Benham, as well as other debtors of the bank, were 
insolvent. In my judgment it is established that the bank had no funds 
out of which the dividends could in any point of view be properly paid. 
I think the auditors might well be held to have known, but I do not rely 
upon that conclusion in my judgment; what I do rely upon is that the 
auditors must have known and did know that the balance sheet was not 
properly drawn up so as to show the state of affairs, and that was a 
misfeasance. If they were guilty of misfeasance in relation to the com­
pany, they must be responsible for the consequences of such misfeasance, 
whether they had arrived at the conclusion that the dividend if paid at 
all would be payable out of capital or not. That dividends were, in fact, 
paid out of capital cannot, I think, be doubted. It was argued that before 
the stoppage of the bank the profits entered in the 1891 balance sheet 
were, in fact, paid by appropriation of moneys paid into current accounts. 
This would not apply to a case like Wilkinson’s, where there was no 
current account, but in my judgment the rule in Clayton’s case has no 
sort of application under the circumstances. If it had, a bank might 
always pay profits by mere book entries, though the customers against 
whom interest and commission were charged might all be hopelessly in­
solvent. Was, then, the loss occasioned by the misfeasance of the auditors? 
It had been argued that the payment of the dividend was not the proxi­
mate result of the auditors’ report, as the recommendation of the directors 
and the vote of the meeting had to intervene. This appears to me to 
misrepresent the true state of things. The report of the auditors was a 
continuing representation, made indeed before, but in law and in good 
sense to be treated as repeated after, the recommendation of the directors. 
It was perfectly well known to Mr. Theobald (at any rate at the meeting 
where he was present and heard the reading of the report recommending 
a dividend, and the speech of Mr. Balfour) that this report was intended 
to be relied upon as justifying the recommendation and as an invitation 
to vote the dividend. How far the judgment should go against the 
appellant has given me considerable difficulty. A great deal of the reason­
ing which has led me to hold that their reporting on the accounts of 1891 
is a misfeasance in relation to the company applies only to the case of 
that report. The learned judge has held Mr. Theobald liable not only 
for the 1891, but also for the 1890, dividend. I am far from saying that 
he is clearly wrong, but I cannot satisfy myself that he is clearly right.
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In the case of the 1890 dividend it cannot, on the evidence, be made out 
to my full satisfaction that the auditors knew the balance sheet to be 
substantially misleading, and I think it safer to confine the order to the 
dividend in respect of 1891.
Lord Justice Lindley: The order will stand as to one dividend with 
interest but not as to the other.
In re KINGSTON COTTON MILL CO.*
Court of Appeal, 1896. 2 Ch. 279.
Lord Justice Lindley said: This is an appeal from an order made by 
Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams under Section 10 the Companies (Winding- 
up) Act, 1890, on Mr. Pickering and Mr. Peasegood, the auditors of the 
company, ordering them to pay the liquidator certain sums of money, 
being the amounts of dividends improperly declared and paid out of the 
assets of the company on the faith of certain balance sheets prepared and 
signed by the auditors. The appeal is made upon two grounds: (1) that 
the auditors have not failed to discharge their duty to the company and 
are under no liability to make good the money misapplied; (2) that even 
if they have, the proper remedy is by action and not by the summary 
process to which the liquidator has had recourse. It will be convenient to 
dispose of the second point first. It has already been decided that the 
auditors of this company are ‘officers’ within the meaning of Section 10 of 
the Companies (Winding-up) Act, 1890 (see [1896] 1 Ch. 6; The Times 
Law Reports, Vol. XII, p. 60). The object of that section is the same as 
that of Section 165 of the Companies Act, 1862, which it has replaced. 
That object was to facilitate the recovery by the liquidator of assets of a 
company improperly dealt with by its promoters, directors, or other 
officers. The section applies to breaches of trust and misfeasance by such 
persons. I agree that the section does not apply to all cases in which 
actions by the company will lie for the recovery of damages against the 
persons named; it is easy to imagine cases of breach of contract, trespasses, 
negligences, or other wrongs to which the section is inapplicable, and 
some such have been the subject of judicial decision; but I am not aware 
of any authority to the effect that the section does not apply to the case 
of an officer who has committed a breach of his duty to the company, the 
direct consequence of which has been a misapplication of its assets, for 
which he could be made responsible by an action at law or in equity. Such 
a breach of duty, if established, is a ‘misfeasance’ within the meaning of 
the section, or, to adopt the language used in Cavendish-Bentinck v. 
Fenn (12 A. C. 652), such a breach of duty is a misfeasance in the nature 
of a breach of trust. This view of the section was adopted by this Court in 
In re The London & General Bank ([1895] 2 Ch. 166, 673; The Times 
Law Reports, Vol. XI, pp. 374-573), and is, in my opinion, correct. On 
this preliminary point, therefore, which, however, does not touch the 
merits of the case, the appellants are not entitled to succeed. I come now 
to the real question in this controversy, and that is, whether the appellants 
have been guilty of any breach of duty to the company. To decide this 
question it is necessary to consider: (1) W hat their duty was; (2) How
* This case is discussed at p. 18 supra.
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they performed it, and in what respects (if any) they failed to perform it. 
The duty of an auditor generally was very carefully considered by this 
Court in In re The London and General Bank ([1895] 2 Ch. 673), and I 
cannot usefully add anything to what will be found on pages 682-684. It 
was there pointed out that an auditor’s duty is to examine the books, 
ascertain that they are right, and to prepare a balance sheet showing the 
true financial position of the company at the time to which the balance 
sheet refers. But it was also pointed out that an auditor is not an insurer, 
and that in the discharge of his duty he is only bound to exercise a reason­
able amount of care and skill. It was further pointed out that what in any 
particular case is a reasonable amount of care and skill depends on the 
circumstances of that case; that if there is nothing which ought to excite 
suspicion, less care may properly be considered reasonable than could be 
so considered if suspicion was or ought to have been aroused. These are 
the general principles which have to be applied to cases of this description. 
I protest, however, against the notion that an auditor is bound to be 
suspicious, as distinguished from being reasonably careful. To substitute 
the one expression for the other may easily lead to serious error. I pass 
now to consider the complaint made against the auditors in this particular 
case. The complaint is that they failed to detect certain frauds. There is 
no charge of dishonesty on the part of the auditors. They did not certify 
or pass anything which they did not honestly believe to be true. It is 
said, however, that they were culpably careless. The circumstances are 
as follows: For several years frauds were committed by the manager, who, 
in order to bolster up the company and make it appear flourishing when 
it was the reverse, deliberately exaggerated both the quantities and values 
of the cotton and yam in the company’s mills. He did this at the end of 
the years 1890, 1891, 1892 and 1893. There was no book or account (ex­
cept the stock journal, to which I will refer presently) showing the quan­
tity or value of the cotton or yarn in the mill at any one time. It would not 
be easy to keep such a book. Nor is it wanted for ordinary purposes. 
There is considerable waste (20 or 25 per cent, on the average) in the 
manufacture of yarn from cotton, and the market prices of both cotton and 
yarn are subject to great fluctuations. The balance sheets of each year 
contained on the asset side entries of the values of the stock-in-trade at the 
end of the year, and those entries were stated to be ‘as per manager’s cer­
tificate.’ There were also in the balance sheets entries on the opposite side 
of the values of the stock-in-trade at the beginning of the year. The quan­
tities did not appear in either case. The auditors took the entry of the 
stock-in-trade at the beginning of the year from the last preceding balance 
sheet, and they took the values of the stock-in-trade at the end of the 
year from the stock journal. The book contained a series of accounts 
under various heads purporting to show the quantities and values of the 
company’s stock-in-trade at the end of each year, and a summary of all the 
accounts showing the total value of such stock-in-trade. The summary 
was signed by the manager, and the value as shown by it was adopted by 
the auditors and was inserted as an asset in the balance sheet, but ‘as per 
manager’s certificate.’ The summary always corresponded with the ac­
counts summarised, and the auditors ascertained that this was the case. 
But they did not examine further into the accuracy of the accounts sum­
marised. The auditors did not profess to guarantee the correctness of this 
item. They assumed no responsibility for it. They took the item from 
the manager, and the entry in the balance sheet showed that they did so. I
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confess I cannot see that their omission to check his returns was a breach 
of their duty to the company. It is no part of an auditor’s duty to take 
stock. No one contends that it is. He must rely on other people for details 
of the stock-in-trade in hand. In the case of a cotton mill he must rely on 
some skilled person for the materials necessary to enable him to enter the 
stock-in-trade at its proper value in the balance sheet. In this case the 
auditors relied on the manager. He was a man of high character and of 
unquestioned competence. He was trusted by everyone who knew him. 
The learned judge has held that the directors are not to be blamed for 
trusting him. The auditors had no suspicion that he was not to be trusted 
to give accurate information as to the stock-in-trade in hand, and they 
trusted him accordingly in that matter. But it is said they ought not to 
have done so, and for this reason. The stock journal showed the quantities 
—that is, the weight in pounds—of the cotton and yarn at the end of each 
year. Other books showed the quantities of cotton bought during the 
year and the quantities of yarn sold during the year. If these books had 
been compared by the auditors they would have found that the quantity of 
cotton and yarn in hand at the end of the year ought to be much less than 
the quantity shown in the stock journal, and so much less that the value 
of the cotton and yarn entered in the stock journal could not be right, or, 
at all events, was so abnormally large as to excite suspicion and demand 
further inquiry. This is the view taken by the learned judge. But, al­
though it is no doubt true that such a process might have been gone 
through, and that, if gone through, the fraud would have been discovered, 
can it be truly said that the auditors were wanting in reasonable care in 
not thinking it necessary to test the managing director’s returns? I cannot 
bring myself to think they were, nor do I think any jury of business men 
would take a different view. It is not sufficient to say that the frauds 
must have been detected if the entries in the books had been put together 
in a way which never occurred to anyone before suspicion was aroused. 
The question is whether, no suspicion of anything wrong being enter­
tained, there was a want of reasonable care on the part of the auditors in 
relying on the returns made by a competent and trusted expert relating to 
matters on which information from such a person was essential. I cannot 
think there was. The manager had no apparent conflict between his 
interest and his duty. His position was not similar to that of a cashier who 
has to account for the cash which he receives, and whose own account of 
his receipts and payments could not reasonably be taken by an auditor 
without further inquiry. The auditor’s duty is not so onerous as the 
learned judge has held it to be. The order appealed from must be dis­
charged with costs.
Lopes, L. J., in the course of his judgment, made the following observa­
tions upon the duties of auditors: It is the duty of an auditor to bring 
to bear on the work he has to perform that skill, care, and caution which a 
reasonably competent, careful and cautious auditor would use. W hat is 
reasonable skill, care and caution must depend on the particular circum­
stances of each case. An auditor is not bound to be a detective, or as was 
said, to approach his work with suspicion or with a foregone conclusion 
that there is something wrong. He is a watch-dog, but not a bloodhound. 
He is justified in believing tried servants of the company in whom con­
fidence is placed by the company. He is entitled to assume that they are 
honest, and to rely upon their representations, provided he takes reason­
able care. If there is anything calculated to excite suspicion he should
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probe it to the bottom, but, in the absence of anything of that kind, he is 
only bound to be reasonably cautious and careful. His lordship then 
referred to the circumstances which led to the auditors being deceived, and 
came to the conclusion that they were not wanting in skill, care or caution, 
in accepting the figures of the manager, and he concluded as follows: The 
duties of auditors must not be rendered too onerous. Their work is respon­
sible and laborious, and the remuneration moderate. I should be sorry 
to see the liability of auditors extended any further than in In  re The 
London and General Bank. Indeed, I only assented to that decision on 
account of the inconsistency of the statement made to the directors with 
the balance sheet certified by the auditors and presented to the share­
holders. This satisfied my mind that the auditors deliberately concealed 
that from the shareholders which they had communicated to the directors. 
It would be difficult to say this was not a breach of duty. Auditors must 
not be made liable for not tracking out ingenious and carefully-laid 
schemes of fraud, when there is nothing to arouse their suspicion and 
when those frauds are perpetrated by tried servants of the company and 
are undetected for years by the directors. So to hold would make the 
position of an auditor intolerable.
* * * *
TH E IRISH WOOLLEN CO. v. TYSON * 
Irish Court of Appeal, 1900. 26 The Accountant L. R. 13.
[The question before the court was whether Mr. Kevans, the account­
ant, was, or was not, responsible for the non-detection of the frauds.]
* * * *
Lord Justice H olmes, in delivering his judgment, referred to the 
career of the company which, he said, was formed in June, 1887, for the 
purpose of promoting the woollen industry in Ireland, the original capital 
being £6,000. For some time at the commencement the business was 
almost entirely confined to the purchase of woollen goods from Irish 
manufacturers. In the year 1889 the directors resolved to develop their 
undertaking by seeking to establish their home trade, and for this pur­
pose they increased their capital. The prospectus announcing this resolu­
tion alluded to the success that had attended the operations of the com­
pany up to that time, and held out more brilliant prospects for the future. 
The whole of the additional capital, however, was required to pay off 
debts previously incurred, and could hardly be used for the purpose of 
opening up new business. Between the years 1888 to 1895 nine balance 
sheets were presented to the shareholders, each showing considerable net 
profit; and during all this period dividends were paid which never once 
fell as low as 5 per cent., amounting to £4,649. There is not the slightest 
evidence of the soundness of the financial position of the company until 
its operations were suspended, when Mr. Carnegie—the auditor’s repre­
sentative, who was examining the accounts—noticed a double entry. The 
mistake was a trifling one, and he was satisfied with the explanation given 
by Mr. Crawford, who had been for some time the accountant of the
This case is discussed at p. 18 supra.
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company. Crawford and Johnson abandoned their positions, and the 
balance sheet for the last period (1895) showed a deficiency of £11,107. 
The company, by order of the Court, was directed to be wound up com­
pulsorily, and Mr. Garde—who was himself formerly in the employment of 
the defendant auditor—found that, although the company was just solvent 
as regards its creditors, its capital had entirely disappeared, and I presume 
it was his report that led to the bringing of the present action. It appears 
that Crawford, acting either by himself or with Johnston, the warehouse­
man, was a defaulter to a very large extent. Mr. Kevans says, in his letters 
of the 22nd and 24th January, 1896, ‘that although the whole of the items 
that made up Crawford’s definciency were apparently received within the 
three months ending 31st December, 1895, it is highly improbable that 
he could have abstracted all that money in so short a period of time, but 
that it was impossible to say how far back exactly the defalcations ex­
tended.’ The defendant was held guilty in connection with Crawford’s 
fraud, and I therefore pass away from this portion of the case, which 
relates to only a small part of the losses sustained by the company. T o  
account for the rest it is necessary to go more fully into the way the busi­
ness was carried on. The directors, who were paid no fees for the first 
two or three years, were originally selected by lot; and Mr. Peter White 
was appointed managing director; Mr. Tyson was appointed secretary at 
£250 per annum; and the rest of the staff—examiner and packer—at 
£150 and £75 per annum respectively. Mr. Tyson did not long remain 
secretary, and was succeeded by Mr. McDonough, and subsequently by 
Crawford. Mr. White, in one of his letters, referred in a somewhat gloomy 
manner to the large annual amount of money paid to the officers in the 
shape of salaries, and recommended such a change being made as would 
reduce the annual expenses to £600. W hite’s recommendation was ac­
cepted, and from that date Crawford was appointed secretary. He only 
received 35s. per week, and his income from the company never seemed 
to come up to £150 a year. I presume that Johnston did not receive more. 
Mr. Kevans was the first auditor of the company, and he provided the 
books which, in his judgment, were necessary for keeping the accounts. 
They consisted of: (1) cash book; (2) customers’ ledger; (3) creditors’ 
ledger; (4) day book; (5) invoice guard book; (6) petty cash book. It 
cannot be denied that these were sufficient to show the true financial 
position of the business of the company, if they had been honestly kept. 
Mr. MacDermot commented upon the absence of one book, but I attach 
no importance to this. The multiplication of books, if written up by 
different parties, may be a check upon fraud, but in this case all the book­
keeping was done by a single officer who, if dishonest, would take care to 
make the books appear perfectly straight. There was another book, re­
ferred to in the evidence, kept for the private use of the directors, but 
whatever its significance may be it could not affect Mr. Kevans. In Feb­
ruary, 1891, there occurred a circumstance materially bearing upon the 
case. After that time the auditor’s fee was increased to £40, the considera­
tion being a ‘monthly audit.’ It was not understood by this that a balance 
sheet or profit and loss account was to be prepared for each month, or 
that a monthly statement was to be submitted to the directors. I t  was a 
monthly investigation for the purpose of checking fraud or error. It was, 
as Mr. Kevans himself says, ‘a system of monthly checking with a view to 
the half-yearly audit.’ Mr. Kevans seems to have done little of the actual 
work himself, and the evidence varies as to the nature of the supervision
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which he gave to it; the investigation of the books he deputed to his 
assistants—namely Mr. Roche, Mr. Garde and Mr. Carnegie, and it must 
be on the faith of their representations that he certified the balance sheets. 
I presume this course is not unusual, and that an accountant with a large 
business is not supposed to do everything himself. The auditor is bound 
to give reasonable care and skill but this can also be exercised by his 
deputy. I do not think there is anything to be gained by considering in 
the abstract the duties of an auditor of a joint stock company. He is 
entitled to see the company’s books and the materials for their books, 
and also to ask for explanations. But he is not called on to seek for knowl­
edge outside the company, or to communicate with customers or creditors. 
He is not an insurer against fraud or error; and if fraud is alleged it must 
be shown with precision the acts of negligence for which he is said to 
be responsible. Nine balance sheets were prepared, and the figures on 
some represent the aggregate amount of many items, but I propose to 
deal only with matters that have been referred to during the hearing. 
There are three sets of figures with which I will deal: (1) stock-in-trade; 
(2) sundry debtors; (3) sundry creditors on the liability side of the bal­
ance sheet. Taking these in order, I find that Mr. Garde, in his evidence, 
drew a distinction between the home stock and the stock in America, 
which was never mentioned in this Court. I do not fully understand this, 
as Mr. Kevans can only be held responsible from the 4th January, 1892, 
and at that date the American trade had been abandoned. The Master of 
the Rolls expressed a doubt, with which I agree, as to whether it was 
the duty of the directors to take stock with their own hands. It was taken 
by Mr. O’Callaghan, and I agree with the Master of the Rolls that he (Mr. 
O’Callaghan) did quite as much as he could be expected to do. There was 
certainly no duty cast on the auditor to take stock. W hat he did was to 
have the calculations checked in his office, and this was done with proper 
care. Mr. Kevans said he was particularly careful as to the deduction 
for discount, and, as far as I could gather, the universal rate of 10 per 
cent. seems reasonable. Moreover, an auditor has nothing to do with the 
terms upon which the company or a trader buys or sells. As to No. 2, 
the charge in this is that the allowance made for the trade discount of 
2½  per cent. was omitted. This is a purely technical question. Mr. 
Kevans says that the proper method of dealing with these debts was to 
return them as they stood in the books, and to bring the discount, when 
it was allowed, to the profit and loss account. Mr. Pixley said it would not 
be scientifically correct to deduct these discounts. This seems to be in 
accordance with common sense, and it is to be noted that although Mr. 
Garde, as liquidator, corrected the balance sheets by marking off these 
discounts, he never thought of doing so when conducting the audit. As 
to the provision for the ‘bad debts,’ if there is any one thing upon which 
an auditor is dependent upon the officers it is the writing-off or the mak­
ing of a prospective allowance for, bad debts. He has no personal knowl­
edge of the customers, and Mr. Kevans seems to have taken particular 
attention in reference to this. (See questions 2,125 to 2,127 in the evi­
dence.) He said ‘he had some special knowledge on the subject, that he 
saw all ascertained bad debts duly written off, and that there was a fund 
amounting to £500 as a provision therefor.’ For the foregoing reasons 
there is no ground for alleging negligence against Mr. Kevans on the ‘assets 
side’ of the balance sheet. As far as this portion is concerned, I think the 
balance sheets were properly and carefully prepared, and there was noth­
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ing dishonest or negligent on the part of anyone; but if there was, it was 
not on the part of Mr. Kevans or of his representative. Now dealing with 
‘sundry creditors’; here evidently there is a fraud, and a curious thing is 
that no one seemed to have derived any benefit from the fraud. Dealing 
with the invoices, the learned judge detailed the practice in connection 
with the statements of accounts being laid before the meeting, and said 
the ledger was used for the purchases made and for the payments on 
account thereof. If, then, all this were rightly done it would be easy for 
the auditor to ascertain the amounts due to the creditors, but unfortun­
ately the books were not properly kept. The creditors’ accounts in the 
ledger did not show all the goods purchased up to the time of the audit, 
nor could the auditor discover the omissions on account of many of the 
invoices being either ‘suppressed’ or not put into the book until a later 
date—a process described as ‘carrying over.’ There is some doubt as to 
whether the deficiency arose from the suppression or the carrying over, 
but my impression is that the whole of it comes within the last mentioned 
class, for at the end of 1894 we find they amounted to £4,095. Mr. Peter 
White is now dead, and he should not be condemned unheard, but it is 
difficult to believe that this system was not within his own knowledge. 
As chief promoter he was no doubt anxious to see that the company was 
successful; Crawford, who was the secretary, appears to have continued 
the process. It seems strange that a system of fraud so long continued, and 
for so extensive a period, was never detected by the auditor. Once or 
twice he noticed something, and the explanation that was given was ‘that 
the goods were not taken into stock.’ The question is, was it negligent 
not to have seen this? There is no doubt that both the suppression and 
carrying over of invoices would have been detected if the auditor had 
called for the creditors’ statements of accounts upon which payment was 
ordered, and compared them with the ledger. I should have thought this 
was part of the auditor’s duty for many reasons; but all the accountants 
examined, except Mr. Southworth, stated that this course is never taken 
unless there is something to arouse suspicion. Mr. Pixley, the eminent 
London accountant, says it could not well be done except in the case of 
a very small concern. In the face of such evidence I should not leave myself 
at liberty to hold that Mr. Kevan’s assistants were guilty of negligence 
in not looking at these statements of account if they were engaged in an 
ordinary audit. Little time is allowed for doing so; but in this case there 
was this system of monthly checking. From the time that Crawford was 
accountant in 1890 the accounts of the company were completely in his 
hands. Now White, for the two years following, may have given general 
directions, but he was often away in America for months at a time, and 
it is clear that the monthly audit was instituted for the purpose of seeing 
that he (Crawford) would do his work regularly and honestly. I am 
unable to conceive how, if there was nothing wrong about this monthly 
checking, it did not lead at an early period to the detection of the frauds 
in this ledger. Mr. Kevans ought to have found out, by the accounts, the 
payments that were made—and no better means could be adopted than 
that of a comparison with the statements of accounts. It ought to have 
been done in some way, and, if it had, detection would have been certain. 
I do not base my decision on this alone; apart altogether from the state­
ments of account and the monthly check, I do not understand how the 
carrying over of the invocies could have escaped detection by the account­
ant, who should have used due care and skill and who was not a mere
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machine. The invoices carried over were ultimately posted to the ledger. 
If they were posted to their true dates it would be at once apparent that 
they were not entered in at the proper time. If they were posted under 
false dates, why was this not detected when the ledger accounts were 
checked with the invoices? And when no invoices came into the books, it 
is admitted that this ought to have excited suspicion. For these reasons I 
am of opinion that if due care and skill had been exercised, the carrying 
over and the suppression of invoices would have been discovered, and the 
auditor is liable for any damage the company has sustained from the un­
derstatement of liabilities in the balance sheet due to this cause since 
4th January, 1892. I consider that not only are Mr. Kevans and his assist­
ants not free from blame for this, but also for the mechanical way the 
audit was carried out. I desire to say that, although I have carefully read 
the evidence, I have not attempted to examine the books of the company 
out of Court. I, at one time, thought of doing so, but, on consideration, 
feared that they might lead me into error. That some damage has been 
sustained by the company is clear; and it will be observed that I have said 
nothing about the measure of the damages. Theoretically, damages re­
sulting from negligence has been assessed in money, but it would be 
premature to consider it now.
Lord Justice Fitzgibbon: I entirely concur with the judgment that 
Lord Justice Holmes has delivered, and there are a few matters on which 
I desire to offer some independent observations:
First.— W hat is the measure of the defendant auditor’s duty in a case 
such as this?
Second.— What is the evidence of the particular case of the breach of 
that duty?
Third.—A few words upon the question of damages.
As regards the measure of the duty of a gentleman employed, as Mr.
Kevans was in this case, the result is the same, as it occurs to me, in all 
cases in which professional skill is employed, except one, the peculiar 
instance of a barrister. The measure of duty is the bringing of reasonable 
care and skill to the performance of the business directed to be done, 
having regard, first to the contract of employment, then to the character 
of the business itself, to the remuneration of the defendant, and to all 
the other circumstances of the case. In strict rule, however, the measure 
of the duty is to be ascertained by applying to all the circumstances of the 
case the best consideration, so as to ascertain what ought to have been 
done under the circumstances. Now, in all the three English cases, and 
also in this case, the auditor was bound by the articles of association of 
the company. In one English case it was put forward for the auditor that 
he had never seen the articles of association, and it was admitted that he 
had never read them, but, nevertheless, it was held that if he did not see 
them, he was at least bound to do all that was required just as if he had 
seen them. In this case Rules 150 and 157 of the articles of association 
prescribe the duties of the auditor, and it is not suggested that Mr. 
Kevans did not see them. ‘Once at least in every year the accounts of the 
company shall be examined, and the correctness of the statement and 
balance sheet ascertained by one or more auditor or auditors.’ Now, it 
appears that half-yearly statements were submitted to the directors, and 
I gather that Mr. Kevans discharged his duties half-yearly, but I shall deal 
with the case entirely on the assumption that he did it only once a year, 
because his half-yearly examination probably would not be as complete
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as the one completed at the end of the year. The 157th rule of the article 
provides: ‘That the auditor shall be supplied with copies of the statements 
of accounts seven days before the intended meeting, and it shall be his 
duty to examine the same with the accounts and vouchers relating thereto, 
and to report to the company in general meeting thereon.’ These are the 
two rules that define his duty. Rule 158 is, however, important, as showing 
the materials that were to be placed at his disposal. ‘The auditor shall 
have a list delivered to him by the directors of all the books kept by the 
company, and shall have reasonable access to the books and accounts of 
the company, and may in relation thereto examine the directors, or other 
officers of the company.’ Now, there are two specific things that Mr. 
Kevans was charged with. In the first place, it was practically left to him 
to say what books the company ought to keep, and therefore he, in the 
position of a skilled accountant, was really made an adviser as to what 
the set of books were that he was to examine, and I take it for granted 
that the books recommended were sufficient. Another matter was, that in 
the course of the business they had to some extent ascertained by actual 
experience what was necessary for their protection. They (the directors) 
made an arrangement with the auditor that there should be a monthly 
checking ,and therefore he was bound, dealing with the set of books that 
he himself provided, to check these books once a month and to audit them 
once a year. Now, I am not going to minimise the distinction between 
checking and auditing. I do not agree at all with a great deal of what has 
been presented to us that Mr. Kevans was to have done in the monthly 
checking, but the monthly checking was a ‘checking at the time,’ a prepara­
tion for the future, and a security that the books were carried forward 
from month to month in the state in which they should be audited. His 
remuneration was not very large, but it must not be taken to have been 
inadequate. He also must be taken to have had a knowledge of the busi­
ness. It was not a business to which any of the directors could have been 
expected to devote anything like their whole time; and it was a business 
where, to Mr. Kevans’ own knowledge, the clerical staff was cut down to 
a very low point. Therefore, he must have known that there was more re­
liance placed upon him, upon his checking, and upon the audit, than 
might be expected in the case of an ordinary company. T hat being the 
measure of his duty—it is the same rule that applies to all, with the ex­
ception I have mentioned—what is the nature of the breach of that duty? 
It is curious that in one English case the breach of duty for which the 
auditor was said to be held liable was exactly as here—a breach of duty 
in not detecting the case of misfeasance on the part of others, which was 
not for the purpose of putting money into their own pockets, but for 
the purpose of giving a fictitious appearance of prosperity to a company 
that really was not prosperous. I shall have to say more about that when 
I come to the question of damages. I think the fairest way to deal with 
Mr. Kevans in this case is to treat him as being charged with having failed 
to find just cause of suspicion on the face of these books which, if found, 
would have imposed on him the duty of pursuing his suspicion until he 
found whether it was or was not well founded; and in that I am only 
following the example of Lord Justice Keane, who in his judgment, took 
as an example one particular instance of one particular year, and applied 
all the rest of the case to that. I am fortunate in the present case to have 
an instance which was discussed as a fair example of the mode in which 
the fraud in question was carried out; as an example of the grounds of sus­
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picion—that there were grounds of suspicion—appearing on the face of 
the books themselves; and also the means that these books would have sup­
plied (had the suspicion been entertained), in order to detect the frauds. 
Now, I must entirely disclaim from myself the intention of going to do 
anything more than what any ordinary intelligent juror would be bound 
to do if he was trying Mr. Kevans on his indictment for having failed to 
discover what appears on the face of the books themselves. This is not 
a question of technical knowledge, nor a question in which it could be 
capable of misleading anyone. The English cases have established that 
the auditor is entitled, in the absence of the elements of suspicion, to 
assume that the books are honestly kept, and that, therefore, unless on 
the face of a presumably honest book something appears to excite his 
suspicion, he is not guilty of negligence, whatever other people might be 
in their departments, if he does not discover that something was wrong. 
Now, the one example is the case of Hill & Sons, for the period where 
the balance was struck as of the 31st December, 1892, and the 31st Decem­
ber, 1893. In that year there was an increase, as now appears, in the sup­
pressed invoices and in the carried over invoices, and this account is one 
of those in which that increase took place, and it has been taken and dis­
cussed as an instance and as an example of others in the book (creditors’ 
ledger), presumably dealt with in the same way. At page 108 of the ledger 
the account of Hill & Sons—if I use a technical word wrongly I hope I 
may be forgiven—is ruled on the 31st December, 1892. The figures imme­
diately below the ruling indicate to my mind that, when it was ruled, all 
the items for that year were then written up. From the 12th August to 
the 20th December, 1892, there were, altogether, items that amount only 
to £57 3s. 9d., and all of these items are on the one date, 20th December. 
There were no transactions with Hill & Sons between the 12th August and 
the 31st December, except whatever is covered by the entries of the 20th 
December. Therefore, if there was anything written in it could only be 
the £57 3s. 9d.; but I think it is admitted that these were not written 
afterwards, because after that, and the very last item above the ruling, 
is the correction of an error of £500, which is taken from the contra side 
of the account; and there is a ruling on the top of £736 4s. 9d., and there 
the account ends for the year 1892. On the face of the book there is no 
subsequent entry in Hill & Sons’ account at all going back into 1892. It 
is a perfectly legible account for 1892, closed on the 31st December, bal­
anced by the correction of an error, and, as I call it, closed in every sense. 
I will assume that all the transactions of 1892 were included in the ac­
counts of 1892, and that there was nothing carried forward. Now, there is 
also a ruling on the 31st December, 1893—there is on the face of the book, 
as it stands, an undoubted ruling as of the 31st December, 1893. But what 
is the case? It is conceded that in striking a trial balance for the purpose 
of statements of account for the year 1893, three items that only appear 
on the right side of page 150 were in the book at the time. In the book 
now, before we come to the ruling, there were inserted below these and 
after them half a column of items totting to no less than £698 19s. 11d., 
and the whole of that is included in the amount of these ‘kept-back in­
voices’ for the year 1893. Well, I will admit that it is not the business of 
an auditor, when he comes to strike his trial balance, on the 31st December 
for the purpose of a meeting, to have every account closed and balanced, 
but he must strike a trial balance, and he did so; but at a figure, 15th De­
cember. I do not agree with the monthly check that was taken. Some of
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these items now introduced must have been there, and therefore within 
a month of the 31st December, 1893, if the monthly check had been 
carried out, the representative of Mr. Kevans would have found that after 
the figure which he had taken for ascertaining the financial position of 
this company, a string of figures had been put in, all in December, and 
all within a day or two of the 15th, the day at which the financial position 
of the company had been ascertained. I think that was something; but 
it is nothing to what follows, because between that time and whatever 
time this book was ruled there then follows a further string of items— 
nearly £600 in amount—that go up to the 3rd November and go down 
as far as the 14th December. I cannot conceive any more clear or glaring 
grounds of suspicion than to discover in the account of a single customer 
items amounting to such a sum having got into the books after the trial 
balance is struck under dates going back two months prior to the period 
of the ascertaining of the trial balance. There appears to be a further 
thing—a monthly check was to be adopted, and that would have put an 
auditor on inquiry. It appears to me that the moment I come to the con­
clusion that that was on the face of it a suspicious mode of dealing with 
Hill & Sons’ figures, I am bound to show how it would be corrected. I can 
add nothing to the judgment of Lord Justice Holmes—viz. that it would 
then have been necessary to call for the creditors’ statements of account, 
and at that moment they would have disclosed on the face of them not 
merely those post-dated items, but the suppressed invoices also; and at 
the instant that this discovery was made there is an absolute conviction 
of something wrong forced upon the mind of the auditor. It, therefore, 
occurs to me that, upon those two branches, all that is required, both to 
show the negligence, to arouse suspicion and to supply the means of put­
ting a stop to the frauds is to be found on the face of the book, and for all 
I have said I have no foundation except what is upon the face of that book 
(creditors’ ledger). I now take the three English cases, in order to make a 
few observations on each. In 36 Ch.D., in the Leeds Estate Building In­
vestment Co., Mr. Justice Stirling held that the manager and auditor 
were liable. It is right to say that the procedure in the other cases was 
different from this Leeds case; and it is important to bear in mind that 
the other two were under the 10th Section of the Winding-up Act. In 
this case the auditor was held liable, and Mr. Justice Stirling held him 
liable, saying that it was his duty to see that no part of the capital 
was applied to any other than the proper purpose, and, in particular, 
that no part of the capital was returned to the creditors—that is, in divi­
dends—except in the cases in which a reduction of capital was permitted 
by various Acts of Parliament. The next case, and the most important one, 
is the London and General Bank ([1895] 2 Ch.D. 681). That was a 
procedure under this 10th Section Mr. Justice Lindley says, ‘An auditor 
has nothing to do with the prudence or imprudence of the way in which 
the business has been carried on; nothing to say as to whether it was 
properly, improprely, profitably or unprofitably carried on, provided he 
discharges his own duties to the shareholders. His business is to ascertain 
and state the true financial position of the company at the time of the 
audit, and his duty is confined to that.’ But then comes the question, ‘How 
is he to ascertain that?’ The answer is by examining the books of the com­
pany. But he does not discharge his duty by doing this without inquiry 
and without taking the common trouble to see that the books show the 
company’s true position. He must take reasonable care to see that this
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is done (page 682), otherwise the audit reduces itself to an ‘idle farce.’ 
I have endeavoured to keep myself within that, and think that the prin­
ciple is the very lowest upon which we can define the duties of an auditor. 
In the Kingston Cotton Mills case (1 Ch.D. 96, 279), Mr. Justice Vaughan 
Williams held, ‘that it was the duty of the auditor to have made a cal­
culation outside the books which, if made, would have shown that the 
amount of the stock was overstated on the books.’ In this case of the stock­
taking and the over-valuing, 8cc., Mr. Kevans is exonerated. Now, time 
after time, this passage about the ‘watch-dog and the bloodhound’ has 
been made use of, and I would wish to say a word regarding it too. His 
lordship then read from Lord Justice Lindley’s judgment the passages 
dealing with the duties of auditors, in one of which it was laid down that 
‘an auditor was a watch-dog, but not a bloodhound.’ This, Lord Justice 
Fitzgibbon remarked, was very unfair to the bloodhound, who was just 
as little likely to have his sense of suspicion aroused as the watch-dog. 
Applying this instance of the dogs to the present case, was not the watch­
dog bound to bark? And if, when sniffing round, you hit upon a trail of 
something wrong, surely you must follow it up, and there is just as much 
obligation on the auditor, who is bound to keep his eyes open, and his 
nose, too. As in the case of the hound, the auditor will follow up this 
trail to the end, and the first things he will ‘root up’ are those statements 
of account, and then the fraud is discovered. On the question of dam­
ages—the damage here—and I guard myself against expressing any in­
dividual opinion upon anything more than is necessary—is sufficiently 
supplied for the purpose of showing the existence of pecuniary losses. In 
the first place, there has been a paying away of a large amount of money 
in dividends to the shareholders that had not been earned, and therefore 
at the time that that was stopped the company ought to have been in pos­
session of a money capital, which they had parted with by paying it away 
to their shareholders. It would be premature to discuss the pecuniary 
damage until the financial position of the company is finally ascertained. 
Then, again, had this system of the suppression—the carrying forward— 
of invoices been detected sooner, it would have been open to the directors 
to have done something to stop it. They had several ways, either to in­
crease their percentages or diminish their dealings—in the latter case 
thereby producing a less loss; or they could have stopped the business 
and wound it up. On the question of the amount of the damages, that 
depends on the amount of the losses the plaintiff has suffered, taking all 
the circumstances of the case into consideration. We have not all these 
circumstances before us, and it is, I say, premature to discuss damages 
at all beyond the point I have discussed them. I have come with much 
reluctance to the conclusion that a professional man has failed in his duty, 
and I am glad to be able to think that the worst that could be said of 
the case is this: That, in what is so small a company, Mr. Kevans and his 
representative, who went there to do this audit (for which Mr. Kevans 
received a very small fee), were deceived not by any glaring or probable 
fraud such as they would be on the watch against, but by a thing that was 
done more for the purpose of giving an appearance of fictitious prosperity 
to a company which did not exist than that of putting money into the 
pockets of shareholders. That, however, cannot alter the legal liability 
if it  is based, as I am satisfied it is, upon the failure to have suspicion 
aroused.
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T he Lord Chancellor also concurred, and the appeal was accordingly 
dismissed.
CRAIG v. ANYON *
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department, 1925. 
212 App. Div. 55, 208 N. Y. Supp. 259, aff’d, 242 
N. Y. 569, 152 N. E. 431 (1926).
Martin, J. The plaintiffs during the years 1913 to 1917, inclusive, were 
engaged in business in New York city as brokers in stocks and commodities 
such as cotton, wheat and coffee. Their transactions on behalf of cus­
tomers were conducted on the New York Stock Exchange, the Cotton 
Exchanges in New York and New Orleans, the Chicago Board of Trade 
and similar exchanges in which they had membership. The business was 
apparently prosperous and the partners had enjoyed a large income there­
from. On May 26, 1917, through the confession of Robert Moore, an 
employee of their commodities department, following an office investiga­
tion, they learned that their prosperity had been an illusion, and that their 
books had been falsified by Moore throughout a period of nearly five years, 
during which they had been defrauded of over $1,250,000.
During the entire five years’ period, the defendants, composing an 
accounting firm well known both in the United States and England, were 
under retainer from the plaintiffs. Each three months throughout this 
period the books were audited by them and a report submitted, by which 
reports the plaintiffs say they were assured the books were properly kept, 
no reference being made to any irregularity.
The action is founded upon the charge that these audits were negli­
gently made; that, had any audit been made with reasonable care, the 
falsification of the books would have been discovered, Moore would 
have been discharged and no further loss would have occurred.
The complaint alleges a contract whereby the defendants undertook 
periodically to audit the plaintiffs’ books and accounts and  to report any 
errors or omissions therein, and negligence by the defendants in the per­
formance of the contract and damage to the plaintiffs amounting to the 
sum of $1,280,233.61. This is made up of sums paid to customers to whom, 
it is alleged, nothing would have been paid except for the defendants’ 
negligent failure to report that similar unauthorized payments had pre­
viously been made, and of other sums paid to brokers, and not charged 
to any customer, upon transactions which, as it is alleged, would not 
have been permitted were it not for the defendants’ negligence in failing 
to report irregularities consisting of similar transactions previously made.
The answer admits the employment of the defendants to audit the 
plaintiffs’ books “subject to certain instructions and limitations imposed” 
by the plaintiffs and their predecessor firms; denies the allegation of 
negligent performance of the contract; and sets up as a defense negligence 
on the part of the plaintiffs and both negligence and “larceny, embezzle­
ment and criminal acts and practices” on the part of employees of the 
plaintiffs.
The action was tried in May, 1922. At the end of plaintiffs’ case a
* This case is discussed at p. 19 ff. supra.
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motion to dismiss was denied except as to six defendants who had become 
members of the firm after 1917.
The defense rested without offering evidence and the motion to dismiss 
was renewed. The court reserved decision in accordance with the prac­
tice set forth in section 1187 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Civ. Prac. 
Act, § § 459, 585), and submitted two specific questions to the jury, as 
follows:
“Were the defendants negligent in the performance of their agreement 
with Craig & Co.?”
“If so, what damages to the plaintiffs resulted directly and proximately 
from such negligence?”
The court charged that if the defendants were found liable the verdict 
must be either for $2,000, the amount paid as compensation for the de­
fendants’ services; or for $1,177,805.26, the amount of plaintiffs’ actual 
loss as proved. To the first question the jury answered, “Yes;” to the 
second question, “$1,177,805.26.”
Upon the rendition of the verdict the defendants’ motion to set aside 
the answer to the second question was granted; the defendants’ motion to 
set aside the answer to the first question was denied; and a general verdict 
was directed in favor of the plaintiffs for $2,000, appropriate exceptions 
being noted by the plaintiffs. The order recites that the court proceeded 
“on the ground that as a matter of law the only loss which resulted directly 
and proximately from the negligence of the defendants was the sum of 
$2,000.”
The three main questions litigated were (1) the degree of care actually 
used by the defendants; (2) the understanding or agreement of the parties 
with respect to the scope of the audits to be made; (3) the degree of care 
used by the plaintiffs. The three questions are closely interlocked and are 
to be answered by the inferences to be drawn from practically undisputed 
evidence.
It is apparent from an examination of the record that the jury found 
the defendants were negligent and the court agreed with the jury on that 
question, but disagreed with it as to the damages resulting from such 
negligence. .
Three questions are before us on this appeal: (1) Were the defendants 
negligent; (2) did the plaintiffs’ negligence contribute to the loss, and 
(3) assuming defendants were negligent, what damages resulted there­
from? The first question has been resolved in favor the plaintiffs both 
by the jury and the court. W ith reference to that question, therefore, it 
is necessary only to inquire whether the evidence warranted a finding of 
negligence.
The plaintiffs contend that defendants are chargeable with negligence 
by reason of the carelessly conducted audit of the plaintiffs’ books. It is 
asserted that one or more books were in the custody of the plaintiffs when 
each audit was made, an examination of which would have disclosed the 
account of one Zabriskie as reflecting an indebtedness to the plaintiffs of 
many thousands of dollars.
The defendants offered no evidence and no defense, except the cross- 
examination which developed the fact that an inspection of all the books 
in the office would have disclosed irregularities; whereas the auditors, in 
making investigations and reports, relied on books, papers and carbon 
copies of statements to customers furnished by one Moore, who apparently 
had charge of a division of the business,
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There can be very little doubt as to carelessness by the auditors. 
Whether it caused the loss is a more difficult question. Although a proper 
audit would have disclosed facts leading to the discovery of Moore’s 
wrongdoing, there are a number of other elements entering into this case 
which show that the plaintiffs are not without blame and might have 
avoided the loss.
They now seek to make Moore a mere clerk. He was much more. He 
was in charge of plaintiffs’ commodities department. He was permitted 
to absolutely control that department; and the real cause of the loss is to 
be found in the fact that he was given a free hand, without any super­
vision, to deal with the accounts of Zabriskie and others at will. He de­
cided what entries were to be made by the bookkeepers and how they 
were to be made, so far as transactions in his division of the business were 
concerned. He was permitted to give directions for the firm to outside 
brokers as to whether transactions should be closed or carried as “open.”
This appears to have been of great assistance in enabling him to keep 
the actual condition of the Zabriskie account concealed. To this customer 
large sums of money were paid time to time, the payment of which was 
unwarranted, for the accounts with him would have shown the absence 
of a sufficient balance to meet margins. Money was paid to him at a time 
when he must have been heavily indebted to plaintiffs.
Should the plaintiffs have relied on Moore who was dealing with the 
Zabriskie account for Zabriskie and at the same time taking care of the 
account for the plaintiffs? Certainly they were called upon to exercise 
some supervision in the matter. Having left a branch of their business 
to an employee, it does not seem reasonable that although there was no 
supervision they should now be permitted to charge the loss to the auditors 
who, apparently on account of the dishonesty of such employee, failed 
to uncover defalcations.
In his charge to the jury the court said: “These defendants rendered 
such reports every three months. These reports undoubtedly contained 
mistakes and inaccuracies. They were based on what Moore wanted them 
to believe was the position of the firm and not on the true position of the 
firm.”
The auditors relied on Moore. They were deceived by him. So were 
the plaintiffs. The auditors could have performed their work inde­
pendently of what they were told by Moore. But Moore was the employee 
who dealt with them and who gave them the books and papers upon 
which they were to work. They did not suspect any wrongdoing and 
believed they were justified in taking the information given them by 
the firm’s representative, who exercised without interference, power to 
deal with them in reference to their work in the commodities department. 
Defendants relied on Moore’s honesty, but no more than did plaintiffs.
In Matter of Kingston Cotton Mill Company (No. 2) (L. R. [1896] 
2 Ch. Div. 279) Lord Justice L indley said: “In this case the auditors 
relied on the manager. He was a man of high character and of unques­
tioned competence. He was trusted by everyone who knew him. The 
learned judge has held that the directors are not to be blamed for trusting 
him. The auditors had no suspicion that he was not to be trusted to 
give accurate information as to the stock-in-trade in hand, and they trusted 
him accordingly in that matter. But it is said they ought not to have done 
so, and for this reason. The stock journal shewed the quantities—that is, 
the weight in pounds—of the cotton and yarn at the end of each year.
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Other books shewed the quantities of cotton bought during the year and 
the quantities of yarn sold during the year. If these books had been com­
pared by the auditors they would have found that the quantity of cotton 
and yarn in hand at the end of the year ought to be much less than the 
quantity shewn in the stock journal, and so much less that the value of 
the cotton and yarn entered in the stock journal could not be right, or 
at all events was so abnormally large as to excite suspicion and demand 
further inquiry. This is the view taken by the learned judge. But ,al­
though it is no doubt true that such a process might have been gone 
through, and that, if gone through, the fraud would have been discovered, 
can it be truly said that the auditors were wanting in reasonable care in 
not thinking it necessary to test the managing director’s return? I cannot 
bring myself to think they were, nor do I think that any jury of business 
men would take a different view. It is not sufficient to say that the frauds 
must have been detected if the entries in the books had been put together 
in a way which never occurred to any one before suspicion was aroused. 
The question is whether, no suspicion of anything wrong being enter­
tained, there was a want of reasonable care on the part of the auditors 
in relying on the returns made by a competent and trusted expert relating 
to matters on which information from such a person was essential. I 
cannot think there was. The manager had no apparent conflict between 
his interest and his duty. His position was not similar to that of a cashier 
who has to account for the cash which he receives, and whose own account 
of his receipts and payments could not reasonably be taken by an auditor 
without further inquiry. The auditor’s duty is not so onerous as the 
learned judge has held it to be.”
Lord Justice Lopes said (at p. 290): “The duties of auditors must not 
be rendered too onerous. Their work is responsible and laborious, and the 
remuneration moderate. I should be sorry to see the liability of auditors 
extended any further than in In re London and General Bank (L. R. 
[1895] 2 Ch. 673). Indeed, I only assented to that decision on account 
of the inconsistency of the statement made to the directors with the 
balance-sheet certified by the auditors and presented to the shareholders. 
This satisfied my mind that the auditors deliberately concealed that from 
the shareholders which they had communicated to the directors. It would 
be difficult to say this was not a breach of duty. Auditors must not be 
made liable for not tracking out ingenious and carefully laid schemes of 
fraud when there is nothing to arouse their suspicion, and when those 
frauds are perpetrated by tried servants of the company and are unde­
tected for years by the directors. So to hold would make the position of 
an auditor intolerable.”
Lord Justice Kay said (at p. 293): “It is said that it is easy to be wise 
after the event. In former years when the stock journal was correctly 
entered the alterations in value in a year were frequently very consider­
able. The increase in the years now in question did not excite any sus­
picion in the directors. Why should it in the auditors? They had no 
reason to distrust the manager. Moreover, he had, or was supposed to 
have, taken the stock which was actually on the premises at the date to 
which the balance-sheets referred. The auditors could not do this. The 
only book from which they could obtain information as to the quantities 
received in the year other than the stock journal was a book called the 
‘invoice guard book,’ in which were pasted the invoices received with 
goods supplied. But this was not necessarily accurate. Invoices received
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might have been omitted. Goods might in some cases have been received 
without invoices. Were the auditors bound to enter upon an investigation 
which could not bring out an accurate result in order to test the truth of 
a statement by the manager which no one had any reason to discredit?”
The court instructed the jury that these auditors did not guarantee the 
correctness of their accounts. “They do not say to the public, ‘Let us 
examine your books and vouchers and we will with absolute certainty 
discover every dishonesty, every mistake that exists in those books, and 
we will protect you against that.’ ” T hat is not what they undertook to 
do. They agreed to use such skill in the performance of their agreement as 
reasonably prudent, skillful accountants would use under the circum­
stances.
One of the plaintiffs, Mr. Craig, said that when defendants originally 
began their duties for a predecessor firm they agreed to supervise, super­
intend and send out certain statements to customers. Mr. Craig knew that 
was never done. Plaintiffs refused to allow statements to be sent to cus­
tomers. It is further asserted that the defendants agreed to take the open 
contracts and to calculate the actual liability of the customers thereon at 
the time of each audit. I t was known that defendants never made such 
calculations.
The plaintiff Craig says that they told him, “We have to make that 
calculation both for straddles and open accounts before we can tell you 
what is the actual standing of this firm.” Craig’s statements with reference 
to the contract were made to a man who has since died, leaving no way 
of directly meeting his testimony in this respect. Craig was aware that 
there had been for several years a failure to strictly live up to arrangements 
and agreements as to what was to be accomplished.
Zabriskie started his account in 1909, writing the brokers a letter that 
he was sending them $200 for margin, and that Moore, the plaintiffs’ em­
ployee, should have the right to give directions to buy and sell for his 
account. In other words, it became what is known as a discretionary 
account. He directed that as soon as the $200 margin was exhausted, the 
account should be closed. Moore thereafter gave orders to buy and sell 
for Zabriskie’s account. The relationship between Moore and Zabriskie 
does not appear, but it does appear that the loss could not have occurred 
if Zabriskie’s account had been closed out when his margin had become 
exhausted.
When Moore gave an order to a broker in Chicago to sell wheat, he 
would sometimes charge that order to the account of Zabriskie but at other 
times he would not. He always entered the transactions or had them 
entered in the blotter. He told the clerks what entries they were to make 
in the charge ledger. At times he gave an order to enter such contracts 
against Zabriskie in this ledger and at other times he did not. If these 
books were all examined at the end of the three months, any accountant, 
skilled or unskilled, would have discovered something was wrong, or that 
some entry remained to be made. Items not entered in the proper place 
were entered in the back of the book on pages beyond the charge account 
in the customers’ open contract ledger. They were made against Zabriskie 
but with instructions that they were not to be entered as actual charges 
against him. This was feasible because Moore was allowed to deal to the 
extent of very great sums in Zabriskie’s account for Zabriskie and at the 
same time had charge of the branch office to the extent of deciding what 
bookkeeping entries should be made. Though Moore was directing these
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very extensive dealings from both sides, nothing was ever done to check 
up and see whether the transactions were in order. Moore arranged for 
payments to Zabriskie from time to time. These payments should never 
have been made; for with the true condition of his account known it would 
have been apparent that margins on hand did not warrant them. Had the 
“opens” been properly checked it could have been seen whether Zabriskie 
had balances due him and whether they warranted the payments made to 
him. Craig made large payments to him without attempting to ascertain 
how his accounts stood. Moore had the sole control in a department of 
plaintiffs’ activities and therein plaintiffs allowed him to represent their 
interests as well as the interests of some of those dealing with them. He 
was permitted to represent conflicting interests. This was true when the 
accountants were there and when they were not. During the whole of the 
three months’ period between audits, being a major part of the time, the 
plaintiffs paid out large sums of money without any investigation or 
examination of the books, though an examination would have disclosed 
the irregularities for which they now attempt to hold the defendants.
The actual liability of Mr. Zabriskie on open transactions and the 
amount to be paid out should have been ascertainable from the customers’ 
ledger. The evidence shows that between February 28, 1917, and May 
26, 1917, there was an actual change of position of something like $500,000. 
Were plaintiffs justified in relying, as reasonably prudent business men, 
on Moore’s honesty, though he was allowed to exercise discretionary 
powers on behalf of customers? Moore was trusted with supervision over 
the department where the loss occurred and, at the same time, was per­
mitted to deal at will for Zabriskie. He was left in the same position as 
to at least one other account. He was also margin clerk. As such it was for 
him to decide what margins should be maintained.
His various and diverse duties and powers put him in a position to keep 
records and papers or cause them to be kept so as to deceive the account­
ants who relied on him. If it be assumed that they should not have done 
so, it is nevertheless true that the plaintiffs also relied upon them to an 
extent beyond all reason in view of all the circumstances. They were 
guilty of the same kind of negligence of which they now complain. It 
may be true that a proper accounting would have put the plaintiffs on 
guard with reference to Moore’s wrongdoing, but it is also true that, if the 
plaintiffs had attended to their business and, in view of the large trans­
actions involved, had looked up Zabriskie’s account when payments were 
being made to him, the dishonesty of Moore would have been discovered.
The plaintiffs admit that they never inquired into the “opens” of 
Zabriskie when he asked for money, nor when he placed orders to be 
executed. Had they done so, nothing would have been paid to him other 
than as his margins warranted, and losing trades would have resulted in 
his account being closed. Instead they left these matters to an employee, 
who, though not a partner or principal, had full authority in his depart­
ment.
It also appears that the accountants notified the plaintiffs in writing 
that a certain ledger should not be taken out of the control of one Hodge 
and that, if it took up too much of his time, an assistant should be engaged 
under his control. The accountants wrote the plaintiffs, “as this ledger 
is now operated, it is practically a check on the subsidiary departments 
and we see no advantage in establishing a separate ledger.” Notwithstand­
ing this advice, one of the partners put that ledger under Moore’s direc­
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tion, leaving him with control of every book in the office necessary to work 
his schemes and, at the same time, conceal his misdeeds.
Craig had knowledge that Moore was to have discretion as to Zabriskie’s 
account. This is shown by a letter: “I enclosed herewith check for $200 
which please place to the credit of my account. I am not fully acquainted 
with the method of trading in cotton and wish to leave the operation of 
my account entirely in Mr. Moore’s hands—with instructions to close out 
if the margin becomes exhausted.”
It seems to us, therefore, that the loss was due to the failure of Moore 
to close out the account when the margin became insufficient. No matter 
what the accountants had reported, if Zabriskie’s account had been closed 
there would have been no loss. True, it was not closed out because of 
the wrongdoing of Moore; but slight supervision would have disclosed 
Moore’s wrongdoing.
Counsel for plaintiffs in his opening stated: “Moore got a man by the 
name of Zabriskie—we do not know Zabriskie except as a name on the 
books and as a witness in litigation that grew out of those transactions— 
that is our total acquaintance with Zabriskie—since Zabriskie wrote a 
letter to the plaintiff firm as then constituted—and you will understand 
me, of course, when I say the plaintiff firm I mean Craig’s firm, in which 
he enclosed a check for $200 which he said he wanted to trade in commod­
ities, $200 will constitute a margin, that Moore was to do the trading for 
him, and that if the margin of $200 was exhausted, that was the end of the 
transaction.”
Zabriskie was in fact better known to the plaintiffs than they would 
admit. Craig knew Zabriskie for about ten years, having spoken to him 
a number of times. In 1910 he took Zabriskie to a dinner of the Stock 
Exchange members, to which he invited all of his best customers. Craig 
raised Moore’s salary because Zabriskie, a valuable customer, desired it 
and said he could obtain for Moore better compensation elsewhere.
Moreover, the Zabriskie account was the most active the plaintiffs car­
ried. He did from seventy-five per cent to eighty-five per cent of their 
Chicago commodities business. Notwithstanding the tremendous loss 
which such an active account might bring to the plaintiffs, they never 
investigated the financial standing of Zabriskie; they never received a 
mercantile report on him; they never asked him for references in the face 
of the fact that his initial margin was about $200. During this period the 
plaintiffs paid Zabriskie $123,689.04 without once making an examination 
of the books to see whether anything was due him.
We are of the opinion that the loss was not entirely the result of the 
negligence of the defendants, but also resulted from the careless and neg­
ligent manner in which the plaintiffs conducted their business.
The verdict embraces two items: Money paid to Zabriskie and subse­
quent losses to his account which he failed to meet. These losses were paid 
to other brokers by Moore. They would not have been incurred if Zabris­
kie’s account had been investigated. The purchases to which they relate 
would not have been made for there was no margin in Zabriskie’s account 
to make them.
Before a payment was made to Zabriskie or an order given by or for 
him was executed, the “opens” and the sufficiency of his margin should 
have been investigated. This should have been done from day to day, at 
times from hour to hour, even though plaintiffs had audits from the 
accountants.
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In Deyo v. Hudson (225 N. Y. 602, 615) the court said: “If they had no 
right to rely exclusively upon the assurance of Mitchell when they might 
have prevented the loss themselves thev cannot recover.”
There is no doubt in this case that plaintiffs could have prevented the 
loss by the exercise of reasonable care, and that they should not have 
relied exclusively on the accountants.
We think the damages cannot be said to flow naturally and directly 
from defendants’ negligence or breach of contract. Plaintiffs should not 
be allowed to recover for losses which they could have avoided by the 
exercise of reasonable care.
In City of East Grand Forks v. Steele (121 Minn. 296) the court 
said (at pp. 298-300): “This is not an action in tort, but an action to 
recover damages for breach of contract. As said by Justice Mitchell 
in Whittaker v. Collins, 34 Minn. 299, 25 N. W. 632, 57 Am. Ren. 55 
(an action brought to recover for the negligence of a physician): ‘Where 
the action is not maintainable without pleading and proving the contract, 
where the gist of the action is the breach of the contract, either by mal­
feasance or nonfeasance, it is in substance, whatever may be the form 
of the pleading, an action on the contract. * * * The foundation of the 
action is the contract, and the gravamen of it its breach.’
“The rule governing liability for breach of contract is given in the 
syllabus to Sargent v. Mason, 101 Minn. 319, 112 N. W. 255, as follows: 
‘In an action for damages for breach of contract, the defaulting party is 
liable only for the direct consequences of the breach, such as usually occur 
from the infraction of like contracts, and within the contemplation of the 
parties when the contract was entered into as likely to result from its 
non-performance.’ * * *
“The damages claimed on account of the losses resulting from the 
defalcations of the clerk and the insolvency of his surety are too remote 
to be recovered, without showing the existence of special circumstances, 
known to defendants, from which they ought to have known that such 
losses were likely to result from a failure to disclose the true condition 
of affairs. Such losses are neither the natural nor the proximate conse­
quences of the failure of defendants to make a proper audit. Neither are 
any facts shown from which it may be inferred that a loss from either of 
these causes was or ought to have been contemplated, when the contract 
was made, as likely to result from a breach of duty on the part of 
defendants.”
In Saugerties Bank v. Delaware & Hudson Co. (236 N. Y. 425, 430) 
the court said: “As I say this criminal act made it possible to use them; 
without it they could not have been used and the defendant’s omission 
would have resulted in no harm.
“Under these circumstances I fail to see how it can be said that its 
omission was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. In the first place 
it has been found as matter of fact that it was not such proximate cause 
and ordinarily it is to be determined as a question of fact whether there 
has been such a connection between cause and effect as to make the 
former proximate. (Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v . Kellogg, 94 U. S. 
469, 475.) But if we disregard this particular finding of fact we then have 
it on other findings that between defendant’s omission and plaintiff’s in­
jury there has intervened the criminal act of a third party without which 
the injury could not have occurred. There has been produced a great 
amount of legal literature and numberless opinions on this subject of
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proximate cause which it is impossible and undesirable to attempt to 
review. But I think that there is one fundamental rule which has been 
clearly established in the discussion of the subject which is decisive of this 
case, and that is the one that the act of a party sought to be charged is 
not to be regarded as a proximate cause unless it is in clear sequence with 
the result and unless it could have been reasonably anticipated that the 
consequences complained of would result from the alleged wrongful act; 
that it the consequences were only made possible by the intervening act 
of a third party which could not have reasonably been anticipated then 
the sequential relation between act and results would not be regarded 
as so established as to come within the rule of proximate cause.”
In Sutherland on Damages (Vol. 1 [4th ed.], p. 158, §41) it is said: 
“If there intervenes between the defendant’s act or omission a wilful, 
malicious and criminal act committed by a third person, which act de­
fendant had no reason to apprehend, the connection between the original 
wrong and the result is broken.”
The plaintiffs, in effect, contend that defendants are chargeable with 
negligence because of failure to detect Moore’s wrongdoing, wholly over­
looking the fact that although they were closely affiliated with Moore, who 
was constantly under their supervision, they were negligent in failing 
properly to supervise his acts or to learn the true condition of their own 
business and to detect his wrongdoing.
We have reached the conclusion that the judgment is right and should 
be affirmed.
Merrell and Finch, JJ., concur; Clarke, P. J., dissents.
Clarke, P. J. (dissenting):
I dissent from the affirmance of so much of the judgment as sets aside 
the verdict of the jury assessing the damages at $1,177,805.26. The con­
tract of audit was not one merely to discover if inadvertent clerical errors 
had been made in the bookkeeping, but was one of protection of the 
plaintiff’s firm from their own failure to find any error in their books 
of account. This contract the defendants failed to perform. Admitting 
the neglect of the plaintiffs to discover the embezzlement and falsification 
of the accounts through an examination of the books on their own part, 
the defendants’ work in pursuance of the contract, owing to the manner 
in which it was performed, failed to save plaintiffs from the consequences 
of such failure and neglect, which was the very subject of the contract.
Judgment and order affirmed, without costs to either party as against 
the other.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS v. BAKER* 
Supreme Court of Kansas. 152 Kan. 164, 102 P.2d 1006.
H och, Justice. This was an action to recover damages for breach of 
contract. The trial court made certain findings favorable to the plaintiff 
but awarded only nominal damages, holding that no actual damage had 
been shown. P lain tiff appeals, contending th a t add itional findings of 
fact should have been made and that the judgment for nominal dam­
ages only was inconsistent with findings of fact and conclusions of law 
theretofore made.
See footnote 32 supra.
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The appellant, the Board of County Commissioners of Allen County, 
Kansas, entered into a contract on August 8, 1936, with appellees, Baker 
& Miller, licensed municipal accountants, for an audit of the accounts 
and records of the various county offices. The audit was to be made in 
compliance with the statutory requirement of an annual county audit. 
G. S. 1935, 75-1122. The appellees agreed to make the audit in accord­
ance with the “Minimum Standard Audit Program” approved by the 
State Municipal Accounting Board as required by the statute. The cost 
of the audit was not to exceed $850.
The appellees proceeded to make the audit. The audit of the county 
treasurer’s office covered the period from October 8, 1935, to October 12, 
1936, and that of the other county offices from January 1, 1936, to Janu­
ary 11, 1937. The appellees were paid the full amount of $850 in three 
payments, the last one of which was made on March 1, 1937. Certain 
inaccuracies and irregularities were discovered in the report of the audi­
tors, further audit being made of three county offices. Following these 
disclosures, this action was brought.
After preliminary recitals, it was alleged in the petition that the defend­
ants failed to discover or report shortages later found to have then existed 
in the “emergency fund” maintained in the office of the county engineer; 
that as a result of carelessness, negligence and wantonness in making the 
audit, the defendants had erroneously reported that the county treasurer 
had collected about $15,000 in taxes in excess of what should have been 
collected, and that the county clerk had about $500 in cash on hand, 
whereas nearly all of the amount reported as cash consisted of checks. 
Other allegations not material to the present discussion need not be nar­
rated, except to add that the plaintiffs alleged that by reason of the care­
less, negligent and wanton manner in which the audit had been made 
and of the incorrect audit report, the audit was “worthless to and of no 
value” to the county, and that plaintiffs had been damaged in the amount 
paid for the audit for which amount judgment was asked.
Defendant Miller was not served with summons being out of the 
jurisdiction of the state. The answer of defendant Baker admitted the 
execution of the written contract and the making of the audit. I t alleged 
that the “emergency fund” in the office of the county engineer was created 
without authority of law and that the defendants were under no obliga­
tion to examine or audit it, but that in their report they did call atten­
tion to the fact that such fund was in existence, and alleged that the 
reimbursement vouchers of this fund were sworn to by the county engi­
neer and approved by the county attorney; that the audit was made in 
good faith and “that the purpose of said contract and audit report was 
to enable plaintiff to comply with the provisions of the General Statutes 
of Kansas of 1935, which require the governing body of each county in 
the State of Kansas to have the accounts of such county examined and 
audited by a licensed municipal accountant or accountants, or certified 
public accountant or acountants; that said audit report was filed with the 
county clerk of Allen county, Kansas, and in the State Accountant’s office, 
Capitol Building, Topeka, Kansas, as alleged in said third amended 
petition, and thereby said contract and said audit report completely and 
fully fulfilled the purpose for which they were intended, as provided by 
the 1935 General Statutes of the State of Kansas pertaining thereto; that 
plaintiff has received and retained all the benefits of said contract and
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audit report and plaintiff therefore has no cause of action for damages 
against the defendant for breach of said audit contract.”
The case was heard by the court, after which sixteen findings of fact 
and certain conclusions of law were made. It will be sufficient for this 
review to refer to the findings of fact only to the extent necessary in 
connection with the “conclusions of law.” The conclusions of law were 
as follows:
“I. T hat in making the audit in question the defendants were guilty 
of negligence in the preparation of their report,—
“ (a) In not reconciling, within a reasonable degree of accuracy in the 
first instance, the total taxes collected and uncollected, charged to the 
treasurer, with the abstract of taxes furnished by the county clerk;
“ (b) In not setting out the items of cash on hand in the county clerk’s 
office, as required by the Minimum Standard Audit program;
“ (c) In wholly failing to check the A. W. Young emergency fund and 
include same in their audit.
“II. T hat Allen county, Kansas, had the benefit of the audit of the 
offices concerning which no question has been raised; that said audit 
is not entirely worthless, but was of some value to said county.
“III. T hat plaintiff has failed to prove any substantial damage that 
it has suffered by reason of the negligence of the defendants; but that 
because of the negligence of defendants the plaintiff is entitled to recover 
nominal damages of one dollar.
“IV. T hat plaintiff is entitled to recover its costs herein.”
This opinion will be simplified if we state at the outset the principal 
conclusions to which we have arrived after examination of the record, 
and particularly after analysis of the findings of the trial court. Those 
conclusions are that the trial court failed in its final determination, to 
evaluate one of the primary purposes for which the audit was made; that 
it proceeded upon the erroneous theory that unless the plaintiff estab­
lished a money loss, apart from the payments made to the defendants, it 
had shown no substantial damage. The purpose of a county audit is not 
merely to “comply with the statute” as the defendants rather indicate in 
their answer. Its primary purpose—the purpose of the statute itself—is 
to determine whether the accounts and records of the county are being 
accurately and honestly kept. When the county commissioners, who are 
charged with responsibility in the matter, employ accountants to make 
the audit, they contract for skill, accuracy and fidelity on the part of 
those who represent themselves as experts in this line of work. If service 
which measures up to that high standard is not furnished, the breach 
of the contract is fundamental—it goes to the very heart of the contract. 
If gross inaccuracies are discovered in the report; if disclosure is made 
that the accountants have failed to report material facts of serious import, 
bearing upon questions of efficiency and honesty, the report becomes of 
little if any value. If those employing the accountants cannot rely upon 
an assumption that the audit and the report have been made with reason­
able accuracy and with complete fidelity they have failed to receive the 
principal thing they were to get under the contract. When confidence
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in the report is gone, very little is left. In the light of these elementary 
and fundamental propositions, let us examine the record.
We first note the court’s findings (a) (b) (c) under its “conclusions of 
law.” Finding (a) was that the defendants were “guilty of negligence in 
not reconciling, within a reasonable degree of accuracy in the first in­
stance, the total taxes collected and uncollected, charged to the treasurer, 
with the abstract of taxes furnished by the county clerk.” This conclu­
sion was based upon the court’s findings of fact numbered 10 and 12, 
which we need only summarize. The court there found that the defend­
ants erroneously reported that the county treasurer’s books showed the 
tax roll to be in excess of the tax abstract in the sum of $14,995.30; that 
subsequently Mr. Bartlett, a bookkeeper in the county clerks office, exam­
ined the county treasurer’s records and discovered that the correct amount 
of the difference between the tax roll and the tax abstract was only $44.62; 
that the attention of the defendants was called to the finding by Mr. 
Bartlett, after which they wrote to the county clerk and submitted pages 
to be substituted in their report, showing the difference to be $44.62 as 
found by Mr. Bartlett, and on this matter the court found that “the evi­
dence does not disclose that the defendants ever checked their records 
to determine their accuracy.”
The court’s finding (b) was that the defendants were “guilty of negli­
gence in not setting out the items of cash on hand in the county clerk’s 
office, as required by the Minimum Standard Audit Program.” This is 
based upon the court’s finding of fact No. 14, the substance of which is 
that the auditors reported the “cash count, January 11, 1937 (noon),” 
to be $494.38, whereas the defendant’s work sheets which were placed 
into the record as an exhibit by the plaintiff, showed the following:
“Cash on hand, January 11, 1937, (noon)
Coin ..................................  $ 7.75
Bills ..............................   12.00
Checks ............................... 416.88
Cash items (express) .........  2.00
I. O. U. (Elarton) .............  55.75
$494.38”
(The item of $416.88, on the same page of their work sheets, is made 
up as follows)
“A. W. Young Emergency
Fund No. 517, 1-11-37 ... $ .25
Elarton, Ralph, 1-2-37 .... 391.63
Palace Ready to Wear,
9-4-36 ............................. 25.00
$416.88”
In this connection we note the testimony of W. L. Warnica. Mr. War­
nica was employed by the defendants to help make the audit. He iden­
tified an exhibit by the plaintiff as sheets made in his handwriting, signed 
and turned over by him to his employer Miller. One of these sheets reads 
as follows: “Allen county, county clerk. County clerk claims the 47 cigar­
ette licenses issued and covered by his personal check on January 2, 1937, 
have now been collected on except for ten for which he secured a bank
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loan. The balance of the check represents funds diverted to his own use. 
The balance of $109.63 is supposed to be covered by another check.”
It is also pertinent to note the following testimony of Barton Avery: 
‘‘I am now and was in September 1937, a Senior Accountant in the State 
Accountant’s Office. I made an investigation of the accounts of Ralph 
Elarton, County Clerk, from the period January 3, 1936, to January 8, 
1937, which showed a difference of $381.95, which had not been reported. 
I also made a check on the discrepancy as to the cash on hand in the 
county clerk’s office between the Cornell Audit and the Baker-Miller 
Audit. We asked Mr. Miller about the difference and he said that he 
omitted the $258.00; that Mr. Elarton stated that it was for an item to be 
remitted direct to the Department of Inspection and Registration. Mr. 
Austin Logan was in Iola with me also, and we made a check to see if the 
personal check of $394.00 of Ralph Elarton, which was in the cash drawer, 
was ever cashed and cleared the bank, and we learned that Mr. Elarton did 
not even maintain a bank account at that time.”
While the trial court made no specific findings relative to the testimony 
of witnesses Warnica and Avery, their testimony was not disputed.
It thus appears that the item reported as “cash, $494.38” in the county 
clerk’s office was not cash. Most of it consisted of checks, and the principal 
check was the personal check of the county clerk, Elarton, whose resigna­
tion subsequently followed after disclosures of irregularities. It is hardly 
necessary to say that of course the county commissioners were entitled to 
know that checks were being carried as cash. A pertinent provision of the 
Minimum Standard Audit Program which appellees contracted to observe 
reads as follows: “Count all cash and cash items on hand. List checks and 
note date of making. Note checks signed by officers, deputies or employees. 
Insist upon all checks being deposited in the bank not later than the next 
business day and see that there is no off-setting withdrawal. Request de­
pository to make direct report of any items not cleared for any reason.” 
(Audit Procedure 1-12a.)
But no recourse to the audit program is required. Had it contained no 
such specific provision it would none the less have been the plain duty of 
appellees to report the facts. The county commissioners were certainly 
entitled to know that a county officer was substituting his own check for 
cash in the cash drawer. W hat confidence in the report could remain after 
disclosure of such a serious failure to do their work carefully and faith­
fully?
We next note the trial court’s “conclusion of law” (c), which was that 
“the defendants were guilty of negligence in wholly failing to check the 
A. W. Young emergency fund and include same in their audit.” This is 
based upon the evidence covered by the court’s findings of fact numbered 
15 and 16. The substance of those findings is that no audit was made of 
the “emergency fund” in the county engineer’s office, the defendants doing 
little more than report the existence of the fund; but that the work sheets, 
submitted as an exhibit by the plaintiff, showed, “no funds on hand 
January 11, 1937. An emergency account has been set up under the name 
of A. W. Young emergency fund. The amount, $389.49”; that as a result 
of an audit subsequently made of this emergency fund by an accountant 
from the State Accountant’s office, and covering the same period, unex­
plained expenditures were disclosed in the amount of $196.77. In other 
words, it is the plain implication of the court’s findings that if the appel­
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lees had not been guilty of negligence in failing to audit this fund, they 
would have discovered a shortage of about $200.
The appellees made no objection at the time, and make none now, to 
any of the findings heretofore narrated.
We now come to the court’s “conclusion of law’’ No. 2, to which the 
appellant objected at the time and now objects, which reads as follows: 
“Allen county, Kansas, had the benefit of the audit of the offices con­
cerning which no question has been raised; that said audit is not entirely 
worthless, but was of some value to said county.”
The theory of the trial court seems to have been that since the audit 
as to the other county offices had not been attacked, the disclosure and 
proof of inaccuracies and irregularities in the report as to only three 
county offices do not seriously injure the value of the report. The un­
soundness of such a theory is sufficiently indicated, we think, by the gen­
eral comments made at the start of this opinion. When reliance can 
no longer be placed in an auditor’s report, the coin of the audit’s value 
has become counterfeit. Moreover, it is pertinent to note that the con­
tract was for a county audit, and this was in harmony with the emphasis 
placed upon the proposition in the audit program, that county audits 
are based upon the county as a unit. The “Introductory Comment” 
therein reads as follows: “The audit contemplated herein comprehends 
the financial position and financial management of the county. The finan­
cial position and management of a county is based on the county as a 
unit. I t may seem trite to indicate as a basic principle that an audit pro­
gram must consider the county as a composite unit made up of various 
offices.”
The only way the county commissioners could have discovered in­
accuracies and irregularities, if any existed, in the other county offices, 
would have been to have other auditors make another audit. Faults of 
the audit made by defendants were not discovered until September 1937. 
Another year, subsequent to the period covered by appellee’s audit, had 
almost expired. In view of the fact that the statute requires that a county 
audit be made annually, the time for another regular audit would soon 
arrive. In the meantime, the county commissioners had secured the serv­
ices of an accountant from the State Accountant’s office. Under such 
circumstances, it would be unreasonable to say that the appellant was 
under obligation, immediately upon the disclosures in September 1937, to 
have another audit made of all county offices for 1936, and having failed 
to do so it cannot recover.
The only remaining question is whether the amount paid for the audit 
is a proper measure of damages. W hat other measure could be used? On 
what scales may some hypothetical residue of reliance be weighed when 
confidence in an auditor’s report has been largely destroyed? We do not 
say that minor inaccuracies in an audit and slight errors in an auditor’s 
report may not be overlooked, nor that under some circumstances sub­
stantial value from an audit may not remain in spite of its errors. But in 
view of the negligence, the inaccuracies, the inexcusable failure to report 
facts of serious character, found by the trial court in the instant case, 
on a record which amply supports such findings, we must conclude that 
the appellees failed, in a fundamental and essential particular, to furnish 
the expert and faithful service which they contracted to furnish. Whether 
this was due to personal fault of the appellees themselves or to that of 
employees working for them is not material. As in other like situations,
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public accountants are liable for the failure of their subordinates to make 
a proper audit. Ultramares Corporation v. George A. Touche, 255 N. Y. 
170, 174 N. E. 441, 74 A. L. R. 1139.
The general rule is that the measure of damages for defective per­
formance of a contract is the difference in the value between what is 
tendered as performance and what is due as performance under the 
contract; and that if what is tendered is unsuitable for the purpose con­
templated, the measure of damages may be the amount required to rem­
edy the defect. 17 C. J. 853; Sutherland Damages, Vol. 1., p. 48. In the 
instant case what was called for as performance was an audit and report 
in which reliance could be placed. W hat was furnished was an audit 
and report in which reliance could not be placed. In the case of City of 
East Grand Forks v. Steele, 121 Minn. 296, 141 N. W. 181, 182, 45 L. R. A., 
N. S., 205, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 720, which involved a faulty audit and report 
by public accountants, it was said;
“5. Defendants represented themselves as expert accountants, which 
implied that they were skilled in that class of work. In accepting em­
ployment as expert accountants, they undertook, and the plaintiff had 
the right to expect, that in the performance of their duties they would 
exercise the average ability and skill of those engaged in that branch 
of skilled labor. They were employed to ascertain, among other things, 
whether any irregularities had occurred in the financial transactions of 
the city clerk, and, if so, the nature and extent of such irregularities. 
If, from want of proper skill, or from negligence, they did not disclose 
the true situation, they failed to perform the duty which they had as­
sumed, and failed to earn the compensation which plaintiff had agreed 
to pay them for the proper performance of such duty.
"6. The work of an expert accountant is of such technical character 
and requires such peculiar skill that the ordinary person cannot be ex­
pected to know whether he performs his duties properly or otherwise, 
but must rely upon his report as to the thoroughness and accuracy of his 
work. The full contract price having been paid in the belief, induced by 
defendants’ report, that such report disclosed fully and accurately the 
condition of the city’s accounts, the city is entitled to recover back the 
amounts so paid, upon proving that, through the incompetence or the 
negligence of defendants, the report was in substance misleading and 
false.”
In substantial particulars, both in what the appellees reported and in 
what they failed to report, the instant audit and report were “misleading 
and false,” and the plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount paid under 
the contract.
The judgment for nominal damages only is set aside, and the case 
remanded with direction to render judgment for the plaintiff in the sum 
of $850 together with interest from the dates the installment payments 
were made.
145
146 ACCOUNTANTS’ LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
NATIONAL SURETY CORP. v. LYBRAND *
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1939. 256 App. Div. 226, 
9 N.Y.S.2d 554
U ntermyer, J. The plaintiff surety company maintains this action 
against three firms of certified public accountants for their failure to 
discover and report substantial cash shortages after auditing and examin­
ing the books and accounts of Halle & Stieglitz, members of the New York 
Stock Exchange. One Wallach, cashier in the main office of Halle & Stieg­
litz, confessed on May 2, 1934, to defalcations over a period of years 
aggregating $329,300. The plaintiff, surety on a fidelity bond, paid the 
loss to Halle & Stieglitz and now sues as its assignee.
During the period involved Halle & Stieglitz maintained about 
twenty-seven bank accounts, nine of which were in New York city. 
It had over 2,500 customers’ accounts, a large volume of daily transactions 
and substantial bank loans. Many of the firm’s records were kept in the 
“cage” of which Wallach, the cashier, had complete charge. Wallach 
determined when and in what amounts to transfer funds from one bank 
to another.
His system of embezzlements from about 1925 to May, 1934, consisted of 
a series of abstractions from petty cash. The ever-accumulating shortage 
of cash in banks was concealed by delaying and substituting bank de­
posits from day to day, and, when outside audits were made, by “kiting” 
checks from one bank to another on the audit date. The effect was that 
the sums covered thereby appeared in two banks at the same time. This 
“lapping” or “kiting” practice resulted in a credit at the payee bank 
on the same day that the check was deposited, making up a shortage 
previously existing there, while the amount would not be debited at 
the drawee bank until at least a day thereafter. Wallach knew when 
audits were to be made and, by the use of this system, effectually con­
cealed his steadily-increasing thefts for several years.
Defendant George R. Bowden & Company (referred to as Bowden) 
examined the books of Halle & Stieglitz as of January 31, 1928, at which 
time the cash shortage amounted to $28,350. Wallach’s subsequent thefts 
amounted to $300,950.
Defendants Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery (referred to as Ly- 
brand) made examinations as of September 30, 1929, September 30, 1930, 
October 31, 1931, and September 30, 1932. The shortages existing at and 
arising after those various audit dates were as follows:
Date
Sept. 30, 1929 ...........................................
Sept. 30, 1930............................................
Oct. 31, 1931............................................
Sept. 30, 1932..........................................
Shortage
$123,328.50
197,000.00
245,000.00
273,000.00
Subsequent thefts 
$205,971.50
132,300.00
84,300.00
56,300.00
Defendant McHeffey & McDonough made an examination as of 
November 30, 1933. The shortage then amounted to $315,000. Wallach’s 
thefts between that date and the date of his confession in the first week 
of May, 1934, amounted to $14,300. In all, his peculations aggregated 
$329,300.
* This case is discussed at p. 22 ff. supra,
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Lybrand had made an earlier examination in 1926, as had Bowden 
in 1927, but causes of action thereon were withdrawn as within the 
Statute of Limitations.
The defendants are charged with failure properly to perform their 
contracts to audit, with breach of warranty in their reports, with negli­
gence in their work, and with fraudulently misrepresenting material 
facts in their reports as to the financial condition of Halle & Stieglitz. 
It is claimed that if the defendants had discovered and reported Wallach’s 
misappropriations, Halle & Stieglitz would not have continued him in 
their employ or sustained the subsequent losses. It is also claimed that 
they might then have recovered previous losses from Wallach.
The defendants Lybrand deny the material allegations of the com­
plaint and assert that Halle & Stieglitz knew or should have known of 
Wallach’s dishonesty but failed to advise the defendants of it; that the 
proximate cause of the loss was the contributory negligence of Halle & 
Stieglitz; that the damage was not attributable to any reasonable reliance 
on the acts or omissions of these defendants; and that the defalcations 
and damages were not within the contemplation of the parties to the 
contracts. Bowden’s answer contains the same defenses, while that of 
McHeffey & McDonough interposes only denials.
The trial course concluded that the plaintiff failed to make out a case 
for submission to the jury. The first question is whether there were cir­
cumstances which should have put the defendants on their guard so that 
they, as professional accountants, might have ascertained the true situa­
tion in the course of their investigations.
It was Wallach’s practice usually to take the “kiting” checks from the 
check books of the firm, but out of numerical order, so that the stubs 
pertaining to the checks would appear beyond the last stub regularly 
dated for the month. Then, when the check stubs for the previous months 
were totaled in the check books the “kited” checks would not be in­
cluded in the footings for that month.
The circumstances surrounding “late” deposits are significant in that 
the deposit was often constituted differently than reflected in the books 
of the firm. For example, the deposit book would disclose the deposit of 
several individual items, and although the total sum would be deposited 
in the bank it would consist of a different number of checks in different 
amounts and usually drawn by different makers. This practice developed 
because it was a part of Wallach’s system to place a customer’s check in 
the petty cash box, instead of immediately depositing it, then extract from 
the petty cash the amount of that check in cash, and deposit the check 
in the bank one or more days later. The accumulating shortage in that 
bank would then be covered by the deposit of a check or checks drawn 
on another of the firm’s banks for the amount necessary to conceal the 
shortage. At times Wallach would make up the aggregate of the shortage 
by depositing his own check along with the checks of others.
The difference between the items on deposit slips and the entries in 
the deposit books was never observed. The bookkeeping department of 
Halle & Stieglitz is blamed by the defendants for allowing this to remain 
unnoticed and unchallenged. Yet these accountants themselves appar­
ently never undertook to examine the deposit slips, which were retained 
by the several banks, nor to obtain duplicates thereof.
Another office custom of Halle & Stieglitz is criticized by the defend­
ants. Memoranda were prepared in pencil by the bookkeeping depart­
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ment intended to show daily bank balances or the cash totals which the 
firm was supposed to have in banks. These memoranda would be given 
to Wallach, who would change the amounts so as to reflect approximately 
the actual amount of cash in banks. However, these slips were not per­
manent records. They were information memoranda used solely for the 
consideration of bank loans. As they were immediately destroyed they 
could not have been the basis for a check-up of cash shortages. The de­
fendants otherwise charge Halle & Stieglitz with carelessness in the con­
duct of their bookkeeping department, but there is no evidence that this 
firm differed in its office practice from that of other Wall Street brokers 
or that the defendants ever made any suggestions relating thereto.
During the years of Wallach’s pilferings one or the other of the de­
fendant firms of certified public accountants was employed by Halle & 
Stieglitz to make audits which included the verification of cash. For 
the audit of January 31, 1928, Bowen received fees of $2,800. He specifi­
cally reported to Halle & Stieglitz that they had on that date a balance 
in Guaranty Trust Company of $73,109.20 and in Hanover National 
Bank of $185,708.17, when in fact the balances were $72,829.20 and $157,­
638.17, respectively. The shortages in those two bank accounts, aggre­
gating $28,350, were concealed by delayed deposits recorded January 31, 
1928, but actually made February first with substituted items.
Djorup, plaintiff’s expert, testified that comparison of the bank state­
ments and the deposit books showed a number of delayed deposits be­
tween January 14, 1928, and February 4, 1928. The late deposits, before 
and after the audit date, range as high as $33,684.70, with delays varying 
from one to three business days. With respect to late deposits, this wit­
ness testified that he would have checked the larger items among them by 
obtaining the deposit slips. It is apparent that inquiries at the time of 
audit might have revealed the shortages.
Bowden, who rested his case without proof, contends that he did not 
undertake to verify the bank accounts. His report indicates no such 
limitation. On the contrary, his balance sheet clearly separates cash in 
banks and on hand and cash borrowed from customers’ accounts. It con­
tains the various bank balances, and cash in banks is listed among assets 
as amounting to $522,719.69. Even if the words “verify” and “verifica­
tion” are not used, the fact of verification follows from the specific state­
ment of the balances and total cash.
The Lybrand firm, in contrast to Bowden, concedes that their engage­
ments for the 1929, 1930, 1931 and 1932 audits included the verification 
of cash. The arrangements for the 1929 and 1930 examinations were in 
writing, it being stated that the examination was to be “along the lines 
followed by us in prior audits of your accounts” and would embrace “the 
verification of cash, securities, customers’ accounts, etc., without verifica­
tion of income and expense accounts or the preparation of the question­
naire  of the New York Stock Exchange.” T h e  arrangem ents for the 1931 
and 1932 examinations were oral and followed the scope of the two 
previous years. For the four years involved, 1929 to 1932, inclusive, 
Lybrand received fees of $11,000, $5,000, $2,850 and $2,400 respectively.
The cash shortage on September 30, 1929, amounting to $123,328.50, 
was concealed by four checks in the amounts of $13,000, $10,000, $100,000 
and $328.50. The first three of these checks were taken from the stubs 
of October first. All were deposited October 1, 1929, to take the place
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of a deposit of same amount, though of different items, recorded in the 
books on September thirtieth.
The shortage on September 30, 1930, of $197,000 was concealed by 
two checks for $102,000 and $95,000, which were drawn from stubs of 
October first, but deposited in the Guaranty Trust Company on Septem­
ber thirtieth.
On October 31, 1931, the shortage amounted to $245,000. The method 
of concealment was a deposit of $245,023.11 recorded October thirtieth 
and actually made October thirty-first with substituted items, including 
two checks for $120,000 and $125,000, respectively, which were drawn 
from stubs of November 2, 1931.
On September 30, 1932, with intervening defalcations of $28,000, the 
shortage had increased to $273,000. It was concealed by two checks of 
Halle & Stieglitz for $138,000 and $135,000 drawn on National City Bank 
and Commercial National Bank, respectively, representing the exact 
amount of the shortage. They had been taken out of numerical order 
from check stubs which were later dated October 3, 1932, and were 
deposited in Guaranty Trust Company on September 30, 1932.
Throughout these years there were continual lapped and delayed 
deposits, and instances of substitution of deposited items. These, plaintiff 
insists, are well-known danger signals to skilled auditors, but were dis­
regarded or not recognized by the defendants, who never requested dupli­
cate deposit slips, never pointed out late deposits or bank transfers, nor 
made any suggestion to Halle & Stieglitz as to their methods relative to 
cash, yet charge Halle & Stieglitz with negligence in the failure to make 
investigations which are within the ordinary realm of professional ac­
countants. The defendants say Halle & Stieglitz were negligent in failing 
to observe the differences between the details of the deposits actually 
made and those recorded in the books during the periods when Halle & 
Stieglitz made their reconciliations of bank accounts. The employees of 
Halle & Stieglitz who made such reconciliations were not auditors skilled 
in their profession, and their methods were purely mechanical checking 
to arrive at an arithmetical balance. The defendants’ employment, how­
ever, was the verification of the sums then actually on deposit in the banks.
Aside from accepting the engagement and reviewing the report, the 
Lybrand partners did not participate in the audits. Their employees 
were supervised by a senior accountant who made assignments and gave 
instructions. The only Lybrand employee who “verified” the cash in 
banks was the witness Brushaber, who was called by the plaintiff. Bru­
shaber had not listed “Transfers between banks” on previous audits, but 
he made such a list during the period covered by his reconciliation in 
1932 and was examined in connection therewith. However, even after 
compiling such a list, Lybrand’s employee either disregarded the very 
items which had become Wallach’s expedient in concealing his defalca­
tions or did not understand their significance. The plaintiff asserts that 
the procedure followed was mere mechanical routine, with no attempt 
to guard against the use of checks drawn from the check book out of 
numerical order and beyond the last check of the current month; that no 
notice was taken of delayed deposits nor effort made to guard against 
“lapped” deposits or “kited” checks; that Brushaber did nothing on 
the audit dates to ascertain the last checks drawn by Halle & Stieglitz 
for the previous month.
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For the audit of November 30, 1933, McHeffey & McDonough received 
fees of $2,000. The shortage had then reached the sum of $315,000 and 
was concealed by two checks for $150,000 and $165,000 drawn on National 
City Bank and Commercial National Bank, respectively, the total cover­
ing the exact amount of cash defalcations to that date. These two checks 
were taken from the stubs of December first, but were deposited in the 
Guaranty Trust Company on November twenty-ninth, the deposits being 
recorded as made on December first.
On May 3, 1934, after Wallach had confessed his thefts, McHeffey 
& McDonough were employed to verify the defalcations and later sub­
mitted a detailed report showing the accumulation of the loss over a 
period of years. The account with Guaranty Trust Company was then 
short a total of $329,300.
In a letter writen by defendant McHeffey & McDonough on November 
8, 1933, they stated that “the details of our audit will include: * * * 6. 
Verification of Bank Balances.” They contend that their report is dis­
tinguished from the report of the other defendants in that there was no 
delayed deposit on the audit date. The plaintiff concedes that there was 
no delayed deposit between November 29 and December 1, 1933, but 
there was a deposit of the two “kited” checks of $150,000 and $165,000, 
above referred to, for which no entry appeared in the deposit book. The 
only items corresponding in amount were entered on December first. 
Furthermore, there are instances of substantial delayed deposits in the 
latter part of November, 1933, and later, investigation of any of which 
would have disclosed that the shortage was then being concealed by 
“lapping.”
McHeffey & McDonough also contend that they are exonerated because, 
notwithstanding the shortage, Halle & Stieglitz retained them to verify 
the amount of defalcations and to prepare a claim against the surety. 
The subsequent employment, however, did not condone any prior negli­
gence of these defendants. The purpose was solely to verify the shortage 
and fix the dates of its occurrence. Except for the expert, Klein, who 
was called by Lybrand, the defendants “rested without calling any wit­
nesses, although there would naturally be available the men who made 
the audit, those who prepared or supervised the preparation of the work­
ing papers or the certified balance sheet and experts to refute the testi­
mony offered by the experts called by plaintiff.” (State Street Trust Co. v. 
Ernst. 278 N. Y. 104, 111.)
It is contended that the defendants’ engagements called for only partial 
examinations, of limited scope and nature, and that the fees were fixed 
accordingly. Conceding that the audits and examinations were limited 
in scope, the loss here did not involve bank loans, customers’ accounts, 
partners’ accounts, expense accounts or other liabilities. It resulted from 
a shortage of cash in banks due to pilferings of petty cash. The question, 
then, is whether the defendants’ duty was performed by a mere book 
reconciliation of cash or whether it did not require the ascertainment 
of the actual cash in bank.
It is undisputed that cash in bank can be verified absolutely. The con­
tracts for the services of the defendants were plain and their engagements 
required the exercise of reasonable skill and diligence in making an actual 
determination of the cash position of Halle & Stieglitz and not a mere 
arithmetical bookkeeping computation. When they accepted the employ­
LIABILITY TO  CLIENTS 151
ment, though it may be at a low rate of compensation, they assumed the 
risk of non-performance of contracts contemplating actual verification of 
cash in banks.
To “verify” as defined in Corpus Juris, volume 67, page 230, is to “as­
certain to be correct; * * * to confirm or establish the truth of.” In 
Dicksee’s Manual on Auditing (Am. ed. 1909), edited by Robert H. 
Montgomery, one of the defendants herein, it is said (p. 40): “A list of 
cheques outstanding should be retained, and it should be ascertained 
afterwards, either by a second writing up of the pass book or by inquiry 
of the bank, whether the amounts agree. If the time of the proposed 
audit is known, fraud may easily be committed and the cash inflated by 
drawing a cheque at the last moment which will be ‘outstanding.’ ”
In Montgomery’s own treatise on “Auditing—Theory and Practice” 
(1912), he says (p. 94): “When the cash balance consists of several bank 
accounts or funds, care must be taken to see that the entire balance is 
verified simultaneously. Instances are known where auditors have been 
deceived through one balance, after being inspected, having been trans­
ferred and used on a later day in connection with another balance.”
Safeguards against fraud are discussed in Bell and Powelson on Audit­
ing (1932), at page 71:
“The reason for thus testing individual deposits, and especially the 
composition thereof, is to detect any evidence of temporary misappropria­
tions of cash which have been restored, or of the somewhat similar form 
of fraud known as ‘kiting,’ which involves a series of unauthorized ‘bor­
rowings,’ one being used to repay the other. * * *
“When there is more than one bank account, a test should always be 
made of deposits during the last days of the audit period. The particular 
purpose of this is to detect a deposit in one bank of an unrecorded check 
on another bank to conceal a shortage in the first bank, which check 
cannot reach the second bank in time to be charged by it in the audit 
period and will not appear as outstanding.”
And (at p. 73) it is said: “For the same reason that all checks supposed 
to have been issued should be accounted for, it is necessary, so tar as 
practicable, to determine that none have been issued which were not 
supposed to have been. Knowing that all current numbers of checks 
would be accounted for by the auditor, the person desiring to issue a 
fraudulent check would be likely to use one that was not current. For 
that reason, the auditor should see that no checks have been abstracted 
from the back of the check book, if they are in book form.”
The extent of an accountant’s duty is well defined in Matter of London 
& General Bank (L. R. [1895] 2 Ch. 673, 682). Not only must he examine 
the books but, if that be his contract, he must satisfy himself with reason­
able diligence that the books “show the true financial position of the 
company.”
The evidence in this case discloses similar conditions at the time 
of all the audits in question. It was for the jury to say whether the 
practice of “lapping” and “kiting” of checks should have put the defend­
ants upon inquiry which would have led to discovery of the defalcations, 
and whether, if defendants had exercised ordinary care and used proper 
methods of accounting as established by the expert testimony, they would 
have observed checks drawn out of numerical order. If they had checked 
“outstandings” they would have noted that the check or checks used by 
Wallach at the audit dates were returned with the canceled vouchers
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accompanying the next bank statement. Again, if there had been any 
substantial compliance with the requirements for verifying cash in 
banks the cash shortages would have been detected, as the jury might 
have found. Their representations that there had been a verification of 
cash was a pretense of knowledge when they did not know the condition 
of the bank accounts and had no reasonable basis to assume that they did. 
This, the jury could have found, amounted at least to a constructive 
fraud. (UItramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 190, 191; State Street 
Trust Co. v. Ernst, supra, p. 112.)
The defendants assert that they are not liable, no matter how negli­
gent they may have been, because Halle & Stieglitz were guilty of con­
tributory negligence. If it be true that Halle & Stieglitz so conducted 
their business as to make possible Wallach’s defalcations, it did not nec­
essarily excuse the defendants from the consequences of their negligence 
in failing to discover and report the facts. The action here, it must be 
remembered, is not to recover for the thefts committed by Wallach as it 
would be if it were against Wallach or against the surety. The action 
is for errors of the accountants in failing to discover Wallach’s defalca­
tions, thereby making further defalcations possible and rendering more 
difficult recovery for defalcations of the past. The measure of damages in 
two such classes of actions is not the same.
We are, therefore, not prepared to admit that accountants are immune 
from the consequences of their negligence because those who employ them 
have conducted their own business negligently. The situation in this 
respect is not unlike that of a workman injured by a dangerous condition 
which he has been employed to rectify. (Kowalsky v. Conreco Company, 
264 N. Y. 125.) Accountants, as we know, are commonly employed for 
the very purpose of detecting defalcations which the employer’s negligence 
has made possible. Accordingly, we see no reason to hold that the ac­
countant is not liable to his employer in such cases. Negligence of the 
employer is a defense only when it has contributed to the accountant’s 
failure to perform his contract and to report the truth. Thus, by way 
of illustration, if it were found that the members of the firm of Halle & 
Stieglitz had been negligent in connection with the transfer of funds 
which occurred at about the time of each audit and that such negligence 
contributed to the defendants’ false reports, it would be a defense to the 
action, for it could then be said that the defendants’ failure to perform 
their contracts was attributable, in part, at least, to the negligent con­
duct of the firm. That was the principle applied in Craig v. Anyon (212 
App. Div. 55; affd., 242 N. Y. 569) where the embezzler had been negli­
gently represented to the accountants as a person to be trusted. In the 
present case the loss consisted of thefts by a cashier not so represented 
“whose own account of his receipts and payments could not reasonably 
be taken by an auditor without further inquiry.” (Matter of Kingston 
Cotton Mill Co. [No. 2], L. R. [1896] 2 Ch. Div. 279.)
We are, therefore, of opinion that the plaintiff established a prima 
facie case. The question of the defendants’ liability on the various theo­
ries set forth in the complaint should have been submitted to the jury. 
It was also for the jury to say whether the defendants were liable for 
defalcations subsequent to their audits, depending upon whether such 
losses could reasonably have been anticipated at the time they were en­
gaged in the performance of the work. (Critten n. Chemical National
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Bank, 171 N. Y. 219; Smith n. London Assurance Corp., 109 App. Div. 
882.)
I t may be prudent, though perhaps unnecessary, to say that we have 
stated the facts as they might have been found if the case had been sub­
mitted to the jury. We do this because, the complaint having been dis­
missed, the plaintiff is entitled to the most favorable inferences fairly 
to be drawn from the evidence. We do not intend to suggest that the facts, 
as we have stated them, would have been accepted by the jury or that 
upon a new trial other facts may not appear. We merely hold that on 
the present record the issues of fact, including negligence and contribu­
tory negligence, were for the jury.
[Judgment reversed and a new trial ordered.]
DANTZLER LUMBER & EXPORT CO. v.
COLUMBIA CASUALTY CO.*
Supreme Court of Florida, 1934. 115 Fla. 541, 156 So. 116.
Buford, Justice. We adopt the statement of the case as presented by 
counsel for respective parties.
The appellee, Columbia Casualty Company, filed bill of complaint 
against the appellants, Dantzler Lumber & Export Company, a Florida 
Corporation, L. N. Dantzler, Jr., and Alvin C. Ernst, Lester W. Blyth, 
Harry C. Royal, and Forrest H. Figsby, copartners doing business under 
the firm name of Ernst & Ernst.
Summarized, the bill of complaint alleged:
(a) T hat the Columbia Casualty Company is a corporation organized 
under the laws of the state of New York, and authorized to do business in 
the state of Florida, as a surety company for compensation.
(b) T hat Dantzler Lumber & Export Company is a corporation organ­
ized under the laws of Florida, engaged in the lumber export business at 
Tampa, Hillsborough county, Fla.
(c) T hat L. N. Dantzler, Jr., is vice president and treasurer of Dantz­
ler Lumber & Export Company, and resides at Tampa, Hillsborough 
county, Fla.
(d) T hat Ernst 8c Ernst is a copartnership composed of the persons 
named in the bill, all of the members of the copartnership being non­
residents of the state of Florida; said copartnership being engaged in 
business as public accountants and maintaining an office in the state of 
Florida.
(e) T hat Ernst 8c Ernst contracted with Dantzler Lumber 8c Export 
Company to make annual audits of books and accounts of said company, 
and did make audits of said books and accounts for the period from 
September 20, 1926, to August 7, 1931, and reported said audits of the 
books and accounts to said Dantzler Lumber 8c Export Company, said 
audits being made at or near the end of each calendar year, and that said 
audits were made by auditors or accountants in the employ of said Ernst 
8c Ernst, and that said auditors were unrestricted in making and reporting 
said annual audits, and were required to make complete and detailed
* See footnote 36 supra.
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audits and reports, and were under agreement with said Dantzler Lumber 
& Export Company to make examination of all cash transactions for the 
period covered by each audit, including inspection of vouchers and other 
supporting data.
(f) T hat one W. Frank Alderman was employed as bookkeeper by 
Dantzler Lumber & Export Company during the period above mentioned, 
and that said Alderman, by means of issuing certain checks against the 
bank accounts of said Dantzler Lumber & Export Company fraudulently 
obtained possession of and embezzled moneys of said Dantzler Lumber & 
Export Company to the aggregate amount of $39,425.61; that of said sum 
$1,670.09 was embezzled during the year 1927, $4,716.62 in the year 1928, 
$15,670.70 in the year 1929, $8,693.20 in the year 1930, and $8,675 in the 
year 1931.
(g) T hat said Ernst & Ernst was negligent and careless in making its 
audits of the books and accounts of said Dantzler Lumber & Export 
Company, and that by the exercise of due care, caution, and vigilance, as 
they were in duty bound to do, they would have discovered the embezzle­
ment, that it was the duty of said auditors, pursuant to their contract of 
employment, to examine every cash transaction and to investigate sup­
porting data, and that, had said auditors, in making said audits, examined 
the cash transactions wherein the cash above mentioned as withdrawn 
by said Alderman by the checks above mentioned, with due care and 
accuracy required of auditors, and pursuant to their contract of employ­
ment, the embezzlement committed by Alderman would have been dis­
covered at the time of the audit in 1927, which would have terminated the 
said embezzlements and resulted in a loss of only $1,670.09, which was 
the amount of the embezzlement committed by said Alderman prior to the 
1927 audit, but that, through the failure of said Ernst & Ernst to use due 
care and vigilance, and to properly perform their contract to examine all 
cash transactions and supporting data and report the same in their annual 
audits, the said embezzlements committed by the said Alderman were not 
discovered and were permitted to continue until August, 1931, during 
which time the amount of the embezzlements so committed by the said 
Alderman aggregated the sum of $39,425.61.
(h) It is further alleged in the bill that in each report of the audit of 
the books and accounts of Dantzler Lumber & Export Company by Ernst 
& Ernst, commencing the year 1927 and continuing through succeeding 
years including 1930, it was certified by the auditors that “all record cash 
receipts for the year under review were traced directly into the bank 
deposits and disbursements through the bank account were verified by an 
examination of said checks, invoices or other supporting data on file.” 
It is alleged that, had the auditors compared the checks with the invoices 
and other supporting data, it would have been found that Alderman was 
wrongfully and fraudulently withdrawing the money from his employer, 
Dantzler Lumber & Export Company, from the bank account on checks 
made payable to “Yourselves,” and that said checks were cashed by the 
paying teller of the bank; that a careful, reasonable, and intelligent audit 
of said accounts and the tracing of said checks would have disclosed that 
there was no supporting data for them and that they were not connected 
with any business transactions of Dantzler Lumber & Export Company; 
that Dantzler Lumber & Export Company relied upon the accuracy of 
said auditors’ reports and believed them to have been made in good faith 
as stated therein; that, had the auditors, Ernst & Ernst, made the examina­
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tion it reported to Dantzler Lumber & Export Company it had made, the 
defalcation of Alderman would have been discovered, Alderman would 
have been discharged and further loss obviated. And it is alleged that 
by and through the fraud of Ernst & Ernst the Dantzler Lumber & Export 
Company sustained losses in the approximate sum of $37,755.52 in excess 
of that occurring prior to the time of the first audit in 1927 when the 
defalcation should have been discovered and disclosed.
(i) T hat the Columbia Casualty Company had executed a surety bond 
in the sum of $10,000, payable to said Dantzler Lumber & Export Com­
pany, protecting said Dantzler Lumber & Export Company against loss 
through embezzlements by certain of its employees, including the said 
Alderman, and that, in accordance with the terms of its bond, for the 
making of which it received an annual premium of $75 from Dantzler 
Lumber & Export Company, it responded to its said liability and paid 
the full penalty of said bond, to wit, the sum of $10,000, to said Dantzler 
Lumber & Export Company, whereas, if the said embezzlements had been 
discovered by said auditors at the end of the year 1927, as the bill charges 
should have been done if said auditors had exercised due diligence and 
had not been careless in the performance of their contract, the liability 
of said Columbia Casualty Company on its bond would have been limited 
to said sum of $1,670.09, being the total of the embezzlements committed 
by the said Alderman up to that time.
(j) That, at the time of making payment of the amount of its bond 
to Dantzler Lumber & Export Company, it notified said Dantzler Lumber 
& Export Company and said Ernst & Ernst that it made claim against said 
Ernst & Ernst for reimbursement to it of the loss so sustained by it, and 
that it would claim to be subrogated to the rights of Dantzler Lumber & 
Export Company to the extent of the payment so made by it against said 
Ernst & Ernst, and warned said Dantzler Lumber & Export Company and 
said Ernst & Ernst against making any settlement between themselves 
without taking into consideration and providing for reimbursement to 
said Columbia Casualty Company for its said loss.
(k) The bill further alleges that, disregarding the notices so given, 
said Dantzler Lumber & Export Company and Ernst & Ernst settled and 
adjusted the claim which Dantzler Lumber & Export Company made 
against Ernst 8c Ernst for a sum of money unknown to Columbia Casualty 
Company, but that said settlement was made by way of compromise for 
less than the total claim, and that Dantzler Lumber & Export Company 
and Ernst & Ernst have refused to disclose to Columbia Casualty Com­
pany the nature and terms of said settlement and the amount of money 
paid in settlement of said claim.
The bill prays that Dantzler Lumber & Export Company and N. L. 
Dantzler, Jr., be required to make answer to certain interrogatories pro­
pounded by the bill, and disclose whether or not settlement of the claim 
of Dantzler Lumber & Export Company against Ernst & Ernst was made, 
and, if so, the amount of the settlement. Certain other interrogatories 
are propounded by the bill which are not of material importance on this 
appeal.
The bill prayed that Columbia Casualty Company be decreed to be 
subrogated to the rights and claims of Dantzler Lumber & Export Com­
pany against Ernst & Ernst as to all liability of Ernst & Ernst to Dantzler 
Lumber & Export Company on account of the loss sustained by reason 
of the alleged neglect of Ernst & Ernst as set forth in the bill to the extent
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of the loss sustained by Columbia Casualty Company and that the persons 
constituting the copartnership of Ernst & Ernst be decreed to pay to 
Columbia Casualty Company such sums as might be found to be due upon 
an accounting.
The defendants in the court below filed motion to dismiss. The motion 
was overruled, and appeal was entered.
Appellants have filed their assignments in error, being four in number. 
The assignments of error present for our determination two questions: 
First, Did the bill of complaint set forth a statement of facts showing 
liability of the appellant copartnership Ernst & Ernst to the appellant 
Dantzler Lumber & Export Company? If that question is answered in 
the affirmative, the second question is: “Did the bill show a right in the 
appellee Columbia Casualty Company to subrogate pro tanto to the rights 
of Dantzler Lumber & Export Company against Ernst & Ernst?” If this 
question is also answered in the affirmative, then order appealed from 
should be affirmed.
The allegations of the bill are sufficient to show that the firm of Ernst 
& Ernst carried on a business in the state of Florida of accounting and 
auditing; that as such accountants and auditors they undertook to make 
annual audits of the books and accounts of Dantzler Lumber & Export 
Company, and in pursuance of such undertaking they made an audit of 
the books and accounts of that corporation from 1927 until 1930, inclu­
sive. It alleges that a careful and proper audit of the books and accounts 
would have shown that Alderman embezzled $1,670.09 in 1927, $4,716.62 
in 1928, $15,670.70 in 1929, $8,693.20 in 1930, and $8,675 in 1931.
The allegations are sufficient to show that Ernst & Ernst negligently 
and fraudulently misrepresented the financial condition of the business 
and the status of the accoqnts of Dantzler Lumber & Export Company in 
each and every of the reports of audits made. Public accountants and 
auditors hold themselves out to be skilled and competent to perform the 
duties and services which they undertake to perform as accountants and 
auditors, and they are bound in law to perform such services in an accurate 
and skillful manner. When auditors and accountants are employed for 
the purpose of auditing books and accounts they occupy a relation of 
trust and confidence to their employer based up on the superior knowledge 
of the business of accounting and auditing possessed by the auditors and 
accountants.
The bill of complaint presents a case of gross negligence if not of legal 
fraud on the part of the accountants in the performance of their services. 
It alleges a loss by reason of such negligence and therefore the right of 
action ex delicto, notwithstanding the injury complained of might also 
be ground for action ex contractu. The action here is not for mere non­
performance, but it is based upon an alleged breach of duty to skillfully 
perform and truly report the condition of accounts, in reporting a condi­
tion which did not in truth and in fact exist and the true status of which 
could and would have been discovered and disclosed by a careful, skillful, 
and proper audit of the books of account.
In 26 R. C. L. 758, it is said:
“Whenever a negligent breach of a contract is also a violation of a com­
mon law duty, an action ex delicto will lie. Accompanying every contract 
is a common law duty to perform the thing agreed to be done with care, 
skill, reasonable expediency, and faithfulness, and a negligent failure to
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observe any of these conditions is a tort, as well as a breach of the contract. 
If the transaction complained of had its origin in a contract which placed 
the parties in such a relation that in attempting to perform the promised 
service the tort was committed, then the breach of the contract is not the 
gravamen of the suit. The contract in such case is mere inducement, 
creating the state of things which furnishes the occasion of the tort. And 
in all such cases the remedy is an action on the case. Based on the prin­
ciple above indicated, the firmly established rule is that for injuries re­
sulting from the unskilful or otherwise negligent performance of a thing 
agreed to be done, an action ex delicto will lie, notwithstanding the act 
complained of would also be ground for an action ex contractu.”
In 45 C. J. 1093, it is said:
“In an action ex delicto for negligence in the performance of a con­
tract, the fact of negligence must be alleged as in other cases of negligence, 
and an allegation only of a breach of a contractual duty is not sufficient, 
although it describes such breach as negligence. As an element of such 
allegation facts should be averred to show the contractual relation be­
tween the parties and the consequent duty owing by defendant to plaintiff; 
and, when necessary for this purpose the contract out of which such duty 
and the consequent negligence arose should be stated, although it is not 
necessary to allege the terms of the contract in detail.”
In Smith et al. v. London Assurance Corporation, 109 App. Div. 882, 
96 N. Y. S. 820, the court held:
“Where public accountants were employed on the express agreement 
that they should frequently check the defendant’s cash account in one 
branch of its business and verify the items thereon, and they negligently 
and willfully failed to do so, and on account of such failure its cashier 
was enabled to embezzle large amounts of money, they were liable for 
the sums embezzled.”
In  Banfield et ux. v. Addington et ux., 104 Fla. 661, 140 So. 893, 895, 
we quoted with approval from Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Randall, 74 Ala. 
170, saying:
“Wherever there is carelessness, recklessness, want of reasonable skill, 
or the violation or disregard of a duty which the law implies from the 
conditions or attendant circumstances, and individual injury results there­
from, an action on the case lies in favor of the party injured; and if the 
transaction had its origin in a contract, which places the parties in such 
relation as that, in performing or attempting to perform the service 
promised, the tort or wrong is committed, then the breach of the contract 
is not the gravamen of the suit. There may be no technical breach of the 
letter of the contract. The contract, in such case, is mere inducement, and 
should be so stated in pleading. It induces, causes, creates the conditions 
or state of things, which furnishes the occasion of the tort. The wrongful 
act, outside of the letter of the contract, is the gravamen of the complaint; 
and in all such cases, the remedy is an action on the case.”
In  th a t same opinion, we also said:
“The reason for this is the firmly established rule that for injuries re­
sulting from the unskilled or otherwise negligent performance of a thing 
agreed to be done, an action ex delicto will lie, notwithstanding the injury 
complained of would also be ground for an action ex contractu. In such
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cases the distinction made is that the action ex delicto can be maintained 
where the action is founded on something more than mere nonfeasance 
in the performance of an alleged contract.”
Numerous cases are there cited to support this enunciation which is 
known as the American Rule, as distinguished from the English Rule 
which prevails in some jurisdictions.
We therefore answer the first question in the affirmative.
As to the nature and doctrine of subrogation, in 25 R. C. L. 1313, it 
is said:
“The doctrine of subrogation is generally considered to have been 
derived, and the term itself borrowed, from the civil law, though some 
authorities regard the Roman Law as its source. However this may be, 
it has long been an established branch of equity jurisprudence. It does 
not owe its origin to statute or custom, but it is a creature of courts of 
equity, having for its basis the doing of complete and perfect justice 
between the parties without regard to form. It is a doctrine, therefore, 
which will be applied or not according to the dictates of equity and good 
conscience, and considerations of public policy, and will be allowed in 
all cases where the equities of the case demand it. It rests upon the 
maxim that no one shall be enriched by another’s loss, and may be in­
voked wherever justice demands its application, in opposition to the 
technical rules of law which liberate, securities with the extinguishment 
of the original debt. The right to it depends upon the facts and circum­
stances of each particular case, and to which must be applied the prin­
ciples of justice. In  the administration of relief by subrogation, it will be 
found that the jurisdiction of equity rests largely on the prevention of 
frauds and on relief against mistakes; and the expression of the rule has 
so nearly covered the field that it may now be said that, wherever a court 
of equity will relieve against a transaction, it will do so by the remedy of 
subrogation, if that be the most efficient and complete that can be 
afforded.”
Our court is committed to a liberal application of the rule of equit­
able subrogation. See Federal Land Bank n. Dekle, 108 Fla. 555, 148 So. 
756, and cases there cited.
In 25 R. C. L. 1316, it is said:
“Subrogation is a consequence which equity jurisprudence attaches to 
certain conditions. The parties may not have contracted for it either 
expressly or by legal implication; but if, in the performance of that con­
tract which they did make, certain conditions have resulted which make 
it necessary for equity to interpose its authority in this respect, it will do 
so, provided that in so doing it will violate no law and not alter the 
contract. It is accordingly the universal rule that the right of legal subro­
gation need not rest upon any formal contract or written agreement, nor 
does it follow from any fixed law; but it exists on principles of mere equity 
and benevolence, and is founded on the relationship of the parties.”
In the same volume (page 1372), it is said:
“One who has indemnified another in pursuance of his obligations 
so to do succeeds to, and is entitled to, a cession of all the means of redress 
held by the party indemnified against the party who has occasioned the 
loss. Thus the rule is well settled in fire insurance as well as in marine in­
surance, that the insurer, upon paying to the assured the amount of a
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loss on the property insured, is subrogated in a corresponding amount to 
the assured’s right of action against any other person responsible for the 
loss; this right of the insurer against such other person not resting upon 
any relation of contract or of privity between them, but arising out of the 
nature of the contract of insurance as a contract of indemnity, derived 
from the assured alone, and enforceable in his right only.”
To like effect is 33 C. J. 43.
In Chickasaw County Farmers’ Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Weller, 
98 Iowa, 731, 68 N. W. 443, it was held:
“Payment by a fire insurance company of a claim for property destroyed 
by the negligence of a railroad company, is not voluntary, and may be 
recovered back, where the insured had previously made a settlement with 
the railroad company, receiving payment in full, which fact he concealed 
from the insurance company, although the latter knew that he was making 
a claim against the railroad company.
“One who has ben paid by a railroad company, the full value of prop­
erty destroyed by its negligence, cannot recover insurance on such prop­
erty, as the insurance company would be entitled to be subrogated to the 
rights of the insured to recover from the railroad company.”
In Joyce on Insurance (2d Ed.) vol. 5, p. 5888, § 3544, the writer says:
“If third parties who may be liable to the insured for the loss effect a 
settlement with the latter and obtain a release from all liability, and this 
is done with knowledge of the fact that the insurers have already paid 
to the insured the amount of their liability to him, such settlement and 
release will in no way affect the insurer’s right of subrogation as against 
such third parties, since the settlement and release will be in fraud of the 
insurer’s rights, and consequently void.”
In 14 R. C. L. 1404, it is said:
“On payment of a loss the insurer acquires the right to be subrogated 
pro tanto to any right of action which the insured may have against any 
third person whose wrongful act or neglect caused the loss. This right in­
cludes the subrogation of the insurer to any cause of action which the 
insured has against a carrier whose failure of duty caused the loss, as the 
carrier is primarily and the insurer only secondly liable, and the insurer 
also is subrogated to the property owner’s statutory right of recovery 
against a railroad company for setting out fire by the operation of its road. 
Likewise an insurer of internal revenue stamps may recover, in the name 
of the owner, from the government for their loss. The insurer is sub­
rogated only to such rights as the insured possessed, and the right of the 
insurer against the wrongdoer may be defeated by the act of the insured, 
prior to the loss, or even after the loss, in releasing the wrongdoer from 
any liability or giving him the benefit of any insurance, or by a recovery 
of the amount of the loss by the insured, unless, in the case of a release 
after loss, the wrongdoer settles with the insured with full knowledge of 
the insurer’s right of subrogation.”
T o  like effect in  Cooley’s Briefs on Insurance (2d Ed.) vol. 7, p. 6713.
It therefore appears that the allegations of the bill of complaint are 
sufficient to constitute the basis for a suit to enforce subrogation.
We have examined and considered the argument and authorities cited 
in brief for plaintiff in error, but we hold that the authorities herein cited
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enunciate the law as it is in this jurisdiction, and therefore, we answer 
the second question also in the affirmative.
The contention is made that the appellants have the right to trial 
by jury as to the rights of parties. The contention is not tenable for the 
reason that subrogation is a matter of equitable cognizance, and, aside 
from this, the bill of complaint seeks discovery of the terms, amount, and 
condition of the settlement had between the appellants. It was therefore 
necessary for the appellee to seek its relief in a court of equity. The court 
of equity, having acquired jurisdiction to determine rights cognizable 
in equity between the parties, it will reach out and draw unto its considera­
tion and determination the entire subject-matter bringing before it all the 
parties interested therein and will retain such jurisdiction until all mat­
ters involved in litigation between the parties or growing out of and 
connected with the subject-matter of the suit are fully disposed of. See 
Hitchcolk v. Mortgage Securities Corporation, 95 Fla. 147, 116 So. 244, 
and cases there cited.
In Norris et ux. v. Eikenberry, 103 Fla. 104, 137 So. 128, 130, we said:
“While a court of equity, having once obtained jurisdiction of a cause, 
will retain it for all purposes and administer complete relief, yet, in order 
to authorize relief which can be obtained in a suit at law, there must be 
some substantial ground of equitable jurisdiction both alleged and 
proven; otherwise, a court of equity will not retain jurisdiction and grant 
a purely legal remedy.”
As we have heretofore indicated, “Subrogation is a consequence which 
equity jurisprudence attaches to certain conditions. The parties may not 
have contracted for it either expressly or by legal implication, but if in 
the performance of that contract which they did make, certain conditions 
have resulted which make it necessary for equity to interpose its authority 
in this respect it will do so.” It may be said to be the universal rule “that 
the right to legal subrogation need not rest upon any formal contract or 
written agreement, nor does it follow from any fixed law, but it exists 
on principles of mere equity and benevolence and is founded on relation­
ship of the parties.” It therefore appears that it was not necessary that 
there should have been any privity between Columbia Casualty Company 
and Ernst & Ernst to create the liability of Ernst & Ernst under the prin­
ciple of equitable subrogation to Columbia Casualty Company. It appears 
to be also well settled that “the insurer upon paying to the insured the 
amount of loss, is subrogated in a corresponding amount to the assured’s 
right of action against any other person responsible for the loss.” This 
right of insured against such other person does not rest upon any relation 
of contract or privity between the insurer and such other person, but it 
arises out of the nature of the contract of insurance as a contract of in­
demnity, and, being derived from the contract with the insured alone, it 
is enforceable in his right only. See 25 R. C. L. p. 1372, and cases there 
cited. See, also, 33 C. J. 43; also Chickasaw County Farmers’ Mutual Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Weller, supra; 14 R. C. L. 1404.
Columbia Casualty Company’s right to recover rests upon principles 
of subrogation, and only by the enforcement of its right to subrogation 
may it recover. The matter of enforcing subrogation is of equitable cog­
nizance.
It therefore appears that, inasmuch as the bill of complaint contains 
sufficient allegations to show that the complainant in the court below was 
entitled to an accounting because of funds having been received by
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Dantzler Lumber & Export Company from Ernst & Ernst and that the 
bill of complaint also contains sufficient allegations to show that the 
insurer has the right to be subrogated pro tanto to any right of action 
which the insured may have had against Ernst & Ernst, whose alleged 
wrongful act or negligence caused the loss, the bill is not without equity.
For the reasons stated, the order appealed from should be affirmed. It 
is so ordered.
Affirmed.
Ellis and T errell, JJ., concur.
Davis, C. J., and Whitfield, J., concur in part and dissent in part.
Brown, J., dissents.
Davis, Chief Justice (concurring in part; dissenting in part).
There was a general motion to dismiss for want of equity in the bill, 
which was overruled. Since that motion is the equivalent of a general 
demurrer and there is equity in the bill, in my opinion, at least to the 
extent of the discovery sought against Dantzler Lumber & Export Com­
pany, I concur in the result which is an affirmance of the order from which 
this appeal is taken.
But there is no justification in law, as I see it, for holding that, in a 
case of this kind, the alleged tort-feasor’s right to a jury trial of a tort 
action can be defeated by the fact that the right sought to be enforced 
by plaintiff is a subrogated right and not the original right. Our own 
cases so hold. See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. n. Campbell, 104 Fla. 274, 
139 So. 886. Compare Royal Indemnity Co. v. Knott, 101 Fla. 1495, 1502, 
136 So. 474.
If a tort was committed by the negligent audit of the Dantzler Lumber 
& Export Company’s books by Ernst & Ernst as alleged, it gave rise to a 
legal right to a tort action by Dantzler Lumber & Export Company against 
Ernst & Ernst. On that tort action Ernst & Ernst are constitutionally en­
titled to a jury trial. Their right to a trial by jury ought not to be, on 
principle, defeated by the fact that Columbia Casualty Company has 
acquired a right to subrogation under its contract of suretyship entered 
into with Dantzler Lumber & Export Company, to which contract Ernst 
& Ernst is not a party. As I see it, Columbia Casualty Company, as the 
new plaintiff by reason of subrogation, must step into the shoes of Dantzler 
Lumber & Export Company and must submit its claim to a jury trial just 
as Dantzler Lumber & Export Company would have had to do had no sub­
rogation taken place.
Can it be said that, where A has a claim against B for damages by reason 
of tort committed by A against B, B loses his right to a jury trial because 
C, by reason of the doctrine of subrogation as applied between A and C, 
has acquired A’s claim against B?
My view is that, under the principles stated in Atlantic Coast Line R. 
Co. v. Campbell, 104 Fla. 274, 139 So. 886, Columbia Casualty Company 
is, as a matter of law, a subrogated plaintiff and is entitled to maintain a 
suit at law against Ernst & Ernst as tort-feasors, to the same extent that 
Dantzler Lumber & Export Company could have done had no subrogation 
taken place, but that subrogation in favor of Columbia Casualty Com­
pany against Dantzler Lumber & Export Company cannot operate so 
as to destroy the right to a jury trial which was at all times possessed by 
Ernst & Ernst as against the subrogated claim.
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I concur as to the finding of some equity in the bill, to wit, the right to 
subrogation and to a discovery by the surety as to material facts relating 
to its suretyship. I dissent from all other portions of the opinion prepared 
by Mr. Justice Buford.
The rule that a court of equity once having assumed jurisdiction of a 
cause on any equitable ground will reach out and draw into its considera­
tion and determination the entire subject-matter, bringing before it all 
the parties interested therein, means no more than that, where there is a 
distinct equitable controversy and a substantial ground of equitable 
jurisdiction, a court of equity will render complainant full relief even 
to the extent of passing upon strictly legal questions and granting strictly 
legal remedies. It does not mean a bill in equity can bring into a court of 
equity, as incident to the right to discovery, separate cause of action cog­
nizable in a court of law. Russell v. Clark, 7 Cranch, 69, 3 L. Ed. 271; 
Buzard v. Houston, 119 U. S. 347, 7 S. Ct. 249, 30 L. Ed. 451.
In this case there is no equitable controversy between Columbia 
Casualty Company and Ernst & Ernst, no privity of contract between them, 
and no right of discovery from them. The equitable controversy is wholly 
between Columbia Casualty Company, on the one hand, and Dantzler 
Lumber & Export Company, on the other. To join in Ernst & Ernst for the 
purpose of settling an alleged action at law against them to which Colum­
bia Casualty Company has by operation of law become subrogated is not 
sustained by any authority other than the general rule above cited in the 
preceding paragraph, and, as will be seen, the general rule does not mean 
that third parties not in privity to an equitable right can be brought in 
as an incident to it, and thereby deprived of the right to a trial by jury. 
Hitchcolk v. Mortgage Securities Corp., 95 Fla. 147, 116 So. 244, cited 
in the majority opinion, in so far as it held to the contrary, has been by 
this court expressly overruled in a recent decision of this court. See Norris 
v. Eikenberry, 103 Fla. 104, 137 So. 128, text page 134, column 1.
I therefore concur in part and dissent in part to the extent indicated.
Whitfield, J., concurs.
Brown, Justice (dissenting).
Although the bill may show a right of action on the part of the Dantzler 
Company against Ernst & Ernst, either ex contractu for breach of contract 
or ex delicto for breach of duty arising out of the contract between those 
parties, I cannot see how the doctrine of subrogation can be resorted to 
in support of a right of action, either legal or equitable, on behalf of the 
Columbia Casualty Company against Ernst & Ernst. The contract between 
Ernst 8c Ernst and the Dantzler Company was not made for the benefit 
of the casualty company. Of course, upon payment to the Dantzler Com­
pany of the loss occasioned by the embezzlement of its funds by one of its 
employees, for whose fidelity to his trust the casualty company had exe­
cuted a surety bond to the Dantzler Company to the extent of the amount 
named in the policy, the casualty company became subrogated to the 
extent of such payment to any right of action which the Dantzler Com­
pany may have had against the defaulting employee whose faithfulness 
the casualty company had in effect guaranteed, but this right of subro­
gation did not extend to any cause of action the Dantzler Company may 
have had against the firm of accountants whom they had employed for 
some years to make an annual audit of the company’s books. The Dantzler 
Company was under no obligation to the Columbia Casualty Company to
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employ Ernst & Ernst or any one else to audit their books. They ap­
parently made this contract for annual auditing for their own benefit. 
The Columbia Casualty Company was in no way a party to the contract 
between the Dantzler Company and Ernst & Ernst, nor does it appear that, 
in writing the surety contract with the Dantzler Company, the casualty 
company were relying upon or had any knowledge of the fact that the 
Dantzler Company were employing Ernst & Ernst to make an annual audit 
of their books. See Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 225 N. Y. 170, 
174 N. E. 441, 74 A. L. R. 1139. Nor is there any question of conventional 
subrogation involved in this case.
Cases involving the right of insurance companies to subrogation to the 
rights of the insured party against tort-feasors causing loss to the insured 
subject-matter are not in point here, as in those cases the liability of the 
insurance company is based on the destruction or damage to the subject- 
matter of the contract, and there is a direct relationship between the 
subject-matter of the contract and the tort of the third party. But here 
there is no direct relationship between the contract of suretyship entered 
into between the casualty company and the Dantzler Company and the 
contract for auditing services entered into between Dantzler Company 
and Ernst & Ernst. So far as the casualty company is concerned, its lia­
bility and its loss would have been the same if the Dantzler Company had 
never made a contract with Ernst & Ernst and had never had its books 
audited. There being no privity of contract nor any duty owed by the 
auditors to the casualty company, the latter certainly had no right of di­
rect action against such auditors.
Nor is there any showing of a right to equitable or legal subrogation; 
nor does the writer know of any rule of law under which the casualty 
company could have compelled the Dantzler Company to prosecute an 
action for damages against Ernst & Ernst, and so, if the Dantzler Company 
saw fit to compromise or waive any claim they may have had against the 
auditors, the casualty company had no right to complain.
See, in this general connection, 25 R. C. L. 1831; Marianna National 
Farm Loan Association v. Braswell, 95 Fla. 510, 116, So. 639.
Furthermore, as pointed out by Mr. Chief Justice Davis in his opinion 
herein, the procedure here attempted to be put in motion, even if there 
was a right of subrogation, would deprive Ernst & Ernst of their right to 
a trial by jury.
I think, therefore, the order overruling the motion to dismiss the bill 
should be reversed.
FLAGG v. SENG *
California District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, 1936. 16 Cal. App.
2d 545, 60 P.2d 1004.
Barnard, Presiding Justice. The California Land Buyers Syndicate 
was organized in June, 1926, for the purpose of buying real property in 
San Diego county with the intention of later selling the same at a 
profit. W ith the permission of the state corporation department one R. 
L. Stewart was appointed as the corporation’s agent for the sale of stock 
at a commission of 20 per cent. A large amount of stock was sold, and the
This case is discussed at p. 25 supra.
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corporation acquired some thirty-one separate properties. Stewart opened 
an office for the sale of stock, and the syndicate sublet from him a portion 
of that space, in which it conducted its business under an arrangement 
by which it allowed Stewart a certain sum each month to cover certain 
expenses. The syndicate had its own bookkeepers and other employees, 
some of whom also worked for Stewart. The directors of the corporation 
held regular meetings and kept careful minutes. Any purchase of prop­
erty was made only on the unanimous approval of the directors and after 
the property had been examined and appraised by each director. All 
papers in connection with each transaction were kept together, and the 
directors were familiar with these and with the manner in which the 
books of account were kept.
The defendants, who were accountants, were employed to open up a 
set of books and thereafter from time to time to audit the books and re­
port to the directors. Four such audits were made, the first on September 
8, 1927, and the last on January 21, 1930. In addition, the defendants 
took a trial balance at the end of each three months and reported to the 
directors. These audits and reports all indicated the amount of the sur­
plus at the respective dates as shown by books of the corporation. A num­
ber of sales and exchanges of lands were made, all of which were entered 
on the books in accordance with values fixed by the board of directors. 
When a parcel was traded in on another property at a figure higher than 
its cost, the difference was carried on the books as surplus, with the knowl­
edge and approval of the directors. Dividends at 2 per cent, were paid 
quarterly on the preferred stock from April 19, 1927, to and including 
June 30, 1929. On November 12, 1929, the syndicate closed its office and 
ceased operations. An auditor sent by the state corporation department 
made an examination early in 1930 and found no irregularities in the 
books and records of the corporation.
As stated by the appellant, he ‘‘seeks to recover on behalf of his bank­
rupt the funds withdrawn from its treasury through the frauds of Stewart; 
respondents having participated in these frauds are equally liable with 
Stewart in answering for the loss sustained.”
The complaint alleges that the respondents were employed by the syn­
dicate to audit the corporation’s books and accounts and submit to the 
directors annual reports as to the corporation’s financial condition and 
such other reports as might be requested; that the respondents did audit 
the books of accounts of the corporation and made reports of its financial 
condition as disclosed by those books and accounts from December, 1926, 
until November, 1929; that the respondents well knew that Stewart was 
the manager of said corporation, that he had control of the entire busi­
ness of said corporation, that all books and records were in his ex­
clusive charge, that all financial transactions were handled by him, and 
that all audits and reports were required for the purpose of informing the 
board of directors of the actual condition of the corporation as disclosed 
by its books and accounts; that the respondents well knew that Stewart 
was engaged in a stock-selling campaign and that the continued payment 
of regular quarterly dividends of 2 per cent. was essential to the continu­
ance of this campaign; that the respondents submitted to the directors 
various audits and reports purporting to show that the corporation then 
had a surplus available for the payment of dividends; that these audits 
and reports were false and did not set forth the true condition of the 
corporation as disclosed by its books and accounts; that the respondents
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knew that these audits and reports were false and did not set forth the 
true condition of the corporation; that the board of directors, believing 
said audits and reports to contain a true and correct statement of the 
condition of the corporation as disclosed by its books and records, de­
clared and paid various specified dividends; that at no time since its in­
corporation did the syndicate have any surplus for the payment of divi­
dends; that the respondents knew that the books of the corporation dis­
closed this fact; that the respondents knew that these reports and audits 
were submitted to the directors for the purpose of inducing them to de­
clare and pay dividends so that Stewart might continue his stock sales; 
that the board of directors relied and acted upon the information furn­
ished by the defendants as to the condition of said corporation; and that 
all payments of dividends were illegal and constituted an impairment of 
the capital of the corporation.
The defendants answered, denying all of the plaintiff’s charges, and 
setting up several special defenses. After a trial the court found in all 
respects in favor of the defendants, and this appeal is from the judgment 
which followed.
The appellant states that his right to recover a judgment herein "de­
pends upon whether or not he has, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
established that approximately $68,000.00 of his bankrupt’s assets have 
been unlawfully distributed among the Syndicate’s preferred stock­
holders to its prejudice and the prejudice of its creditors, by the frauds 
and deceptions practiced upon the corporation by its fiscal agent and 
manager, R. L. Stewart, and those associated with him and that re­
spondents, with guilty knowledge, aided and participated in such frauds 
and deceptions by suppressing all information in relation thereto while 
employed by the Syndicate as its auditors and by certifying in their audit 
reports and statements submitted to Syndicate to the truth and reality 
of transaction set up by false and fictitious entries in Syndicate’s books 
and records made to conceal and cover the illegal and wrongful acts and 
conducts of Stewart and his associates.” The case was tried on the issue 
as to whether the defendants knowingly submitted false reports which 
deceived the directors and which caused them to declare dividends which 
could not be legally declared.
The court found, among other things, that it was not true that the 
sole source from which the corporation produced funds for the operation 
of its business was from the sale of shares of its capital stock; that Stew­
art had the exclusive right to sell stock for which he was paid a com­
mission of 20 per cent.; that with that exception it was not true that he 
had control of any of the business affairs of the corporation or that any 
of the records of the corporation were kept or maintained by him; that 
the stenographers and bookkeepers when engaged on the business and 
books of the corporation were the employees of its directors and said 
books, records, and accounts were at all times kept and maintained by 
and under the control of the directors; that the directors hired Stewart 
to see that these accounts and records correctly reflected the transactions 
had or entered into by the company; that said books, records, and accounts 
correctly reflected these transactions; that the directors were familiar with 
these books and knew how the same were being kept and maintained; that 
the respondents from time to time were employed by the directors to 
make, and did make, to them audit reports, trial balances, and state­
ments reflecting the financial condition of the corporation as shown by
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its books and records; that the various audits and reports made by the 
respondents were neither false nor fraudulently prepared, and that each 
of the same correctly set forth the true condition of said Corporation at 
the time the same was made; that it was not true that the corporation did 
not have a surplus at any time but that the corporation did have a surplus 
as shown by its books of account on the dates and in the amounts set 
forth in the various audits and reports; that the directors were familial 
with the books and with the condition of the corporation and in order­
ing the various dividends to be paid did not rely upon the reports and 
audits submitted by the respondents; that it was not true that the re­
spondents or any of them knew that any of the reports or audits was made 
or submitted for the purpose of inducing the directors to declare or to 
pay dividends so that Stewart might proceed with his stock sale, or for the 
purpose of inducing any one to do anything whatsoever for any pur­
pose; that it was not true that any of the dividends paid were illegally 
declared, or that by reason of any such payments the corporation has had 
its capital investment impaired, or that by reason thereof it became, or 
now is, insolvent; that none of the letters, audits, reports, or statements 
prepared by the respondents or submitted to the directors was false or 
fraudulent, and that none thereof was made, prepared or submitted for 
any purpose except in good faith to furnish the directors, in compliance 
with the terms of their employment, with true and correct reports of the 
financial condition of the corporation for the period covered therein as 
shown by the books, accounts, and records of the corporation; and that 
all of said audits and reports were faithfully and diligently made.
The transcript and the briefs are voluminous, and it is a little difficult 
to follow the appellant’s contentions. Disregarding immaterial matters, 
the gist of appellant’s case is that Stewart, rather than the directors, was 
in actual control and direction of the business of the corporation; that 
Stewart sold stock in an illegal manner, claimed a fictitious profit on un­
sold real estate, and deceived the directors by manipulating the books; 
that the respondents assisted Stewart in this deception by suppressing 
information and by falsely reporting the condition of the corporation; 
that this was intentionally and knowingly done; that the directors, rely­
ing on these reports and being deceived thereby, declared dividends which 
were not warranted by the condition of the corporation; that the corpora­
tion was damaged; and that the respondents are liable therefor. The 
court found that Stewart was not in charge of the business of the cor­
poration or of its books; that its transactions and business were conducted 
by the directors; that the directors were familiar with the books and the 
manner in which they were kept and with the facts in connection with 
each of the transactions; that the audits and reports were correctly made; 
and that the directors were not deceived by any of these reports and 
audits. These findings are fully sustained by the evidence, and the ap­
pellant has failed to establish the facts which he admitted throughout 
the trial were essential to his recovery. Most of these findings and other 
material findings are not directly attacked, and the contention seems to 
be that the court should have drawn different conclusions. It is argued, 
however, that some of the findings are not supported by the evidence 
because, while the audits and reports correctly reflected the condition 
of the corporation as shown by its books, the respondents could have 
discovered through further investigation that the books did not show 
the actual situation, that stock was being sold in an illegal manner, and
that profits supposedly accruing from the sales of real property were in 
fact nonexistent.
Several of these contentions relate to the theory of bookkeeping and 
accounting, and involve the question as to whether certain items were 
properly carried on the books as assets. All of the expert witnesses called 
by the respondents testified against the appellant’s contentions in this 
regard, and this testimony was confirmed, at least in part, by the ap­
pellant’s own experts. Conceding that any conflict here appears, the 
court’s findings are sustained by a part, and apparently by a preponder­
ance, of the evidence.
Appellant’s main contention seems to be that stock in the corporation 
was exchanged for real estate in violation of the permit issued by the 
state corporation department, and that, when a parcel of real estate was 
exchanged for other property at a price in excess of its original cost, the 
difference was entered on the books as a profit before the second piece 
was sold. The matter last referred to represents an established policy 
on the part of the directors, the books were thus kept on their order, and 
they were in no way deceived by anything done by the respondents in 
this connection. W ith respect to the other matter it appears that stock 
was, in effect, exchanged for real property. This was done by putting 
through escrows whereby the corporation's check was given in payment 
for the land and the other party’s check was given in payment for the 
stock. While there is some evidence that certain papers in the files of the 
corporation indicated the true situation, although the same was not in­
dicated by the books of the corporation, there is other evidence to the 
effect that this could not be learned from an examination of the books 
and records of the corporation, that it was unknown to the respondents 
except in one instance, and that in that case the respondents took the 
matter up with the attorney for the corporation who assured them that 
the matter was perfectly legal. It further appears that whatever illegality 
existed and whatever harm arose therefrom was caused directly by the 
action of the board of directors, and that all such exchanges were made 
with their full knowledge and consent and in accordance with their fixed 
policy, and no inference could be drawn that anything done by the 
respondents had anv casual relation to any part of this situation.
Not only are the findings sustained by the evidence, but we are unable 
to see how the matters particularly relied upon by the appellant can 
justify or compel any other conclusions than those drawn by the court. 
Conceding that certain sales of stock were illegally made, this was not 
only well known to the directors, but was intentionally done by them. 
They were not only not deceived by the audits and reports, but they had 
intentionally handled the transactions in such a manner as to make 
them appear on the books as a cash transaction. While the court found 
upon sufficient evidence that the respondents had no knowledge of those 
parts of those transactions which had been thus covered up, and conced­
ing, for the sake of argument, that the respondents might have found out 
the true situation by a more extensive investigation, it in no way appears 
that any discovery they might have made would have affected the result. 
The method pursued by the directors was followed on the advice of their 
attorneys, and, although the same has since been declared illegal, no such 
blame can be attached to the respondents, under the circumstances here 
appearing, as would justify a reversal of the judgment.
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Some contention is made that the trial court committed prejudicial 
error in limiting the appellant’s cross-examination of a certain witness. 
The cross-examination of this witness takes up more than a thousand 
pages of the transcript, and it abundantly appears therefrom that the 
court did not abuse its discretion in this regard.
The judgment is affirmed.
FIDELITY & DEPOSIT CO. OF MARYLAND 
v. ATHERTON *
Supreme Court of New Mexico. 47 N. M. 443, 144 P.2d 157.
Brice, Justice. The questions are: (1) Whether the appellant (plain­
tiff below), who as surety upon the official bond of the treasurer of Berna­
lillo County, paid the shortage of a defaulting deputy county treasurer, 
is subrogated to the county’s rights and remedies (if any) against the 
appellees Horton & Bixler (hereafter referred to as appellees), whose 
negligence as public accountants (it is charged) was the proximate 
cause of the loss: and (2) should appellees be required to pay appellant, 
whose loss has been partially paid and the balance well secured, by the 
county treasurer who is the principal debtor?
The appellees demurred to appellant’s complaint, asserting that it 
did not state a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled and there­
after appellee answered. This action of the court is assigned as error, 
but we are of the opinion that the trial court did not err in overruling 
the demurrer. Our reasons therefor will sufficiently appear from a deter­
mination of the merits of the case.
The facts as found by the trial court, material to a decision, are as 
follows:
The appellees, a co-partnership, are certified public accountants. 
They entered into a written contract with Bernalillo County, wherein 
they agreed for considerations named, to conduct a continuous audit of 
the books and records of account of Bernalillo Countv and to act as con­
sulting accountants for the period from July 1, 1936, to and including 
June 30, 1937; to furnish to the appellee Board of County Commissioners 
(hereafter called the Board), upon demand, a certified statement of cash 
receipts and disbursements of the county treasurer from July 1, 1936 to 
and including June 30, 1937; to prepare typewritten reports of a final 
audit for the period ending June 30, 1937; to meet with the Board at least 
once a month and furnish it the balances to the credit of the various 
funds over which the Board had control and against which it could draw 
warrants; to place accountants on the assignment who were skilled and 
experienced in municipal accounting; to make audits in conformity with 
existing laws, and render reports as required by the Board, and—“Party 
of the Second Part agrees to furnish evidence to the Board of County 
Commissioners and to file evidence with the County Clerk, indicating 
that the County will be protected for the faithful performance of the 
terms of this agreement, and also protected against defalcations or other 
misdeeds of employees of Party of the Second Part, such evidence being a 
blanket accountant’s Liability Policy of $60,000.00—34682-K American
* This case is discussed at p. 27 supra.
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Surety Company of New York, protecting all clients of Party of the 
Second Part. This above Policy expires June 1, 1937.”
This contract was extended by agreement of the parties to June 30, 
1938. During the existence of this contract David J. Armijo was the 
county treasurer of Bernalillo County and the appellant surety on his 
official bond, payable to the State of New Mexico and conditioned that 
he would well and faithfully perform his duties as county treasurer; that 
he would render true accounts of his office and pay over all monies that 
might come into his hands by virtue of his office to the persons authorized 
to receive the same by law, and carefully keep and preserve all books and 
papers and other property pertaining to his office and deliver them to 
his successor.
Virgil G. Webster was deputy county treasurer, and he as principal, 
and the appellant as his surety, executed a bond for $10,000 payable to 
the State of New Mexico, conditioned substantially as that of the treasur­
er’s bond. This bond was not required by law, and was executed for the 
protection of the county treasurer as against his deputy.
From the period of July 1, 1937, to January 22, 1938, deputy county 
treasurer Webster embezzled from the treasurer’s office funds aggrega­
ting $21,611.57. The appellant paid to county treasurer Armijo $10,000 
as surety on his deputy’s bond, which sum of money was delivered back 
to it, and appellant thereupon paid to the county of Bernalillo the total 
amount of the defalcation.
After endorsing to appellant the $10,000 check received from it, treas­
urer Armijo executed and delivered to appellant his promissory note in 
the principal sum of $11,611.57 (the balance due the County by treas­
urer Armijo) secured by a mortgage on certain real estate, the value of 
which is ample security for the payment of the note, and much in excess 
of the principal sum thereof. Thereafter treasurer Armijo paid to appel­
lant on that note sums aggregating $3,393.43. No effort has been made 
by appellant to enforce collection of this indebtedness, although long 
past due.
The duties of the treasurer of Bernalillo County required him to and 
he did collect monies for payment of taxes upon real and personal prop­
erty in said county as well as to collect and receive other monies due said 
county.
In the collection of tax monies by the county treasurer of Bernalillo 
County, at all times material, the method and procedure used was as 
follow: Upon receipt of the tax rolls from the county assessor, the county 
treasurer prepared a form of tax receipt in triplicate, in white, blue and 
pink, for each taxpayer shown on the tax rolls. These receipts were num­
bered consecutively and bound in books each containing one hundred 
receipts, not dated or signed by the treasurer at the time of their prepara­
tion. The blue and pink sheets were carbon impressions of the white 
sheet made at the same time as the white sheet was typed. The white and 
blue receipts were perforated, permitting them to be torn out of the tax 
receipt book. When taxes were paid the receipts were signed in triplicate 
by the treasurer or his employee and the date of payment was inserted. 
The white receipt was then delivered to the taxpayer, the blue receipt 
was removed from the receipt book and retained by the treasurer. The 
pink receipt was not perforated for tearing out of the bound book, and 
it remained in the receipt book after the taxes were paid. It was a per­
manent record of the cash received.
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Appellees each month sent their employee to the County Treasurer’s 
office to audit the books and records of account of the treasurer, and to 
prepare data for quarterly and annual audit reports, required to be made 
under the auditing contract. They compared the blue receipts and the 
adding machine tapes which then remained in the treasurer’s office with 
the entries in the tax cash record and the tax cash journal; totaled the 
amounts in the tax cash record and the tax cash journal and checked 
the distributions to the various funds in the tax cash journal.
The pink receipts were permanently bound records of the treasurer’s 
office containing a record of the actual cash received by the treasurer 
from taxes.
The tax cash record book and the tax cash journal kept during 1937 
did not contain any details showing the name of the taxpayer who paid 
taxes, the number of the receipt issued to the taxpayer, or the amount 
of money for which each receipt was issued, but only the total sum re­
ceived daily as shown by the entries purporting to have been made by 
the bookkeeper from the blue receipts which ostensibly remained avail­
able in the treasurer’s office. The books did not contain entries showing 
any money received upon blue receipts which had been lost or destroyed.
Appellees did not test check any of the pink receipts by comparing 
them with the available blue receipts or the tax cash record or the tax 
cash journal, or the tax roll at any time prior to January 1, 1938, to de­
termine whether or not all cash received by the country treasurer for 
which tax receipts were issued and for which pink receipts remained had 
been accounted for in the tax cash record and the tax cash journal, and 
did not at any time during 1937 check the pink receipts in the bound vol­
ume against the blue receipts available in the treasurer’s office or against 
the tax rolls, or against the tax cash record or against the tax cash journal.
Between January 1, 1937, and January 22, 1938, during which time the 
audit contract was in force, deputy treasurer Webster embezzled from 
monies collected for taxes $21,176.20, and $435.28 from other monies re­
ceived in the treasurer’s office. To cover this defalcation Webster des­
troyed the blue receipts equal in amount to the funds embezzled, and 
made new adding machine tapes to correspond with the amount received 
less the amount embezzled. As the amounts evidenced by the blue re­
ceipts destroyed were not entered in the cash record or the tax cash 
journal, the amounts of the retained receipts corresponded with those 
evidenced by these records and the adding machine tape.
Appellees did not check the pink receipts nor begin the special in­
vestigation agreed upon, in September, 1937, at any time during 1937, 
but commenced work thereunder on January 1, 1938, to ascertain if 
there was any shortage in the treasurer’s office.
The trial court concluded that appellees were not negligent in the 
performance of their contract with the County of Bernalillo; and they 
“did not cause, or contribute to the cause of, any loss sustained by the 
plaintiff.”
The appellees assert that the complaint does not state a cause of action; 
that as the State of New Mexico is the obligee named in the bond, it is an 
indispensable party to the action; that as there was no privity of contract 
between appellees and appellant it could not be subrogated to the rights 
and remedies (if any) of the county of Bernalillo; that mere actionable 
negligence resulting from the breach of a contract creates no right to 
subrogation in favor of one who is neither a party nor a privy to the
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contract. These questions for the purpose of this suit only will be re­
solved in favor of the appellant. The writer is of the opinion that these 
assumptions are legally correct, but this is not necessarily the view of any 
other members of the court, and the questions are not decided.
Subrogation is not necessarily founded upon contract. Crippen v. 
Chappel, 35 Kan. 495, 11 P. 453 Am. Rep. 187; Fourth Nat. Bank v. 
Board of Com’rs of Craig County, 186 Okl. 102, 95 P.2d 878. It is an 
equitable remedy of civil law origin whereby through a supposed suc­
cession to the legal rights of another, a loss is put ultimately on that one 
who in equity and good conscience should pay. American Surety Co. 
of New York v. Robinson, 5 Cir., 53 F.2d 22, 23; Northern Trust Co. v. 
Consolidated Elevator Co., 142 Minn. 132, 171 N.W. 265, 4 A.L.R. 510. 
It is a remedy for the benefit of one secondarily liable, who has paid the 
debt of another and to whom in equity and good conscience should be 
assigned the rights and remedies of the original creditor, Andrew v. 
Bevington Sav. Bank, 206 Iowa 869, 221 N.W. 668.
Treasurer Armijo was primarily liable to the county for his deputy’s 
defalcation. He paid $10,000 which was paid to him by appellant as 
surety on his unfaithful deputy’s official bond. True, the appellant’s 
check to Armijo was endorsed by him, returned to appellant and de­
livered to the county; but it was Armijo’s money and he, not appellant, 
paid the county the $10,000. The balance of $11,611.57 was paid to the 
county by appellant, of which amount Armijo has repaid $3,393.43, and 
appellant has accepted Armijo’s note secured by a mortgage on property 
the value of which is much in excess of the debt, which, though long 
past due, appellant has made no effort to collect.
If, in equity and good conscience, the appellees, under any circum­
stances, should pay this debt (a question we do not decide), they should 
not be required to do so under the facts stated. The appellant has refused 
to enforce collection of the amount due it from the treasurer Armijo, 
who is primarily liable therefor, and the collection of which could be en­
forced if not paid upon demand.
We do not hold that a surety who has paid his principal’s obligation 
is not ordinarily entitled to be subrogated to all rights and remedies of 
the insured, including those based upon ordinary negligence; we do not 
decide the question; but see United States F. & G. Co. v. Citizens’ Nat. 
Bank, D.C., N.M., 13 F.2d 213; Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v. Co­
lumbia Casualty Co., 115 Fla. 541, 156 So. 116, 95 A. L. R. 258; Maryland 
Casualty Co. v. Cook, D. C., Mich., 35 F.Supp. 160; Fourth Nat. Bank 
v. Board of Com’rs, 186 Okl. 102, 95 P.2d 878; Martin v. Federal Surety 
Co., 8 Cir., 58 F.2d 79. We do hold that where, as in this case, the surety 
has been paid approximately two-thirds of its outlay by the principal 
debtor, and has accepted for the balance its principal’s note, so well se­
cured that there can be no question of ultimate payment, which it re­
fuses to enforce, it would be inequitable to require a third person to pay it.
No general rule can be laid down which will afford a test in every 
case in which subrogation is sought. The underlying principle is that 
the right flows from principles of justice and equity. Every case depends 
upon its particular facts, and we can see no reason in equity or justice to 
require a third person to pay this particular debt with such a back­
ground of facts. Richardson v. American Surety Co., 97 Okl. 264, 223 P. 
389; American Surety Co. v. Citizens’ Nat. Bank of Roswell, D.C., N.M., 
294 F. 609.
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The appellees owed to the board of county commissioners a legal duty 
to make their reports without fraud, and a contractual duty to make 
them, under the terms of their contract, with the care and caution re­
quired of experts. They likewise owed a duty to third persons, if any, to 
whom they knew, or reasonably should have known, their employer 
intended to exhibit their reports, and upon which they might act to their 
injury, to make such reports without fraud. But there is no finding that 
appellees made a fraudulent report, or of a reliance upon appellees’ re­
port by either the appellant or Armijo, nor, of course, that they, or 
either of them, was injured by such reliance, so as to bring the case with­
in the doctrine of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 
441, 74 A.L.R. 1139.
We are entirely satisfied that appellant could have collected from 
Armijo the balance due it, without the necessity of a suit, and certainly 
with much less trouble and expense than it has incurred in this proceed­
ing against appellees. Its negligence in failing or refusing to collect from 
Armijo does not appeal to this court as a reason for requiring third per­
sons to pay the debt.
It should be stated in behalf of the appellees that the trial court found 
that they performed their contract; that they were not negligent, and that 
no act or default of theirs caused or contributed to the loss of the county’s 
funds.
The decree of the district court should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.
DEFALCATION IN RELATION TO AUDIT, 
INTERNAL CONTROL AND FIDELITY BONDS *
By John L. Carey, Executive Director of the American Institute of Accountants
Losses running into millions of dollars are suffered each year by Amer­
ican business through defalcation by employees, of which only a small 
percentage are covered by fidelity bonds. Every businessman naturally 
trusts his own employees or he would not continue to employ them. He 
often enjoys an unwarranted sense of security, which is shattered when a 
theft occurs. Then he locks the stable door after the horse has been stolen 
by taking precautionary measures that should have been taken long before.
Studies have shown that most defaulters are not habitual criminals, 
or even fundamentally dishonest. They often begin by “borrowing” com­
pany money to meet financial emergencies. Then if they find it easy to 
continue without discovery, they cannot resist the temptation.
Employers are sometimes to blame for permitting strong temptation 
to dishonesty to confront their employees.
There are three major preventives of losses through defalcation. They 
are internal control, audits, and fidelity bonds. A book could be written 
about each of them. The purpose of this discussion is only to emphasize 
the fact that the most economical and effective defense against defalca­
tions requires an integration of the three major preventives.
Internal Control: The best defense against defalcation is an adequate
* Published in  83 J ournal of Accountancy 353 (1947) and 15 T he Controller 
127 (1947).
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system of internal control, which basically is simply a division of duties 
among employees in such a manner that no one person alone should be 
able to defraud the company without early detection. Independent audi­
tors review their clients’ systems of internal control in the course of their 
audits, and they often make recommendations to a client as to how his 
system could be strengthened. These recommendations are often placed 
in the file for future reference and then forgotten. The busy executive 
has many other things to do. But it would be good business in every in­
stance to carry out the recommendations of the accountants for strength­
ening the system. It is the cheapest and most effective way of minimizing 
losses.
Audits: Audits by independent public accountants are sometimes as­
sumed to be a satisfactory defense against defalcations. This is not a 
wholly valid assumption. Today the primary purpose of most audits 
of business of any size is to provide an expert, independent opinion on the 
financial position and results of operations of the company concerned. 
The usual audit is based on testing and sampling procedures which may 
incidentally, but will not necessarily, disclose defalcations. Unless there 
has been collusion between several of the principal executives, an inde­
pendent audit should disclose theft of amounts having a material effect 
on the reported financial position or earnings. The accounting profes­
sion has stated publicly again and again that the customary type of audit 
(financial examination) cannot be expected to catch minor irregularities, 
and that the auditor cannot take responsibility for detecting them, al­
though the deterrent effect of audits may minimize frauds.
It is possible to make detailed audits that would give reasonable as­
surance of the detection of even minor irregularities (though it would 
not necessarily prevent them, unless such audits were made at frequent 
intervals throughout the year), but such detailed audits would be so ex­
pensive that the game would not be worth the candle. The cost of such 
detailed auditing in companies of any size might be greater than probable 
losses through defalcation.
Fidelity Bonds: Even a good system of internal control, however, does 
not always prevent collusive fraud. If two or more employees conspire 
to defraud the employer they may be successful for some time without dis­
covery. Again, many companies are too small to be able to afford an 
internal accounting staff of a size which would permit the installation 
of a satisfactory system of internal control. Accountants generally recom­
mend, as a matter of broad policy, that fidelity bonds be taken out on all 
employees who have positions of any importance from the viewpoint of 
fraud prevention. At the present time most accountants believe that 
fidelity bond coverage in many companies is inadequate in relation to 
risks involved, and recommend extension of such coverage. Adequate 
coverage not only assures recovery of losses from discovered defalcations, 
but it has a preventive effect, in that the underwriters usually investigate 
the past records of bonded employees, and employees may sometimes be 
deterred from theft by the thought that they might be prosecuted by the 
surety company, no matter how merciful their boss might be.
One complication has occurred in recent years that the accounting pro­
fession has been attempting, with some success, to resolve. Some surety 
companies, under their rights of subrogation, have asserted claims against 
independent public accountants on the ground that all or a part of the 
loss insured by the company under a fidelity bond would not have oc­
174 ACCOUNTANTS’ LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
curred if the independent public accountant had not failed to make early 
discovery of the defalcation.
Auditor’s Responsibility
If an independent public accountant should be guilty of an affirmatively 
dishonest act or wilful failure to follow accepted audit procedures, he 
should be held responsible. This, however, is quite a different thing from 
holding him financially responsible for not discovering defalcations which 
generally accepted auditing procedures are not expected to disclose.
Unless an independent auditor has reasonable confidence that he will 
not be held responsible by the surety company concerned for failure to 
detect defalcations (except in case of gross negligence or dishonesty) he 
may feel it necessary to protect himself by extending the scope of detailed 
auditing. This would substantially increase the audit fee. The client 
might decide that he was paying twice for the same protection. He might 
dispense with the audit, or drop fidelity coverage, or transfer the bond 
to a surety company which will provide the auditor with the reasonable 
assurance that will permit him to confine his work to the scope necessary 
for certification of the financial statements.
Surety companies generally have recognized the position of the account­
ing profession. In December, 1945, twenty-three of the companies issuing 
fidelity bonds signed a form of letter to the American Institute of Account­
ants under which they have agreed that they will not assert claims against 
accountants in any cases not involving affirmatively dishonest or criminal 
acts or gross negligence on the part of accountants, and that claims shall 
in no case be asserted except after a hearing of the matter by an impartial 
committee of three persons who are not accountants. If this committee 
concludes that such a case does not involve affirmatively dishonest or 
criminal acts or gross negligence, then the companies have agreed that they 
will not assert claims against the accountants. If the committee reaches a 
contrary conclusion, then the surety company quite properly may assert 
its claim. In the past year, eleven additional surety companies have signed 
similar letters, bringing the total number to thirty-four.
It is hoped that other surety companies will participate in this general 
agreement which, it is believed, will help greatly to avoid unnecessary 
increase in the cost of audits, to encourage adequate fidelity bond coverage, 
and to bring about better integration of audit, internal control, and 
fidelity bonds as a defense against defalcation.
SECTION 3
LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES 
AT COMMON LAW
LANDELL v. LYBRAND *
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1919. 264 Pa. 406, 107 Atl. 783.
Per Curiam. Appellees, defendants below, are certified public account 
ants, and, as such, audited the books and accounts of the Employers’ In­
demnity Company for the year 1911. The appellant, plaintiff below, 
averred in his statement of claim that he had been induced to buy 11 
shares of the capital stock of that company, at the price of $200 per share, 
on the strength of the report made by the appellees as to its assets and 
liabilities at the close of the year 1911; the report having been shown to 
him by some one who suggested that he purchase the stock. A further 
averment was that the report was false and untrue, that the stock pur­
chased by him on the strength of it is valueless, and for the loss he sus­
tained he averred the defendants were liable. To enforce this liability an 
action in trespass was brought against them. In their affidavit of defense 
they averred that the statement of claim disclose no cause of action, and 
asked that this be disposed of by the court below as a matter of law, under 
the provisions of section 20 of the Practice Act of May 14, 1915 (P. L. 
483). It was so disposed of by the court below in entering judgment for 
the defendants.
There were no contractual relations between the plaintiff and de­
fendants, and, if there is any liability from them to him, it must arise out 
of some breach of duty, for there is no averment that they made the re­
port with intent to deceive him. The averment in the statement of claim 
is that the defendants were careless and negligent in making their report; 
but the plaintiff was a stranger to them and to it, and, as no duty rested 
upon them to him, they cannot be guilty of any negligence of which he 
can complain. Schiffer v. Sauer Co. et al., 238 Pa. 550, 86 Atl. 479. This 
was the correct view of the court below, and the judgment is accordingly 
affirmed.
ULTRAMARES CORP. v. TOUCHE **
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department, 1930. 
229 App. Div. 681, 243 N. Y. Supp. 179, rev’d, 255 N. Y.
170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931).
McAvoy, J. The defendants, public accountants, have been held liable 
to the plaintiff, to whom they owed no contractual duty through any con­
* This case is discussed at p. 29 supra.
** This case is discussed at p. 30 ff. supra.
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tract of employment which the plaintiff intrusted to them. Whether a 
duty arises here, in the absence of direct contractual relation, out of the 
situation shown by the evidence, is the problem for solution.
The general principle involved, and upon which plaintiff relies for 
imposition of liability, is that if one undertakes to discharge any duty by 
which the conduct of others may be governed, he is bound to perform it 
in such a manner that those who are thus led to action in the faith that 
such duty will be properly performed shall not suffer loss through im­
proper performance of the duty or neglect in its execution. Thus in 
Glanzer v. Shepard (233 N. Y. 236) we have the buyers of merchandise 
given recovery against public weighers who were to make return of the 
weight and to furnish buyers with a copy. The public weighers certified 
the weight and the buyers paid the sellers on that basis. Discovery that 
the weight had been incorrectly certified as a result of defendants’ negli­
gence was found to give the plaintiffs the right to the resulting damage.
I t  was decided there that the use of the certificates was not an indirect 
or collateral consequence of the action of the weighers; and “it was a 
consequence which, to the weighers’ knowledge, was the end and aim 
of the transaction.” The sellers ordered, but the buyers were to use the 
certificates. Public weighers hold themselves out to the public as “skilled 
and careful in their calling.” (Glanzer v. Shepard, supra, 238.)
The duty there was held not be found in terms of contract, nor of 
privity; although arising from contract, its origin is not exclusive from 
that realm. If the contract and the relation are found, the duty follows 
by rule of law. Diligence—it was pointed out—was owing not only to 
the person who ordered the employment, but also to those who relied 
thereon.
Plaintiff here is in the business of factoring. The defendants were en­
gaged by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to audit its books and accounts and certify 
a balance sheet as of the end of the year 1923. They prepared a balance 
sheet and attached it to a certificate signed by them, which they dated 
February 26, 1924. This balance sheet stated that Fred Stern & Co., Inc., 
had a net worth amounting to $1,070, 715.26, when the fact (as thereafter 
found) was that at the very time of this certification the firm was in­
solvent, with impairment of thousands of dollars in its assets and credit 
and much enhancement of its reported liabilities.
The finding of the jury would justify a conclusion that defendants were 
guilty of a gross degree of negligence in their audit, and it is even urged 
that the evidence also warranted the finding that the balance sheet was 
made up in fraud of the rights and obligations which accountants, en­
gaged in public calling, would owe to those to whom they had reason to 
believe such balance sheets would be exhibited for purposes of obtaining 
loans, extending credit, or to induce the sale of merchandise.
The evidence showed that these accountants knew for four years that 
their client (Fred Stern & Co., Inc.) was a borrower from banks in large 
sums; that these banks required certified balance sheets as a basis for mak­
ing loans; and that Fred Stern & Co., Inc., would require these certified 
balance sheets for continuing existing loans and securing new loans. So 
that this might be done, some thirty-two original counterparts of the certi­
fied balance sheet were requested by the client, Fred Stern & Co., Inc., 
and furnished by the accountants (defendants).
The jury’s verdict thus imports that defendants knew that the certified 
balance sheets would be used by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the purpose
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of procuring loans, and that the very purpose of employment in the trans­
action between Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and Touche, Niven & Co., the 
accountants, was to allow Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to bring it about through 
these balance sheets, the result that loans on the faith thereof would be 
made by persons who would be governed by its declarations. Financial 
statements in the course of trade have come to be used customarily for 
the purpose of securing credit, and accountants indicate in their public 
advertisements that makers of loans should require the safeguard of an 
independent audit prepared by public accountants, so a corelative obliga­
tion is placed upon them. It is their duty—if they do not wish their audit 
to be so used—to qualify the statement of their balance sheet and the 
certificate which accompanies it in such a way as to prevent its use. One 
cannot issue an unqualified statement which will be so used, and then 
disclaim responsibility for his work.
Banks and merchants, to the knowledge of these defendants, require 
certified balance sheets from independent accountants, and upon these 
audits they make their loans. Thus, the duty arises to these banks and 
merchants of an exercise of reasonable care in the making and uttering 
of certified balance sheets.
The facts here are brought within the rule in the case of International 
Products Co. v. Erie R. R . Co. (244 N. Y. 331) that “there must be knowl­
edge, or its equivalent, that the information is desired for a serious pur­
pose; that he to whom it is given intends to rely and act upon it; that if 
false or erroneous he will, because of it, be injured in person or property. 
* * * The relationship of the parties, arising out of contract or other­
wise, must be such that in morals and good conscience the one has the 
right to rely upon the other for information, and the other giving the 
information owes a duty to give it with care.”
The certificate which these accountants attached to the balance sheet 
reads:
“T ouche, N iven & Co.,
“Public Accountants,
“Eighty Maiden Lane,
“New York
February 26, 1924.
“Certificate of Auditors.
“We have examined the accounts of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the 
year ended December 31, 1923, and hereby certify that the annexed 
balance sheet is in accordance therewith and with the information and 
explanations given us. We further certify that, subject to provision for 
Federal taxes on income, the said statement in our opinion, presents a 
true and correct view of the financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., 
as at December 31, 1923.
“T ouche, N iven & Co., 
“Public Accountants.”
From the certificate and the findings made by the jury which are en­
titled to be held conclusive in behalf of the plaintiff there is established: 
That the defendants knew that the result of the audit would be used by 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to represent its financial condition to persons from 
whom Fred Stern & Co., Inc., might seek to borrow money, and that the
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balance sheet would be relied upon by such persons as indicating the true 
financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc.; that defendants, in exercising 
their public calling as auditors, did not exercise that care and skill re­
quired of them, but acted in a negligent and careless manner, as a con­
sequence of which the balance sheet made by them was incorrect, and 
that such negligence was the proximate cause of the loss sustained by 
plaintiff, i. e., that there was a causal relation between the neglect and 
the loss sustained which could reasonably have been anticipated, and 
that the presentation of the balance sheets, as certified by defendants, 
was the inducing cause for making these loans to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., 
which plaintiff made, and that the loss was not caused by reason of any 
change in the financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., from the time 
of the presentation of the audit to the plaintiff, or because of any reliance 
of plaintiff on other intervening causes; and that plaintiff’s conduct was 
free from contributory negligence, and we, therefore, conclude that a 
liability was properly found, arising out of a duty owed by the defendants 
to plaintiff not to misrepresent, willfully or negligently, the financial con­
dition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and that the judgment for the plaintiff 
was correct and should not have been set aside.
T hat the particular person who was to be influenced by defendants’ 
act was unknown to the defendants is not material to a right to recovery, 
for it is not necessary that there should be an intent to defraud any par­
ticular person. In this case there was no mere casual representation made 
as a matter of courtesy; there was a certificate intended to sway conduct. 
There was “the careless performance of a service * * * which happens 
to have found in the words of a certificate its culmination and its sum­
mary.’’ (Glanzer v. Shepard, supra, 241.) Here is an act performed care­
lessly, intended to influence the actions of third parties, and one that 
reasonably might be expected, when carelessly performed, to cause sub­
stantial loss.
A duty exists towards those whom the accountants know will act on 
the faith of their certificates. The loss occurring here was the very result 
which reasonably was to be anticipated if the balance sheet was carelessly 
prepared.
While negligence was established and was the proximate cause of the 
loss, and, as we have seen, the duty arose out of this situation which, while 
not contractual, was, nevertheless, a ground of liability, yet we do not 
think that there was sufficient proof upon which to found a liability in 
fraud. We think that there was no error at the close of the entire case, 
in the court’s decision to dismiss the second cause of action based upon 
that ground. Misjudgment, however gross, or want of caution, however 
marked, is not fraud. The mere breach of duty, or the omission to use 
due care is not fraud. Intentional fraud, as distinguished from a mere 
breach of duty or the omission to use due care, is an essential factor in an 
action for deceit. (Kountze v. Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124.)
We think that there was a proper conclusion with respect to damages. 
The amount of cash loans made to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., with interest 
thereon, credited with all moneys repaid or collected by plaintiff, whether 
through voluntary action or suit, without deduction of costs of collection, 
was the approximate damage, and while other proof of damage was ex­
cluded by the trial court, no appeal has been taken by plaintiff which 
raises a construction of that rule.
The judgment and order appealed from should, therefore, be modified
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by reversing so much thereof as sets aside the verdict and dismisses the 
amended complaint as to the first cause of action, and by directing that 
the verdict be reinstated and judgment entered thereon, with costs to the 
plaintiff, and as so modified affirmed without costs.
Dowling, P. J., and O’Malley, J., concur; Finch and Martin, JJ., 
dissent.
Finch, J. (dissenting). Assuming that the defendants may be held 
liable for the negligence of their employees where they undertake a duty 
to a definite plaintiff (Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236), or to a definite 
class (Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat. Bank, 253 N. Y. 369), yet, for the 
following reasons the defendants are not liable to this plaintiff: First, 
because they undertook to make only a “balance sheet audit” at the re­
quest of their client; second, because in their certificate the defendants 
purported only to furnish their opinion based upon an examination in 
connection with “ the information and explanations given us.” But even 
more important, the defendants furnished such a report and certificate 
without reference to any particular person or class of persons.
The plaintiff seeks to liken the facts in the case at bar to a case where 
the defendants were to make an audit which to their knowledge was for a 
definite plaintiff, to induce such plaintiff to make loans thereon. (Glanzer 
v. Shepard, supra.) This record does not sustain such a contention. The 
courts have not gone to the length of holding that defendants in a case 
like the case at bar can be held liable in negligence to the whole world, or, 
as has been aptly said, liable for “negligence in the air.”
In other words, not only the purpose for which the statement is to be 
used, but the person or class of persons who is to rely thereon, must be 
definite to the knowledge of the defendants. The plaintiff relies upon the 
stipulation in the record that the defendants “knew generally that these 
reports would be used as financial statements to banks or to creditors or to 
stockholders or to purchasers or sellers.” In accordance with the author­
ities, this general knowledge is not sufficient.
As Judge Andrews said in International Products Co. v. Erie R. R. Co. 
(244 N. Y. 331), speaking of the information given, “that he to whom it is 
given intends to rely and act upon it; that if false or erroneous he will 
because of it be injured in person or property.” In Courteen Seed Co. v. 
Hong Kong & S. B. Corp. (245 N. Y. 377) Judge Pound writes: “It [the 
defendant] did not deal with appellant, had no relations with it and was 
under no duty of care to it.” (See, also, Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 
195.)
The professional man, be he accountant or otherwise, certifies for his 
client and not for all the world. If the client makes it clear to such a man 
that the statement is to be used in a particular transaction in which a 
third party is involved, such circumstance should create a duty from the 
professional man to such third party. If the accountant is to be held to 
an unlimited liability to all persons who may act on the faith of the 
certificate, the accountant would be obliged to protect himself by a verifi­
fication so rigid that its cost might well be prohibitive and a limited but 
useful field of service thus closed to him. The smallness of the compen­
sation paid to the defendants for the services requested is in striking con­
trast to the enormity of the liability now sought to be imposed upon them. 
If in the case at bar the plaintiff had inquired of the accountants whether 
they might rely upon the certificate in making a loan, then the accountants
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would have had the opportunity to gauge their responsibility and risk, 
and determine with knowledge how thorough their verification of the 
account should be before assuming the responsibility of making the cer­
tificate run to the plaintiff.
It also appears in the case at bar that the loss of the plaintiff resulted 
because of its own contributory negligence in failing to check the col­
lateral. (Craig n. Anyon, 212 App. Div. 55: aff’d., 242 N. Y. 569.)
In so far as the claim of actual fraud is concerned, there is no proof in 
this record sufficient to support such a finding by a jury. The court, there­
fore, properly dismissed this cause of action. (Civ. Prac. Act, § 457-a.) This 
is so, even assuming that personal connivance and fraud on the part of the 
employees of defendants could be held within the scope of the authority 
given to these employees by the defendants, which at least is doubtful. 
(Henry v. Allen, 151 N. Y. 1; Credit Alliance Corp. v. Sheridan Theatre 
Co., 241 id. 216; Martin v. Gotham Nat. Bank, 248 id. 313.)
It follows that the judgment and order should be affirmed.
Martin, J., concurs.
Judgment and order modified by reversing so much thereof as sets aside 
the verdict and dismisses the amended complaint as to the first cause of 
action, and by directing that the verdict be reinstated and judgment 
entered thereon, with costs to the plaintiff, and as so modified affirmed, 
without costs.
ULTRAMARES CORP. v. TOUCHE *
Court of Appeals of New York, 1931. 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441.
[Cross-appeals from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Su­
preme Court in the first judicial department, entered June 18, 1930, which 
modified and affirmed as modified a judgment in favor of defendants, 
entered upon an order of the court at a T rial Term setting aside a ver­
dict in favor of plaintiff and dismissing the complaint. The defendants 
appeal from so much of the judgment as reversed the judgment dismissing 
the complaint as to the first cause of action and directed reinstatement of 
the verdict; and the plaintiff appeals from so much of said judgment as 
affirmed the judgment of the Trial Term dismissing the complaint as to 
the second cause of action.]
Cardozo, Ch. J. The action is in tort for damages suffered through 
the misrepresentations of accountants, the first cause of action being 
for misrepresentations that were merely negligent and the second for 
misrepresentations charged to have been fraudulent.
In January, 1924, the defendants, a firm of public accountants, were 
employed by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to prepare and certify a balance 
sheet exhibiting the condition of its business as of December 31, 1923. 
They had been employed at the end of each of the three years preced­
ing to render a like service. Fred Stern 8c Co., Inc., which was in sub­
stance Stern himself, was engaged in the importation and sale of rubber. 
T o  finance its operations, it required extensive credit and borrowed 
large sums of money from banks and other lenders. All this was known
* This decision reverses the Appellate Division decision reprinted at p. 175 supra. 
It is discussed at p. 30 ff. supra.
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to the defendants. The defendants knew also that in the usual course of 
business the balance sheet when certified would be exhibited by the Stern 
company to banks, creditors, stockholders, purchasers or sellers, accord­
ing to the needs of the occasion, as the basis of financial dealings. Ac­
cordingly, when the balance sheet was made up, the defendants supplied 
the Stern company with thirty-two copies certified with serial numbers 
as counterpart originals. Nothing was said as to the persons to whom 
these counterparts would be shown or the extent or number of the trans­
actions in which they would be used. In particular there was no mention 
of the plaintiff, a corporation doing business chiefly as a factor, which 
till then had never made advances to the Stern company, though it had 
sold merchandise in small amounts. The range of the transactions in 
which a certificate of audit might be expected to play a part was as in­
definite and wide as the possibilities of the business that was mirrored in 
the summary.
By February 26, 1924, the audit was finished and the balance sheet 
made up. It stated assets in the sum of $2,550,671.88 and liabilities other 
than capital and surplus in the sum of $1,479,956.62, thus showing a net 
worth of $1,070,715.26. Attached to the balance sheet was a certificate 
as follows:
“Touche, Niven & Co.
“Public Accountants 
“Eighty Maiden Lane
“New York
“February 26, 1924.
“Certificate of Auditors
“We have examined the accounts of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the 
year ending December 31, 1923, and hereby certify that the annexed 
balance sheet is in accordance therewith and with the information and 
explanations given us. We further certify that, subject to provision for 
federal taxes on income, the said statement, in our opinion, presents a 
true and correct view of the financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., 
as at December 31, 1923.
“T ouche, N iven & Co. 
“Public Accountants.”
Capital and surplus were intact if the balance sheet was accurate. In 
reality both had been wiped out, and the corporation was insolvent. The 
books had been falsified by those in charge of the business so as to set 
forth accounts receivable and other assets which turned out to be ficti­
tious. The plaintiff maintains that the certificate of audit was erroneous 
in both its branches. The first branch, the asserted correspondence be­
tween the accounts and the balance sheet, is one purporting to be made 
as of the knowledge of the auditors. The second branch, which certifies 
to a belief that the condition reflected in the balance sheet presents a 
true and correct picture of the resources of the business, is stated as a 
m atte r of op in ion . In  the view of the plaintiff, b o th  branches of the 
certificate are either fraudulent or negligent. As to one class of assets, 
the item of accounts receivable, if not also as to others, there was no real 
correspondence, we are told, between balance sheet and books, or so the 
triers of the facts might find. If correspondence, however, be assumed,
182 ACCOUNTANTS’ LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
a closer examination of supporting invoices and records, or a fuller in­
quiry directed to the persons appearing on the books as creditors or 
debtors, would have exhibited the truth.
The plaintiff, a corporation engaged in business as a factor, was ap­
proached by Stern in March, 1924, with a request for loans of money to 
finance the sales of rubber. Up to that time the dealings between the two 
houses were on a cash basis and trifling in amount. As a condition of any 
loans the plaintiff insisted that it receive a balance sheet certified by public 
accountants, and in response to that demand it was given one of the cer­
tificates signed by the defendants and then in Stern’s possession. On the 
faith of that certificate the plaintiff made a loan which was followed by 
many others. The course of business was for Stern to deliver to the plain­
tiff documents described as trust receipts which in effect were executory 
assignments of the moneys payable by purchasers for goods thereafter to 
be sold. When the purchase price was due, the plaintiff received the 
payment, reimbursing itself therefrom for its advances and commissions. 
Some of these transactions were effected without loss. Nearly a year later, 
in December, 1924, the house of cards collapsed. In that month, plaintiff 
made three loans to the Stern company, one of $100,000, a second of $25,­
000, and a third of $40,000. For some of these loans no security was re­
ceived. For some of the earlier loans the security was inadequate. On 
January 2, 1925, the Stern company was declared a bankrupt.
This action, brought against the accountants in November, 1926. to 
recover the loss suffered by the plaintiff in reliance upon the audit, was 
in its inception one for negligence. On the trial there was added a second 
cause of action asserting fraud also. The trial judge dismissed the second 
cause of action without submitting it to the jury. As to the first cause of 
action, he reserved his decision on the defendants’ motion to dismiss 
and took the jury’s verdict. They were told that the defendants might 
be held liable if with knowledge that the results of the audit would be 
communicated to creditors they did the work negligently, and that negli­
gence was the omission to use reasonable and ordinary care. The verdict 
was in favor of the plaintiff for $187,576.32. On the coming in of the 
verdict, the judge granted the reserved motion. The Appellate Division 
affirmed the dismissal of the cause of action for fraud, but reversed the 
dismissal of the cause of action for negligence, and reinstated the verdict. 
The case is here on cross-appeals.
The two causes of action will be considered in succession, first the 
one for negligence and second that for fraud.
(1) We think the evidence supports a finding that the audit was 
negligently made, though in so saying we put aside for the moment the 
question whether negligence, even if it existed, was a wrong to the plain­
tiff. To explain fully or adequately how the defendants were at fault 
would carry this opinion beyond reasonable bounds. A sketch, however, 
there must be, at least in respect of some features of the audit, for the 
nature of the fault, when understood, is helpful in defining the ambit 
of the duty.
We begin with the item of accounts receivable. At the start of the 
defendants’ audit, there had been no posting of the general ledger since 
April, 1923. Siess, a junior accountant, was assigned by the defendants 
to the performance of that work. On Sunday, February 3, 1924, he had 
finished the task of posting, and was ready the next day to begin with 
his associates the preparation of the balance sheet and the audit of its
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items. The total of the accounts receivable for December, 1923, as thus 
posted by Siess from the entries in the journal, was $644,758.17. At some 
time on February 3, Romberg, an employee of the Stern company, who 
had general charge of its accounts, placed below that total another item 
to represent additional accounts receivable growing out of the transactions 
of the month. This new item, $706,843.07, Romberg entered in his own 
handwriting. The sales that it represented were, each and all, fictitious. 
Opposite the entry were placed other figures (12-29), indicating or sup­
posed to indicate a reference to the journal. Siess when he resumed his 
work saw the entries thus added, and included the new item in making 
up his footings, with the result of an apparent increase of over $700,000 
in the assets of the business. He says that in doing this he supposed the 
entries to be correct, and that his task at the moment being merely to 
post the books, he thought the work of audit or verification might come 
later, and put it off accordingly. The time sheets, which are in evidence, 
show very clearly that this was the order of time in which the parts of the 
work were done. Verification, however, there never was either by Siess 
or by his superiors, or so the triers of the facts might say. If any had 
been attempted, or any that was adequate, an examiner would have found 
that the entry in the ledger was not supported by any entry in the jour­
nal. If from the journal he had gone to the book from which the journal 
was made up, described as “the debit memo book,” support would still 
have failed. Going farther, he would have found invoices, seventeen in 
number, which amounted in the aggregate to the interpolated item, but 
scrutiny of these invoices would have disclosed suspicious features in 
that they had no shipping number nor a customer’s order number and 
varied in terms of credit and in other respects from those usual in the 
business. A mere glance reveals the difference.
The December entry of accounts receivable was not the only item that 
a careful and skillful auditor would have desired to investigate. There 
was ground for suspicion as to an item of $113,199.60, included in the 
accounts payable as due from the Baltic Corporation. As to this the de­
fendants received an explanation, not very convincing, from Stern and 
Romberg. A cautious auditor might have been dissatisfied and have un­
covered what was wrong. There was ground for suspicion also because 
of the inflation of the inventory. The inventory as it was given to the 
auditors, was totaled at $347,219.08. The defendants discovered errors in 
the sum of $303,863.20, and adjusted the balance sheet accordingly. Both 
the extent of the discrepancy and its causes might have been found to 
cast discredit upon the business and the books. There was ground for 
suspicion again in the record of assigned accounts. Inquiry of the creditors 
gave notice to the defendants that the same accounts had been pledged to 
two, three and four banks at the same time. The pledges did not diminish 
the value of the assets, but made in such circumstances they might well 
evoke a doubt as to the solvency of a business where such conduct was 
permitted. There was an explanation by Romberg which the defendants 
accepted as sufficient. Caution and diligence might have pressed investi­
gation farther.
If the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff to act with the same care 
that would have been due under a contract of employment, a jury was 
at liberty to find a verdict of negligence upon a showing of a scrutiny so 
imperfect and perfunctory. No doubt the extent to which inquiry must 
be pressed beyond appearances is a question of judgment, as to which
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opinions will often differ. No doubt the wisdom that is born after the 
event will engender suspicion and distrust when old acquaintance and 
good repute may have silenced doubt at the beginning. All this is to be 
weighed by a jury in applying its standard of behavior, the state of mind 
and conduct of the reasonable man. Even so, the adverse verdict, when 
rendered, imports an alignment of the weights in their proper places in 
the balance and a reckoning thereafter. The reckoning was not wrong 
upon the evidence before us, if duty be assumed.
We are brought to the question of duty, its origin and measure.
The defendants owed to their employer a duty imposed by law to 
make their certificate without fraud, and a duty growing out of contract 
to make it with the care and caution proper to their calling. Fraud in­
cludes the pretense of knowledge when knowledge there is none. To 
creditors and investors to whom the employer exhibited the certificate, 
the defendants owed a like duty to make it without fraud, since there 
was notice in the circumstances of its making that the employer did not 
intend to keep it to himself (Eaton, Cole & Burnham Co. v. Avery, 83 
N. Y. 31; Tindie n. Birkett, 171 N. Y. 520). A different question develops 
when we ask whether they owed a duty to these to make it without 
negligence. If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, 
the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive 
entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount 
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a 
business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt 
whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to 
these consequences. We put aside for the moment any statement in the 
certificate which involves the representation of a fact as true to the 
knowledge of the auditors. If such a statement was made, whether 
believed to be true or not, the defendants are liable for deceit in the 
event that it was false. The plaintiff does not need the invention of 
novel doctrine to help it out in such conditions. The case was submitted 
to the jury and the verdict was returned upon the theory that even in the 
absence of a misstatement of a fact there is a liability also for erroneous 
opinion. The expression of an opinion is to be subject to a warranty 
implied by law. What, then, is the warranty, as yet unformulated, to be? 
Is it merely that the opinion is honestly conceived and that the pre­
liminary inquiry has been honestly pursued, that a halt has not been 
made without a genuine belief that the search has been reasonably 
adequate to bring disclosure of the truth? Or does it go farther and 
involve the assumption of a liability for any blunder or inattention that 
could fairly be spoken of as negligence if the controversy were one 
between accountant and employer for breach of a contract to render 
services for pay?
The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days 
apace. How far the inroads shall extend is now a favorite subject of 
juridical discussion (Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 
24 Harv. L. Rev. 415, 433; Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts, pp. 150, 
151; Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42 
Harv. L. Rev. 733; Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, 14 Harv. L. 
Rev. 184; Green, Judge and Jury, chapter Deceit, p. 280; 16 Va. Law 
Rev. 749). In the field of the law of contract there has been a gradual 
widening of the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox (20 N. Y. 268), until today 
the beneficiary of a promise, clearly designated as such, is seldom left
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without a remedy (Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 238). Even in that 
field, however, the remedy is narrower where the beneficiaries of the 
promise are indeterminate or general. Something more must then appear 
than an intention that the promise shall redound to the benefit of the 
public or to that of a class of indefinite extension. The promise must 
be such as to “bespeak the assumption of a duty to make reparation 
directly to the individual members of the public if the benefit is lost” 
(Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N. Y. 160, 164; American Law 
Institute, Restatement of the Law of Contracts, § 145). In the field of the 
law of torts a manufacturer who is negligent in the manufacture of a 
chattel in circumstances pointing to an unreasonable risk of serious 
bodily harm to those using it thereafter may be liable for negligence 
though privity is lacking between manufacturer and user (MacPherson 
v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382; American Law Institute, Restatement 
of the Law of Torts, § 262). A force or instrument of harm having been 
launched with potentialities of danger manifest to the eye of prudence, 
the one who launches it is under a duty to keep it within bounds (Moch 
Co. n. Rensselaer Water Co., supra, at p. 168). Even so, the question is 
still open whether the potentialities of danger that will charge with 
liability are confined to harm to the person, or include injury to property 
(Pine Grove Poultry Farm v. Newton B.-P. Mfg. Co., 248 N. Y. 293, 296; 
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U. S. 303; American Law 
Institute, Restatement of the Law of Torts, supra). In either view, how­
ever, what is released or set in motion is a physical force. We are now 
asked to say that a like liability attaches to the circulation of a thought or 
a release of the explosive power resident in words.
Three cases in this court are said by the plaintiff to have committed 
us to the doctrine that words, written or oral, if negligently published 
with the expectation that the reader or listener will transmit them to 
another, will lay a basis for liability though privity be lacking. These 
are Glanzer v. Shepard (233 N. Y. 236); International Products Co. v. 
Erie R . R . Co. (244 N. Y. 331), and Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat. 
Bank (253 N. Y. 369).
In Glanzer v. Shepard the seller of beans requested the defendants, 
public weighers, to make return of the weight and furnish the buyer 
with a copy. This the defendants did. Their return, which was made out 
in duplicate, one copy to the seller and the other to the buyer, recites that 
it was made by order of the former for the use of the latter. The buyer 
paid the seller on the faith of the certificate which turned out to be 
erroneous. We held that the weighers were liable at the suit of the buyer 
for the moneys overpaid. Here was something more than the rendition 
of a service in the expectation that the one who ordered the certificate 
would use it thereafter in the operations of his business as occasion might 
require. Here was a case where the transmission of the certificate to 
another was not merely one possibility among many, but the “end and 
aim of the transaction,” as certain and immediate and deliberately willed 
as if a husband were to order a gown to be delivered to his wife, or a 
telegraph company, contracting with the sender of a message, were to 
telegraph it wrongly to the damage of the person expected to receive it 
(Wolfskehl v. Western Union Tel. Co., 46 Hun, 542; DeRuth v. New 
York, etc., Tel. Co., 1 Daly, 547; Milliken v. Western Union Tel. Co., 
110 N. Y. 403, 410). The intimacy of the resulting nexus is attested by the 
fact that after stating the case in terms of legal duty, we went on to point
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that viewing it as a phase or extension of Lawrence n. Fox (supra), or 
Seaver v. Ransom (supra), we could reach the same result by stating it in 
terms of contract (cf. Economy Building & Loan Assn. v. West Jersey 
Title Co., 64 N. J .L . 27; Young v. Lohr, 118 Iowa, 624; Murphy v. 
Fidelity, Abstract & Title Co., 114 Wash. 77). The bond was so close as to 
approach that of privity, if not completely one with it. Not so in the 
case at hand. No one would be likely to urge that there was a contractual 
relation, or even one approaching it, at the root of any duty that was 
owing from the defendants now before us to the indeterminate class of 
persons who, presently or in the future, might deal with the Stern com­
pany in reliance on the audit. In a word, the service rendered by the de­
fendant in Glanzer v. Shepard was primarily for the information of a 
third person, in effect, if not in name, a party to the contract, and only 
incidentally for that of the formal promisee. In the case at hand, the 
service was primarily for the benefit of the Stern company, a convenient 
instrumentality for use in the development of the business, and only in­
cidentally or collaterally for the use of those to whom Stern and his 
associates might exhibit it thereafter. Foresight of these possibilities may 
charge with liability for fraud. The conclusion does not follow that it 
will charge with liability for negligence.
In the next of the three cases (International Products Co. v. Erie 
R. R. Co., supra) the plaintiff, an importer, had an agreement with the 
defendant, a railroad company, that the latter would act as bailee of 
goods arriving from abroad. The importer, to protect the goods by 
suitable insurance, made inquiry of the bailee as to the location of the 
storage. The warehouse was incorrectly named, and the policy did not 
attach. Here was a determinate relation, that of bailor and bailee, either 
present or prospective, with peculiar opportunity for knowledge on the 
part of the bailee as to the subject-matter of the statement and with a 
continuing duty to correct it if erroneous. Even the narrowest holdings 
as to liability for unintentional misstatement concede that a representa­
tion in such circumstances may be equivalent to a warranty. There is a 
class of cases “where a person within whose special province it lay to 
know a particular fact, has given an erroneous answer to an inquiry made 
with regard to it by a person desirous of ascertaining the fact for the 
purpose of determining his course accordingly, and has been held bound 
to make good the assurance he has given” (Herschell, L. C., in Derry v. 
Peek, [L. R.] 14 A. C. 337, 360). So in Burrowes v. Lock (10 Ves. 470), 
a trustee was asked by one who expected to make a loan upon the security 
of a trust fund whether notice of any prior incumbrance upon the fund 
had been given to him. An action for damages was upheld though the 
false answer was made honestly in the belief that it was true (cf. Brownlie 
v. Campbell, [L. R.] 5 A. C. 925, 935; Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat. 
Bank, supra, at p. 379).
In one respect the decision in International Products Co. v. Erie R. R. 
Co. is in advance of anything decided in Glanzer v. Shepard. The latter 
case suggests that the liability there enforced was not one for the mere 
utterance of words without due consideration, but for a negligent service, 
the act of weighing, which happened to find in the words of the certificate 
its culmination and its summary. This was said in the endeavor to 
emphasize the character of the certificate as a business transaction, an 
act in the law, and not a mere casual response to a request for informa­
tion. The ruling in the case of the Erie Railroad shows that the rendition
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of a service is at most a mere circumstance and not an indispensable 
condition. The Erie was not held for negligence in the rendition of a 
service. It was held for words and nothing more. So in the case at 
hand. If liability for the consequences of a negligent certificate may be 
enforced by any member of an indeterminate class of creditors, present 
and prospective, known and unknown, the existence or non-existence 
of a preliminary act of service will not affect the cause of action. The 
service may have been rendered as carefully as you please, and its quality 
will count for nothing if there was negligence thereafter in distributing 
the summary.
Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat. Bank (supra), the third of the cases 
cited, is even more plainly indecisive. A trust company was a trustee 
under a deed of trust to secure an issue of bonds. It was held liable to a 
subscriber for the bonds when it certified them falsely. A representation 
by a trustee intended to sway action had been addressed to a person who 
by the act of subscription was to become a party to the deed and a cestui 
que trust.
The antidote to these decisions and to the over-use of the doctrine of 
liability for negligent misstatement may be found in Jaillet v. Cashman 
(235 N. Y. 511) and Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking 
P. Corp. (245 N. Y. 377). In the first of these cases the defendant supply­
ing ticker service to brokers was held not liable in damages to one of the 
broker’s customers for the consequences of reliance upon a report negli­
gently published on the ticker. If liability had been upheld, the step 
would have been a short one to the declaration of a like liability on the 
part of proprietors of newspapers. In the second the principle was clearly 
stated by Pound, J., that “negligent words are not actionable unless they 
are uttered directly, with knowledge or notice that they will be acted on, 
to one to whom the speaker is bound by some relation of duty, arising out 
of public calling, contract or otherwise, to act with care if he acts at all.”
From the foregoing analysis the conclusion is, we think, inevitable that 
nothing in our previous decisions commits us to a holding of liability for 
negligence in the circumstances of the case at hand, and that such 
liability, if recognized, will be an extension of the principle of those 
decisions to different conditions, even if more or less analogous. The 
question then is whether such an extension shall be made.
The extension, if made, will so expand the field of liability for 
negligent speech as to make it nearly, if not quite, coterminous with that 
of liability for fraud. Again and again, in decisions of this court, the 
bounds of this latter liability have been set up, with futility the fate of 
every endeavor to dislodge them. Scienter has been declared to be an in­
dispensable element except where the representation has been put for­
ward as true of one’s own knowledge (Hadcock v. Osmer, 153 N. Y. 604), 
or in circumstances where the expression of opinion was a dishonorable 
pretense (3 Williston, Contracts, § 1494; Smith v. Land & House Prop. 
Corp., [L. R .] 28 Ch. Div. 7, 15; Sleeper v . Smith, 77 N. H. 337; Andrews 
v. Jackson, 168 Mass. 266; People ex rel. Gellis v. Sheriff, 251 N. Y. 33, 37; 
Hickey v. Morrell, 102 N. Y. 454, 463; Merry Realty Co. v. Martin, 103 
Misc. Rep. 9, 14; 186 App. Div. 538). Even an opinion especially an opinion 
by an expert, may be found to be fraudulent if the grounds supporting 
it are so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief 
back of it. Further than that this court has never gone. Directors of 
corporations have been acquitted of liability for deceit though they
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have been lax in investigation and negligent in speech (Reno v. Bull, 
226 N. Y. 546, and cases there cited; Kountze v. Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124). 
This has not meant, to be sure, that negligence may not be evidence from 
which a trier of the facts may draw an inference of fraud (Derry v. Peek, 
[L. R.] 14 A. C. 337, 369, 375, 376), but merely that if that inference is 
rejected, or, in the light of all the circumstances, is found to be unreason­
able, negligence alone is not a substitute for fraud. Many also are the 
cases that have distinguished between the willful or reckless representa­
tion essential to the maintenance at law of an action for deceit, and the 
misrepresentation, negligent or innocent, that will lay a sufficient basis 
for rescission in equity (Bloomquist v. Farson, 222 N. Y. 375; Seneca Wire 
& Mfg. Co. v. Leach & Co., 247 N. Y. 1). If this action is well conceived, 
all these principles and distinctions, so nicely wrought and formulated, 
have been a waste of time and effort. They have even been a snare, en­
trapping litigants and lawyers into an abandonment of the true remedy 
lying ready to the call. The suitors thrown out of court because they 
proved negligence, and nothing else, in an action for deceit, might have 
ridden to triumphant victory if they had proved the self-same facts, 
but had given the wrong another label, and all this in a State where forms 
of action have been abolished. So to hold is near to saying that we have 
been paltering with justice. A word of caution or suggestion would have 
set the erring suitor right. Many pages of opinion were written by judges 
the most eminent, yet the word was never spoken. We may not speak it 
now. A change so revolutionary, if expedient, must be wrought by legisla­
tion (Landell v. L ybrand, 264 Penn. St. 406).
We have said that the duty to refrain from negligent representation 
would become coincident or nearly so with the duty to refrain from fraud 
if this action could be maintained. A representation even though know­
ingly false does not constitute ground for an action of deceit unless made 
with the intent to be communicated to the persons or class of persons who 
act upon it to their prejudice (Eaton, Cole & Burnham Co. v. Avery, 
supra). Affirmance of this judgment would require us to hold that all or 
nearly all the persons so situated would suffer an impairment of an in­
terest legally protected if the representation had been negligent. We 
speak of all “or nearly all,” for cases can be imagined where a casual 
response, made in circumstances insufficient to indicate that care should 
be expected, would permit recovery for fraud if willfully deceitful. Cases 
of fraud between persons so circumstanced are, however, too infrequent 
and exceptional to make the radii greatly different if the fields of liability 
for negligence and deceit be figured as concentric circles. The like may 
be said of the possibility that the negligence of the injured party, con­
tributing to the result, may avail to overcome the one remedy, though un­
availing to defeat the other.
Neither of these possibilities is noted by the plaintiff in its answer to 
the suggestion that the two fields would be coincident. Its answer has 
been merely this, first, that the duty to speak with care does not arise 
unless the words are the culmination of a service, and second, that it does 
not arise unless the service is rendered in the pursuit of an independent 
calling, characterized as public. As to the first of these suggestions, we 
have already had occasion to observe that given a relation making 
diligence a duty, speech as well as conduct must conform to that exacting 
standard (International Products Co. v. Erie R. R . Co., supra). As to 
the second of the two suggestions, public accountants are public only in
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the sense that their services are offered to any one who chooses to employ 
them. This is far from saying that those who do not employ them are in 
the same position as those who do.
Liability for negligence if adjudged in this case will extend to many 
callings other than an auditor’s. Lawyers who certify their opinion as to 
the validity of municipal or corporate bonds with knowledge that the 
opinion will be brought to the notice of the public, will become liable to 
the investors, if they have overlooked a statute or a decision, to the same 
extent as if the controversy were one between client and adviser. Title 
companies insuring titles to a tract of land, with knowledge that at an 
approaching auction the fact that they have insured will be stated to the 
bidders, will become liable to purchasers who may wish the benefit of a 
policy without payment of a premium. These illustrations may seem to 
be extreme, but they go little, if any, farther than we are invited to go now. 
Negligence, moreover, will have one standard when viewed in relation to 
the employer, and another and at times a stricter standard when viewed 
in relation to the public. Explanations that might seem plausible, 
omissions that might be reasonable, if the duty is confined to the em­
ployer, conducting a business that presumably at least is not a fraud upon 
his creditors, might wear another aspect if an independent duty to be 
suspicious even of one’s principal is owing to investors. “Every one 
making a promise having the quality of a contract will be under a duty 
to the promisee by virtue of the promise, but under another duty, apart 
from contract, to an indefinite number of potential beneficiaries when 
performance has begun. The assumption of one relation will mean the 
involuntary assumption of a series of new relations, inescapably hooked 
together’’ (Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., supra, at p. 168). “The 
law does not spread its protection so far’’ (Robins Dry Dock & Repair 
Co. v. Flint, supra, at p. 309).
Our holding does not emancipate accountants from the consequences 
of fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit has been so negligent as 
to justify a finding that they had no genuine belief in its adequacy, for 
this again is fraud. It does no more than say that if less than this is 
proved, if there has been neither reckless misstatement nor insincere pro­
fession of an opinion, but only honest blunder, the ensuing liability for 
negligence is one that is bounded by the contract, and is to be enforced 
between the parties by whom the contract has been made. We doubt 
whether the average business man receiving a certificate without paying 
for it and receiving it merely as one among a multitude of possible in­
vestors, would look for anything more.
(2) The second cause of action is yet to be considered.
The defendants certified as a fact, true to their own knowledge, that
the balance sheet was in accordance with the books of account. If their 
statement was false, they are not to be exonerated because they believed 
it to be true (Hadcock v. Osmer, supra; Lehigh Zinc & Iron Co. v. Bam­
ford, 150 U. S. 665, 673; Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, 147 Mass. 403; 
Arnold v. Richardson, 74 App. Div. 581). We think the triers of the facts 
might hold it to be false.
Correspondence betw een the balance sheet and  the books im ports 
something more, or so the triers of the facts might say, than correspond­
ence between the balance sheet and the general ledger, unsupported or 
even contradicted by every other record. The correspondence to be of 
any moment may not unreasonably be held to signify a correspondence
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between the statement and the books of original entry, the books taken 
as a whole. If that is what the certificate means, a jury could find that 
the correspondence did not exist and that the defendants signed the 
certificates without knowing it to exist and even without reasonable 
grounds for belief in its existence. The item of $706,000, representing 
fictitious accounts receivable, was entered in the ledger after defendant’s 
employee Siess had posted the December sales. He knew of the interpola­
tion, and knew that there was need to verify the entry by reference to 
books other than the ledger before the books could be found to be in 
agreement with the balance sheet. The evidence would sustain a finding 
that this was never done. By concession the interpolated item had no 
support in the journal, or in any journal voucher, or in the debit memo 
book, which was a summary of the invoices, or in any thing except the 
invoices themselves. The defendants do not say that they ever looked at 
the invoices, seventeen in number, representing these accounts. They 
profess to be unable to recall whether they did so or not. They admit, 
however, that if they had looked, they would have found omissions and 
irregularities so many and unusual as to have called for further in­
vestigation. When we couple the refusal to say that they did look with 
the admission that if they had looked, they would or could have seen, 
the situation is revealed as one in which a jury might reasonably find 
that in truth they did not look, but certified the correspondence without 
testing its existence.
In this connection we are to bear in mind the principle already stated 
in the course of this opinion that negligence or blindness, even when not 
equivalent to fraud, is none the less evidence to sustain an inference of 
fraud. At least this is so if the negligence is gross. Not a little confusion 
has at times resulted from an undiscriminating quotation of statements 
in Kountze v. Kennedy (supra), statements proper enough in their 
setting, but capable of misleading when extracted and considered by 
themselves. “Misjudgment, however gross,” it was there observed, “or 
want of caution, however marked, is not fraud.” This was said in a case 
where the trier of the facts had held the defendants guiltless. The judg­
ment in this court amounted merely to a holding that a finding of fraud 
did not follow as an inference of law. There was no holding that the 
evidence would have required a reversal of the judgment if the finding as 
to guilt had been the other way. Even Derry v. Peek, as we have seen, 
asserts the probative effect of negligence as an evidentiary fact. We 
had no thought in Kountze v . Kennedy of upholding a doctrine more 
favorable to wrongdoers, though there was a reservation suggesting the 
approval of a rule more rigorous. The opinion of this court cites Derry 
v. Peek, and states the holding there made that an action would not lie 
if the defendant believed the representation made by him to be true, 
although without reasonable cause for such belief. “It is not necessary,” 
we said, “to go to this extent to uphold the present judgment, for the 
referee, as has been stated, found that the belief of Kennedy * * * was 
based upon reasonable grounds.” The setting of the occasion justified the 
inference that the representations did not involve a profession of knowl­
edge as distinguished from belief (147 N. Y. at p. 133). No such charity 
of construction exonerates accountants, who by the very nature of their 
calling profess to speak with knowledge when certifying to an agreement 
between the audit and the entries.
The defendants attempt to excuse the omission of an inspection of the
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invoices proved to be fictitious by invoking a practice known as that 
of testing and sampling. A random choice of accounts is made from the 
total number on the books, and these, if found to be regular when in­
spected and investigated, are taken as a fair indication of the quality of 
the mass. The defendants say that about 200 invoices were examined 
in accordance with this practice, but they do not assert that any of the 
seventeen invoices supporting the fictitious sales were among the number 
so selected. Verification by test and sample was very likely a sufficient 
audit as to accounts regularly entered upon the books in the usual course 
of business. It was plainly insufficient, however, as to accounts not entered 
upon the books where inspection of the invoices was necessary, not as a 
check upon accounts fair upon their face, but in order to ascertain 
whether there were any accounts at all. If the only invoices inspected 
were invoices unrelated to the interpolated entry, the result was to certify a 
correspondence between the books and the balance sheet without any 
effort by the auditors, as to $706,000 of accounts, to ascertain whether the 
certified agreement was in accordance with the truth. How far books of 
account fair upon their face are to be probed by accountants in an 
effort to ascertain whether the transactions back of them are in accord­
ance with the entries, involves to some extent the exercise of judgment 
and discretion. Not so, however, the inquiry whether the entries certified 
as there, are there in very truth, there in the form and in the places where 
men of business training would expect them to be. The defendants were 
put on their guard by the circumstances touching the December accounts 
receivable to scrutinize with special care. A jury might find that with 
suspicions thus awakened, they closed their eyes to the obvious, and 
blindly gave assent.
We conclude, to sum up the situation, that in certifying to the cor­
respondence between balance sheet and accounts the defendants made a 
statement as true to their own knowledge, when they had, as a jury 
might find, no knowledge on the subject. If that is so, they may also be 
found to have acted without information leading to a sincere or genuine 
belief when they certified to an opinion that the balance sheet faithfully 
reflected the condition of the business.
Whatever wrong was committed by the defendants was not their per­
sonal act or omission, but that of their subordinates. This does not 
relieve them, however, of liability to answer in damages for the con­
sequences of the wrong, if wrong there shall be found to be. It is not a 
Question of constructive notice, as where facts are brought home to the 
knowledge of subordinates whose interests are adverse to those of the 
employer (Henry v. Allen, 151 N. Y. 1; see, however, American Law In­
stitute, Restatement of the Law of Agency, § 506, subd. 2-a). These sub­
ordinates, so far as the record shows, had no interests adverse to the de­
fendants’, nor any thought in what they did to be unfaithful to their trust. 
The question is merely this, whether the defendants, having delegated 
the performance of this work to agents of their own selection, are respon­
sible for the manner in which the business of the agency was done. As to 
that the answer is not doubtful (Fifth Ave. Bank v. 42d St., etc., R. R. Co., 
137 N. Y. 231; Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 278 U. S. 349, 356; 
American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Agency, §481).
Upon the defendants’ appeal as to the first cause of action, the judg­
ment of the Appellate Division should be reversed, and that of the Trial 
Term affirmed, with costs in the Appellate Division and in this court.
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Upon the plaintiff’s appeal as to the second cause of action, the judg­
ment of the Appellate Division and that of the Trial Term should be 
reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
Pound, Crane, Lehman, Kellogg, O’Brien and H ubbs, JJ., concur.
Judgment accordingly.
BEARDSLEY v. ERNST *
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Cuyahoga County, 1934. 47 Ohio App. 241, 191 N. E. 808. 
Syllabus by the Court.
In an action for damages for fraudulent misrepresentations of account­
ants, brought by one purchasing stocks and bonds, relying on such ac­
counts’ certified balance sheet, fraud is not established, where it is shown 
by the accountants’ certificate that the statements “were based upon 
statments from abroad with respect to the foreign constituent companies.” 
Such statement gives rise to the indisputable inference that the account­
ants had not examined the records of the foreign constituent companies.
McGill, Judge. This is a proceeding in error to reverse a judgment of 
the court of common pleas wherein Martha R. Beardsley was plaintiff and 
Alwin C. Ernst and others were defendants.
The petition in substance alleged that the defendants were copartners 
doing business as Ernst & Ernst, who were certified public accountants. It 
further alleged that the plaintiff in 1931 purchased at different times two 
bonds and twenty-one shares of preferred stock in the International Match 
Corporation. The petition set forth that the plaintiff acted upon her own 
initiative and relied upon the certification made by the expert accountants 
to the consolidated balance sheet and consolidated income and surplus 
account of the International Match Corporation for the year 1929 and 
for the year 1930.
It was further alleged by the plaintiff that the certificates made by the 
defendants were fraudulent, in that the defendants purported to have 
knowledge of the facts when in truth the defendants had no such knowl­
edge; that the fraud was not discovered until after the suicide and death 
of Ivar Krueger, which occurred in Paris on March 12, 1932; and, further, 
that the bonds and stocks were at said time worthless and the International 
Match Corporation was bankrupt, although not so officially declared at the 
time of the purchases. By reason of these facts plaintiff claimed damages 
resulting from the alleged fraud in the sum of $2,339.99.
The defendants filed a joint answer, which, in substance, admitted the 
partnership; admitted the execution of the certificates; and also pleaded a 
general denial. A jury having been waived, the court below heard the 
evidence and rendered judgment for the defendants.
An examination of the record discloses that each certificate executed 
by the defendants was as follows:
"We hereby certify that we have examined the books of account and 
record of International Match Corporation and its American Subsidiary 
company at December 31, 1929, and have received statements from abroad 
with respect to the foreign constitutent companies as of the same date.
* See footnote 47 supra.
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Based upon our examination and information submitted to us it is our 
opinion that the annexed Consolidated Balance Sheet sets forth the finan­
cial condition of the combined companies at the date stated, and that the 
related Consolidated Income and Surplus Account is correct.
“Ernst & Ernst.”
On behalf of the plaintiff, proof was introduced that the International 
Match Corporation was adjudicated bankrupt by the United States Dis­
trict Court of the Southern District of New York on April 9, 1932. There 
were introduced by stipulation copies of an audit made by Price, Water- 
house & Co., who were employed to audit the affairs of the International 
Match Corporation, and these audits had been filed with the referee in 
bankruptcy.
The audit made by Price, Waterhouse & Co. revealed annual net earn­
ings of the International Match Corporation for the years involved to be 
approximately $8,000,000, whereas the defendants had certified the net 
income for 1929 and 1930 respectively to have been in excess of 
$20,000,000.
The plaintiff relies largely upon the case of Ultramares Corporation v. 
Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441, 442, 74 A. L. R. 1139. In that case a 
certificate was made by Touche, Niven & Co., who were public account­
ants, to the effect that they had examined the accounts of Fred Stern & Co., 
Incorporated, and the certificate stated “that the annexed balance sheet is 
in accordance therewith and * * * the said statement, in our opinion, 
presents a true and correct view of the financial condition of Fred Stern 
& Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1923.”
The lower court, in the Touche Case, held the accountants liable for 
negligence and not liable for fraud. Both sides appealed, and Judge 
Cardozo reversed both holdings and found that the accountants were not 
liable for negligence, but were liable for fraud. In that case, syllabus 8 
reads as follows:
“8. In action for damages for fraudulent misrepresentations of account­
ants, brought by person making advances relying on certified balance 
sheet, dismissal without submission to jury held error.
“The evidence indicated that, in certifying to the correspondence be­
tween balance sheet and accounts, the defendant accountants made a 
statement as true to their own knowledge when they had no knowledge 
on the subject.”
If certified public accountants examine the books and records of a cor­
poration and certify that the balance sheet reflects the true condition of 
the books and records examined, and there is a substantial variation be­
tween the balance sheet and such books and records, an action would no 
doubt lie against the accountants, where the certification was made know­
ingly, or where there was a pretense of knowledge when in fact they had no 
knowledge.
In the instant case, however, the certificate made by Ernst & Ernst 
clearly states that it is based both upon an examination of records and 
upon statements received from abroad with respect to the foreign con­
stituent companies. T h e  language used in these certificates gives rise to 
the indisputable inference that the accountants had not examined the 
books and records of the foreign constituent companies.
The record does not establish fraud or any false or fraudulent state­
ments in relation to the examination actually made of the books and
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records in this country. We do not think that the defendants can be 
charged with fraud under these certificates by the very language used 
therein, when they in fact disclose that some of the information and state­
ments came from abroad. It is obvious that the accountants in this case 
could not know whether or not the information from abroad was accurate 
or inaccurate, and, inasmuch as they disclose that these certificates were 
based partly upon information so received, there was no pretense of 
knowledge as to the information received which would make defendants 
liable.
Accordingly, the judgment of the common pleas court is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed.
GLANZER v. SHEPARD *
Court of Appeals of New York, 1922. 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275.
Appeal, by permission, from a judgment entered January 21, 1921, upon 
an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first 
judicial department, which reversed a determination of the Appellate 
Term, reversing a judgment of the City Court of the city of New York in 
favor of plaintiffs entered upon a verdict directed by the court and affirmed 
said City Court judgment.
Cardozo, J. Plaintiffs bought of Bech, Van Siclen & Co., a corporation, 
905 bags of beans. The beans were to be paid for in accordance with 
weight sheets certified by public weighers. Bech, Van Siclen & Co., the 
seller, requested the defendants, who are engaged in business as public 
weighers, to make return of the weight and furnish the buyers with a copy. 
A letter to the weighers, dated July 20, 1918, informed them that the bags 
were on the dock, that the beans had been sold to Glanzer Bros., the plain­
tiffs, who would accept delivery Tuesday, July 23, and that the defendants 
were to communicate with the plaintiffs, and ascertain whether it would 
“be in order” to be on the pier Tuesday morning to weigh the beans 
before delivery. The defendants did as bidden. They certified the weight 
of the 905 bags to be 228,380 pounds, and were paid for the service by 
the seller. Their return recites that it has been made “by order of” Bech, 
Van Siclen & Co., “for G. Bros.” One copy of the return they sent to the 
seller, and a duplicate to the buyers. Later, 17 bags, containing 4,136 
pounds, were withdrawn from the shipment. The others were accepted 
and paid for on the faith of the certificates. The plaintiffs, upon attempt­
ing a resale, found that the actual weight was less by 11,854 pounds than 
the weight as certified in the return. Upon learning this, they brought 
suit against the defendants in the City Court of New York for $1,261.26, 
the amount overpaid. The trial judge, upon motions made by each side 
for the direction of a verdict, ordered judgment for the plaintiffs. The 
Appellate Term reversed upon the ground that the plaintiffs had no con­
tract with the defendants, and must seek their remedy against the seller. 
The Appellate Division reversed the Appellate Term, and reinstated the 
verdict. The defendants are the appellants here.
We think the law imposes a duty toward buyer as well as seller in the 
situation here disclosed. The plaintiffs’ use of the certificates was not an
* This case is discussed at p. 31 f. supra.
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indirect or collateral consequence of the action of the weighers. It was a 
consequence, which, to the weighers’ knowledge, was the end and aim of 
the transaction. Bech, Van Siclen & Co. ordered, but Glanzer Brothers 
were to use. The defendants held themselves out to the public as skilled 
and careful in their calling. They knew that the beans had been sold, and 
that on the faith of their certificate payment would be made. They sent a 
copy to the plaintiffs for the very purpose of inducing action. All this 
they admit. In such circumstances, assumption of the task of weighing 
was the assumption of a duty to weigh carefully for the benefit of all whose 
conduct was to be governed. We do not need to state the duty in terms 
of contract or of privity. Growing out of a contract, it has none the less 
an origin not exclusively contractual. Given the contract and the relation, 
the duty is imposed by law (cf. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 
382, 390).
There is nothing new here in principle. If there is novelty, it is in the 
instance only. One who follows a common calling may come under a duty 
to another whom he serves, though a third may give the order or make 
the payment (1 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, pp. 187, 188; 
Bohlen, Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Torts, 44 Am. Law Reg. 
[N. S.] 209, 218, 293, 294; 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law, p. 332). 
“It is the duty of every artificer to exercise his art rightly and truly as he 
ought” (Fitzherbert Abr., Trespass sue le Case, 94d, quoted by Bohlen, 
supra, p. 293). The surgeon who unskillfully sets the wounded arm of a 
child is liable for his negligence, though the father pays the bill (Gladwell 
v. Steggall, 5 Bing. N. C. 733; Pippin v. Sheppard, 11 Price, 400-411). The 
bailee who is careless in the keeping of the goods which he receives as 
those of A, does not escape liability though the deposit may have been 
made by B. It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even 
though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting 
carefully, if he acts at all (Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raymond, 909; Shields 
v. Blackburne, 1 H. Bl. 158; W illes, J., in Skelton v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., 
L. R. 2 C. P. 631, 636; Kent, Ch. J., in Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84, 96). 
The most common examples of such a duty are cases where action is 
directed toward the person of another or his property (Street, supra). A 
like principle applies, however, where action is directed toward the gov­
ernance of conduct. The controlling circumstance is not the character of 
the consequence, but its proximity or remoteness in the thought and pur­
pose of the actor. There are decisions that a lawyer who supplies a certi­
ficate of title to a client is not answerable to a third person whom he did 
not mean to serve (Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195; cf. Glawatz v. 
People’s Guaranty Search Co., 49 App. Div. 465; Day v. Reynolds, 23 Hun, 
131). “Neither fraud nor collusion is alleged or proved; and it is conceded 
that the certificates were made by the defendant at the request of the 
applicant for the loan, without any knowledge on the part of the de­
fendant what use was to be made of the same or to whom they were to 
be presented” (Savings Bank v. Ward, supra, p. 199). No such immunity, 
it has been held, protects the searcher of a title who, preparing an abstract 
at the order of a client, delivers it to another to induce action on the 
faith of it (Economy Bldg, & Loan Ass’n. v. West Jersey Title Co., 64 N. J. 
L. 27; Denton v. Nashville Title Co., 112 Tenn. 320; Anderson v. Spries- 
tersbach, 69 Wash. 393; Murphy v. Fidelity Abstract Title Co., 114 
Wash. 77; Brown v. Sims, 22 Ind. App. 317; Western Loan Co. v. Silver 
Bow Abstract Co., 31 Mont. 448; Lawall v. Groman, 180 Penn. St. 532;
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cf. Scholes v. Brook, 63 L. T . [N. S.] 837, 838; aff’d., 64 id. 674). Constantly 
the bounds of duty are enlarged by knowledge of a prospective use (Mac­
pherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra, p. 393; Brett, M. R., in Coventry, 
Sheppard & Co. v. Great Eastern Ry Co., L. R. 11 Q. B. D. 776, 780; cf. 
Bank of Batavia v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 106 N. Y. 195, 199). We 
must view the act in its setting, which will include the implications and the 
promptings of usage and fair dealing. The casual response, made in mere 
friendliness or courtesy (Fish v. Kelly, 17 C. B. [N. S.] 194, 205, 207; 
Bohlen, supra, p. 374; Street, supra, p. 408) may not stand on the same 
plane, when we come to consider who is to assume the risk of negligence or 
error, as the deliberate certificate, indisputably an “act in the law” (Pol­
lock, Contracts [8th ed.] p. 3), intended to sway conduct. Here the defend­
ants are held, not merely for careless words (Le Lievre v. Gould, 1893, 1 
Q. B. D. 491; Pollock, Torts [10th ed.], pp. 301, 302; Jeremiah Smith, 
Liability for Negligent Language, 14 Harvard Law Review, 184, 195), but 
for the careless performance of a service—the act of weighing—which 
happens to have found in the words of a certificate its culmination and its 
summary (cf. Corey v. Eastman, 166 Mass. 279, 287). The line of separa­
tion between these diverse liabilities is difficult to draw. It does not lose 
for that reason its correspondence with realities. Life has relations not 
capable always of division into inflexible compartments. The moulds 
expand and shrink.
We state the defendants’ obligation, therefore, in terms, not of contract 
merely, but of duty. Other forms of statement are possible. They involve, 
at most, a change of emphasis. We may see here, if we please, a phase or 
an extension of the rule in Lawrence v. Fox. (20 N. Y. 268) as amplified 
recently in Seaver v. Ransom (224 N. Y. 233). If we fix our gaze upon 
that aspect, we shall stress the element of contract, and treat the defend­
ants’ promise as embracing the rendition of a service, which though 
ordered and paid for by one, was either wholly or in part for the benefit 
of another (DeCicco v. Schweizer, 221 N. Y. 431; Rector, etc., St. Mark’s 
Church v. Teed, 120 N. Y. 583). We may find analogies again in the de­
cisions which treat the sender of a telegram as the agent of the recipient 
(Wolfskehl v. W. U. Tel. Co., 46 Hun, 542; Milliken v. W. U. Tel. Co., 110 
N. Y. 403). These other methods of approach arrive at the same goal, 
though the paths may seem at times to be artificial or circuitous. We have 
preferred to reach the goal more simply. The defendants, acting, not 
casually nor as mere servants, but in the pursuit of an independent calling, 
weighed and certified at the order of one with the very end and aim of 
shaping the conduct of another. Diligence was owing, not only to him 
who ordered, but to him also who relied.
Other points are made by counsel. We have not failed to consider 
them, but they do not alter our conclusion. Both sides having moved for 
direction of a verdict without other request, the ruling of the trial judge 
stands with the same force as the verdict of a ju ry  (A d a m s  v. R o sc o e  
Lumber Co., 159 N. Y. 176). If the purpose of the parties, the relation 
that arose between them and the significance of the transaction may be 
the subject of conflicting inferences, those most favorable to the plaintiffs 
must be deemed to have been accepted.
The judgment should be affirmed with costs.
H iscock, Ch. J., Pound, McLaughlin, Crane and Andrews, JJ., concur; 
H ogan, J., dissents.
Judgment affirmed.
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DOYLE v. CHATHAM & PHENIX NATIONAL BANK * 
Court of Appeals of New York, 1930. 253 N. Y. 369, 171 N. E. 574.
Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court in the second judicial department, entered July 17, 1929, affirming 
a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a decision of the court at a 
Trial Term, a jury having been waived.
Kellogg, J. The plaintiff is the owner of “Collateral Trust Gold 
Bonds” executed by the Motor Guaranty Corporation, a Delaware cor­
poration. Certain bonds were issued directly to the plaintiff for value 
paid; others were issued for value to persons from whom the plaintiff 
purchased. The bonds are expressed to have been issued in pursuance of 
the provisions of a certain indenture of trust entered into between the 
Motor Guaranty Corporation and the defendant, the Chatham and 
Phenix National Bank of the City of New York, as trustee. Each of the 
bonds bears a certificate, signed by the defendant as trustee, which reads 
as follows: “This bond is one of the series of bonds described in the Col­
lateral Trust Indenture mentioned therein.” The securities pledged by 
the Motor Guaranty Corporation to protect its bond issue, which were 
deposited with the defendant as trustee, have proven worthless and the 
bonds are uncollectible. The plaintiff, as assignee of all causes of action 
accruing to the persons from whom he purchased, and in his own right, 
brings this action to recover from the defendant trustee the losses sus­
tained, on the ground that its certificates were issued negligently and 
without authority, and that the plaintiff and his assignors were thereby 
induced to acquire worthless bonds and pay value therefor.
The collateral trust indenture was executed on the 1st day of February, 
1922. It recites that the Motor Guaranty Corporation proposes from time 
to time to issue its collateral trust gold bonds, to draw interest at eight 
per cent, payable semi-annually; that each bond is to be written in accord­
ance with a form of bond set up in the indenture. This form, with which 
the bonds of the plaintiff comply, contains the statement that the bond is 
“secured by the trade acceptances or notes of dealers, guaranteed by the 
Motor Guaranty Corporation; cash or notes of purchasers in part payment 
for motor vehicles, or other first lien mortgages, such purchasers’ notes 
being endorsed by dealers and guaranteed by the Motor Guaranty Corpo­
ration.” It also contains the following: “This bond is secured by said col­
lateral of a face value of at least one hundred and ten percentum (110%) 
of the principal amount of the bond.” It also states: “This bond shall 
not be valid for any purpose until the Trustee’s certificate endorsed hereon 
shall have been duly executed.” The form of the prescribed certificate, to 
be signed by the defendant as trustee, is identical with each of the certifi­
cates attached to the plaintiff’s bonds, the reading of which has already 
been given.
The indenture provides that bonds shall from time to time be executed 
by the Motor Guaranty Corporation and delivered to the defendant as 
trustee for authentication by it; that the delivery shall be accompanied by 
a request, signed by an appropriate officer of the corporation, stating the 
amount, date and denomination of bonds to be issued, and demanding
* See footnote 50 supra.
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authentication of the bonds requested to be issued. It further provides 
that the trustee shall thereupon, without further action by the corpora­
tion, authenticate the bonds and deliver them back to the corporation, 
“provided, however, there shall be delivered to and pledged with the 
Trustee” certain named collateral. The collateral to be pledged is as 
follows: “ (a) Cash or current funds, and/or (b) Trade acceptances or 
notes of dealers guaranteed by the Motor Guaranty Corporation, or notes 
of purchasers in part payment for motor vehicles, or other first lien mort­
gages, such purchasers’ notes being endorsed by dealers and guaranteed by 
the Motor Guaranty Corporation.” It also provides: “The aggregate 
principal amount of cash and/or of securities delivered and pledged under 
subsection (b) shall always be at least equal to 110% of the amount of the 
Bonds to be issued hereunder in respect thereto.” It further provides: 
“Upon receipt of cash and/or notes, and/or first lien mortgages, all as 
provided and described in this article, the Trustee shall be fully protected 
and is authorized without further inquiry, to authenticate and deliver the 
Bonds specified in such request and shall in no way be responsible to see 
to the application of the proceeds of any such Bond.”
The identure further provides that the trustee may require from time 
to time that the corporation furnish a certificate or certificates of the 
president or a vice-president, attested by the secretary or assistant secretary, 
under the corporate seal, setting forth all or any information “concerning 
names and addresses of makers, acceptors, and other pertinent data re­
garding such collateral and/or first lien mortgages, such lists, descrip­
tions and tabulations of collateral delivered or to be delivered to the 
Trustee.” It contains this: “Such certificate or certificates shall be con­
clusive evidence to the Trustee of all statements therein contained and 
full warrant and protection to it for any and all action taken on the faith 
thereof under the terms of this indenture.”
During the year 1922 the Motor Guaranty Corporation delivered to 
the defendant, for its certification as trustee, bonds of an aggregate par 
value in excess of $110,000. The defendant executed the requested cer­
tificates and returned the bonds to the corporation, which issued them to 
various persons upon payment of value therefor. Among these bonds were 
the bonds now owned by the plaintiff. In January, 1923, the corporation 
defaulted in the payment of interest and the defendant resigned as trustee. 
The fact then appeared that the corporation had, during the course of 
the year 1922, deposited with the trustee, as collateral for the bonds certi­
fied by it, the notes of various persons or corporations expressing an 
aggregate par value in excess of $130,000, all of which, with the exception 
of one note for $300, were in fact utterly valueless. W ith the same ex­
ception, none of the notes given were for the purchase of an automobile; 
none were made by an automobile dealer, or, for that matter, by a dealer 
in goods, wares and merchandise of any description. The makers com­
prised a lawyer, a bond salesman, a ticket agent, a mining corporation, 
and  a construction com pany. T h e  m aker of two notes, aggregating 
$75,000, had no occupation, business or other visible means of support, 
although judgments in excess of $900,000 were outstanding against him. 
None of the securities held by the trustee defendant, at the time the bonds 
now owned by the plaintiff were issued, with the exception noted, were 
the notes or acceptances of dealers or automobile purchasers. Subse­
quently to January, 1923, all the assets of the Motor Guaranty Corporation 
were sold for the sum of $143.30.
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We agree that the defendant cannot be held as the guarantor of the 
sufficiency or legality of the securities pledged with it, or for negligence 
in not ascertaining that the securities were worthless. (Tschetinian v. 
City Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 432; Green v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 
223 App. Div. 12; aff’d., 248 N. Y. 627; Byers v. Union Trust Co., 175 
Penn. St. 318; Jones on Corporate Bonds & Mortgages, § 287a.) “The 
purpose of the certification was not to insure the sufficiency of the security. 
It was to prevent an overissue.” (Ainsa v. Mercantile Trust Co., 174 
Cal. 504, 512.) If the defendant, without investigation, chose to lend its 
name to the swindling operations of a bogus finance corporation, by 
acting as its trustee and certifying its bonds, provided it certified with 
authority and without actual knowledge of the fraud intended, it was well 
within its legal rights. The question before us for decision is this: May 
the defendant be held in damages if, without authority, it certified the 
bonds now owned by the plaintiff, thereby inducing the plaintiff and his 
assignors to advance moneys upon the faith of securities which were 
worthless?
It is clear that the defendant signed the certificates without authority. 
As we have seen, it was authorized to certify “provided, however, there 
shall be delivered to and pledged with the Trustee” certain securities. The 
securities enumerated were the acceptances or notes of dealers or automo­
bile buyers. No such securities were ever delivered to the defendant. If 
the defendant had requested and obtained a statement from the appropri­
ate officers of the corporation, certifying to the “pertinent data regarding 
such collateral” possessed by them, its authority, without further investi­
gation, to execute the certificates could not have been questioned. How­
ever, it requested and received no such statement. Its authority, therefore, 
remained conditional upon the fact that the notes of dealers had been 
precedently deposited with it. No such securities having been deposited, 
it had no authority to execute the certificates.
In Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co., (88 N. J. Eq. 450; aff’d., 89 N. J. 
Eq. 584) the facts considered were these: A trust agreement provided that 
the mortgagor would assign to a trustee bonds and mortgages acquired by 
it, which had been appraised and guaranteed by a corporation associated 
in interest with the mortgagor; that, as the securities were deposited, the 
trustee would certify bonds of the mortgagor to an equal amount and 
deliver them to it for issuance to purchasers. The trustee accepted bonds 
secured by mortgages upon the lands of the mortgagor, rather than bonds 
and mortgages owned by the mortgagor and assigned to the trustee, and 
thereupon certified an equal amount of bonds which were sold subse­
quently by the mortgagor. It was held that the trustee was without au­
thority to execute the certificates and was, therefore, liable to compensate 
the takers of the bonds for their money losses occasioned by the acquisition 
thereof. In Rhinelander v . Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (172 N. Y. 519) this 
court expressed the opinion that where a corporate mortgage provides for 
a certification of bonds, only upon the making by the directors of the 
mortgagor of a written instrument setting forth the purposes of the 
issue, the certification, without such a statement made, would afford to 
a taker of the bonds thus certified a cause of action against the certifying 
trustee for damages resulting from the investment. Such a recovery was 
there withheld, but only for the reason that the cause of action had been 
barred by the Statute of Limitations. In Mullen v. Banking Co. (108 
Me. 498) the facts considered were these: All the bonds authorized by a
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trust indenture had been certified by the trustee and issued by the 
mortgagor. Nevertheless, on the request of a director of the mortgagor, 
the trustee certified two additional bonds, which were issued for value 
to the plaintiff. I t was held that the plaintiff might recover from the 
trustee the difference between the value of an authorized bond and the 
value of the bond actually received, which was nil. The court said: “Under 
these circumstances the responsibility rests upon the trustee to authenti­
cate no bond that should not be authenticated.”
In Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co. (supra) the opinion was expressed 
that the right of the takers of the bonds to recover damages from the 
trustee, on account of its unauthorized certification, rested upon a breach 
of the duty owed by the trustee to the takers as cestui que trustent. A 
similar view was expressed in Rhinelander v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. 
(supra), where the court said of the acceptance by the trustee of its trust 
position: “In executing that acceptance the defendant created the rela­
tion of trustee and cestui que trust between it and the future bond­
holders.” Notwithstanding these expressions, it is obvious that a trustee, 
in wrongly certifying bonds to prospective takers, in order that they may 
become cestui que trust, cannot at that moment and before the rela­
tionship is established, have violated a trust duty owed to them. 
Manifestly this is true: “There is no trust or other relation between 
a trustee and a stranger about to deal with a cestui que trust.” (Lindley, 
L. J., in Low v. Bouverie, L. R. [1891] 3 Ch. 82.) In Mullen v. Banking 
Co. (supra) the court held that an unauthorized certificate executed by 
a trustee was a false representation that the bond was properly issued 
rendering the trustee liable upon a cause of action in deceit. The fact 
that the representation was innocently made was not material, said the 
court, since the trustee, by its certificate, made an assertion of fact which, 
according to information which was or should have been within its own 
knowledge, was not true. In the case before us, however, it is clear that 
the plaintiff may not recover damages for a false representation, as in an 
action for deceit. In the first place, no such cause of action is alleged. 
In the second place, there is no proof that the trustee, in issuing its certi­
cates, intended to defraud the plaintiff or his assignors. “Intentional 
fraud, as distinguished from a mere breach of duty or the omission to 
use due care, is an essential factor in an action for deceit.” (Kountze v. 
Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124; Reno v. Bull, 226 N. Y. 546.)
T hat there may be liability for damages resulting from the negligent 
utterance of words is now the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction. 
(Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236; International Products Co. v. Erie 
R. R. Co., 244 N. Y. 331.) In the first of the cited cases a buyer of mer­
chandise, in reliance upon an erroneous certificate of a public weigher 
employed by the seller, made an overpayment for the goods purchased, 
and was permitted to recover from the weigher the equivalent of the 
moneys overpaid. In the second, a consignee of merchandise, desiring to 
insure the same, inquired of a carrier, which was to warehouse them, 
where the goods would be stored. The carrier, although the goods had not 
yet been received, replied that they were stored upon a certain dock, and 
the consignee insured them at that place. They were subsequently re­
ceived by the carrier and stored at another dock where they were destroyed 
by fire. In consequence the consignee lost its insurance. It was permitted 
a recovery from the carrier for the amount of its loss. No relationship had 
been established, between the plaintiff and the defendant, in either of
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these cases, when the careless statement was made. In the one, the plain­
tiff had no contract relationship with the weigher; in the other the re­
lationship of bailor and bailee had not been initiated, for the goods had 
not been received. Nevertheless the negligent statements gave rise to 
causes of action.  
In Glanzer v. Shepard (supra) Judge Cardozo said: “The defendants, 
acting, not casually nor as mere servants, but in the pursuit of an inde­
pendent calling, weighed and certified at the order of one with the very 
end and aim of shaping the conduct of another. Diligence was owing, 
not only to him who ordered, but to him also who relied.” In Interna­
tional Products Co. v. Erie R. R. Co. (supra) Judge Andrews named cer­
tain elements which must be present, in order that a cause of action 
for negligent speaking might lie. The utterer of the statement must have 
knowledge that the statement is required for a serious purpose; that those 
for whom it is made intend to rely and act thereupon; that if it be false 
they may be damaged. Finally, the relationship of the parties, arising 
out of contract or otherwise, must be such that in morals and good con­
science the one has the right to rely upon the other for information, and 
the other, giving the information, owes a duty to give it with care. “An 
inquiry made of a stranger is one thing; of a person with whom the 
inquirer has entered or is about to enter into a contract concerning the 
goods which are or are to be its subject is another. Even here the inquiry 
must be made as the basis of independent action. We do not touch the 
doctrine of caveat emptor.” The case of Derry v. Peek (L. R. 14 A. C. 
337) was cited by Judge Andrews as establishing the principle, for appli­
cation in the courts of England, that no action lies for a statement, negli­
gently but not fraudulently made. However, even in that case, Lord 
H erschell, in laying down the general rule, made this noteworthy ex­
ception: “There is another class of actions which I must refer to also for 
the purpose of putting it aside. I mean those cases where a person within 
whose special province it lay to know a particular fact, has given an erron­
eous answer to an inquiry made with regard to it by a person desirous 
of ascertaining the fact for the purpose of determining his course accord­
ingly, and has been held bound to make good the assurance he has given.”
The defendant here, like the defendant in Glanzer v. Shepard (supra), 
occupied an independent position, and issued its certificates at the behest 
of a third person. We may say with Judge Cardozo that the certificates 
were made “with the very end and aim of shaping the conduct of an­
other.” Like the utterer of the statement in the assumed case in Lord 
H erschell’s exception, it was the “special province” of the defendant 
“to know a particular fact;” it imparted information, by its certificates, 
to persons “desirous of ascertaining the fact for the purpose of determin­
ing” their course accordingly. W ithin the requirements laid down by 
Judge Andrews, the defendant knew that the certificates were desired for 
a serious purpose by persons who intended to rely and act thereupon. 
They were issued for the very purpose of establishing a relationship of 
trustee and cestui que trust between the defendant and the persons who 
might rely thereon. It must be remembered that this is not the case of 
a buyer and seller to whose transactions the principle of caveat emptor 
might apply. It is a case where the creator of a trust, accepted by the 
defendant, in a solemn instrument signed by both, named the defendant 
as trustee, for the special purpose, among others, that it might certify 
bonds to prospective investors, to the very end that the takers of the bonds
202 ACCOUNTANTS’ LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
might receive definite assurance that the bonds were issued pursuant to 
the terms of the indenture. It seems clear, therefore, that, within the 
authorities cited, the defendant, in so far as its certificates constituted 
misrepresentations of fact, innocently though negligently made, became 
liable to the takers of the bonds, who invested their moneys upon the 
faith of the certificates.
The certificates were not to be issued, as we have seen, unless ac­
ceptances and notes of dealers and automobile buyers, in excess of bonds 
to be issued, had been deposited with the defendant as security therefor. 
Necessarily, therefore, the certificates constituted representations that 
the deposits had been made. Clearly, if the defendant, as trustee, had is­
sued the certificates when no securities whatever had been deposited with 
it, liability for the damage done would have arisen. Equally must this fol­
low where, as in this case, the securities deposited were not the securities 
specified in the trust indenture from which alone the defendant derived 
its power to certify. In not ascertaining that the securities deposited were 
not securities of the character named in the indenture, the defendant was 
guilty of negligence. In certifying the bonds, as issued pursuant to the 
terms of the indenture, it was guilty of negligently making a misrepre­
sentation of fact. The plaintiff and certain assignors were induced by the 
certificates to invest in the worthless bonds. If the certificates had not 
been executed the bonds could not have been issued and no loss would 
have accrued. Therefore, the false certificates were the proximate cause 
of the losses sustained. (Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co., supra; Mullen 
v. Banking Co., supra; Rhinelander v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., supra.)
The provisions of the trust indenture in certain instances exempting 
the defendant from liability for its acts or omissions as trustee, do not, 
in this instance, apply. (Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co., supra; Mullen 
v. Banking Co., supra; Rhinelander v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., supra.) 
In Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co. (supra) the vice chancellor said: “It 
accordingly seems impossible to construe an immunity clause as intended 
to exempt a trustee from liability for transcending his powers as clearly 
defined by the trust agreement; his engagement is to exercise the powers, 
and only the powers conferred upon him, and the appropriate office and 
purpose of an immunity clause forming a part of a trust agreement which 
specifically and clearly defines the trustee’s powers appears to be to limit 
his responsibility in matters of judgment and discretion committed to 
him in the execution of those defined powers.”
The record indicates that the plaintiff and many of his assignors took 
their bonds in reliance upon the certificates and in ignorance of the char­
acter of the securities deposited. The plaintiff is entitled to recover 
damages on account of the investments thus induced, on the basis of the 
consideration paid therefor plus interest, less the value of the bonds ac­
quired, if any. (Reno v. Bull, supra.) The record leaves it in doubt 
w hether certain  o ther assignors were n o t fully aware of the character of 
the securities deposited and of the shady nature of the financial trans­
actions in which the Motor Guaranty Corporation was engaged and, there­
fore, whether or not they in good faith relied upon the certificates in 
making their investments. For the determination of these questions a 
new trial is necessary.
The judgment of the Appellate Division and that of the Trial Term 
should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
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Cardozo, Ch. J., Pound, Crane, Lehman, O’Brien and H ubbs, J J ., 
concur.
Judgments reversed, etc.
STATE STREET TRUST CO. v. ERNST *
Court of Appeals of New York, 1938. 278 N. Y. 104, 15 N. E. 2d 416.
Appeal, by permission, from a judgment of the Appellate Division of 
the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered June 4, 1937, 
which unanimously affirmed a judgment in favor of defendants entered 
upon an order of the court at a T rial Term granting motions by the 
defendants to set aside a verdict in favor of plaintiff and for the direction 
of a verdict in favor of defendants.
Finch, J. Was the evidence introduced by plaintiff so inadequate that, 
resolving all contested issues and drawing all possible inferences in 
plaintiff’s favor, a jury could not find that defendants were guilty of gross 
negligence raising an inference of fraud, and that plaintiff relied upon 
the certified balance sheet prepared by defendants, thereby suffering 
damage?
The Pelz-Greenstein Company was organized in 1922 to engage in the 
business of financing wholesalers or mills. Its sole business was lending 
money, taking back, as collateral, inventory of the borrower and assign­
ments of accounts receivable. Each borrower was referred to as a “depart­
ment.” Advances were made by Pelz-Greenstein to its borrowers to enable 
them to purchase or manufacture merchandise. Pelz-Greenstein was repaid 
in large part by the assignment of accounts receivable resulting from the 
sales of such merchandise. The collectibility of these advances thus 
depended in the first instance on the salability of the merchandise manu­
factured or purchased by the funds so advanced. If the merchandise failed 
to sell, not only was the repayment of the advances jeopardized, but like­
wise the income of Pelz-Greenstein, for its major item of income, to wit, 
commissions, was a percentage of the assigned accounts.
On January 19, 1929, the president of Pelz-Greenstein applied to 
plaintiff for a line of credit and a loan of $300,000. He presented an 
estimated balance sheet of the business as of December 31, 1928, and 
stated that defendants, a firm of accountants, were making an audit of 
the condition of the company as of that date and that a balance sheet 
certified by defendants would be submitted to plaintiff when it had been 
prepared. Plaintiff refused to grant the application of Pelz-Greenstein 
for a time loan until it had received the certified balance sheet of 
defendants and had found that it substantially corroborated the estimated 
balance sheet. Pending the receipt of the certified balance sheet of 
defendants plaintiff made a demand loan to Pelz-Greenstein of $300,000.
This certified balance sheet prepared by defendants was dated April 2, 
1929, and issued in ten counterparts. The defendants admit that they 
knew it was to be used to obtain credit. On April 9 a copy was given 
by Pelz-Greenstein to plaintiff. Plaintiff found that the certified balance 
sheet substantially corroborated the estimated balance sheet. The demand 
note was then surrendered and a three months’ time note taken in its 
place. This note was renewed for three months’ periods, the last renewal
* This case is discussed at p. 34 ff. supra.
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being made January 9, 1930. Morgan, the lending officer of plaintiff, 
testifies that he relied upon this certified balance sheet in passing upon 
the application for the loan and in making the renewals. On April 26, 
1930, Pelz-Greenstein was petitioned into bankruptcy. Plaintiff has 
received back only a portion of its loan and brings this action for the 
difference.
With the certified balance sheet defendants issued the following 
certificate:
“We hereby certify that we examined the books of account and record 
pertaining to the assets and liabilities of Pelz-Greenstein Co., Inc., New 
York City, as of the close of business December 31, 1928, and, based on the 
records examined, information submitted to us, and subject to the fore­
going notes [not here material], it is our opinion that the above con­
densed statement shows the financial condition of the company at the date 
stated and that the related income and surplus account is correct.”
On May 9, 1929, a month after supplying ten copies of the balance 
sheet to be used, to the knowledge of the defendants, to obtain credit, 
defendants sent a letter to the Pelz-Greenstein Company containing 
comments on and explanations of the balance sheet. Apparently only 
one copy of this letter was sent, and it did not come to the attention 
of plaintiff nor, so far as the evidence shows, to any one else until after 
the bankruptcy of Pelz-Greenstein. This accompanying letter contained 
statements of facts discovered by defendants in the course of their audit, 
and, therefore, known to them when they prepared the original certified 
balance sheet, but which were not mentioned therein. One of the 
defendants testified before trial that the certified balance sheet was subject 
to the comments contained in the letter and the letter was sent for the 
purpose of trying to prevent any one from using this balance sheet without 
knowing the scope of the examination which was made.
At the close of plaintiff’s case defendants moved to dismiss the com­
plaint. The trial judge reserved decision. Defendants thereupon rested 
without calling any witnesses, although there would naturally be available 
the men who made the audit, those who prepared or supervised the 
preparation of the working papers or the certified balance sheet and 
experts to refute the testimony offered by the experts called by plaintiff. 
Defendants renewed their motion to dismiss and also moved for a directed 
verdict. The court reserved decision and submitted the case to the jury. 
After the jury rendered a verdict for plaintiff the trial judge denied the 
reserved motion to dismiss, but granted a motion to set aside the verdict, 
and directed a verdict for defendants. The Appellate Division has unani­
mously affirmed, and the appeal is here by permission of this court.
In the brief of respondents, Pelz and Greenstein are denominated as 
deliberately dishonest. It is there conceded that they made old and 
probably uncollectible accounts appear good by causing payments to be 
made to Pelz-Greenstein, Inc., by another corporation owned by them­
selves, which payments, credited to such old accounts, made it appear as 
if the debtors had been paying their debts. They induced one Saqui, who 
freely admitted his own dishonesty and testified on behalf of plaintiff, to 
furnish false inventories and to assign to Pelz-Greenstein large numbers 
of false and fictitious accounts. In one account of $800,000 there were 
$300,000 of wholly fictitious sales. At the time Pelz-Greenstein was hope­
lessly insolvent.
To what extent may accountants be held liable for their failure to
LIABILITY TO TH IR D  PARTIES — AT COMMON LAW 205
reveal this condition? We have held that in the absence of a contractual 
relationship or its equivalent, accountants cannot be held liable for 
ordinary negligence in preparing a certified balance sheet even though 
they are aware that the balance sheet will be used to obtain credit. (Ultra­
mares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170.) Accountants, however, may be 
liable to third parties, even where there is lacking deliberate or active 
fraud. A representation certified as true to the knowledge of the account­
ants when knowledge there is none, a reckless misstatement, or an opinion 
based on grounds so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no 
genuine belief in its truth, are all sufficient upon which to base liability. 
A refusal to see the obvious, a failure to investigate the doubtful, if 
sufficiently gross, may furnish evidence leading to an inference of fraud so 
as to impose liability for losses suffered by those who rely on the balance 
sheet. In other words, heedlessness and reckless disregard of consequence 
may take the place of deliberate intention.
In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche (255 N. Y. 170) we said with no uncer­
tainty that negligence, if gross, or blindness, even though not equivalent 
to fraud, was sufficient to sustain an inference of fraud. Our exact words 
were: “In this connection we are to bear in mind the principle already 
stated in the course of this opinion that negligence or blindness, even 
when not equivalent to fraud, is none the less evidence to sustain an 
inference of fraud. At least this is so if the negligence is gross” (p. 190).
To emphasize our holding that active and deliberate fraud was not 
necessary to create liability, and that gross negligence, and even blindness 
to the obvious may be evidence to sustain an inference of fraud, we were 
careful to point out that the language in Kountze v. Kennedy (147 N. Y. 
124), saying that misjudgment, however gross, or want of caution, however 
marked, is not fraud, must be confined to the facts of that case, where 
the trier of the facts had found the defendants guiltless, and the ruling 
“amounted merely to a holding that a finding of fraud did not follow as 
an inference of law.” (Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, supra, p. 191.)
The defendants, however, contend that they may escape all liability by 
insisting that the balance sheet merely purported to reflect the condition 
of the books and that it did this correctly. The balance sheet, however, 
did not correctly reflect the condition of the company even as shown by 
the books, as will later appear. Nor is the duty of an accountant in prepar­
ing a balance sheet confined to a mere setting up of the items from the 
books. Such duties have been defined.
“His [the author’s] business is to ascertain and state the true financial 
position of the company at the time of the audit, and his duty is confined 
to that. But then comes the question, ‘How is he to ascertain that posi­
tion?’ The answer is, ‘By examining the books of the company.’ But he 
does not discharge his duty by doing this without inquiry and without 
taking any trouble to see that the books themselves shew the company’s 
true position. He must take reasonable care to ascertain that they do so. 
Unless he does this his audit would be worse than an idle farce. Assuming 
the books to be so kept as to shew the true position of a company, the 
auditor has to frame a balance-sheet shewing that position according to 
the books and to certify that the balance sheet presented is correct in that 
sense. But his first duty is to examine the books, not merely for the 
purpose of ascertaining what they do shew, but also for the purpose of 
satisfying himself that they shew the true financial position of the com­
pany.” (Matter of L ondon & General Bank, [1895] 2 Ch. 673, 682.)
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The record is, indeed, replete with evidence, both oral and docu­
mentary, to make a prima facie case against the defendants. In the first 
place, we have these accountants guilty of an act which is the equivalent 
of active misrepresentation. On April 2, 1929, they sent to Pelz-Greenstein 
the certified balance sheet, with ten additional copies, knowing that it 
was to be used to obtain credit. “Nothing was said as to the persons to 
whom these counterparts would be shown or the extent or number of 
the transactions in which they would be used * * * The range of the 
transactions in which a certificate of audit might be expected to play 
a part was as indefinite and wide as the possibilities of the business that 
was mirrored in the summary.” (Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 
170, 174.) Not until thirty days later did the accountants send to Pelz- 
Greenstein a letter of explanation of this balance sheet, and then ap­
parently only one copy. So important was this covering letter in the minds 
of defendants that, although the balance sheet attached to the covering 
letter was in other respects substantially identical with the original bal­
ance sheet, it contained the following notation, which did not appear at 
all on the original balance sheet released thirty days earlier: “This balance 
sheet is subject to the comments contained in the letter attached to and 
made a part of this report.” One of the copartners, testifying before trial, 
said: “We want to try to prevent anyone using this balance sheet, without 
knowing the scope of the examination which we made, which is set forth 
in paragraph 2 of the full report. * * * We have had cases where our 
entire covering letter had been deleted from these reports and just the 
balance sheet used.” Yet, in effect, these defendants themselves did just 
this. They held back this covering letter for thirty days and issued the 
balance sheet alone to the world of possible lenders. The loan by the 
plaintiff was made long before this important covering letter was even 
sent.
The above act of the accountants, in placing in circulation a certified 
balance sheet which they practically conceded should not be used without 
knowing the scope of the examination set forth in the covering letter, 
and then allowing a period of thirty days to elapse before sending the 
covering letter, and then only one copy, whereas there had been ten 
copies of the certified balance sheet issued, was itself gross negligence 
and an important piece of evidence raising an inference of fraud.
The certified balance sheet, outside of capital, showed a small surplus 
of $83,000. According to the evidence and the reasonable inferences 
deductible therefrom, a jury might have found that instead of a surplus 
of $83,000 the balance sheet should have shown a deficit and impairment 
of capital of over half a million. A jury could also have found that in 
addition over $768,000 of its commission accounts were in a condition 
indicating the likelihood of substantial losses.
Turning now to the specific items. The second largest item in the 
balance sheet was the item:
“Commission Accounts Receivable— secured by merchandise
Advances ................................................................................ $2,043,337.81
Less allowance ......................................................................  19,767.15
$2,023,570.66”
The above item represented the advances made by Pelz-Greenstein to its
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borrowers to finance their operations in the purchase or manufacture of 
merchandise. These accounts, amounting to over one-fourth of Pelz- 
Greenstein’s total assets, were shown on the certified balance sheet as good 
after deducting the $19,000 allowance. Yet, to the knowledge of defend­
ants, according to their own statement, in the delayed covering letter, a 
very large proportion of these commission accounts receivable “were 
comparatively inactive during the year and appeared slow of collection.” 
Out of the total of $2,043,000 an aggregate of $768,000, or over 38 per 
cent of the total amount, had unpaid advances at the end of the year 1928, 
amounting to 125 per cent of the total sales during the year. This meant 
that these borrowers owed Pelz-Greenstein more money at the end of the 
year than their total sales during the year by 25 per cent, thus indicating 
stagnation of inventories. Not only did these stagnant accounts represent 
over 38 per cent in amount, but they included 27 out of 55 borrowers. The 
defendants had knowledge of this condition as shown by the delayed 
covering letter, and this knowledge was brought home to them by their 
report for the prior year, when they referred in the following manner 
to similar accounts, although the percentage of advances to sales then 
was only 65 per cent, as compared with 125 per cent in 1928: “The follow­
ing accounts had excessive advances as measured by their sales volume 
which indicated probably excessive or slow moving inventories.” It was 
conceded that this was the third consecutive audit by the defendants 
of the books of Pelz-Greenstein.
One of the experts for the plaintiff testified without contradiction that 
the percentage of unpaid advances, amounting to 125 per cent of sales, 
indicated that the accounts were in an over-extended condition and were 
badly out of proportion to the amount of merchandise sold during the 
year, indicating that the inventories were either excessive, slow moving or 
unsalable. In his opinion this condition indicated the likelihood of 
excessive losses. Furthermore, this expert testified unequivocally that the 
financial condition of Pelz-Greenstein could not be truthfully expressed 
without mention of this condition in the balance sheet. Professor Cole, the 
other expert called by plaintiff, testified that proper accounting practice 
required that defendants either establish a very large allowance for 
uncollectible accounts or indicate, in connection with the balance sheet, 
the existence of approximately $768,000 with a ratio of advances to sales 
of 125 per cent. The best corroboration of the testimony of both these 
experts is what defendants themselves said of this condition in the delayed 
covering letter. In spite of this a reserve of a mere $19,767.15 was set up 
against this account. This was to cover not only those accounts of $768,000, 
showing the stagnation of inventories described above, but all other 
commission accounts in a total of over $2,000,000.
This small reserve of $19,000 was practically absorbed in the one 
account of W. K. Wardener, which had gone into bankruptcy in 1924 
and from which account Pelz-Greenstein had received nothing since May, 
1924. Even if the accountants had not been informed that the Wardener 
account was in bankruptcy yet a warning that this account required a 
substantial reserve was given to them by the fact that an account upon 
which nothing had been received since May, 1924, was being padded 
year after year by monthly interest charges. From a failure to note on 
the balance sheet the stagnant condition of over three-quarters of a 
million of these accounts and the setting up of a totally inadequate 
reserve, a jury might reasonably draw the inference that these defendants
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had no genuine belief in these figures in the balance sheet to which they 
certified.
We next come to a very substantial item entitled 
“Commission Account Advances—
Inactive and in L iquidation .................................................... $215,124.72.”
This item appeared on the certified balance sheet without any reserve. 
The books of Pelz-Greenstein showed on their face that many of the 
accounts included in this item had had no transactions for many years, 
neither sales nor relaizations upon security. Furthermore, within this 
time the books showed systematic inflation of these accounts by steadily 
increasing interest charges. In fact, these charges were added to one 
account, even though the account appeared on the face of the books to 
have been in bankruptcy. The covering letter set forth the real condition 
of these accounts in detail, thus showing full knowledge on the part of 
the defendants. Defendants seek to sustain the integrity of this item on 
the ground that they placed it “below the line” and characterized it as 
“inactive and in liquidation.” The only evidence in the record concern­
ing the effect of these acts is the uncontradicted evidence of the accounting 
experts that placing an item below the line means only that it is not 
current but that otherwise it will be realizable in full. Furthermore, these 
expert witnesses testified that the failure to set up a reserve against an 
item, whether it is placed above or below the line, according to the rules 
of accountancy which any one must apply in reading a balance sheet, 
means that the accountants represent that they have no knowledge which 
would indicate to them that these accounts are worth less than “full 
value” and “that the people certifying to this balance sheet indicate this 
is the value.” The experts went on to testify without contradiction that 
from the facts as shown on the face of the books a reserve of at least 
$150,000 should have been set up against these accounts unless investiga­
tion showed them to be of full value.
The defendants urge that these defendants were excused from investiga­
tion because of a letter from Leon S. Pelz, treasurer of Pelz-Greenstein, in 
which he stated that Pelz-Greenstein had in its possession “sufficient 
salable merchandise to completely liquidate” these accounts. In other 
words, defendants were content to certify a balance sheet knowing it 
would be used to secure bank credit which contained an item of over 
$125,000* of apparently dead accounts on the uninvestigated and unsup­
ported statement of the party seeking the credit that these accounts were 
amply secured, although it appeared on the face of the books that there 
had been no realization upon this security for years. Where the books 
indicate the likelihood of a substantial loss, a failure to indicate this on 
the balance sheet can be justified only by an actual check-up. It does not 
suffice to rely instead upon the statement of an officer of the firm the 
books of which are being examined. If an accountant may disregard a 
situation which indicates substantial losses because he is informed by the 
person whose books are being examined that there is adequate security, 
the balance sheet issued by the accountant, by its failure to point this 
out, contains a misrepresentation. The very purpose of the bank in 
seeking the balance sheet prepared by the accountant is to check any 
possible fraud on the part of the person seeking the loan. Yet these
* Sic. should clearly be $215,000. (Ed.)
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accountants contend that they may accept as true a statement by the 
party whose books are being examined, make no check-up or investigation 
on their own part, and issue a statement omitting entirely any mention 
of the reason why investigation of the security was omitted.
We have explicit expert testimony, uncontradicted, that under these 
circumstances it was improper accounting practice for defendants to 
accept a letter from Pelz-Greenstein, and that they should have investi­
gated these accounts very fully to ascertain whether the companies were 
still in business and to ascertain definitely and independently what 
security, if any, Pelz-Greenstein held for the payment of these accounts.
We next come to an item which is not as large as those which have 
gone before, but as to which there was obvious gross negligence. In the 
“Accounts Receivable” item of $3,200,000, protected only by a reserve 
of $15,000, was a group of accounts totaling over $72,000 denominated 
by defendants on their work sheet as “Ocean Bankrupt Accounts.” De­
fendants stated that the failure to set up a reserve against this $72,000 of 
bankrupt accounts was justified because they were covered by policies of 
credit insurance. A mere cursory examination of the policies shows that 
over $32,000 of these accounts were not covered by the policies at all. 
Thus the reserve was shown to be inadequate by this one account alone. 
In addition, defendants’ own work sheets showed that $14,000 of these 
bankrupt accounts had been with the insurance company from three years 
to fifteen months without action. There was expert testimony which a 
jury was at liberty to believe that a reserve of at least $46,000 should have 
been established against this account.
We find, also, a $10,000 demand note listed as part of the assets without 
reserve although it had been overdue and in the hands of an attorney, 
who had been unable to collect, for two years.
In connection with the foregoing items we have been concerned with 
evidence from which a jury might find that defendants had actual knowl­
edge that the condition of the items in the balance sheet was not as repre­
sented. In the account of E. Heller & Bros., on the other hand, plaintiff 
contends that the evidence was sufficient to justify a jury in finding that 
there were circumstances appearing on the books which were so unusual 
and suspicious that proper accounting practice required defendants to 
make an investigation. The Heller account involved over $800,000 of the 
assets of Pelz-Greenstein. During the first eleven months of 1928 sales 
by the Heller Company never exceeded $191,000 a month, and averaged 
about $129,000. In December, just preceding the report of the account­
ants, sales were listed in the books as having jumped to $491,000. The 
amount included $300,000 of wholly fictitious sales. Plaintiff contends 
that this sudden increase of approximately $300,000 for the month should 
have put defendants on notice that something was wrong. Investigation 
was at least called for and would have disclosed the fictitious accounts.
We come now to evidence from which a jury could find that these 
defendants were at least heedless and reckless in purporting to reflect the 
condition of the books. We have an allowance of $101,000 for “doubtfuls” 
and “discounts,” $86,000 of this $101,000 being for discounts and $15,000 
for doubtfuls in the item of Accounts Receivable for $3,200,000. There 
was evidence that these figures for doubtfuls and discounts were arrived 
at, not by computation on the basis of business done during the year 1928, 
but by accepting the figures used for the year 1927. The working papers 
used by defendants for 1927 showed that in that year the amount of dis­
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counts had been based originally upon usual accounting practice, and 
was much larger than the final figure adopted by the accountants. Also, 
the original allowance for doubtfuls was greater than the final figure. On 
the basis of these higher figures, however, the profit for the year 1927 was 
less than the amount of dividends declared for that year. The reserves for 
discounts and for doubtfuls were then reduced so as to establish a profit 
in excess of the dividends for the year. The haphazard method used in 
arriving at these figures and the failure to follow usual accounting practice 
supports the contention urged by plaintiff, without answer or explana­
tion upon this record, that defendants, in preparing this balance sheet, 
were negligent to such an extent as to amount to a reckless disregard for 
the accuracy necessary for a balance sheet to give the proper reflection 
of the condition of the business.
The record contains many other important items of evidence to 
enumerate which would unduly extend this opinion, now beyond reason­
able limits.
The foregoing presents abundant evidence from which a jury could 
find that defendants knew facts which vitally affected the financial worth 
of Pelz-Greenstein, and which defendants totally suppressed on the certi­
fied balance sheet but disclosed to Pelz-Greenstein alone in the one copy 
of the covering letter sent thirty days later. The jury further could have 
found that the computation of reserves on the certified balance sheet was 
a misrepresentation which did not reflect the facts as known to defendants, 
and which they in good faith should have revealed. Where the record 
shows acts on the part of the accountants, as outlined above, we cannot 
say, as a matter of law, that plaintiff has failed to make out a case for 
the jury.
This brings us to the question of reliance. Defendants contend that 
the difference between the estimated balance sheet furnished by Pelz- 
Greenstein and the certified balance sheet prepared by them was such 
that as a matter of law plaintiff must have disregarded their certified 
balance sheet in making the loan and decided to make the loan solely 
on the basis of the estimated balance sheet of Pelz-Greenstein. In so con­
tending defendants disregard the uncontradicted evidence that the certi­
fied balance sheet substantially corroborated the estimated balance sheet, 
the differences being only those which an audit would ordinarily produce. 
A mere comparison of the two balance sheets discloses that there was 
ample evidence from which a jury could find that the certified balance 
sheet was a substantial corroboration of the estimated balance sheet. 
When the items of cash receivable, commission accounts receivable and 
subscriptions on the two balance sheets are totaled they show a total for 
the estimated balance sheet of $7,760,000 and for the certified balance 
sheet of $7,650,000, the latter figure being net after deducting reserves 
of about $121,000. As the estimated balance sheet showed no reserves, the 
actual discrepancy in assets between the estimated and certified balance 
sheet was only about $11,000. Furthermore, the only substantial difference 
between the balance sheets was that defendants listed a number of items 
as non-current assets which the estimated balance sheet had listed as 
current assets. It cannot be said, therefore, that there was no evidence 
that the certified balance sheet substantially corroborated the estimated 
balance sheet. It is undoubtedly true that, in making the loan, there was 
reliance upon the then reputations of Pelz and Greenstein. But this does 
not preclude reliance also upon defendants’ certified balance sheet. Evi-
LIABILITY TO TH IR D  PARTIES— AT COMMON LAW 211
dence of such reliance is to be found in the uncontradicted testimony of 
the witnesses testifying for the plaintiff. Also it is to be found in the fact 
that the plaintiff would not make any but a demand loan until receipt of 
the certified balance sheet, and that it was only after it had received and 
examined the certified balance sheet that it made the time loan. The 
fraudulent misrepresentations on the part of defendants need not be the 
sole inducing cause of the damage. It is sufficient if such representations 
be an inducing cause. (Ochs v. Woods, 221 N. Y. 335; Laska n. Harris, 
215 N. Y. 554.)
In addition the defendants rely on the fact that plaintiff renewed the 
note on several occasions so as to extend it for more than a year, and that 
when the precarious condition of Pelz-Greenstein Company was discovered 
plaintiff agreed to participate in a pooling of assets agreement with several 
other banks. Defendants knew that Pelz-Greenstein Company was seeking 
a line of credit from plaintiff and that the original note, if granted, would 
be extended subsequently. There is abundant evidence to show that these 
extensions were made in reliance upon the certified balance sheet, and, 
although other factors may have been considered, they do not constitute 
a sole and independent cause which brought about the loss rather than 
the misstatements in the balance sheet. (See Hotaling v. Leach & Co., 247 
N. Y. 84, 93.) The pooling agreement was to plaintiff’s advantage and 
helped to minimize the loss.
Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff was not damaged by reason 
of the balance sheet because at the time it was issued plaintiff already 
had made a demand loan of $300,000, and the company, according to 
plaintiff’s allegations, was insolvent at that time. There can be no doubt 
that if at the time the balance sheet was issued plaintiff had been in­
formed of the true condition of Pelz-Greenstein Company it would have 
insisted upon immediate payment of the demand loan, and there is evi­
dence from which it can be found that at that time full payment of the 
loan could have been obtained.
Upon all the evidence it cannot be said as a matter of law that plaintiff 
has failed to make out a prima facie case against defendants.
The judgments should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs 
in all courts to abide the event.
Lehman, J. (dissenting). The defendants, a firm of accountants, were 
employed by the Pelz-Greenstein Company to examine the books of the 
company and to prepare a certified balance sheet of its financial position. 
To their employers they owed a duty to perform their work with care 
and with the skill which they represented they had, as professional ac­
countants. They owed no such duty to persons who might deal with Pelz- 
Greenstein Company, upon the basis of the certified balance sheet pre­
pared by the defendants. To such persons they owed only the duty to 
refrain from making any fraudulent misrepresentation. (Ultramares 
Corp. v. Touche, 225 N. Y. 170.) The courts below have held, without 
dissent, that the evidence is insufficient to permit an inference of fraud 
as defined in that case.
The only representations made by the defendants are contained in the 
balance sheet which they prepared after examining the books of account 
of the Pelz-Greenstein Company and the certificate appended thereto. The 
certificate states: “We hereby certify that we examined the books of ac­
count and record pertaining to the assets and liabilities of Pelz-Greenstein 
Co., Inc., New York City, as of the close of business December 31, 1928,
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and, based on the records examined, information submitted to us, and 
subject to the foregoing notes [not material here], it is our opinion that 
the above condensed statement shows the financial condition of the com­
pany at the date stated and that the related income and surplus account 
is correct.”
To prepare a balance sheet, accountants must, of course, examine the 
books and accounts submitted to them, and from such examination and 
any other information which may be furnished to them, they must pre­
pare a balance sheet which, in their opinion, reflects the true financial 
position of the business. The certificate of the defendants constitutes an 
express representation of fact that they have “examined the books of 
account and record pertaining to the assets and liabilities of Pelz- 
Greenstein Co., Inc.” The balance sheet itself represents and was under­
stood to represent only the “opinion” of the defendants based “on the 
records examined” and on information presented to the defendants.
It is undisputed that the defendants did examine the books and ac­
counts of Pelz-Greenstein Company and that the balance sheet is based 
upon entries in those books and accounts. It is also undisputed that the 
balance sheet did not show the true financial position of the business. 
According to the balance sheet, the corporation had assets of about 
$8,000,000 and debts of less than $5,000,000; its capital of over $3,000,000 
was unimpaired and it had, a surplus of about $83,000. In fact the cor­
poration was insolvent; its liabilities exceeded the fair value of its assets. 
The defendants did not, however, warrant, or certify, the accuracy of the 
balance sheet; they represented only that the balance sheet was in “their 
opinion” correct. May they be held responsible for loss caused to the 
bank by reliance on this expression of opinion? T hat is the problem 
presented upon this appeal.
The defendants are not liable for error of judgment; they are not liable 
even for lack of care in arriving at their opinion. They are liable only if 
the opinion expressed was not only erroneous, but was fraudulently ex­
pressed. Actual bad faith and intent to deceive is not always, it is true, 
an essential element in a cause of action for deceit. Such a cause of action 
may be established against the defendants without proof that they ex­
pressed an opinion which they knew was incorrect; at least, however, 
there must be evidence of a ruthless disregard of whether the opinion 
was correct or not—the expression of an opinion where “the grounds sup­
porting it are so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no 
genuine belief back of it.” (Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, supra, p. 186.)
In that case we said that “negligence or blindness, even when not 
equivalent to fraud, is none the less evidence to sustain an inference of 
fraud. At least this is so if the negligence is gross” (p. 190). T hat rule 
was not new; it had been applied in earlier cases cited in the opinion. 
Again and again, however, in that opinion, as in the cases cited, the court 
pointed out that even gross negligence is not equivalent to fraud. It may, 
in proper case, furnish sufficient evidence to justify an inference of fraud, 
but that is true only when the proof of gross negligence shows that the 
grounds supporting the opinion are in fact “so flimsy as to lead to the con­
clusion that there was no genuine belief back of it. Further than that this 
court has never gone.” (Italics are mine.) (Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 
supra, p. 186.)
Judge Finch has, in his opinion, referred to the evidence upon which 
he Bases his conclusion that it establishes fraud. I shall try to avoid repeti-
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tion of that evidence. The most important of the alleged errors in the 
balance sheet is the failure to provide sufficient reserves for the collection 
of “commission accounts receivable.” The amount of reserves which 
should be set aside to take care of loss that may be suffered by reason of 
inability to collect such accounts is a matter of judgment. The defendants 
knew of circumstances which it is said pointed clearly to the conclusion 
that a reserve of $21,000 is insufficient to take care of these accounts of 
over $2,043,337.81. Perhaps the defendants here showed a lack of caution. 
Their letter sent thirty days after the certified balance sheet was sent, 
shows that they knew that the reserve might prove insufficient. None the 
less, the amount of probable loss even with these circumstances known 
remained uncertain; the estimate of one per cent loss was doubtless over- 
optmistic, yet the estimate was based on facts which were not “so flimsy 
as to lead to the conclusion that there was no honest belief back of it” 
(p. 186).
The next error which, it is argued, shows negligence so gross as to indi­
cate a lack of honest belief based on substantial grounds is that no allow­
ance was made for “commission account advances.” Many of these 
accounts were old. Again there are circumstances which perhaps should 
have acted as a warning signal to a cautious accountant. The defendants 
saw the signal—that is shown by the supplementary letter—but decided, 
nevertheless, to make no allowance. Again it would, doubtless, have been 
better if the defendants had given to those who might rely upon the 
balance sheet, the warning signal they had seen. They did, however, give 
notice on the balance sheet that accounts were “inactive and in liquida­
tion” and they removed them from the current assets of the business and 
placed them “below the line.” The owners of the business, men who at 
that time had a fine reputation, assured the defendants that they had 
sufficient security to liquidate these dead accounts. I can find here no 
justification for any argument that a balance sheet which shows that no 
allowance or reserve has been made for inactive accounts in liquidation 
may be held to be a fraudulent representation that no allowance or 
reserve is necessary.
I agree that the jury might find gross negligence in failure to provide 
a reserve of $46,000 against a group of bankrupt accounts aggregating 
$72,000. Even gross negligence in regard to an item of $46,000 in a balance 
sheet showing assets of almost $8,000,000 can hardly be regarded as sub­
stantial evidence of fraudulent misrepresentation. I do not take up in 
detail the other items where it is said the jury might find gross negligence. 
Each one involves the exercise of judgment; in none does it appear that 
there was no ground for honest exercise of judgment.
Certainly there is here no deliberate intention to deceive, no state­
ment of fact made without actual knowledge, no statement of an opinion 
which the defendants did not honestly hold; nor, with the possible ex­
ception of the one item of $46,000. is there any evidence of an expression 
of opinion made by a person careless as to whether it was based on suffi­
cient knowledge. The case is entirely different from that presented by 
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche (supra). There the defendants certified 
that the balance sheet corresponded with accounts which the jury might 
find had not been examined by the defendants, or had been disregarded 
by them; and the court pointed out “that in certifying to the correspond­
ence between balance sheet and accounts” (p. 192), the defendants made
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a statement as true to their own knowledge, when they had, as a jury 
might find, no knowledge on the subject.
Here the defendants examined adequately the books and data which 
they certified they had examined, and they are not charged with either 
bad faith or even neglignce in making their examination. The balance 
sheet corresponds with the books and if the defendants were negligent, 
their negligence, whether gross or slight, consisted only in failure to give 
to the information, which they obtained through such examination, the 
effect which expert witnesses testify should, in their opinion, be given 
to it. The defendants realized that this information might reasonably 
affect their judgment. The explanatory letter which they sent later shows 
that. The jury might find that the defendants’ judgment was bad, but 
the court pointed out in the Ultramares case that liability cannot be 
predicated upon error however great in the exercise of judgment. The 
error of judgment does not indicate a willful expression of a false opinion, 
or an expression of opinion based on grounds so flimsy that the jury 
might conclude that the opinion was not based on genuine belief. To 
permit recovery in a case where the evidence does not sustain such a 
conclusion is to wipe out the distinction which this court has always 
drawn and which it reiterated in the Ultramares case.
The judgment should be affirmed.
O’Brien, Loughran and R ippey, JJ., concur with Finch, J.; Lehman, J., 
dissents in opinion in which Crane, Ch. J., concurs; H ubbs, J., taking no 
part.
Judgments reversed, etc. (See 278 N. Y. 704.)
O’CONNOR v. LUDLAM *
Court of Appeals of the United States for the Second Circuit, 1937. 
92 F.2d 50, cert. denied, 302 U. S. 758.
Swan, Circuit Judge. This is an action for deceit brought against the 
members of the firm of Haskins & Sells, certified public accountants. 
Haskins & Sells audited the books and accounts of G. L. Miller & Co., 
Inc., a Delaware corporation, as of the close of business August 31, 1925, 
and delivered to the corporation a balance sheet purporting to show its 
financial condition as of that date after giving effect to proposed new 
financing, namely, the sale of 30,000 shares of preferred stock at par— 
$3,000,000. This balance sheet was used by the corporation in selling 
its preferred stock to the public, and Haskins & Sells knew that it was to 
be so used. The plaintiffs are persons who purchased shares of the pre­
ferred stock between October 24, 1925, and June 3, 1926, in reliance upon 
the balance sheet, which they assert was fraudulently false and misleading. 
In  Septem ber, 1926, the corporation  was ad judicated  b an k ru p t, its assets 
were insufficient to pay the allowed claims of creditors, and the plaintiffs 
lost their investments in their entirety. This action was begun in October, 
1928. Jurisdiction of the District Court rests upon diversity of citizenship, 
and each of the plaintiffs sued on his own behalf for $3,000 or more. Their 
separate causes of action were tried together for convenience. After a 
trial lasting thirteen weeks, the jury found a verdict for the defendants.
* This case is discussed at p. 40 ff. supra.
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Judgment thereon was entered May 18, 1934. Seventeen of the plain tiffs 
have appealed. The appellees are the original defendants, excepting 
Charles S. Ludlam, against whom the action had abated by death. The 
enormous record on appeal, consisting of more than 4,000 printed pages 
and several hundred documentary exhibits, was not filed until January, 
1936, and the case did not come on for argument until a year later. The 
errors assigned relate solely to refusals to charge as requested, no excep­
tions having been taken by the appellants to the charge as given.
G. L. Miller & Co., Inc., was organized under the laws of Delaware in 
October, 1930. It took over the assets, good will, and liabilities of G. L. 
Miller & Co., a Florida corporation, and issued therefor 1,000 shares of no 
par value stock. This was issued to Mr. G. L. Miller, who remained 
throughout the owner of all the common stock of the corporation, except 
for qualifying shares issued to employee-directors. The net book value of 
the assets, exclusive of good will, so taken over was about $7,500 after 
deducting liabilities. In 1923 the corporation declared a common stock 
dividend of 100 per cent. Thus there were 2,000 shares outstanding at 
the time of the proposed new financing in 1925. The business of the Miller 
Company consisted in underwriting mortgage bonds on real estate, usually 
on buildings to be constructed, acting as trustee under the mortgage in­
dentures, and selling the bonds to the public. The common course of 
business involved three agreements: An underwriting agreement under 
which Miller & Co. purchased the mortgagor’s bonds; a trust indenture, 
under which Miller & Co. as trustee was to receive from the mortgagor in 
equal monthly installments sums sufficient to enable it to pay semi­
annually to the bondholders the yearly interest, the federal income tax 
thereon (up to 4 per cent.), and the amount required for annual re­
demption of the bonds, which matured serially; and a disbursing agree­
ment, under which Miller & Co. agreed to advance the amount of the 
mortgage loan as construction progressed. For the money thus advanced 
Miller & Co. depended upon the sale of the mortgage bonds.
At the time of the audit in question Miller & Co. had received from 
mortgagors for interest, income tax, and bond-redemption payments due 
under the trust indentures funds totalling approximately $1,377,000. 
These were held by it as trustee for the bondholders, but were commingled 
with its own cash, and the audit is claimed to be intentionally fraudulent 
in not adequately disclosing the amount of cash held in trust. Another 
ground of attack relates to payments made by Miller & Co. to complete the 
construction of mortgaged buildings. In selling bonds Miller & Co. repre­
sented that the mortgagor had agreed to provide the money necessary to 
complete the building under construction, and had furnished a surety 
bond guaranteeing completion free of all liens prior to that of the mort­
gage indenture. In fact, surety bonds were not furnished, and frequently 
the mortgagor defaulted in completing the structure. To make good such 
defaults Miller & Co. advanced very large sums out of its own funds. These 
were represented by notes of affiliates or subsidiaries of Miller & Co. and 
were shown in the audit as “secured,” although, as the District Judge 
charged, they were n o t secured. F urtherm ore, in  num erous instances 
Miller & Co. had itself guaranteed to bondholders completion of the 
buildings under construction, and the audit made no mention of such 
contingent liabilities running into many millions of dollars. It is also 
charged that the defendants made a false certificate as to the net earnings
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of Miller & Co. for the year 1924 and the first eight months of 1925. The 
audit is printed in the margin.1
The specific items which are challenged will be referred to hereafter in 
discussing the alleged errors of the court in refusing to charge as requested.
The charge which Judge Patterson delivered to the jury was an excep­
tionally clear exposition of the applicable law. Since there was no con­
tractual relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants, liability 
could be imposed only for fraud; a mistake in the balance sheet, even if it 
were the result of negligence, could not be the basis of a recovery. Ultra­
mares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441, 74 
A. L. R. 1139. Fraud presupposes not only an untrue statement but also 
a fraudulent intent. On the question of falsity of the representations the 
jury was told that the issue was whether the defendants’ representations, 
“in the sense to be taken by an ordinary reasonable man,” were, in fact, 
true or untrue—whether a true or a false impression was created. On the 
question of intent, the jury was told that fraud may be established by 
showing that a false representation has been made, either knowingly, or
1 G. L. MILLER & CO. 
Incorporated
General Balance Sheet, August 31, 1925 
After Giving Effect to Proposed New Financing
ASSETS
Cash, Including Time Certificates of Deposit.................................................... $4,663,099.93
Temporary Investments in Outside Securities:
Free Securities ...................... $335,861.38
In Escrow ...............................  131,038.44
Total temporary investments in outside securities..................................... 466,899.82
Bonds Secured by First Mortgages on Real Estate........................................  7,621,918.92
Notes and Accounts Receivable and Accrued Interest — Secured..............  2,987,411.69
Deferred Debit Items .......................................................................................... 162,126.42
Furniture and Fixtures, Less Reserve for Depreciation.................................  52,038.30
Good-Will ............................................................................................................. 1.00
Total............................. $15,953,496.08
LIABILITIES
Due to Mortgagors — For Bonds Underwritten —
Payable as Construction Progresses.........................................................
Accounts Payable and Sundry Accruals.............................................................
Customers’ Partial Payments ............................................................................
Funds for Bond Interest and Redemption........................................................
Deferred Credits to Income ..............................................................................
$8,757,379.86
88,258.24
124,099.69
1,966,938.40
234,624.80
Reserves:
Bond issue expenses ..............................................................$116,576.82
Taxes ......................................................................................  171,894.43
General ..................................................................................  30,000.00
Total reserves..................................................................... 318,471.25
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without belief in its truth, or in reckless disregard of whether it be true or 
false; and that the issue was whether the defendants had an honest belief 
that the statements made by them were true. “If they did have that honest 
belief, whether reasonably or unreasonably, they are not liable. If they did 
not have an honest belief in the truth of their statements, then they are 
liable, so far as this third element [scienter] is concerned.” The jury 
was also told that an intent to deceive may be inferred from a lack of 
honest representation; and that, so far as alleged concealments or omis­
sions were concerned, the issue was whether the omission to state certain 
matters was deliberate and intended to conceal. It was further charged 
that, if the audit made “was so superficial as to be only a pretended audit 
and not a real audit, then the element of knowledge of falsity of their 
representations is present, and they may be held liable.” Reading the 
charge as a whole, it seems to be in strict conformity with the established 
law. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 
441, 74 A. L. R. 1139; Knickerbocker Merchandising Co. v. United States, 
13 F. (2d) 544 (C. C. A. 2); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Drovers’ State Bank, 
15 F. (2d) 306 (C. C. A. 8); Panther Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner of 
Int. Rev., 45 F. (2d) 314 (C. C. A. 1). And apparently the plaintiffs them­
selves thought it accurate and satisfactory at the time, for in response to 
the court’s invitation to state exceptions to the charge as delivered, counsel 
replied that he had none. However, both sides had previously handed to 
the court requested instructions, and at the conclusion of the charge 
Judge Patterson remarked that many of the requests had been given in 
substance and that, to the extent not thus covered, the requests were 
refused an exception granted in each instance. The requests handed 
up by the appellants numbered 82; and their assignments of error involve 
40 alleged refusals to charge as requested, although they had failed to 
point out any errors in the charge as given. A similar grant of blanket ex­
ceptions has been criticized for the burden it passes to an appellate court. 
People v. Katz, 209 N. Y. 311, 103 N. E. 305, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 501. In 
Capital and Surplus:
Preferred capital stock, 8% cumulative participating 
(authorized and to be issued 30,000 shares of $100.00
each) ................................................................................ $3,000,000.00  
Common capital stock (authorized 5,000 shares of no
par value: issued 2,000 shares)....................................... 200,000.00
Surplus ................................................................................  1,263,723.84
Total Capital and Surplus ....................................................  4,463,723.84
Total .............................................................................. $15,953,496.08
Note: The Company carries life insurance on the life of Mr. G. L. Miller, President, 
for $500,000.00.
Our audit of the books and accounts of the G. L. Miller Company, Incorporated, 
discloses that the net earnings of the Company for the year ended December 31, 1924, 
were in excess of 2½ times the dividend requirements of the contemplated issue of 
30,000 shares of 8% cumulative preferred stock, and that the net earnings for the eight 
months ended August 31, 1925, were in excess of 3 times the dividend requirements of 
said stock for the said eight months.
New York, September 30, 1925/ HASKINS & SELLS. 
Certified Public Accountants.
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the federal courts the doctrine is firmly established that exceptions should 
be specifically taken so that the trial judge may have an opportunity to 
reconsider the matter and remove the ground of exception. Where the 
exceptions are not specific, an appellate court is under no duty laboriously 
to relate each of the requested instructions to the charge as given, in order 
to determine that no error was committed. American Sugar Refining Co. 
v. Nassif, 45 F. (2d) 321, 326 (C. C. A. 1) and authorities there cited. 
Nevertheless, if a refused instruction constituted plain error and had re­
sulted in a miscarriage of justice, we should hesitate to ignore it because 
exceptions were taken as they were in the case at bar. Accordingly, we 
have examined all of the errors assigned, but we shall discuss only those 
relating to requested instructions which appear to be the most significant.
The Subject of Trust Funds: The first item of assets on the general
balance sheet is “Cash, Including Time Certificates of D eposit........$4,­
663,099.93.” This figure was obtained by adding to the actual cash the 
estimated proceeds from sale of the new preferred stock. The actual cash 
included $1,477,000 of trust funds which Miller & Co. as trustee had re­
ceived from mortgagors on account of payments due under trust inden­
tures. Miller & Co. was itself the beneficiary of $100,000 of these trust 
funds, but the remainder, $1,377,000, was held in trust for other bond­
holders. The inclusion of this sum as a general cash asset of the company 
without further explanation would plainly give a false impression as to the 
company’s cash position. The main defense against this charge was the 
defendants’ contention that an adequate explanation was supplied by 
the item on the liability side of the balance sheet, “Funds for Bond Interest 
and R edem ption........$1,966,938.40.” In round figures this sum repre­
sented the aforesaid amount of $1,477,000 actually received from mort­
gagors plus an amount of $489,000 which was accrued and treated on 
the company’s books as received, although in fact it had not been. The 
defendants point out that the word “Funds” necessarily meant trust funds, 
since the “Bond Interest and Redemption” referred to could relate only 
to bonds on mortgaged property, Miller & Co. having no bond issue of its 
own. On the question whether there was ambiguity in this item, there 
was testimony both ways and the judge so charged, after calling the jury’s 
attention to the respective contentions of the parties. He had previously 
stated that the sum of about $1,400,000.00 was received by Miller & Co. 
as trustee under the mortgages.
The appellants complain because their requested instructions num­
bered 25 to 31, inclusive, were not given. They urge that the jury was 
simply left with the conflicting contentions of counsel on the subject of 
trust funds. In substance, their complaint seems to be that the court did 
not point out with particularity how to apply to this subject the general 
rules he laid down for determining whether representations were false 
and made with fraudulent intent. Such a complaint is not well taken. 
The judge was under no obligation to discuss in detail the evidence re­
lating to each item of the alleged misrepresentations, and particularly is 
this true where no request was made to amplify the charge as given. Re­
quest No. 25 was to the effect that cash received as trustee can form no part 
of the company’s assets. It is incredible that the jury did not so under­
stand. The court had charged that about $1,400,000 was held in trust, and 
the issues between the parties, as shown by the court’s statement of their 
respective claims and the general charge, was whether the balance sheet 
disclosed this trust obligation to the ordinary reader, and whether the
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accountants could honestly believe that it did. Several of the requested 
instructions, for example, No. 28, assumed that the balance sheet con­
cealed the true financial condition by failure to disclose the trust. This 
was for the jury to decide, and such requests were properly refused. Re­
quest No. 26 asserted that it was the duty of Haskins & Sells to show 
clearly on the balance sheet that these trust funds did not belong to 
Miller & Co. As a principle of correct accounting we should suppose this 
to be true, but the issue for the jury was not that, but was whether a false 
impression of financial worth was intentionally created. Request No. 31 
asserted that prospective investors in the preferred stock were entitled to 
know whether Miller & Co. had been guilty of breach of trust and that 
“the misuse of trust funds is the normal incident of a hopeless financial 
condition.” The inclusion of the final sentence, above quoted, was enough 
to justify refusal of the instruction in the form presented. We think the 
charge as given was adequate on the subject of trust funds and no preju­
dicial error occurred in the refusal of requested charges on this subject.
The Subject of Secured Notes: The fourth item of assets in the balance 
sheet is “Notes and Accounts Receivable and Accrued Interest—Se­
cured .......$2,987,411.69.” The main dispute as to this item relates to notes
of corporations amounting to $1,434,764.76. They represented advances 
made by Miller & Co. for the completion of mortgaged buildings. They 
were signed by affiliated or subsidiary corporations. Although stated in 
the balance sheet to be “Secured,” they were not secured as a matter of 
law. The plaintiffs contend that the defendants knew they were not 
secured. They further claim that the notes were of little value, to the 
defendants’ knowledge, and, finally, that the notes signed by subsidiaries 
should have been shown as such.
W ith respect to listing the notes as secured, the defense is that Peed 
honestly, even if erroneously, believed them to be secured. He testified 
that he based his opinion on a provision in the trust indentures empower­
ing the trustee to make advances “for payment of taxes, insurance premi­
ums, or any other purpose for preserving the property and the lien of this 
instrument,” or on similar provisions. As to this the trial judge charged: 
“As matter of law it is my opinion, and I charge you, that these advances 
to complete unfinished buildings are not the kind of advances that are 
secured under the trust deeds. The point, however, is not so clear that 
persons reading such parts of the deed might not, in good faith, entertain 
different opinions; and the good faith of the defendants in representing 
these advances as secured is one of the questions of fact for you to deter­
mine under all the evidence applicable to these notes, and under the rules 
which I will later explain to you.”
Of their several requests dealing with this subject, the appellants urge 
No. 38 as the most significant. This informed the jury that, if they should 
find that the statement as to security was false and “that the defendants 
represented to the plaintiffs that this was true to their own knowledge, 
as distinguished from belief or opinion, they are guilty of making a false 
balance sheet, even if they believed it to be true.” It is urged that the 
Ultramares Case in 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441, 74 A. L. R. 1139, points 
directly to the correctness of this request, but we cannot so construe it. 
Accountants profess to speak with knowledge when certifying to an agree­
ment between the audit and the entries in books audited, but there is no 
suggestion in the cases relied upon that a statement by an auditor that 
notes are secured by the provisions of a trust deed is an assertion of
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knowledge rather than an expression of opinion. To suggest that a title 
examiner was guilty of fraud if he erroneously certified a title because he 
had honestly misconceived the legal significance of a provision in a deed 
would doubtless horrify counsel for the appellants no less than other mem­
bers of the legal profession. There is no reason to hold accountants to a 
higher standard, when they deal with legal documents. The issue of 
the defendants’ good faith was rightly left to the jury.
Complaint is made of the refusal to charge request No. 67 to the effect 
that, if the defendants knowingly overvalued doubtful assets [the notes], 
then they were guilty of false representations. We cannot doubt that the 
jury were sufficiently informed of so obvious a proposition by the general 
charge as given. This request was repeated in various alternative forms 
covering specific details of the evidence. T hat the trial judge was under 
no duty in such a case as this to discuss in detail the evidence relating to 
each alleged misrepresentation we have already stated.
Request No. 65 relates to the failure to show that the notes were those 
of subsidiary or affiliated companies. The court made reference to this 
and to the conflicting testimony of experts as to whether good accounting 
practice required it. We think this was sufficient. Here also the issue was 
the defendants’ intent, and questions of the effect of concealment and of 
a pretended rather than real audit were covered in the general charge.
Contingent Liabilities: We can see little excuse for omitting from the 
balance sheet mention of contingent liabilities. These were principally 
guaranties of completion of buildings under construction and might run 
into millions of dollars should the mortgagors default, which was not a 
remote possibility as shown by Miller & Co.’s prior experience. Neverthe­
less, Palmer, one of the defendants’ experts, testified that it was proper 
to omit the items; and Klein and Madden said that the showing of con­
tingent liabilities is frequently a matter of judgment and that they need 
not be shown when, as here, with respect to the guaranties of completion, 
the primary obligation was shown under the heading “Due to Mortgagors
—For Bonds Underwritten—Payable as Construction Progresses........
$8,757,379.86.” The plaintiffs’ expert contradicted this. The charge 
called attention to the conflicting testimony and instructed the jury to 
weigh it. The refused requests were to the effect that omission of the 
contingent liabilities made the balance sheet false. In view of the con­
flicting testimony, such a charge was properly refused. Even if it were an 
abuse of good accounting practice to omit them, such an abuse was not 
fraud unless accompanied by an intent to conceal. The issue of fraudulent 
concealment was fairly put to the jury in the general charge.
Finally, the appellants complain of the refusal to charge that, if the 
balance sheet represented Miller & Co. to be in a sound financial position 
when in fact the defendants knew it was not, then they were guilty of 
fraud. Variations of this proposition were contained in requests 13 and 
14. Undoubtedly they were correct statements of law, but they were 
adequately covered by the general charge.
In conclusion, we may say that the trial was entirely fair to the ap­
pellants. A clear and accurate charge was delivered under which the jury 
might well have found a verdict for the plaintiffs. There was much in the 
evidence which tended to cast doubt upon the good faith of the account­
ants, but it did not persuade the jury. An appellate court cannot set at 
naught a jury’s verdict merely because they might have reached a different 
conclusion had they been sitting as the jury. Finding no error in the
LIABILITY TO  TH IR D  PARTIES — AT COMMON LAW 221
charge as given and nothing clearly wrong in refusing requested instruc­
tions, we affirm the judgment.
CANDLER v. CRANE, CHRISTMAS & CO. *
Court of Appeal, 1951. 2 K.B. 164, 1 The Times L.R. 371.
The defendants, a firm of accountants, had been employed to write 
up the books and prepare the accounts of a limited liability company, and 
they instructed F. their clerk to do so. When the accounts had been pre­
pared and were ready for certification by the accountants, F., at the 
request of the managing director of the limited liability company, showed 
the accounts to the plaintiff who, to the knowledge of F., was considering 
whether he should invest money in the company. F. had been careless in 
the preparation of the accounts so that they were defective and deficient 
and did not correctly represent the financial position of the company. 
The plaintiff, after seeing the accounts, invested £2,000 in the company. 
Subsequently the company was wound up and there were no assets. The 
plaintiff sued the defendants on the ground that he had lost his invest­
ment through breach of duty of care of the defendants to him.
Held, that F. was acting within the scope of his authority in showing 
the plaintiff the accounts.
There being no contractual or fiduciary relationship between the 
parties, Held, also, by Cohen and Asquith, L.JJ. (Denning, L.J., 
dissenting), that the plaintiff had no cause of action in tort against the 
defendants.
Le Lievre v. Gould (9 The Times L. R. 243; [1893] 1 Q. B. 491) which 
was held to have been neither overruled nor qualified by Donoghue v. 
Stevenson (48 The Times L. R. 494; [1932] A. C. 562), followed.
Per Asquith, L.J.—There was not a word of disapproval by Lord 
Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra) of the decision in Le Lievre v. 
Gould (supray though he referred to the case as annexing a valid and 
essential qualification to the formula of Lord Esher, M. R., in Heaven 
Pender ((1883) 11 Q. B. D. 503). The principle laid down by Lord Atkin 
in Donoghue Stevenson (supra) in answer to the question: “who, then, 
in law, is my neighbour?’’ had never yet been applied where the damage 
complained of was not physical, to either person or property.
Per Denning, L.J., dissenting; Accountants owed a duty to use care 
in their reports and in the work which resulted in their reports. Their 
calling required special knowledge and skill. They owed that duty not 
only to their employers, but to any third person to whom they showed the 
accounts or to whom they knew that their employer was going to show 
them so as to induce him to invest money or take some other action on 
them. The duty only extended to those transactions for which the 
accountants knew their accounts were required. He would not call in 
question the decision in Le Lievre v. Gould (supra) which was distinguish­
able from the present case. Surveyors, valuers and analysts were under 
a similar duty to use care in statement.
This was the appeal of the plaintiff, a Mr. Candler, in an action in 
which he claimed damages for negligence against the defendants, Messrs.
* See footnote 70 supra.
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Crane, Christmas and Company, a firm of accountants. The defendants 
were the accountants to a company called Trevaunance Hydraulic T in  
Mines, Limited (referred to as the company). In the circumstances stated 
in the case the accountants prepared the accounts of the company (which 
were produced to the plaintiff by an employee of the accountants) and in 
doing so were, as the trial Judge found, careless in the preparation of 
them and that accordingly the accounts were “defective and deficient.” 
The plaintiff, relying on the accounts, invested £2,000 in the company and 
lost it because the company turned out to be a failure.
It was submitted for the plaintiff that, although there was no contract 
or fiduciary relationship between him and the defendant accountants, 
nevertheless the relationship between them was so close and direct that 
the accountants owed him a duty of care within the principles stated in 
Donoghue v. Stevenson (48 The Times L. R. 494; [1932] A. C. 562). For 
the accountants it was submitted that the only duty which they owed was 
a purely contractual duty which they owed to the company, and therefore 
that they were not liable for negligence to a person to whom they were 
under no duty.
By his action against the accountants, the plaintiff pleaded that he had 
lost his £2,000 through the defendants’ breach of duty of care in respect 
of the accounts which Mr. Fraser placed before him, and he claimed 
that sum in damages. He also alleged fraud at the trial. Alternatively, the 
plaintiff alleged that the accountants, as auditors of the company, owed 
a duty to him as a shareholder to give him the accurate information which 
they should have given him when he was a prospective investor.
Mr. Justice Lloyd-Jacob dismissed the action. He found that there 
was no fraud and that no damage flowed from the alternative claim of 
the plaintiff as a shareholder. On the claim for breach of duty he found 
that the accounts were defective and deficient and presented a position 
of the company which was “wholly contrary to the actual position” and 
that Mr. Fraser was extremely careless in the preparation of the accounts. 
He said that the damage which the plaintiff suffered was plain, but he held 
that the accountants were under no duty of care to the plaintiff. Their 
only duty was to produce accounts which they honestly believed to be 
the draft accounts of the company.
The plaintiff appealed, but no longer alleged fraud. On the appeal 
the defendants contended: (1) that Mr. Fraser was not acting in the 
course of his employment, and (2) that, even if he was, they owed no duty 
to the plaintiff.
Mr. Neil Lawson appeared for the plaintiff; Mr. John Foster, K. C., 
and Mr. Phineas Quass for the defendants.
The following judgments were read.
Lord Justice Cohen.—I will ask Lord Justice Denning to read his 
judgment first.
Lord Justice Denning.—In September, 1946, Mr. Candler invested 
£2,000 in a company called Trevaunance Hydraulic T in  Mines, Limited 
(which I will call the company) and he has lost it because the company 
turned out to be a failure. He now brings this action against the com­
pany’s accountants and auditors, Crane, Christmas and Company (whom 
I will call the accountants) claiming that he was induced to invest the 
money because of erroneous accounts which they put before him and on
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the faith of which he invested his money. The Judge has found that the 
accounts were “defective and deficient” and presented a position of the 
company which was “wholly contrary to the actual position”; that the 
accountants were “in fact extremely careless in the preparation of the 
accounts” ; and that the damage which Mr. Candler suffered was “plain”; 
but nevertheless the Judge dismissed his claim because in his opinion the 
accountants owed no duty of care to Mr. Candler.
The case raises a point of law of much importance, because Mr. 
Lawson, on behalf of Mr. Candler, submitted that, although there was no 
contract between Mr. Candler and the accountants, nevertheless the 
relationship between them was so close and direct that the accountants 
did owe a duty of care to him within the principles stated in Donoghue v. 
Stevenson (48 The Times L.R. 494; [1932] A.C. 562); whereas Mr. Foster, 
on behalf of the accountants, submitted that the duty which the account­
ants owed was purely a contractual duty owed by them to the company, 
and therefore they were not liable for negligence to a person to whom they 
were under no contractual duty.
Before discussing this point of law, I must set out the facts in some 
detail so as to see what exactly the relationship was between Mr. Candler 
and the accountants. The story centres round the activities of a Mr. 
Donald Ogilvie in connexion with some surface tin workings in Corn­
wall. In November, 1944, he formed the company to work the tin, with 
himself as chairman and managing director for life. In March, 1946, he 
told the accountants that he wanted them to prepare the accounts of 
the company and to write up the books. The accountants entrusted the 
work to one of their clerks named Henry Fraser, but he had not done 
much towards it when in June, 1946, Mr. Ogilvie told the accountants that 
he had decided “to go out for substantially more capital” and asked them 
to insert an advertisement in a newspaper as quickly as possible. They 
arranged it for him, and it appeared on July 8, 1946, in these words: 
“£10,000 established T in  Mine (low capitalization) in Cornwall seeks 
further capital, instal additional milling plant, directorship and active 
participation open to suitable applicant.—Apply” &c.
Mr. Candler, the plaintiff, answered that advertisement in these words: 
“I should be interested to take an active part in a Cornish T in  Mine and 
have about £2,000 to invest. Will you let me have particulars?” The 
accountants sent that letter unopened to Mr. Ogilvie, who got into touch 
with Mr. Candler. As a result, in the first half of September, 1946, Mr. 
Ogilvie showed Mr. Candler the Cornish workings and told Mr. Candler 
that, if he invested £2,000, he would get a directorship in the company 
and a service agreement for two years at £10 a week. Mr. Candler said, 
however, that he wanted to see the balance-sheet of the company first.
As a result of Mr. Candler’s request, Mr. Ogilvie started pressing the 
accountants to get out the accounts. He told their clerk, Mr. Fraser, that 
he wanted the accounts got out as quickly as possible, and that the 
accounts were required to show to a potential investor in the company, 
whose name was Candler. Mr. Fraser was asked in the witness box: “Did 
you assume at that time that the accounts that Mr. Ogilvie was pressing 
for had some relation to his negotiations with Mr. Candler?”, and he 
answered: “I thought there would be a connexion, of course. Yes, I 
suppose so.”
Mr. Fraser accordingly, in the middle of September, 1946, worked on 
the accounts very intensively, going to Mr. Ogilvie’s flat two or three times
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a day for his explanation of various items. He was, as the Judge found, 
under the mistaken impression that it was, in substance, Mr. Ogilvie’s 
business, and he accepted Mr. Ogilvie’s statements without verification.
On Monday, September 16, 1946, Mr. Ogilvie asked Mr. Fraser to meet 
Mr. Candler the next day so as to give him information relating to the 
accounts of the company; and accordingly, on Tuesday, September 17, 
Mr. Fraser went with Mr. Ogilvie to meet Mr. Candler and took with him 
the draft accounts which he had by that time prepared. At the meeting 
Mr. Ogilvie introduced Mr. Fraser to Mr. Candler as the representative of 
Crane, Christmas and Company, the accountants and auditors of the com­
pany, who were preparing the accounts, and he introduced Mr. Candler 
to Mr. Fraser as a man who was contemplating an investment in the com­
pany. Mr. Fraser knew, of course, of the advertisement which his firm 
had inserted for new capital; and he knew, when the meeting began, that 
the negotiations depended on Mr. Candler’s being satisfied with the 
balance-sheet of the company.
At that meeting on September 17, Mr. Fraser produced the draft 
accounts. They already had, on them, at that time, a certificate ready for 
signature by the accountants, stating in the usual formula: “We have 
audited the balance-sheet as above set forth. We have obtained all the 
information and explanations we have required and we report that such 
balance-sheet is in our opinion properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true 
and correct view of the state of the company’s affairs, according to the 
best of our information and the explanations given to us and as shown by 
the books of the company.” That certificate was not signed at the time; 
but Mr. Fraser told Mr. Candler that that certificate would be signed with 
a clear docket subject to one or two small alterations which he wished to 
consider for another two or three days.
At that meeting of September 17, Mr. Candler took down in his own 
handwriting a copy of the accounts, because he wanted to put them 
before his own accountant for advice. There was a conflict of recollection 
how he came to take them down, but the judge said that it did not matter 
because Mr. Fraser clearly assented to Mr. Candler’s taking a copy. The 
Judge said: “Having regard to the fact that Mr. Fraser was plainly aware 
of the purpose for which the draft accounts were required, I entertain no 
doubt at all that he was aware of and acquiesced in the showing of these 
accounts to Mr. Candler: indeed, the meeting would have been wholly 
pointless but for that purpose.” Mr. Fraser drew Mr. Candler’s attention 
to the fact that some of the items in the draft balance-sheet might need 
revision and the parties arranged to meet again on September 20, 1946. 
The Judge expressly found that, when the meeting of the 17th broke up, 
Mr. Fraser must have been satisfied, not only that Mr. Candler was con­
sidering an investment in the company, but was taking with him and rely­
ing on the draft accounts which Mr. Fraser had prepared.
The parties met again on September 20. By that time Mr. Fraser had 
concluded his examination of the books and drew Mr. Candler’s attention 
to some modifications which are for present purposes immaterial. Mr. 
Fraser said that the accounts had been passed by the directors and would 
be signed in the next few days. Meanwhile Mr. Candler had himself 
obtained advice from his own accountant and put queries to Mr. Fraser 
about the accounts which Mr. Fraser answered. Nothing now turns on 
those queries. At the end of the meeting Mr. Candler told Mr. Ogilvie 
and Mr. Fraser that he was satisfied and would invest £2,000 in the com­
pany. He sent off a cheque for £500 that day to Mr. Ogilvie and the 
balance of £1,500 on September 25, 1946.
The Judge has found that, to Mr. Fraser’s knowledge, Mr. Candler was 
induced to believe that the accounts, as modified on September 20, 1946, 
would be the certified accounts as they emerged from the accountants, and 
that is what did in fact happen. On September 27, 1946, the accounts were 
certified by the accountants in precisely the same form as Mr. Fraser had 
shown them to Mr. Candler at the meeting of the 20th without any 
alteration at all.
It has subsequently turned out that the accounts gave an altogether 
inaccurate picture of the position of the company. Instances were given 
to us which show that there was no verification whatever by the account­
ants of the information which Mr. Ogilvie gave them. Thus, among the 
assets were inserted “Freehold cottages (at cost) £650.” In fact the com­
pany had no title deeds for the cottages. The cottages stood in Mr. Ogil­
vie’s name and he had mortgaged them to the bank for his own overdraft. 
Again, “Leasehold buildings (at cost) £650.” The company had no leases, 
but they stood in Mr. Ogilvie’s name and were ultimately forfeited for 
non-payment of rent. Yet again, the assets were said to include £3,280 
expended on capital development, whereas the propriety of that figure 
depended on whether, out of the total expenditure of the company, a 
proper allocation had been made between capital and revenue expendi­
ture; and the accounts contained no indication that any such allocation 
had been necessary, or had indeed been made. It appears that much too 
high a figure was allocated to capital, thus making the assets appear 
larger than they in fact were. It was admitted that Mr. Fraser had entirely 
failed to use proper care and skill in the preparation and presentation 
of the accounts.
The result was disastrous for Mr. Candler. In September, 1946, he 
entered the service of the company and moved down to Cornwall and 
worked at the mine. Indeed, he invested in November, 1946, another £200. 
But a little later his suspicions became aroused because he discovered that 
his £2,000 had not been applied for the purposes of the company’s busi­
ness. Ultimately he discovered that the company was in a very bad way. 
It was not even able to pay his salary. He himself issued writs against 
the company on May 1, and June 30, 1947, for salary and money lent. 
On August 11, 1947, he presented a petition for winding up and on De­
cember 15, 1947, a winding up order was made. There are no assets. 
The bank took the freehold cottages for Mr. Ogilvie’s debt. The lessors 
forfeited the leasehold property. Mr. Ogilvie became a bankrupt. Mr. 
Candler lost his £2,000 altogether, and he says it is due to the carelessness 
of the accountants, because if they had put before him accounts which had 
been properly prepared, the true position of affairs would have been dis­
closed and he would never have invested his money in the company. The 
only defences raised by the accountants at the hearing of the appeal were: 
(1) that Mr. Fraser was not acting in the course of his employment; (2) 
that, even if he was, they owed no duty of care to Mr. Candler.
The Judge seems to have treated it as beyond question that Mr. Fraser 
was acting in the course of his employment, and I agree with him. There 
is no doubt that Mr. Fraser was acting within his actual authority in writ­
ing up the books and preparing the accounts, and indeed his action in so 
doing was ratified and confirmed by the senior partner who signed the 
certificate. But it is said that Mr. Fraser had no authority to show the
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draft accounts to Mr. Candler, or to answer his queries, at any rate not 
without asking his principals for permission to do so. The senior partner 
admitted that it was a very common thing for accountants at the request of 
the chairman or person in control of a company to give details of the 
company’s accounts to a prospective investor so as to induce him to invest 
money, but he said that it was for the principal of the firm to do it, and 
not for a clerk. That may well be so. It may not have been within Mr. 
Fraser’s actual authority, but that is not the point. A master is often made 
responsible for the unauthorized or forbidden acts of his servant when 
he has for his own purposes put the servant in a position where he can do 
the acts. Practical good sense demands that, even though the master is 
not at fault himself, he should be responsible if the servant conducts him­
self in a way which is injurious to others. He takes the benefits of the serv­
ant’s rightful acts and should bear the burden of his wrongful ones; and 
he is, as a rule, the only one who has the means to pay. So, here, I have 
no doubt that the accountants are responsible for the way in which Mr. 
Fraser conducted himself in preparing the accounts and showing them 
to Mr. Candler who, after all, was perfectly innocent in the matter and 
had not the slightest idea that Mr. Fraser had no authority to do what 
he did.
I now come to the great question in the case: did the accountants owe 
a duty of care to Mr. Candler? If the matter were free from authority, I 
should have said that they clearly did owe a duty of care to him. They 
were professional accountants who prepared and put before him these 
accounts, knowing that he was going to be guided by them in making 
an investment in the company. On the faith of those accounts he did make 
the investment, whereas if the accounts had been carefully prepared, he 
would not have made the investment at all. The result is that he has lost 
his money. In the circumstances, had he not every right to rely on the 
accounts being prepared with proper care; and is he not entitled to re­
dress from the accountants on whom he relied? I say that he is, and I 
would apply to this case the words of Lord Justice Knight Bruce in an 
analogous case 90 years ago: “A country whose administration of justice 
did not afford redress in a case of the present description would not be 
in a state of civilization”: Slim v. Croucher ( (1860) 1 De G. F. and T. 518, 
at p. 527).
Turning now to authority, I can point to many general statements of 
principle which cover the case made by some of the great names in the law: 
Lord Eldon, L. C., in Evans v. Bicknell ((1801) 6 Ves. 174, at p. 183), Lord 
Campbell, L. C., in Slim v. Croucher (supra), Lord Selborne, L. C., in 
Brownlie v. Campbell ((1880) 5 App. Cas. 925, at pp. 935 and 936), Lord 
Herschell in Derry v. Peek ( (1889) 5 The Times L. R. 625, at p. 629; 14 
App. Cas. 337, at p. 360), Lord Shaw in Nocton v. Ashburton (30 The 
Times L. R. 602; [1914] A. C. 932, at p. 972), and Lord Atkin in Dono­
ghue v. Stevenson (48 The Times L. R. 494, at p. 499; [1932] A. C. 562, 
at p. 580). But it is said that effect cannot be given to those statements 
of principle because Le Lievre v. Gould (9 The Times L. R. 243; [1893] 
1 Q. B. 491) is an actual decision of this Court to the contrary.
Before I consider the decision in Le Lievre v. Gould (supra) itself, I 
wish to say that, in my opinion, current legal thought at the time it was 
decided was infected by two cardinal errors. The first error was an error 
which appeared time and time again in nineteenth-century thought— 
namely, that no one who is not a party to a contract can sue on it or on
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anything arising out of it. This error has had unfortunate consequences 
both in the law of contract and in the law of tort. So far as contract is 
concerned, I have said something about it in Smith v. River Douglas 
Catchment Board (65 The Times L. R. 628; [1949] 2 K. B. 500). So far as 
tort is concerned, it led the lawyers of that day to suppose that, if one of 
the parties to a contract was negligent in carrying it out, no third person 
who was injured by that negligence could sue for damages on account of 
it: see Winterbottom  v. Wright ((1842) 10 M. and W. 109), Alton v. M id­
land Railway Company ((1865) 19 C. B. (N. S.) 213), and the notes in 
Pasley v. Freeman ((1789) 3 Term. Rep. 51; 2 Sm. L. C. (13th ed., 1929, 
pp. 103 to 110)); except in the case of things dangerous in themselves, like 
guns: see Dixon v . Bell ((1816) 5 M. and S. 198). This error lies at the 
root of the reasoning of Lord Justice Bowen in Le Lievre v. Gould ([1893]
1 Q. B., at p. 502) when he said that the law of England “does not con­
sider that what a man writes on paper is like a gun or other dangerous 
instrument,’’ meaning thereby that, unless it was a thing which was 
dangerous in itself, no action lay. This error was exploded by the great 
case of Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra), which decided that the presence of 
a contract did not defeat an action for negligence by a third person, pro­
vided that the circumstances disclosed a duty by the contracting party 
to him.
The second error was an error as to the effect of Derry v. Peek (supra), 
an error which persisted for 35 years at least after that decision—namely, 
that no action ever lies for a negligent statement, even though it is in­
tended that the plaintiff should act on it, and he in fact acts on it to his 
loss. This error led the Court of Appeal in Low v. Bouverie (7 The Times 
L. R. 582; [1891] 3 Ch. 82) to deny the correctness of Slim v. Croucher 
(supra); and in Le Lievre v . Gould (supra) to deny the correctness of 
Cann v. Willson ( (1888) 4 The Times L. R. 588; 39 Ch. 39). The cases 
thus denied were so plainly just that the very denial of them was itself 
an error. The error was, however, exposed by the important case of 
Nocton v. Ashburton (supra), which decided that an action did lie for a 
negligent statement where the circumstances disclosed a duty to be care­
ful; and that all that is to be deduced from (though not decided by) 
Derry v. Peek (supra) is that in the particular circumstances of that case 
there was no duty to be careful. Lord Haldane, L. C., observed signifi­
cantly ([1914] A. C., at p. 947) that the authorities subsequent to Derry 
v. Peek (supra) had shown “a tendency to assume that it was intended 
to mean more than it did.” In my opinion the decisions of the House 
of Lords in Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra) and Nocton v. Ashburton 
(supra) are sufficient to entitle this Court to examine afresh the law as 
to negligent statements, and that is what I propose to do.
Let me first be destructive and destroy the submissions which Mr. 
Foster put forward. His first submission was that a duty to be careful 
in making statements arose only out of a contractual duty to the plaintiff, 
or a fiduciary relationship to him. Apart from such cases no action, he 
said, had ever been allowed for negligent statements, and he urged that 
this want of authority was a reason against its being allowed now. This 
argument about the novelty of the action does not appeal to me in the 
least. It has been put forward in all the great cases which have been mile­
stones of progress in our law, and it has always, or nearly always, been re­
jected. If the great cases of Ashby v. White ((1703) 2 Ld. Raym. 938), 
Pasley v. Freeman (supra), and Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra) are read it
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will be found that in each of them the Judges were divided in opinion. 
On the one side there were the timorous souls who were fearful of allow­
ing a new cause of action. On the other side there were the bold spirits 
who were ready to allow it, if justice so required. It was fortunate for 
the common law that the progressive view prevailed. Whenever this argu­
ment of novelty is put forward I call to mind the following emphatic 
answer which Chief Justice Pratt gave nearly 200 years ago in Chapman 
v. Pickersgill ((1762) 2 Wils. 145, at p. 146): “I wish never to hear this 
objection again. This action is for a tort: torts are infinitely various; not 
limited or confined, for there is nothing in nature but may be an instru­
ment of mischief.” Lord Macmillan gave the same answer in Donoghue 
v. Stevenson when he said (48 The Times L. R. 494, at p. 510; [1932] 
A. C., at p. 619): “The criterion of judgment must adjust and adapt itself 
to the changing circumstances of life. The categories of negligence are 
never closed.” It needs only a little imagination to see how much the 
common law would have suffered if those decisions had gone the other 
way.
The second submission of Mr. Foster was that a duty to take care only 
arose where the result of a failure to take care will cause physical damage 
to persons or property. It was for this reason that he did not dispute two 
illustrations of negligent statements which I put in the course of the argu­
ment, the case of an analyst who negligently certifies to a manufacturer of 
food that a particular ingredient is harmless, whereas it is in fact poison­
ous, or the case of an inspector of lifts who negligently reports that a par­
ticular lift is safe, whereas it is in fact dangerous. The analyst and the lift 
inspector would, I should have thought, be liable to any person who was 
injured by consuming the food, or using the lift, at any rate if there was no 
likelihood of intermediate inspection: Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra), 
Haseldine v. Daw and Son, Limited (58 The Times L. R. 1; [1941] 2 K. B. 
343). Mr. Foster said that that might well be so because the negligence 
there caused physical damage, but that the same would not apply to negli­
gence which caused financial loss. He referred to some observations of 
Mr. Justice Wrottesley which were in his favour on this point (Old Gate 
Estates, Limited  v. Toplis and Harding and Russell ((1939) 161 L. T. 
Rep. 227)). But I must say that I cannot accept this as a valid distinction. 
I can understand that in some cases of financial loss there may not be a 
sufficiently proximate relationship to give rise to a duty of care; but if once 
the duty exists I cannot think that liability depends on the nature of the 
damage.
The third submission of Mr. Foster was that the duty which the 
accountants owed was purely a contractual duty, and, therefore, that they 
were not liable for negligence to a person to whom they were under no 
contractual obligation. This seems to me to be simply a repetition of 
the nineteenth century fallacy stated in Alton v. Midland Railway (supra) 
and exploded by Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra).
Let me now be constructive and suggest the circumstances in which I 
say that a duty to use care in statement does exist apart from a contract in 
that behalf. First, what persons are under such duty? My answer is those 
persons such as accountants, surveyors, valuers and analysts, whose profes­
sion and occupation it is to examine books, accounts, and other things, 
and to make reports on which other people—other than their clients— 
rely in the ordinary course of business. Their duty is not merely a duty 
to u se care in their reports. They have also a duty to use care in their
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work which results in their reports. Herein lies the difference between 
these professional men and other persons who have been held to be under 
no duty to use care in their statements, such as promoters who issue a 
prospectus: Derry v. Peek (supra) (now altered by statute), and trustees 
who answer inquiries about the trust funds: Low  v. Bouverie (7 The 
Times L. R. 582; [1891] 3 Ch. 82). Those persons do not bring and are 
not expected to bring, any professional knowledge or skill into the prepa­
ration of their statements: they can only be made responsible by the law 
affecting persons generally, such as contract, estoppel, innocent misrepre­
sentation or fraud.
But it is very different with persons who engage in a calling which 
requires special knowledge and skill. From very early times it has been 
held that they owe a duty of care to those who are closely and directly 
affected by their work apart altogether from any contract or undertaking 
in that behalf. Thus, Fitz-Herbert in his new Natura Brevium  ((1534) 
94D) states that “if a smith prick my horse with a nail, I shall have my 
action on the case against him, without any warranty by the smith to do 
it well,” and he supports it with an excellent reason: “for it is the duty of 
every artificer to exercise his art rightly and truly as he ought.” This rea­
soning has been treated as applicable not only to shoeing smiths, surgeons 
and barbers, who work with hammers, knives and scissors, but also to ship- 
brokers and clerks in the Custom House who work with figures and make 
entries in books, “because their situation and employment necessarily 
imply a competent degree of knowledge in making such entries”: see 
Shiels v. Blackburne ((1789) 1 Hy. Bl. 159, at p. 163, per Lord Lough­
borough), which was not referred to by Mr. Justice Devlin in Heskell v. 
Continental Express, Limited ([1950] 1 All E. R. 1033, at p. 1042).
The same reasoning has been applied to medical men who make re­
ports on the sanity of others: see Everett v. Griffiths (36 The Times L. R. 
491, at pp. 493 and 501; [1920] 3 K. B. 163, at pp. 182 and 217). I t  is, I 
think, also applicable to professional accountants. They are not liable, 
of course, for casual remarks made in the course of conversation, nor for 
other statements made outside their work, or not made in their capacity as 
accountants: compare Fish v. Kelly ( (1864) 17 C. B. (N. S.) 194). But they 
are, in my opinion, in proper cases, apart from any contract in the matter, 
under a duty to use reasonable care in the preparation of their accounts 
and in the making of their reports. Secondly, to whom do these profes­
sional people owe this duty? I will take accountants, but the same reason­
ing applies to the others. They owe the duty, of course, to their employer 
or client; and also I think to any third person to whom they themselves 
show the accounts, or to whom they know their employer is going to show 
the accounts so as to induce him to invest money or take some other 
action on them. But I do not think the duty can be extended still further 
so as to include strangers of whom they have heard nothing and to whom 
their employer without their knowledge may choose to show their ac­
counts. Once the accountants have handed their accounts to their em­
ployer they are not, as a rule, responsible for what he does with them 
without their knowledge or consent.
A good illustration is afforded by the decision in Le Lievre v. Gould 
(supra) itself, which I certainly would not wish to call in question. The 
facts are somewhat differently stated in the various reports, but collecting 
them together they come to this: A surveyor there surveyed work for a 
building owner and handed certificates to him so that he could know
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the amounts which he had to pay the builder. The building owner then 
chose to show the certificates to his own mortgagees who advanced money 
on them instead of on the certificates of their own surveyor. The mort­
gagees then said that the owner’s surveyor owed a duty of care to them. 
T hat was obviously untenable, because they should have had the work 
surveyed by their own surveyor. Indeed, they had actually stipulated for 
it. The relationship was therefore one in which the inspection of an 
intermediate person might reasonably be interposed, and was consequently 
too remote to raise a duty of care: see per Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. 
Stevenson (48 The Times L. R., at p. 499; [1932] A. C., at p. 582). But 
excluding such cases as those, there are some cases—of which the present is 
one—where the accountants know all the time, even before they present 
their accounts, that their employer requires the accounts to show to a third 
person so as to induce him to act on them; and then they themselves, or 
their employers, present the accounts to him for the purpose. In such cases 
I am of opinion that the accountants owe a duty of care to the third 
person.
The test of proximity in these cases is: Did the accountants know that 
the accounts were required for submission to the plaintiff and use by him? 
T hat appears from Langridge v. Levy ( (1837-8) 2 M. and W. 519) as ex­
tended by Baron Cleasby in George v. Skivington ( (1869) L. R. 5 Ex. 1, at 
p. 5); and from the decision of that good Judge, Mr. Justice Chitty, in 
Cann v. Willson (supra), which is directly in point. In that case a valuer 
made a valuation of property for the very purpose of enabling his client to 
raise a mortgage on it; and, in order to further the transaction, the valuer 
himself actually put the valuation before the mortgagee’s solicitor saying 
that it was a very moderate valuation and not made in favour of the bor­
rower. The mortgagee advanced money on the faith of the valuation, but 
it turned out that the valuer had been grossly careless, and the mortgagee 
lost his money. Mr. Justice Chitty held that the valuer was liable in 
negligence, apart from any contract at all. He said (39 Ch. D., at p. 42) 
that the valuation was sent by the valuer direct to the mortgagee’s solicitor 
“for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff and his co-trustee to lay out the 
trust money on mortgage. It seems to me that the defendants knowlingly 
placed themselves in that position, and in point of law incurred a duty 
toward him to use reasonable care in the preparation of the document 
called a valuation. I think it is like the case of the supply of an article— 
the supply of the hairwash in the case of George v. Skivington (supra).’’
T hat reasoning seems to me to be good sense and good law. I know that 
in Le Lievre v. Gould (supra) the Court of Appeal said that Cann v. 
Willson (supra) was wrongly decided; but it must be remembered that 
at that time the general opinion of the profession was that George v. 
Skivington (supra), on which Mr. Justice Chitty relied, was itself wrongly 
decided, or at any rate that the principle stated in it by Baron Cleasby was 
wrong: see per Mr. Justice Field and Mr. Justice Cave, and Lord Justice 
Bowen and Lord Justice Cotton, in Heaven v. Pender ( (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 
302, at pp. 306-7; (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 503, at pp. 516-7), and per Mr. Justice 
Hamilton in Blacker v. Lake and Elliott ( (1912) 106 L. T. Rep., at p. 533). 
If George v. Skivington (supra) was wrong, then, of course, Cann v. Will- 
son (supra) was wrong, for it was based on it. But in Donoghue v. 
Stevenson (supra) the House of Lords fully restored George v. Skivington 
(supra), and Lord Atkin himself approved the reasoning of Baron Cleasby 
(see 48 The Times L. R., at p. 500; [1932] A. C., at pp. 584-5). It seems
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to me that by so doing the House of Lords have implicitly restored Cann 
v. Willson (supra), because they have restored the case on which it was 
based; and if Cann v. Willson (supra) is good law, it follows that in the 
present case the accountants owed a duty of care to Mr. Candler, for the 
circumstances are indistinguishable.
Thirdly, to what transactions does the duty of care care extend? It 
extends, I think, only to those transactions for which the accountants knew 
their accounts were required. For instance, in the present case it extends 
to the original investment of £2,000 which Mr. Candler made in reliance 
on the accounts, because the accountants knew that the accounts were 
required for his guidance in making that investment; but it does not 
extend to the subsequent £200 which he made after he had been two 
months with the company. This distinction, that the duty only extends to 
the very transaction in mind at the time, is implicit in the decided cases. 
Thus, a doctor, who negligently certifies a man to be a lunatic when he is 
not, is liable to him, although there is no contract in the matter, because 
the doctor knows that his certificate is required for the very purpose of 
deciding whether the man should be detained or not; but an insurance 
company’s doctor owes no duty to the insured person, because he makes his 
examination only for the purposes of the insurance company: see Everett 
v. Griffiths (supra), where Lord Justice Atkin proceeded on the self-same 
principles as he fully expounded later in Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra). 
So, also, a Lloyd’s surveyor who, in surveying for classification purposes 
negligently passes a mast as sound when it is not, is not liable to the owner 
for damage caused by its breaking, because the surveyor makes his survey 
only for the purpose of classifying the ship for the yacht register and not 
otherwise: Humphrey v. Bowers ( (1929) 45 The Times L. R. 297). Again, 
a scientist or expert (including a marine hydrographer) is not liable to his 
readers for careless statements in his published works. He publishes his 
work simply for the purpose of giving information, and not with any 
particular transaction in mind at all. But when a scientist or an expert 
makes an investigation and report for the very purpose of a particular 
transaction, then, in my opinion, he is under a duty of care in respect of 
that transaction.
It will be noticed that I have confined the duty to cases where the ac­
countant prepares his accounts and makes his report for the guidance of 
the very person in the very transaction in question. T hat is sufficient for 
the decision of this case. I can well understand that it would be going too 
far to make an accountant liable to any person in the land who chooses to 
rely on the accounts in matters of business, for that would expose him to 
“liability in an indeterminate amount for an indtetrminate time to an 
indeterminate class”: see Ultramares Corporation v. Touche ( (1931) 255 
N. Y. Rep. 170, at p. 179; 174 N. E. Rep. 441, at p. 444), per Chief Justice 
Cardozo. Whether he would be liable if he prepared his accounts for the 
guidance of a specific class of persons in a specific class of transactions, I 
do not say. I should have thought he might be, just as the analyst and lift 
inspector would be liable in the instances I have given earlier. I t  is per­
haps worth mentioning that Parliament has intervened to make the pro­
fessional man liable for negligent reports given for the purposes of a 
prospectus: see sections 40 and 43 of the Companies Act, 1948. That is an 
instance of liability for reports made for the guidance of a specific class 
of persons—investors, in a specific class of transactions—applying for 
shares, That enactment does not help one way or the other to show what
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result the common law would have reached in the absence of such provi­
sions; but it does show what result it ought to reach.
My conclusion is that a duty to use care in statement is recognized by 
English law, and that its recognition does not create any dangerous prece­
dent when it is remembered that it is limited in respect of the persons by 
whom and to whom it is owed and the transactions to which it applies.
One final word. I think that the law would fail to serve the best interests 
of the community if it should hold that accountants and auditors owe a 
duty to no one but their client. Its influence would be most marked in 
cases where their client is a company or firm controlled by one man. It 
would encourage accountants to accept the information which the one 
man gives them, without verifying it; and to prepare and present the 
accounts rather as a lawyer prepares and presents a case, putting the best 
appearance on the accounts they can without expressing their personal 
opinion of them. This is, to my way of thinking, an entirely wrong 
approach. There is a great difference between the lawyer and the account­
ant. The lawyer is never called upon to express his personal belief in the 
truth of his client’s case; whereas the accountant, who certifies the accounts 
of his client, is always called upon to express his personal opinion whether 
the accounts exhibit a true and correct view of his client’s affairs; and he 
is required to do this not so much for the satisfaction of his own client but 
more for the guidance of shareholders, investors, revenue authorities, and 
others who may have to rely on the accounts in serious matters of business. 
If we should decide this case in favour of the accountants there will be no 
reason why accountants should ever verify the word of the one man in a 
one-man company, because there will be no one to complain about it. 
The one man who gives them wrong information will not complain if they 
do not verify it. He wants their backing for the misleading information 
he gives them, and he can only get it if they accept his word without veri­
fication. It is just what he wants so as to gain his own ends. And the 
persons who are misled cannot complain because the accountants owe no 
duty to them. If such be the law, I think it is to be regretted, for it means 
that the accountants’ certificate, which should be a safeguard, becomes a 
snare for those who rely on it. I do not myself think that it is the law. In 
my opinion accountants owe a duty of care not only to their own clients, 
but also to all those whom they know will rely on their accounts in the 
transactions for which those accounts are prepared.
I would therefore be in favour of allowing the appeal and entering 
judgment for Mr. Candler for damages in the sum of £2,000.
Lord Justice Asquith.—On two points I entirely agree with the judg­
ment which Lord Justice Denning has delivered and I agree that the 
cause of action based on an alleged breach of duty occurring after the 
plaintiff became a shareholder cannot be made out if only because the 
damaged relied on preceded the breach. I also agree, for the reasons which 
he has given, that Mr. Fraser was clearly acting within the scope of his 
employment by the defendant firm in showing the draft accounts and 
giving certain other information to the plaintiff.
But I have the misfortune to differ from Lord Justice Denning on the 
more important point raised in this case. The point may be put in this 
way: Assume that Mr. Fraser’s negligent misrepresentations had been 
made by his employers, the partners in the defendant firm. Assume 
further, as the fact is, that there was no fraud and no contract or fiduciary
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relationship between them and the plaintiff. Would they, in those events, 
have been liable to the plaintiff in respect of damage incurred by him 
through acting on those negligent misrepresentations? The defendants 
say, “No.” They do not question that in the absence of fraud, contract 
and fiduciary relationship, there are cases in which A. may be under a 
legal obligation to B. to use  reasonable care for some purposes. Their 
proposition is that under the conditions assumed in this case the defend­
ants were under no duty, sounding in tort, to the plaintiff to take care that 
their representations of fact should be true. They rely in support of this 
contention on Le Lievre v . Gould (9 The Times L. R. 243; [1893] 1 Q. B. 
491), a decision binding on this Court. I agree with the trial Judge in con­
sidering that authority to be conclusive in their favour unless it can be 
shown to have been overruled or to be distinguishable.
The plaintiff’s case is that whatever may have been the position before 
Donoghue v. Stevenson (48 The Times L. R. 494; [1932] A. C. 562), the 
rule which the majority of the House of Lords applied in that case neces­
sarily involves the consequence that (even where fraud, contract and 
fiduciary relationship are absent) A. will be liable to B. for any negligent 
misrepresentations on which B. acts to his detriment, provided always that 
there exists between A. and B. the necessary degree of so-called “prox­
imity.” It is argued that there was sufficient proximity on the facts of this 
case.
It may make for clearness first to consider some of the authorities pre­
ceding Donoghue’s case (supra) (as for short I will call it); and, secondly, 
to inquire what difference, if any, that case has made. I do not think it 
useful to go back farther than Derry v. Peek ((1889) 5 The Times L. R. 
625; 14 App. Cas. 337). In that case the plaintiff subscribed for shares in 
a limited company in reliance on a prospectus issued by the directors who 
included the defendants. The prospectus contained a negligent misstate­
ment made in good faith. The claim on the writ as amended was for 
damages for deceit; for that and nothing else. There was no independent 
alternative claim in respect of negligent or innocent misrepresentation. 
The Court of Appeal held that fraud would be sufficiently established by 
proof that the directors had no reasonable grounds for believing the state­
ment they made. The House of Lords, reversing the Court of Appeal, 
held that this was not enough to constitute fraud. If the defendants 
believed what they said it matters not how credulous they were or how 
groundless their belief. Fraud necessarily connotes dishonesty and no 
degree of mere stupidity can serve in its place. The case is therefore 
primarily, and according to one view solely, a decision on the meaning of 
the word “fraud,” and is therefore not directly relevant to the main issue 
in the present case from which fraud, though originally alleged, has been 
eliminated. Nevertheless it is indirectly relevant and illuminating. For, 
although it does not decide in terms, it clearly assumes or implies, that a 
merely negligent misrepresentation made by a director to potential sub­
scribers for shares, on which some of them act to their detriment, affords 
the latter no remedy. The notion that Donoghue’s case (supra) was 
intended parenthetically or sub silentio to sweep away this substratum of 
Derry v. Peek (supra) seems to me quite unconvincing.
After the Court of Appeal had given its decision in Derry v. Peek 
(supra), but before it had been reversed by the House of Lords, a case 
came up for determination at first instance on facts not materially dis­
tinguishable from those of the present case. In Cann v. Willson ( (1888) 4
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The Times L. R. 588; 39 Ch. D. 39) Mr. Justice Chitty, relying on the 
decision (then unreversed) of the Court of Appeal in Derry v. Peek 
(supra), held that the plaintiff could recover damages in respect of a 
negligent but (according to what we now know the word “fraud” means) 
non-fraudulent misrepresentation. This was the view implicitly con­
demned by the House of Lords when Derry v. Peek (supra) reached 
them; and Cann v. Willson (supra) was consequently on this assumption 
expressly overruled by the Court of Appeal in Le Lievre v. Gould (supra). 
As I have indicated, this last decision is binding on this Court and dis­
poses of the appeal, in my view, unless it can be shown to have been (a) 
overruled or (b) distinguishable.
I will consider these points in turn, premising that the principle on 
which Gould’s case (supra) was decided was, in the words of Lord Esher, 
M. R., (9 The Times L. R., at p. 244; [1893] 1 Q. B., at p. 498) this: “All 
that he” (the defendant) “had done was to give untrue certificates 
negligently. Such negligence, in the absence of contract with the plain­
tiffs, can give no right of action at law or in equity.” Both he and Lord 
Justice Bowen treated Derry v. Peek (supra) as deciding not merely that 
fraud was not established in that case, but that nothing short of fraud 
could in the circumstances of that case have given a cause of action, for 
example, that negligent misrepresentation could not do so.
T hat being so, the first question is whether the principle laid down in 
Gould’s case (supra) has been modified or overruled, either expressly or 
by necessary implication, by the decision in  any other case of superior 
authority. It has been qualified by Nocton v. Ashburton (30 The Times 
L. R. 602; [1914] A.C. 932) to this extent, that in the passage cited 
above, after the words “in the absence of contract with the plaintiff,” the 
further words,“or in some circumstances where a fiduciary relationship 
exists between the defendant and the plaintiff,” ought to be written in. 
Subject to this gloss, has it been overruled? It has certainly not there 
been overruled expressly. Has it, then, been overruled by necessary 
implication? Lord Atkin in Donoghue’s case (supra) referred pointedly 
to Gould’s case (supra) without a hint or a suggestion that it was wrongly 
decided, or that the memorable formula which he himself was pro­
pounding was inconsistent with it. As regards the two minority judg­
ments, one of them, that of Lord Buckmaster, also mentions the case, and 
without disapproval.
On the other hand, it is arguable (though the argument does not carry 
conviction to my mind) that whether or not Lord Atkin realized the fact 
or directed his mind to the question, the formula which he laid down 
does in fact logically invalidate the principle laid down, and acted on in 
Gould’s case (supra). This contention must be squarely faced. Lord 
Atkin pointed out that the law governing the duty owned by A. to B. in 
the absence of fraud, contract or fiduciary relationship has been built up 
piecemeal—built up, if one may pursue the metaphor, in disconnected 
slabs exhibiting no organic unity of structure. Certain classes owed 
duties of care to certain other classes: road users to other road users; 
bailees to person entrusting property to them; doctors and surgeons (and 
originally barbers) to persons entrusting their bodies to them; occupiers 
of premises to persons whom they invite or permit to come on the 
premises; and so on. These categories attracting the duty had been added 
to and subtracted from from time to time. But no attempt had been 
made in the past to rationalize them, to find a common denominator
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between road users, bailees, surgeons, occupiers, and so on, which would 
explain why they should be bound to a duty of care and some other 
classes who might be expected equally to be so bound should be exempt 
—no attempt, that is, save that of Lord Esher, M. R., (from which his 
colleagues dissociated themselves) in Heaven v. Pender ((1883) 11 
Q. B. D. 503). Yet, said Lord Atkin, there must be such a common 
denominator, or at any rate some general conception of relations present 
in the cases in which a duty arises, and absent in cases in which it does 
not.
Very tentatively (and prefacing his observation with a warning that 
it might go beyond the province of a Judge to make such an attempt) he 
suggested the formula which has now become classic, but which neverthe­
less it is desirable here to quote afresh (48 The Times L. R., at p. 499; 
[1932] A.C., at p. 580): “You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or 
omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure 
your neighbour. Who, then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems 
to be—persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I 
ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when 
I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in 
question. This appears to me to be the doctrine of Heaven v. Pender 
(supra) as laid down by Lord Esher, when it is limited by the notion of 
proximity introduced by Lord Esher himself and Lord Justice A. L. 
Smith in Le Lievre v. Gould (supra).”
This passage, if read literally and without regard to the qualifying 
effect of its context, or of the subjecta materies, might be taken to com­
prehend not only conduct causing physical injury to person or property 
through setting a certain kind of chattels in motion or in circulation (the 
case immediately under review), but also conduct of any kind through 
any means (including negligent misstatement) causing damnum  of any 
kind recognized by the law, whether physical or not, to anyone who 
could bring himself within Lord Atkin’s definition of a “neighbour.” I 
cannot believe that so broad an application was intended by Lord Atkin 
himself. The case may not decide quite so little as is contained in the 
somewhat conservative headnote in the Law Reports, which purports to 
confine it to the act of a manufacturer launching into circulation a neg­
ligently manufactured chattel which is calculated to injure and in fact 
injures the ultimate consumer or user in circumstances in which neither 
he nor any intermediate party has a reasonable opportunity of examining 
it. In fact, it has since been applied somewhat outside this limited ambit: 
for instance, to physical injury caused by negligent failure to repair a 
lift: Haseldine v. Daw (58 The Times L. R. 1; [1941] 2 K. B. 343), and to 
physical injury suffered when unloading timber from a barge: Denny v . 
Supplies and Transport Company, Limited (66 The Times L. R. (Pt. 1) 
1168; [1950] 2 K. B. 374), or by the negligent adoption of a system of 
working. It has, however, I think, never been applied where the damage 
complained of was not physical. Mr. Justice Wrottesley in Old Gate 
Estates v . Toplis and Harding and Russell ((1939) 161 L. T. 227) held 
its application was limited to cases where the injury was to life or limb. 
I think that this is too narrow a view, and that physical injury to property 
may suffice, but it has never been applied to injury other than physical.
Apart, however, from any limitation which should be read into Lord 
Atkin’s language by reference to the facts of the case before him—the 
subjecta materies—it seems to me incredible that, if he thought that his
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formula was inconsistent with Gould's case (supra), he would not have 
said so. This case, now nearly 60 years old, had at that time stood for 
nearly 40 years. He must have considered it closely. Yet his only reference 
to it is as annexing a valid and essential qualification to Lord Esher’s 
formula in Heaven v. Pender (supra). Not a word of disapproval of the 
decision on its merits. The inference seems to me to be that Lord Atkin 
continued to accept the distinction between liability in tort for careless 
(but non-fraudulent) misstatements and liability in tort for some other 
forms of carelessness, and that his formula defining “who is my neighbour’’ 
must be read subject to his acceptance of this overriding distinction.
Counsel for the appellant was unable to point to any clean decided case, 
standing unreversed, either before or after Donoghue’s case (supra), in 
which (always apart from fraud, contract and fiduciary relationship) A. 
had ever been held liable to B. in damages for a careless misrepresentation. 
But he anchored certain hopes on George v. Skivington ( (1869) L. R. 5 
Ex. 1), and on certain observations of Lord Herschell in Derry v. Peek 
(supra). I  will say a word now on each of these cases.
George v. Skivington (supra), a decision “battered but unbowed,” was 
in the end vindicated by the House of Lords in Donoghue’s case (supra). 
The case was tried on demurrer. The declaration averred, inter alia, “that 
the defendant carried on the business of a chemist, and in the course of 
such business professed to sell a chemical compound made of ingredients 
known only to the defendant, and which he represented and professed to 
be fit and proper to be used for washing the hair, which could and might 
be so used without personal injury to the person using the same, and to 
have been carefully and skilfully and properly compounded by him the 
defendant; and thereupon the plaintiff Joseph George, bought of the de­
fendant, and the defendant sold to him at a certain price, a bottle of the 
said compound, to be used by the plaintiff Emma for washing her hair as 
the defendant then knew, and on the terms that the same was then fit and 
proper to be used and could be safely used, by her for the purpose afore­
said, without personal injury to her, and had been skilfully, carefully, and 
properly compounded by the defendant,” and that the wife suffered con­
sequent injury.
Thus it was averred that the defendant put into circulation, knowing it 
was intended to be used by the purchaser’s wife, a negligently compounded 
and deleterious hairwash. She used it, sustained physical injury, and an 
action was brought by her or on her behalf in which she succeeded on the 
issue raised by the demurrer. So far, the case is on all fours with Donog­
hue’s case (supra) according to its narrowest interpretation, and it is not 
surprising that Donoghue’s case (supra) affirmed it. But the declaration 
also averred that the defendant had said the hairwash was safe.
The present plaintiff, basing himself on this last averment, contended 
that it—an averment of negligent misstatement—standing alone would 
have evoked the same decision—namely, that the facts averred amounted, 
if proved, to a good cause of action. This I venture to doubt. It seems to 
me that the essence of the decision resided in the averment of negligent 
compounding and setting in motion by the defendant of a physical thing 
with knowledge that the plaintiff would or might use the physical thing so 
compounded and with resulting injury to the plaintiff; and that the 
parallel between Donoghue’s case (supra) and the hairwash case lay ex­
clusively in these features.
Turning to the decision in Derry v. Peek (supra), it is said that among
LIABILITY TO  TH IR D  PARTIES—AT COMMON LAW 237
decided cases Derry v. Peek (supra) also lends indirect support to the plain­
tiff’s case. This contention is based on a dictum  of Lord Herschell’s 
(5 The Times L. R., at p. 629; 14 App. Cas. at p. 360). Lord Herschell, in 
deciding that the defendants were not liable for a non-fraudulent misrep­
resentation in their prospectus, said that he excluded from his purview 
cases “where a person within whose special province it lay to know a par­
ticular fact has given an erroneous answer to an inquiry made with regard 
to it by a person desirous of ascertaining the fact for the purpose of deter­
mining his course.”
Here, again, is a statement which if construed in its literal breadth 
might seem to fit the present case. Lord Herschell’s dictum was, however, 
later interpreted both by the Court of Appeal in Low v. Bouverie (7 The 
Times L. R. 582; [1891] 3 Ch. 82) and later by the House of Lords in 
Nocton v. Ashburton (30 The Times L. R., at p. 604; [1914] A.C. 932, at 
p. 950). It seems clear from the latter case (in which the former was also 
considered and affirmed) that Lord Herschell’s proposition has been held 
only to hold good where (to use its terms) the “person within whose spe­
cial province it lays to know a particular fact” occupies a contractual or 
fiduciary position vis-à-vis the “person desirous of ascertaining that fact.” 
The cases which had decided otherwise are one by one dismissed by Lord 
Haldane as defensible if at all only on some other ground; warranty, 
estoppel, or whatnot. He affirmed that liability for negligence in word 
had in material respects been developed in our law differently from lia­
bility for negligence in act. The cases cited in support of Lord Herschell’s 
dictum are all based, according to Lord Dunedin in Nocton v. Ashburton 
([1914] A.C., at p. 964). “upon the existence of a fiduciary relationship, 
and, subsequently, the breach of duty subsequently arising.”
In what has gone before it has been assumed that the two Law Lords 
who agreed with Lord Atkin’s opinion or result accepted the broad for­
mula about "my duty to my neighbour” which he laid down, as well as 
in the narrow proposition limited to the liability of the negligent manu­
facturer of a chattel which reaches the consumer without an opportunity 
of intermediate examination and injures him. This assumption seems to 
me more than questionable. Lord Thankerton, though he said (48 The 
Times L.R., at p. 506; [1932] A.C., at p. 604) that he entirely agreed 
with Lord Atkin’s discussion of the authorities, was clearly considering 
the authorities in their application to the narrow ambit of a manufactur­
er’s liability, chattels and physical injury. His judgment does not travel 
outside those limits. Nor do I read Lord Macmillan’s judgment as en­
dorsing the wider proposition. There is a passage in which he laid down 
certain general propositions (48 The Times L. R., at p. 510; [1932] A.C., 
at p. 619). It would have been easy for him to have adopted Lord Atkin’s 
formula in terms if he had thought so broad a proposition justified. But 
when he said in an oft-quoted phrase, “the categories of negligence are 
never closed,” he is not, in my view, accepting an acid test of liability 
valid in all circumstances—he does not mention the word “neighbour”; 
he is merely saying that in accordance with changing social needs and 
standards new classes of persons legally bound or entitled to the exer­
cise of care may from time to time emerge—in this case by the addition 
of a careless manufacturer or circulator of a chattel—as parties bound, 
vis-à-vis consumers or users as parties entitled. In other words, what Lord 
Macmillan envisaged was the addition of another slab to the existing edi­
fice, not a systematic reconstruction of the edifice on a single logical plan.
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For these reasons I am of opinion that Donoghue's case (supra) neither 
reverses nor qualifies the principle laid down in Gould's case (supra).
If I am wrong in thinking that Lord Atkin’s formula was not accepted 
by the majority of the House, there remains the question whether, assum­
ing that Gould's case (supra) was well decided on its own facts, the facts 
of the present case are not so far different as to justify and require a 
different conclusion. The suggestion here is that the conclusion in Gould’s 
case (supra) could be defended consistently with the principle of Dono­
ghue’s case (supra) being applicable to negligent misrepresentation, if 
in Gould's case (supra) there was insufficient “proximity” between the 
parties to attract the Donoghue principle; and that a conclusion favour­
able to the plaintiff in the present case could properly be reached on the 
ground that in the present case there was sufficient “proximity.” The 
contention under this head is, in other words, first, that Donoghue's case 
(supra) overrules Gould’s (supra) so far as the latter places careless mis­
statements on a different and privileged level as compared with some other 
forms of careless behaviour; but, secondly, that the actual result of Gould's 
case (supra) was right because the principle in Donoghue's case (supra) 
required “proximity” as a condition of liability and there was in Gould's 
case (supra) no sufficient “proximity”; and, thirdly, that this accounts, 
inter alia, for Lord Atkin’s omission to say that Gould’s case (supra) was 
wrongly decided.
This argument also seems to me invalid. The only difference, quoad 
“proximity,” between the present case and Gould’s (supra) is that in the 
present case Mr. Fraser knew when he made his representation the identity 
of the man who was likely to rely on his representations, whereas Gould 
did not know this: he did not know that the parties who were to make 
the advances were the mortgagees, the plaintiffs, or at least he did not 
know the contents of the mortgage deed. But consider what he did know. 
He knew before any mortgage was effected that his certificates were 
required because advances were going to be made by someone to the 
builder on the security of the work performed up to date as vouched by 
his certificates. That someone could only be the building owner or some 
other lender relying on the same security.
I take the following passage from the statement of facts ([1893] 1 Q. B. 
492) premising that Hunt was the owner of the land on which two houses 
were to be built; Lovering was the builder; Dennes was the mortgagee 
who ultimately made advances; and Le Lievre, the plaintiff, was Dennes’ 
assign. “Hunt arranged with the plaintiff Dennes that he should advance 
the £850 to Lovering upon the security of a mortgage from him. Hunt 
also agreed with the defendant Gould, who was an architect and surveyor 
at Ilfracombe, that he should give certificates from time to time that the 
work had reached the respective stages at which the respective instalments 
were to be advanced as provided by the schedule of advances, a copy of 
which was given to the defendant. This agreement with the defendant 
was made before the execution of the mortgage.”
On those facts, to say that there was insufficient proximity in the Gould 
case (supra) seems to me wrong. Lord Atkin, in affirming the Donoghue 
type of liability, and annexing to it the condition of proximity, did not 
say: “There is no proximity unless the defendant can identify the ultimate 
victim of his carelessness in advance.” The manufacturers of the peccant 
bottle of ginger beer had no idea who would in the end consume it. All 
they knew was that someone would. You may adopt the formula Certum
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est qui certum reddi potest. The unidentifiability in advance of the ulti­
mate consumer and victim did not, by displacing the notion of proximity 
or in any other way, protect them from liability. I am therefore of opinion 
that this argument fails.
Singular consequences would follow if the principle laid down in Dono­
ghue’s case (supra) were applied to negligent misrepresentation in every 
case in which the representee were proximate to the representor. The case 
had been instanced by Professor Winfield and referred to by Lord Justice 
Denning of a marine hydrographer who carelessly omits to indicate on 
his map the existence of a reef. The captain of a liner, in reliance on the 
map and having no opportunity of checking it by reference to any other 
map, steers her on the unsuspected rocks, and she becomes a total loss. 
Is the unfortunate cartographer to be liable to her owners in negligence 
for some millions of pounds damages? Yet what line can be drawn between 
him and the defendants in the present case? If it be said that there is no 
proximity between the cartographer and those for whose use his map is 
designed, the reply surely is that there is just as much as there was between 
the manufacturer of the peccant ginger beer bottle and its ultimate 
consumer.
In the present state of our law different rules still seem to apply to the 
negligent misstatement on the one hand and to the negligent circulation 
or repair of chattels on the other; and Donoghue’s case (supra) does not 
seem to me to have abolished these differences. I am not concerned with 
defending the existing state of the law or contending that it is strictly logi­
cal—it clearly is not—but I am merely recording what I think it is. If this 
relegates me to the company of “timorous souls,” I must face that con­
sequence with such fortitude as I can command.
I am of opinion that the appeal should be dismissed.
Lord Justice Cohen.—The Judge dismissed the plaintiff’s claim. He 
found “no fraud” and from this part of his judgment the plaintiff does not 
appeal. He also found that the only duty which the defendants owed to 
the plaintiff was to produce accounts which they honestly believed to be 
the draft accounts of the company. In other words, he found that they 
owed no duty of care to the plaintiff. From that part of his judgment the 
plaintiff appeals on two grounds.
He says, first, that, since to the knowledge of the defendants’ employee, 
Mr. Fraser, the plaintiff was a prospective investor in the company and 
was asking for information about the accounts of the company to assist 
him in reaching a decision whether to make the investment, the defend­
ants, in accordance with the principles laid down by Lord Atkin in Dono­
ghue v. Stevenson (48 The Times L. R. 494; [1932] A.C. 562) owed a duty 
to the plaintiff, when giving him that information, to exercise care to see 
that it was accurate. Secondly, he says that since the information given to 
the plaintiff was inaccurate in material particulars owing to the negli­
gence of the defendants’ employee Mr. Fraser, the defendants are liable in 
damages. Alternatively, the plaintiff alleges that as he became a share­
holder in the company and the defendants were the auditors of the com­
pany, they owed a duty to him as shareholder to give him the accurate 
information which they should have given him when he was a prospec­
tive investor. This duty, he says, was broken and accordingly he is entitled 
to damages.
So far as the second ground is concerned, I entirely agree with the Judge
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that no damage flowed from the breach of such duty as is owed by the 
defendants as auditors to the plaintiff as a shareholder. The £2,000 had 
been irretrievably invested before the relationship had become operative. 
I would add that I doubt whether the defendants’ alleged duty as auditors 
extends to cover information given to the plaintiff before he became a 
shareholder.
The first ground presents more difficulty, but in spite of Mr. Lawson’s 
able and lucid argument I have come to the conclusion that we are bound 
by authority to hold that the Judge came to the right conclusion.
Mr. Foster submitted, first, that Mr. Fraser was not acting within the 
scope of his employment in giving to the plaintiff information as to the 
accounts and therefore the defendants could not be liable for his negli­
gence in the preparation thereof. So far as this point is concerned, I have 
nothing to add to the reasons given by my brethren for thinking that it 
cannot be sustained. Secondly, he said that the principle of Donoghue v. 
Stevenson (supra) had never been applied to a case of negligent misstate­
ment. A defendant could only be liable for negligent misstatement where 
there was a contractual nexus or a fiduciary relationship between him and 
the plaintiff. In the absence of such a relationship the decision in Derry v. 
Peek ((1889) 5 The Times L. R. 625; 14 App. Cas. 337), as interpreted in 
Nocton v. Ashburton (30 The Times L. R. 602; [1914] A.C. 932) is, Mr. 
Foster said, authority that no liability in negligence exists. This argument 
is, I think, well founded.
In Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra) as in all the other cases to which our 
attention was called, the breach of duty alleged has been one which has 
resulted in damages to the person of the plaintiff: see Hazeldine v. C. A. 
Daw and Son, Limited  (58 The Times L. R. 1; [1941] 2 K. B. 343); 
Denny v. Supplies and Transport Company, Limited  (66 The Times L. R. 
(Pt. 1) 1168; [1950] 2 K. B. 374). In Old Gate Estates v . Toplis and Har­
ding and Russell ( (1939) 161 L. T. Rep. 227) Mr. Justice Wrottesley re­
fused to apply the principle of Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra) to a case 
where a company had paid too much for a property owing to an over­
valuation by the defendants, who had been instructed by the promoters to 
value it for the purpose of the promotion. The company, which was the 
plaintiff, was not formed at the time of the valuation. Mr. Justice Wrottes­
ley, rejecting an argument based on Donoghue v . Stevenson (supra) and 
(161 L. T. Rep., at p. 229): “The conception which runs through all these 
cases, both in those applications of the principle and in Donoghue v. 
Stevenson (supra) itself, is that something was negligently created or put 
into circulation which was dangerous either to life or limb”—those are, 
I think, the very words of Lord Atkin himself and the other learned Lords 
who delivered opinions, or the opinions of a majority, in Donoghue v. 
Stevenson (supra)— “or else that something carelessly handled, made, or 
mended, which would become dangerous to life or limb or health. It is as 
true to-day as it was in 1893, when Le Lievre v. Gould (9 The Times L. R. 
243; [1893] 1 Q. B. 491) was decided, that, to use the words of Lord Justice 
Bowen ([1893] 1 Q. B., at p. 502): ‘It is idle to refer to cases which were 
decided under totally different aspects, and upon totally different consid­
erations of the law. Take, for example, the case of an own er of a chattel, 
such as a horse, a gun, or a carriage, or any other instrument, which is in 
itself of such a character that, if it be used carelessly, it may injure some 
third person who is near to it; then it is as plain as daylight that the 
owner of that chattel, who is responsible for its management, is bound
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to be careful how he uses it. Exactly in the same way with regard to the 
owner of premises. If the owner of premises knows that his premises are 
in a dangerous condition, and that people are coming there to work on 
them by his own permission and invitation, of course he must take reason­
able care that those premises do not injure those who are coming there. 
. . . How has it any application to the present case? [that was, of a certifi­
cate given by an architect.] Only, I suppose, on the suggestion that a man 
is responsible for what he states in a certificate to any person to whom 
he may have reason to suppose that the certificate may be shown. But the 
law of England does not go to that extent: it does not consider that what 
a man writes on paper is like a gun or other dangerous instrument, and, 
unless he intended to deceive, the law does not, in the absence of contract, 
hold him responsible for drawing his certificate carelessly.’ ”—I think 
that that is as true to-day as it was when it was said by Lord Justice Bowen. 
—“There is nothing in my opinion, in Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra) 
which makes that bad law. The exceptions laid down by Donoghue v. 
Stevenson (supra)”— the exceptions to the rule that a man is obliged to 
be careful only to those to whom he owes a duty by contract—“are, as I 
understand the decision, confined to negligence which results in danger to 
life, danger to limb, or danger to health, and, the present case not being 
one of those exceptions, the plaintiffs have, in my opinion, no cause of 
action on the analogy of that case.” Mr. Foster submitted that those ob­
servations constituted a correct statement of the law at any rate if the 
words “or property” were added after the words “or danger to health.”
The question of liability for negligent misstatement was also considered 
by Mr. Justice Devlin in Heskell v. Continental Express Limited ([1950] 
1 All E.R. 1033), a case where, through carelessness, a bill of lading had 
been issued for goods which had not been shipped. Mr. Justice Devlin 
said (at p. 1041): “In my judgment, therefore, the plaintiff has not estab­
lished any contractual relationship with Strick giving rise to any particu­
lar duty owing to him. In putting forward the wider proposition that 
Strick owed a duty to the public not carelessly to circulate a document 
of title knowing it would be used as such, counsel for the plaintiff acknowl­
edged the difficulty he encountered because of Le Lievre v. Gould (supra) 
and other similar decisions which make it plain that negligent misstate­
ment can never give rise to a cause of action.” Read literally, this state­
ment is too wide, since negligent misstatement can give rise to a cause of 
action not only where there is a contractual relationship, but also where 
there is a fiduciary relationship: see Nocton v. Ashburton (supra). But 
with this limitation the statement is, in my opinion, correct.
So far as I am aware, there is only one reported case involving negligent 
misstatement which supports the plaintiff’s claim. That is the decision of 
Mr. Justice Chitty in Cann v. Willson ((1882) 4 The Times L. R. 588; 39 
Ch. D. 39). In that case (I am reading from the headnote in the Law 
Reports): “An intending mortgagor, at the request of the solicitors of an 
intending mortgagee, applied to a firm of valuers for a valuation of the 
property proposed to be mortgaged. A valuation at the sum of £3,000 was 
sent in by the valuers direct to the mortgagee’s solicitors, and the mortgage 
was subsequently carried out. Default having been made in payment by 
the mortgagor, and a loss having resulted to the mortgagee, he commenced 
an action against the valuers for damages for the loss sustained through 
their negligence, misrepresentation, and breach of duty. The Court being 
satisfied on the evidence that the defendants knew at the time the valua­
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tion was made that it was for the purpose of an advance, and that the 
valuation as made was in fact no valuation at all:—Held, that, under the 
circumstances, the defendants were liable on two grounds: (1) that they 
(independently of contract) owed a duty to the plaintiff which they had 
failed to discharge; (2) that they had made reckless statements on which 
the plaintiff had acted.”
If the first ground of decision was good law, it would support Mr. Law­
son’s argument; but this Court considered the case in Le Lievre v. Gould 
(supra), and Lord Esher, M. R., Lord Justice Bowen and Lord Justice 
A. L. Smith all agreed that Cann v. Wilson (supra) must be treated as 
overruled by Derry v. Peek (supra). The facts in Le Lievre v. Gould 
(supra) differed somewhat from those in the present case, but I do not 
think the Court thought the differences material, for Lord Esher stated 
the problem with which the Court was then faced in the following terms 
([1893] 1 Q. B., at p. 496): ‘‘Then it is said that, even if there was no 
contract between the plaintiff Dennes and the defendant, nevertheless 
the defendant is liable to the plaintiffs for having given certificates which 
contained untrue statements; for it is said, the defendant owed a duty to 
the plaintiffs to exercise care in giving the certificates, because he knew 
that the plaintiffs would or might act upon them by advancing money 
to Lovering.”
Lord Esher in Le Lievre v. Gould (supra) then proceeded to consider 
the problem. He treated Heaven v. Pender ((1883) 11 Q. B. D. 503), 
which was the foundation of Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra), as good law, 
saying (9 The Times L. R. at p. 244; [1893] 1 Q. B., at p. 497): “If one 
man is near to another, or is near to the property of another, a duty lies 
upon him not to do that which may cause a personal injury to that other, 
or may injure his property. For instance, if a man is driving along a 
road, it is his duty not to do that which may injure another person whom 
he meets on the road, or to his horse or his carriage.” He then considered 
Cann v. Willson (supra) and said it was not good law, and finally came 
to the conclusion that the action failed, saying, in the last two or three 
lines of his judgment: “Such negligence, in the absence of contract with 
the plaintiffs, can give no right of action at law or in equity. All the 
grounds urged on behalf of the plaintiffs fail, and the appeal must be 
dismissed.” Lord Justice Bowen and Lord Justice A. L. Smith gave 
judgment to the same effect. I need not, I think, refer to any passages in 
their judgments, because I have referred to the material passage in Lord 
Justice Bowen’s judgment which Mr. Justice Wrottesley cited in Old Gate 
Estates v. Toplis and Harding and Russell (supra).
The principle of that decision seems to me directly in point in the pres­
ent case. It is binding on us unless it can be said to be inconsistent with 
some other decision of this Court or of the House of Lords. I am unable 
to find any such decision. Mr. Lawson asked us to say that it is inconsis­
tent with the principle laid down by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Steven­
son (supra). It is to be observed that in Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra) 
Lord Atkin himself cited with approval some passages from the judg­
ments of Lord Esher and Lord Justice A. L. Smith in Le Lievre v. Gould 
(supra), and I am unable to believe that if he had thought the ratio 
decidendi in that case was wrong he would have cited those passages 
without making it clear that he was not approving the decision. I 
think, therefore, that, although the passages (48 The Times L. R ., at p. 
499; [1932] A.C., at pp. 580-1) in Lord Atkin’s speech are couched in such
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general terms that they might possibly cover the case of negligent mis­
statement, that question was not present to Lord Atkin’s mind or intended 
to be covered by his statement.
Mr. Lawson further submitted that Derry v. Peek (supra) was purely a 
case of fraud and did not touch the question of negligent misstatement. 
It is true that the cause of action in Derry v. Peek (supra) was one of 
fraud, but it is, I think, implicit in the speeches that their Lordships 
would have reached the same conclusion had there been an alternative 
plea of negligence. I am fortified in this conclusion by the observations of 
two of their Lordships in Nocton v. Ashburton (supra). Lord Haldane, 
L. C., said ([1914] A.C., at p. 947): “The discussion of the case by the 
noble and learned Lords who took part in the decision appears to me to 
exclude the hypothesis that they considered any other question to be 
before them that what was the necessary foundation of an ordinary action 
for deceit.” He is examining the decision in Derry v. Peek (supra). “They 
must indeed be taken to have thought that the facts proved as to the rela­
tionship of the parties in Derry v. Peek (supra) were not enough to estab­
lish any special duty arising out of that relationship other than the gen­
eral duty of honesty.”
Again, Lord Shaw in Nocton v . Ashburton ([1914] A.C., at p. 971) 
cited with approval the following passage from the judgment of Lord 
Justice Bowen in Low v. Bouverie (7 The Times L. R. 582; [1891] 3 Ch. 
82, at p. 105): “ ‘Derry v. Peek (supra) decides . . . that in cases such as 
those of which that case was an instance, there is no duty enforceable at 
law to be careful in the representation which is made. Negligent misrep­
resentation does not certainly amount to deceit, and negligent misrepre­
sentation can only amount to a cause of action if there exist a duty to be 
careful—not to give information except after careful inquiry. In Derry v. 
Peek (supra) the House of Lords considered that the circumstances raised 
no such duty. It is hardly necessary to point out that, if the duty is 
assumed to exist, there must be a remedy for its non-performance, and 
that therefore the doctrine that negligent misrepresentation affords no 
cause of action is confined to cases in which there is no duty, such as the 
law recognizes, to be careful.’ ”
Derry v. Peek (supra) was a case where the action was founded on 
an allegation of a false statement in a prospectus, and I find it difficult 
to imagine a case where the proximity test laid down by Lord Atkin in 
Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra) would more clearly be satisfied if the prin­
ciple of that case is applicable to negligent misstatement. Mr. Lawson 
submitted that there was a distinction between Derry v. Peek (supra) and 
the present case in that a prospectus is issued to the world at large, 
whereas Mr. Fraser’s statements were addressed to the plaintiff in particu­
lar. This seems to me to be a distinction without a difference in principle.
For these reasons I think the decision in Le Lievre v. Gould (supra) is 
still good law and is conclusive of the present case. I might perhaps add 
that the conclusion which I have reached appears to accord with the views 
of the textbook writers. The learned editor of Salmond on the Law of 
Torts expresses the view that with certain exceptions not material to the 
present case, “A false statement is not actionable as a tort unless it is 
wilfully false. Mere negligence in the making of false statements is not 
actionable either as deceit or as any other kind of tort” (10th ed., p. 580). 
He regards the rule as anomalous. Winfield’s Textbook of the Law of 
Tort (4th ed., pp. 386 and 387) expresses his dislike of it in more forcible
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language, be he recognizes that decisions of this Court are definitely 
against the existence of any action in tort for nelgigent statement. He 
thinks that it is open to the House of Lords to take the contrary view. On 
this point I need express no opinion.
Before parting with the textbook writers, I ought perhaps to mention 
that Mr. Charlesworth, in his book on the Law of Negligence (2nd ed., 
p. 16) suggests an explanation of the alleged anomaly in the rule. He 
states: “The duty to take care is ultimately based on the possible con­
sequences which will occur if care is not taken. W hat the consequences 
may be of any particular act or omission is often a very difficult problem 
involving inquiry into questions of causation. This inquiry is difficult 
enough in cases where physical damage is concerned in which the cause, 
whether it be defective vehicles or machinery or lack of care and skill in 
management, can usually be accurately traced. To regard the issue of a 
certificate, an opinion, or a report as carrying the same duty of care as the 
delivery of a defective chattel would be to introduce a most disturbing 
factor into the mutual intercourse of society.” I do not find this explana­
tion entirely satisfactory, but I am unable to suggest a better one. Be that 
as it may, I am satisfied that on the authorities, as they stand, we have no 
alternative but to dismiss this appeal.
Since writing this judgment my attention has been directed by Professor 
Goodhart to a case in the New York Reports where a similar point was 
considered. The case is Ultramares Corporation v. Touche ((1931) 255 
N. Y. Rep. 170; 174 N. E. Rep. 441). It has the merit that the decision 
of the Court was given by Mr. Justice Cardozo. In that case the account­
ants had certified the annual report of a company which, in order to 
finance its operations, required extensive credit and borrowed large sums 
from banks and other lenders.
The facts are stated quite shortly and sufficiently for my present pur­
pose (at pp. 173 and 442 of the respective reports): “In January, 1924, the 
defendants, a firm of public accountants, were employed by Fred Stern 
and Co., Inc., to prepare and certify a balance-sheet exhibiting the con­
dition of its business as of December 31, 1923. They had been employed at 
the end of each of the three years preceding to render a like service. Fred 
Stem and Co., Inc., which was in substance Stern himself, was engaged in 
the importation and sale of rubber. To finance its operations, it required 
extensive credit and borrowed large sums of money from banks and other 
lenders. All this was known to the defendants. The defendants knew 
also that in the usual course of business the balance-sheet when certified 
would be exhibited by the Stern company to banks, creditors, stockholders, 
purchasers or sellers, according to the needs of the occasion, as the basis 
of financial dealings. Accordingly, when the balance-sheet was made up, 
the defendants supplied the Stern company with 32 copies certified with 
serial numbers as counterpart originals. Nothing was said as to the per­
sons to whom these counterparts would be shown or the extent or number 
of the transactions in which they would be used. In particular there was 
no mention of the plaintiff, a corporation doing business chiefly as a fac­
tor, which till then had never made advances to the Stern company, 
though it had sold merchandise in small amounts. The range of the trans­
actions in which a certificate of audit might be expected to play a part 
was as indefinite and wide as the possibilities of the business that was 
mirrored in the summary.”
The Court held that mere negligence did not make the defendants
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liable to the plaintiff, who had made advances on the strength of the certi­
fied accounts, though they in fact found that there was evidence of negli­
gence by the defendants in making their report. Mr. Justice Cardozo said 
(at pp. 179 and 444): “We are brought to the question of duty, its origin 
and measure. The defendants owed to their employer a duty imposed by 
law to make their certificate without fraud, and a duty growing out of 
contract to make it with the care and caution proper to their calling. 
Fraud includes the pretence of knowledge when knowledge there is none. 
To creditors and investors to whom the employer exhibited the certificate, 
the defendants owed a like duty to make it without fraud, since there was 
notice in the circumstances of its making that the employer did not intend 
to keep it to himself.” I pause there to say that there follow citations, 
but I do not propose to burden this judgment with the citations of the 
Judge except where they are of English cases. Mr. Justice Cardozo 
continued:
“A different question develops when we ask whether they owed a duty 
to these to make it without negligence. If liability for negligence exists, 
a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery be­
neath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability 
in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indetermi­
nate class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so 
extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implica­
tion of a duty that exposes to these consequences. We put aside for the 
moment any statement in the certificate which involves the representation 
of a fact as true to the knowledge of the auditors. If such a statement was 
made, whether believed to be true or not, the defendants are liable for 
deceit in the event that it was false. The plaintiff does not need the 
invention of novel doctrine to help it out in such conditions. The case 
was submitted to the jury and the verdict was returned upon the theory 
that, even in the absence of a misstatement of fact, there is a liability also 
for erroneous opinion. The expression of an opinion is to be subject to 
a warranty implied by law. What, then, is the warranty, as yet unformu­
lated, to be? Is it merely that the opinion is honestly conceived and that 
the preliminary inquiry has been honestly pursued, that a halt has not 
been made without a genuine belief that the search has been reasonably 
adequate to bring disclosure of the truth? Or does it go farther and in­
volve the assumption of a liability for any blunder or inattention that 
could fairly be spoken of as negligence if the controversy were one between 
accountant and employer for breach of a contract to render services for 
pay?
“The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days 
apace. How far the inroads shall extend is now a favourite subject of 
juridical discussion. . . .  In the field of the law of contract there has 
been a gradual widening of the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox (20 N. Y. 
268) until to-day the beneficiary of a promise, clearly designated as 
such, is seldom left without a remedy. . . . Even in that field, however, 
the remedy is narrower where the beneficiaries of the promise are inde­
terminate or general. Something more must then appear than an inten­
tion that the promise shall redound to the benefit of the public or to 
that of a class of indefinite extension. The promise must be such as to 
‘bespeak the assumption of a duty to make reparation directly to the 
individual members of the public, if the benefit is lost’. . . .  In the field 
of the law of torts a manufacturer who is negligent in the manufacture
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of a chattel in circumstances pointing to an unreasonable risk of serious 
bodily harm to those using it thereafter may be liable for negligence, 
though privity is lacking between manufacturer and user. . . .  A force or 
instrument of harm having been launched with potentialities of danger 
manifest to the eye of prudence, the one who launches it is under a duty 
to keep it within bounds. . . . Even so, the question is still open whether 
the potentialities of danger that will charge with liability are confined 
to harm to the person, or include injury to property. . . .  In either view, 
however, what is released or set in motion is a physical force. We are now 
asked to say that a like liability attaches to the circulation of a thought 
or a release of the explosive power resident in words.”
The Judge then considered three cases which were said to support the 
plaintiff’s action, and continued (at pp. 185 and 447): “From the fore­
going analysis the conclusion is, we think, inevitable that nothing in our 
previous decisions commits us to a holding of liability for negligence in 
the circumstances of the case at hand, and that such liability, if recognized, 
will be an extension of the principle of those decisions to different con­
ditions even if more or less analogous. The question then is whether such 
an extension shall be made. The extension, if made, will so expand the 
field of liability for negligent speech as to make it nearly, if not quite, 
coterminous with that of liability for fraud. Again and again, in decisions 
of this Court, the bounds of this latter liability have been set up, with 
futility the fate of every endeavour to dislodge them. Scienter has been 
declared to be an indispensable element except where the representation 
has been put forward as true of one’s own knowledge . . .  or in circum­
stances where the expression of opinion was a dishonourable pretense. . . . 
Even an opinion, especially an opinion by an expert, may be found to be 
fraudulent if the grounds supporting it are so flimsy as to lead to the 
conclusion that there was no genuine belief back of it. Farther than that 
this Court has never gone. Directors of corporations have been acquitted 
of liability for deceit though they have been lax in investigation and negli­
gent in speech. . . . This has not meant, to be sure, that negligence may 
not be evidence from which a trier of the facts may draw an inference of 
fraud . . . but merely that if that inference is rejected, or, in the light 
of all the circumstances, is found to be unreasonable, negligence alone is 
not a substitute for fraud. Many also are the cases that have distinguished 
between the wilful or reckless representation essential to the maintenance 
at law of an action for deceit, and the misrepresentation, negligent or 
innocent, that will lay a sufficient basis for rescission in equity. . . .  If this 
action is well conceived, all these principles and distinctions, so nicely 
wrought and formulated, have been a waste of time and effort. They have 
even been a snare, entrapping litigants and lawyers into an abandonment 
of the true remedy lying ready to the call. The suitors thrown out of 
Court because they proved negligence, and nothing else, in an action for 
deceit, might have ridden to triumphant victory if they had proved the 
self-same facts, but had given the wrong another label, and all this in 
a State where forms of action have been abolished. So to hold is near 
to saying that we have been paltering with justice. A word of caution or 
suggestion would have set the erring suitor right. Many pages of opinion 
were written by Judges the most eminent, yet the word was never 
spoken. We may not speak it now.”
The final passage which I wish to read (at pp. 188 and 448) is this: “Lia­
bility for negligence if adjudged in this case will extend to many callings
LIABILITY TO  TH IR D  PARTIES—AT COMMON LAW 247
other than an auditor’s. Lawyers who certify their opinion as to the 
validity of municipal or corporate bonds with knowledge that the opinion 
will be brought to the notice of the public, will become liable to the in­
vestors, if they have overlooked a statute or a decision, to the same extent 
as if the controversy were one between client and adviser. T itle companies 
insuring titles to a tract of land, with knowledge that at an approaching 
auction the fact that they have insured will be stated to the bidders, will 
become liable to purchasers who may wish the benefit of a policy without 
payment of a premium.
“These illustrations may seem to be extreme, but they go little, if any, 
farther than we are invited to go now. Negligence, moreover, will have 
one standard when viewed in relation to the employer, and another and 
at times a stricter standard when viewed in relation to the public. Expla­
nations that might seem plausible, omissions that might be reasonable, 
if the duty is confined to the employer, conducting a business that pre­
sumably at least is not a fraud upon his creditors, might wear another 
aspect if an independent duty to be suspicious even of one’s principal is 
owing to investors. 'Everyone making a promise having the quality of a 
contract will be under a duty to the promisee by virtue of the promise, 
but under another duty, apart from contract, to an indefinite number of 
potential beneficiaries when performance has begun. The assumption of 
one relation will mean the involuntary assumption of a series of new 
relations, inescapably hooked together’. . . . ‘The law does not spread its 
protection so far’. . . . Our holding does not emancipate accountants from 
the consequences of fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit has been 
so negligent as to justify a finding that they had no genuine belief in its 
adequacy, for this again is fraud. It does no more than say that, if less 
than this is proved, if there has been neither reckless misstatement nor 
insincere profession of an opinion, but only honest blunder, the ensuing 
liability for negligence is one that is bounded by the contract, and is 
to be enforced between the parties by whom the contract has been made. 
We doubt whether the average business man receiving a certificate with­
out paying for it, and receiving it merely as one among a multitude of 
possible investors, would look for anything more.”
I am glad, therefore, to find that the conclusion which I have reached 
on the basis of the English authorities seems to accord with the opinion 
of so eminent a student of the common law as Mr. Justice Cardozo.
I would only add that, despite the observations of Lord Justice Den­
ning, I do not think that the conclusion which I have reached will encour­
age accountants to fall short of the high standard of conduct which the 
institutes to which they belong have laid down for their members.
In the result the appeal will be dismissed.
DURO SPORTSWEAR, INC. v. COGEN
Supreme Court of New York, Special Term, 1954. 131 n. y. law journal 7.
Wasservogel, Referee. Plaintiffs seek to recover from defendants the 
sum of $20,000 as damages allegedly resulting from malpractice by the 
defendant Cogen, a certified public accountant, and the fraudulent repre­
sentations by all defendants as to the financial condition of the plaintiff 
corporation as of December, 1950.
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Prior to January 6, 1951, plaintiff Schwartz and defendant Louis Leff 
owned the entire capital stock of the plaintiff corporation, the shares 
of which were registered in the names of their respective wives. On or 
about January 6, 1951, plaintiffs and the defendants Leff entered into a 
written agreement which provided, among other things that: (1) Schwartz 
would acquire all of the capital stock of the corporation; (2) Schwartz 
would loan $10,000 to the corporation without interest; (3) defendant 
Louis Leff would be relieved of certain liabilities then due and owing 
by him and would remain as an employee of the corporation at a fixed 
salary plus 25 per cent of its net profits; and (4) defendant Louis Leff 
would remain liable for one-half of the deficit of the corporation as it 
then existed. The defendant Cogen, a son-in-law of the defendants Leff, 
was employed to audit the books of account of the plaintiff corporation 
and to present to the parties a statement of its financial condition in order 
to determine the amount of deficit, in accordance with the terms of the 
above-mentioned agreement.
The record shows that when the agreement was entered into by the 
parties, the defendant Cogen, at the request of the individual plaintiff, 
certified as correct a statement of the financial condition of the corpora­
tion which fixed its deficit at $3,458.84. Subsequent thereto, however, 
and in or about March 1951, Cogen delivered to Schwartz a “Statement of 
Adjustments’’ which indicated that the deficit of the corporation was in­
creased to $5,534.84. It is plaintiffs’ claim that Cogen and the other 
defendants knowingly caused the deficit of the plaintiff corporation to be 
understated by approximately $12,000 in order to induce the individual 
plaintiff to acquire all of the stock of the corporation and to relieve the 
defendant Louis Leff of certain liabilities, as set forth in the agreement 
entered into on January 6, 1951.
The documentary evidence and credible testimony adduced upon 
the trial clearly established that Schwartz consented to acquire the stock 
of the corporation at a time when defendant Cogen advised him that its 
deficit was not in excess of $3,600, whereas, in fact, the deficit was greater 
than $9,000. The difference between the amount indicated in Cogen’s 
original financial statement and the actual deficit consists, for the most 
part, of a series of bills which were not entered on the books of the 
corporation as of December 26, 1950, the closing date of the financial 
statement prepared by Cogen, but which were purportedly entered sub­
sequent thereto. Plaintiffs, however, have failed to prove that de­
fendants, or any of them, willfully, deliberately, or fraudulently caused 
these bills to be omitted from either the original books of account or 
the financial statement prepared by Cogen. Contrary to plaintiffs’ con­
tention, it appears most unlikely that defendants could have fraudu­
lently concealed any substantial bill which had to be paid by the cor­
poration, inasmuch as the record shows that Schwartz was in charge 
of the office, made the purchases, paid the bills, made entries in the 
original books of account, kept a diary of due dates of bills, and, thus, 
had an independent source of knowledge of the finances of the cor­
poration. The mere fact that plaintiff established that the defendant 
Louis Leff had failed to approve certain bills which were not entered 
in the corporate books of account prior to Cogen’s audit thereof is in­
sufficient to establish plaintiffs’ claim of fraud, particularly in view of 
the evidence which shows that it was the practice of Schwartz and other 
employees of plaintiff corporation to delay the posting and entry of
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such bills for at least several weeks after they were received. In the 
absence of other proof, therefore, it necessarily follows that plaintiffs’ 
second cause of action against all of the defendants, which is predicated 
upon allegations of fraud, must be dismissed upon the merits.
However, although there is not sufficient evidence to substantiate 
fraudulent intent on the part of any of the defendants, Cogen’s unqual­
ified certification of the financial statement and his method of preparing 
same is sufficient to sustain plaintiffs’ claim that at the very least he is 
guilty of malpractice. It cannot be disputed that at the time the certified 
statement was delivered to plaintiffs, it did not accurately reflect the 
true financial condition of the corporation. Cogen’s testimony that he 
took into consideration “all bills then available,” is inconsistent with 
his certification, which was absolute and not qualified in any manner. 
There is sufficient evidence to establish that Cogen failed to fully in­
vestigate the probability that the original books of account did not 
reflect outstanding bills due as of the date of his financial statement, 
although such bills had been received by the corporation but had not 
been entered or posted by either the individual plaintiff, the defendant 
Louis Leff, or any employee of the plaintiff corporation. Cogen, however, 
was associated with the plaintiff corporation for a considerable length 
of time prior to his preparation of the financial statement. He, there­
fore, was fully familiar with the customary delay in posting and entering 
bills in the books of account. Despite his knowledge of this practice, he 
nevertheless failed to take it into consideration and qualify his certi­
fication accordingly. His apparent refusal to realize the effect of an ab­
solute certification and his evident reckless disregard of the consequences 
of such action, in the opinion of the court, is sufficient to constitute 
malpractice.
Moreover, it further appears that defendant Cogen, in April, 1951, 
made a journal entry wherein he added $10,000 to the corporation’s 
surplus account by crediting “Surplus” and debiting “Accountants Pay­
able—Chic Style,” a dress contracting business wholly owned by the in­
dividual plaintiff, his son and wife. It was Cogen’s contention upon the 
trial that his authority for such entry was the January 6, 1951, agreement 
executed by the individual plaintiff and the defendants Leff. The record, 
however, establishes that Cogen did not post the $10,000 charge against 
the Chic Style account in the “Accounts Payable” ledger of the plaintiff 
corporation, as good accounting practice required. Likewise the journal 
entry made by Cogen does not in any manner reflect a loan as con­
templated by the parties at the time of the execution of their agreement. 
Nowhere in this agreement is there any provision which justifies the 
journal entry as made by Cogen, which, in effect, reflects a complete 
forgiveness of the money due and owing Chic Style by the corporation. 
If this journal entry had been correctly made and in accordance with 
the provisions of the January, 1951, agreement, the total liabilities of 
the corporation would not have decreased by $10,000, which was the 
effect of Cogen’s act. The individual plaintiff had merely agreed to 
make a loan to the corporation and a proper $10,000 loan entry would 
not have had the effect upon the capital, surplus, or deficit of the 
corporation as indicated in the financial statement prepared by Cogen. 
It clearly appears, therefore, that the defendant Cogen, as a certified 
public accountant, improperly recorded the intention of the parties in 
the books of account and, at the very least, must be deemed negligent
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in the preparation of the financial statement relied upon by the parties 
prior to the actual execution of the agreement on January 6, 1951. 
Plaintiffs’ claim for damages is obviously based upon the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals in the case of Ultramares Corporation v. Touche (255 
N. Y., 170). In view of the holding by this court, as above noted, that 
plaintiffs have failed to establish fraud on the part of any of the de­
fendants, the Ultramares case is not applicable. In the cited case, the 
Court of Appeals, in substance, held that in the absence of fraud, an 
accountant’s liability for negligence “is one that is bounded by * * * 
contract, and is to be enforced between the parties by whom the contract 
has been made” (supra, p. 189). In the instant action, there is no privity 
of contract between Cogen and Schwartz. The record is clear that Cogen 
was employed only by the plaintiff-corporation and not by Schwartz. 
The mere fact that he gratuitously prepared personal income tax re­
turns for Schwartz and his family is not sufficient basis for concluding 
that an employer-employee relationship existed between them within 
the intendment of the Ultramares case. Likewise, the fact that Cogen 
was employed by Schwartz to audit the books of Chic Style Company 
does not impose a contractual obligation upon Cogen with respect to 
Schwartz to use care and diligence in the preparation of his accounting 
statements for plaintiff-corporation. Plaintiff corporation and Chic Style 
Company are two separate entities with no legal relationship. There is 
no claim in this action that Cogen was negligent insofar as his work for 
Chic Style Company was concerned. The fact that he was an employee 
of this company as well as the plaintiff-corporation is not material to 
the issues before the court.
Although the corporation, as Cogen’s employer, was joined in the 
action as a party-plaintiff, the claim for damages in its behalf, in effect, 
was abandoned by counsel in the briefs submitted to the court after 
trial. In any event, there is nothing in the record which shows that the 
corporation suffered any loss as a result of Cogen’s negligence or mal­
practice which would enable it to recover damages under the Ultramares 
case.
In a subsequent case, however, the Court of Appeals made it clear 
that under certain circumstances accountants may be held liable to third 
parties even where there is lacking deliberate or active fraud (State 
Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N. Y., 104, 112). In order for Schwartz 
to recover damages, it would be necessary for the court to find that Cogen 
was guilty of gross negligence rather than mere faulty judgment. In 
the opinion of the court, the relevant facts of the instant action clearly 
require such finding.
Cogen’s heedlessness and wanton disregard of the consequences of 
his incorrect financial statements take the place of a deliberate intention 
to defraud. Even under the principles set forth in the Ultramares case, 
“negligence or blindness, even when not equivalent to fraud, is none the 
less evidence to sustain the inference of fraud. At least this is so if the 
negligence is gross” (supra, p. 190). As already stated, this court has 
found that there is not sufficient evidence to warrant a specific finding 
of fraud. Nevertheless, the proof establishes that Cogen was derelict in 
his duty to thoroughly investigate the status of the corporate books of 
account prior to the preparation of his initial financial statement, and 
more particularly in view of the fact that he had personal knowledge 
of the practice of the corporation’s bookkeepers to delay the entering
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and posting of such bills in these books of account. His unqualified 
certification and his failure to note the possibility of such unentered 
bills in the financial statements are matters which have not been ex­
plained to the satisfaction of the court. As a licensed certified public 
accountant, Cogen must be deemed to be aware of the reliance which 
normally is attached to an absolute certification of a financial report. 
Moreover, it cannot be denied that Cogen knew about specific unentered 
bills on or before March 25, 1951, at which time he delivered a supple­
mental financial statement to Schwartz. His repeated failure to include 
such bills in this statement is inexcusable, as is the fact that he in­
correctly reflected Schwartz’ loan of $10,000 to the corporation in the 
journal book of account. Thus, the record is replete with the foregoing 
evidence and other proof, both oral and documentary, showing Cogen’s 
“refusal to see the obvious * * * and his failure to investigate the 
doubtful,” which are sufficient to impose liability upon him for dam­
age suffered by Schwartz (State Street Trust Co., supra).
Contrary to defendant’s contention, the mere fact that the damage 
to Schwartz cannot be measured with absolute mathematical certainty, 
is not sufficient to preclude his recovery herein. Where it is certain that 
damages have been caused by a wrong and the only uncertainty is as to 
the precise amount, there can rarely be good reason for refusing any 
damages whatever for the wrong on account of such uncertainty (Wake­
man v. Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co., 101 N. Y. 205; Nat. Concert & 
Artists Corp. v. Murray, 281 App. Div., 230, 233; Alexander’s Depart­
ment Stores, Inc., v . Ohrbach’s Inc., 269 App. Div., 321, 328-29). A 
wrongdoer may not escape liability simply because the ordinary standards 
for measuring damages are not available. In any event, there is suffi­
cient evidence in this record from which the court can reasonably 
evaluate the loss to Schwartz. Credible and disinterested expert tes­
timony establishes that the actual deficit of the corporation as of January 
6, 1951, was $9,448.68. Prior to the execution of the agreement entered 
into on the same date, Schwartz, as one-half owner of the stock of the 
corporation, was liable for one-half of such deficit, to wit, $4,724.34. As 
a result of the agreement, Schwartz consented to acquire the corporation 
with a deficit of $3,458.84, as reported to him by Cogen. This amount, 
subtracted from the remaining one-half of the actual deficit which 
Schwartz was obligated to take over on January 6, 1951, to wit, $4,724.34, 
leaves a balance of $1,265.50 above the amount of the deficit Schwartz 
had agreed to assume in reliance upon Cogen’s financial statement. This 
amount, therefore, represents the damage to Schwartz.
Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, there is no merit to the claim that 
Schwartz was additionally damaged to the extent of $10,000, which 
amount allegedly represents moneys advanced by him to the corporation 
in reliance upon Cogen’s reports. This sum of $10,000 is part of the 
liabilities set forth in the financial statements here involved and is al­
ready taken into consideration in reaching the foregoing deficit of the 
corporation as above set forth. Furthermore, nothing in the record war­
rants the conclusion that Schwartz agreed to advance additional capital 
to the corporation in sole reliance upon Cogen’s financial statements. 
The credible testimony adduced upon the trial shows that Schwartz 
had agreed to make such loans prior to the preparation of any report 
by Cogen. Concededly, the financial statement submitted to Schwartz 
in January, 1951, did not reflect the true condition of the corporation.
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Nevertheless, Schwartz had already committed himself to make certain 
advances to the corporation and was cognizant of its insolvency, al­
though he was not aware of the exact amount of the deficit. His own 
testimony indicates that it was because of known past losses that he 
was compelled to make loans to the corporation. Plaintiffs have failed 
to establish that Schwartz was induced to lend an additional $10,000 
in reliance upon Cogen’s financial statements and thereby incur any 
loss other than that already considered by the court in fixing the damage 
he sustained.
Judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff Schwartz against defendant 
Cogen on the first cause of action for the sum of $1,265.50, with interest 
thereon from January 6, 1951. Judgment is rendered in favor of de­
fendants dismissing the second cause of action upon the merits. The 
above constitutes the decision of the court as required by the applica­
ble provisions of the Civil Practice Act. The defendant Cogen may have 
a thirty day stay of execution.
SECTION 4
LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES 
BY STATUTE
SHONTS v. HIRLIMAN *
District Court of the United States, S. D. California, 1939. 28 F. Supp. 478.
The plaintiffs, who were purchasers of stock in Condor Pictures, In­
corporated, brought three actions against certain officers of the corpora­
tion and Webster, Atz & Company, the auditors, to recover damages, the 
price paid for the stock, under the provisions of the Securities Act of 
1933, section 11, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k, establishing civil liability against 
certain persons for falsity in the registration statement. The cases were 
consolidated for trial. The falsity relied on related to misrepresentations 
and omissions concerning a lease by the Condor Pictures, Incorporated, 
and Western Service Studios, and, more particularly, the failure to set 
forth in the amendments to the registration statement, dated January 23, 
1937, and February 1, 1937, that Condor Pictures, Incorporated, was obli­
gated under the lease to use the studio a minimum of one hundred days 
a year at a total rental of thirty-five thousand dollars. The form in which 
the alleged false statements appeared on the respective dates in the sec­
ond and third amendments was:
The second amendment to Registration Statement, paragraph No. 3 
read:
“The issuer is fully equipped to carry out its present program and 
business. It owns no substantial physical properties or studios but carries 
on its production program at the present by rental of the use of studio and 
equipment at RKO Pathe Studio, Culver City, California. This policy 
will be continued by the issuer until such time as it becomes advantageous 
to purchase or build its own studio. At the present time this does not 
appear advisable as there are fully equipped operating studios available 
for rental one of which the issuer is now leasing and using and which is 
more than ample for the present requirements. There are sufficient space, 
equipment and facilities to meet issuer’s requirements even should 
the present production program be doubled. The issuer’s leasing arrange­
ment with the studio provides the issuer with all necessary equipment for 
the production volume above stated in addition to all necessary offices 
for production staff.
“It is not necessary for the issuer to make any substantial investment in 
equipment because the studio lease provides the issuer with the essentials.
“The affiliate of the issuer, The Van Beuren Corporation, does not
* This case is discussed at p. 48 supra.
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own any physical property or equipment of material account, neither does 
it require the ownership of such property or equipment for the present 
or proposed program. The properties and studio or location and equip­
ment used by said Company are likewise leased. The volume that may be 
produced with properties and equipment so leased is more than double 
the present program.”
The third amendment read:
“The issuer is fully equipped to carry out its present program and busi­
ness. It owns no substantial physical properties or studios but carries on 
its production program at the present by rental of the use of studio and 
equipment at the Western Service Studios, Hollywood, California. This 
policy will be continued by the issuer until such time as it becomes advan­
tageous to purchase or build its own studio. At the present time this does 
not appear advisable as there are fully equipped operating studios avail­
able for rental one of which the issuer is now leasing and using and which 
is more than ample for the present requirements. There are sufficient 
space, equipment and facilities to meet issuer’s requirements even should 
the present production program be doubled. The issuer’s leasing arrange­
ment with the studio provides the issuer with all necessary equipment 
for the production volume above stated in addition to all necessary 
offices for production staff.
“The Western Service Studios are rented to the registrant by Grand 
National Films, Inc., the present lessee, for a period of approximately 
one (1) year from the date of this registration statement with options to 
renew granted solely to the registrant for a further nine (9) year period 
terminable only by the registrant at the end of any year during the first 
four (4) years of the 9-year period but not terminable during the suc­
ceeding five (5) year period if the registrant exercises its option to renew 
at the commencement of said 5-year period. The rental basis is at the 
rate of $350 per shooting day with no payments for any days on which 
there is no shooting. “It is not necessary for the issuer to make any sub­
stantial investment in equipment because the studio lease provides the 
issuer with the essentials.
“The affiliate of the issuer, The Van Beuren Corporation, does not 
own any physical property or equipment of material account, neither 
does it require the ownership of such property or equipment for the 
present or proposed program. The properties and studio or location and 
equipment used by said Corporation are likewise leased. The volume that 
may be produced with properties and equipment so leased is more than 
double the present program.”
Paragraph No. 46 read:
“The registrant has entered into a rental agreement with Grand Na­
tional Films, Inc., the present lessee of the Western Service Studios in 
Hollywood, California, whereby space, facilities and equipment to meet 
the requirements of the registrant’s production program, even should it 
be doubled, together with all necessary offices for production staff are 
rented to the registrant. The studio is a fully equipped operating studio 
and the amount of space varies and is made available according to the 
stage and settings required.
“The Western Service Studios are rented to the registrant by Grand
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National Films, Inc. for a period of approximately 1 year from the date 
of this registration statement with options to renew granted solely to the 
registrant for a further 9-year period terminable only by the registrant 
at the end of any year during the first 4 years of the 9-year period but not 
terminable during the succeeding 5-year period. The rental basis is at the. 
rate of $350 per shooting day with no payments for any days on which 
there is no shooting. A copy of this agreement is to be filed as a post 
effective amendment to the registration statement.”
The evidence showed that a formal lease was not entered into until 
March 9, 1937. However, a telegram signed by the President of Western 
Service Studios, dated January 31, 1937, committed the company to a 
rental arrangement to be followed by a formal leasing. This telegram, 
however, did not refer to a minimum guarantee. On May 11, 1937, the 
Securities Exchange Commission issued a stop order by reason of the 
alleged misrepresentations in the registration statement. The auditors, 
in their certificate dated January 19, 1937, did not set up the obligation 
to pay a minimum rental of $35,000 as a contingent liability. The de­
fendants stipulated, without conceding the materiality of the matter, 
that the stock had no market value. The plaintiffs did not offer any 
evidence as to the actual value of the stock at the time the actions were 
instituted. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ case, the defendants moved 
to dismiss the complaints upon the ground that no damage had been 
shown and that the actions were barred by Section 13 of the Securities 
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §77m.
Yankwich, District Judge (after stating facts as above). The problems 
presented by these motions must be solved by an analysis of the statute 
or by reference to similar statutes or claims of similar character, because, 
owing to the newness of the Securities Act of 1933, there are no cases 
determining them.
The Congress of the United States, for the first time in its history, 
undertook in 1933, to pass a statute similar to the state Corporate Securi­
ties statutes, commonly known as “blue sky laws”. They take their name 
from their object, which is to prevent promoters of corporate securities 
from selling “the blue sky” to investors, or at least, from promising it 
to them. Most of these statutes are regulatory only. They regulate the 
securities which may or may not be issued or sold in a state and set up 
agencies for the granting of permits to issue or sell securities. They do 
not, as a rule, create any special claim of a civil nature for falsity in the 
application for a permit. The person who feels defrauded, by any mis­
representation relating to the stock, must resort to the law action of 
deceit or to the equity suit of rescission.
This Act, however, creates a civil liability of a specific character. It 
provides that if any part of the registration statement contains an untrue 
statement of material facts or omits to state material facts, the person who 
acquires the security, without knowledge of the untruth or omission, may 
sue either at law or in equity, the person who signed the registration state­
ment, the officers or directors of the corporation which applied for the 
registration, and the accountants or others who certified to the registra­
tion statement or prepared it. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k.
The measure of damages is not the one which usually obtains in fraud, 
—the difference between the value of the thing bought and what: it would 
have been if it had been as represented.
I refer, for illustration of the latter rule, to Hines v. Brode, 1914, 168
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Cal. 507, 143 P. 729, and to a later case, in which I was of counsel for the 
defendant, Palladine v. Imperial Valley Farms Lands Association, 1924, 
65 Cal. App. 727, 225 P. 291. I quote from Hines v. Brode, supra [168 
Cal. 507, 143 P. 730]: “The price paid may be considered only as. evi­
dence of value. Therefore, in a proper case, a wronged plaintiff may 
assert, as here, and, if possible, show, that the actual value of the property 
was only $100, and that its value, if the property had been as represented, 
was $4,000. He may also show and recover for the depreciation in the 
value of the improvements which he may have placed upon the property— 
a depreciation resulting from the fact that the actual value was not the 
represented value; and he may also recover for any other legitimate ex­
penditures he may have made.” This rule was abolished in California by 
the Amendment of 1935 to Section 3343 of the Civil Code (St. 1935, p. 
1612).
If we study the Securities Act of 1933, and especially Section 11, which 
creates a right of action which would not otherwise exist, we find that 
the Congress did not adopt this rule, but made the measure of recovery 
that which had always obtained in actions for fraud in the courts of the 
United States. Thus, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Bolles, 1889, 132 U. 
S. 125, 129, 130, 10 S. Ct. 39, 40, 33 L. Ed. 279:
“The measure of damages was not the difference between the contract 
price and the reasonable market value if the property had been as repre­
sented to be, even if the stock had been worth the price paid for it; nor, 
if the stock were worthless, could the plaintiff have recovered the value 
it would have had if the property had been equal to the representations. 
What the plaintiff might have gained is not the question, but what he 
had lost by being deceived into the purchase. The suit was not brought 
for breach of contract. The gist of the action was that the plaintiff was 
fraudulently induced by the defendant to purchase stock upon the faith 
of certain false and fraudulent representations, and so as to the other 
persons on whose claims the plaintiff sought to recover. If the jury be­
lieved from the evidence that the defendant was guilty of the fraudulent 
and false representations alleged, and that the purchase of stock had been 
made in reliance thereon, then the defendant was liable to respond in 
such damages as naturally and proximately resulted from the fraud. He 
was bound to make good the loss sustained,—such as the moneys the plain­
tiff had paid out and interest, and any other outlay legitimately attribu­
table to defendant’s fraudulent conduct; but this liability did not include 
the expected fruits of an unrealized speculation. The reasonable market 
value, if the property had been as represented, afforded, therefore, no 
proper element of recovery.
“Nor had the contract price the bearing given to it by the court. What 
the plaintiff paid for the stock was properly put in evidence, not as the 
basis of the application of the rule in relation to the difference between 
the contract price and the market or actual value, but as establishing the 
loss he had sustained in that particular. I f  the stock had a value in fact, 
that would necessarily be applied in reduction of the damages. ‘The dam­
age to be recovered must always be the natural and proximate conse­
quence of the act complained o f,’ says Mr. Greenleaf (volume 2, § 256); 
and ‘the test is,’ adds Chief Justice Beasley in Crater v. Binninger, 33 
N.J.L. [4 Vroom] 513 [518, 97 Am. Dec. 737], ‘that those results are 
proximate which the wrong-doer, from his position, must have con­
templated as the probable consequence of his fraud or breach of contract.’
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In that case the plaintiff had been induced by the deceit of the defendant 
to enter into an oil speculation, and the defendant was held responsible 
for the moneys put into the scheme by the plaintiff in the ordinary course 
of the business, which moneys were lost, less the value of the interest 
which the plaintiff retained in the property held by those associated in 
the speculation.” (Italics added.)
And see, Sigafus v. Porter, 1900, 179 U. S. 116, 21 S. Ct. 34, 45 L. Ed. 
113; Tooker v. Alston, 1907, 8 Cir., 159 F. 599, 16 L. R. A., N. S., 818; 
Towle v . Maxwell Motor Sales Corp., 8 Cir., 1928, 26 F. 2d 209.
The Act, in section 11, subdivision (e), provides that the recovery shall 
be of such damages as shall represent the difference between the amount 
paid for the security and “ (1) the value thereof as of the time such suit 
was brought, or (2) the price at which such security shall have been 
disposed of in the market before suit, or (3) the price at which such 
security shall have been disposed of after suit but before judgment if 
such damages shall be less than the damages representing the difference 
between the amount paid for the security (not exceeding the price at 
which the security was offered to the public) and the value thereof as of 
the time such suit was brought.” 15 U. S. C.A. § 77k (e).
It is evident that the Congress intended to make the action, notwith­
standing its origin in fraud, purely compensatory. And so, it provided for 
the recovery of the price paid. It anticipated three possible contingencies:
(1) Where there has been no sale of the stock; (2) where there has been a 
sale of the stock before the action was brought or (3) a sale after the action 
was brought.
Where there has been no sale of the stock, the recovery is for the 
difference between the value of the stock when purchased, and its value 
as of the time suit is brought. Where there has been a sale, the recovery 
is for the difference between the price received by the seller and the price 
he paid.
Before disposing of this question and the question of limitation, I 
comment briefly on the evidence in the record as it relates to the elements 
of the action created by the statute.
I am satisfied that the omission from the statement of the minimum 
requirements in the leases, which obligated Condor Pictures, Inc., to 
shoot at least 100 days a year, is material. I t is not of any great significance 
that the lease was not actually entered into until later. For that reason, 
I am of the view that there is no falsity in the statement that they had 
certain rental arrangements with a particular company. I think the oral 
negotiations and the telegram of January 1, 1937, showed a commitment 
which the parties themselves considered binding, and which was to be 
later embodied in a more formal instrument. The effect of these con­
clusions is this: No misstatement or omission appears in the registration 
statement until after the last certificate of Webster, Atz & Co., dated 
January 19, 1937. Prior to January 31, 1937, there were merely discus­
sions of rental, and no definite undertaking by either side or guarantee 
of a minimum, which was binding on the company. The failure of the 
certificate of Webster, Atz & Co. to set up the rental undertaking and the 
minimum guarantee of $35,000 as a contingent liability, is not the 
omission of anything which existed then. The rental arrangement was 
not called to their attention. There was no entry on the books at their 
disposal, from which, by further inquiry, they might have discovered 
that there was such an undertaking. Absent these, they cannot be
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charged with a misrepresentation which was made later—long after their 
certification.
In  sum, we cannot, as to Webster, Atz & Co., take the subsequent omis­
sions and retroject them to the date of January 19, 1937, so as to “tie” 
them to a certificate, which they made on the basis of facts as they then 
existed and which showed no rental arrangement of any kind.
We return to the element of damages. It is stipulated that, at the time 
the actions were begun, the stock had no “market value.” But it is not 
conceded that it had no intrinsic value. In the view I take, this value is 
of utmost importance. The object of the statute is not to penalize pro­
moters or auditors for the full value of the stock, merely because the 
stock—which may be that of a new corporation—might not have a 
“market value.” The object of the Congress was to compensate a person 
for the depreciation in the value—the actual value of his security.
Mark you, the object of this section is compensatory. No penalties are 
intended. The object is not to recover the full value of the stock, under 
all circumstances. The plaintiffs are not required, as a condition precedent 
to recovery, to surrender for cancellation to the defendants or to the 
court, the stock, or even to tender it back. They retain it. If, as counsel 
claim, they may retain the stock and then recover its full value by 
showing that there is no market for it at a particular time, then we 
have this situation: A person might recover the full value of the stock, 
retain his position as a stockholder in the corporation, exercise his full 
rights as such, and then, at some future time, when the stock had acquired 
a “market value,” reap the full benefit of his investment, after he has 
already been repaid it. This would be a penalty, inconsistent with the 
compensatory nature of the Act.
The finding of insolvency in the reorganization proceedings is not 
proof that the stock was valueless. A petition for reorganization was filed 
on November 29, 1937. Under Section 77B of the old Bankruptcy Act, 11 
U. S. C. A. § 207, and Chapter 10 of the Chandler Act, a petition for 
reorganization may be filed either if a corporation is insolvent, or if it is 
unable to pay its debts as they mature. 11 U. S. C. A., Ch. 10, § 530 (1). 
Insolvency here is interpreted as it is defined in clause (19) of Section 1 
of the new Bankruptcy Act, namely: A condition existing when the 
aggregate of a debtor’s property, exclusive of any property which he may 
have concealed, transferred or removed with intent to defraud, is not, at a 
fair valuation, sufficient in amount to pay his debts. 11 U. S. C. A., Ch. 1, 
§ 1 (19).
A corporation may seek the benefit of corporate reorganization, without 
being insolvent. The only object of determining insolvency is to dispense 
with the need for the assent of a majority of the stockholders to the plan 
of reorganization. T hat was the rule under 77B and is the rule under the 
present Act, subdivision 8 of Section 216, which provides that protection 
for stockholders shall not be required after the Judge determines that the 
debtor is insolvent. 11 U.S.C.A. § 616 (8).
A reorganization differs from an ordinary proceeding in bankruptcy, 
whether upon a voluntary or involuntary petition. In an involuntary 
petition in bankruptcy, it is usually alleged that the defendant is insolvent 
and has committed certain acts of bankruptcy. 11 U. S. C. A., Ch. 3, § 21. 
If, later on, the issue is tried, the finding of insolvency reverts to the date 
of the filing of the petition. 11 U. S. C. A., Ch. 1, §1 (13). For that is the 
issue presented by the pleadings. I think that this is the principle which
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counsel had in mind in urging that the finding of insolvency in the 
reorganization proceedings of Condor Pictures, Inc., on the 30th of 
December, 1938, reverted back to the filing of the petition. When a 
petition for reorganization is filed, by either the debtor or some of its 
creditors, the object is to subject at once the property to the equity powers 
of the court. And the court is not called upon, in approving the petition, 
to determine whether the debtor is solvent or insolvent. When, in the 
course of the proceedings, it becomes necessary to determine the voting 
rights of the stockholders, the court may make a finding of insolvency. 
This finding is merely for the purpose of reorganization. For if reorganiza­
tion fails, either through the failure of the plan formulated and approved 
by the court, to receive the assent of the requisite number of creditors or 
because the court is satisfied that no reorganization is possible, the court 
has the choice of liquidating or of dismissing. If the court liquidates, then 
its finding of insolvency becomes effective, and liquidation is ordered 
through a trustee. 11 U. S. C. A. §§ 636-638.
I refer to these matters in order to point out how provisional all acts 
done in the course of a reorganization proceeding may be until there is 
actually a reorganization or liquidation.
Now, to get back to the specific order. The minute order of Judge 
Ralph E. Jenney says specifically: “This matter coming on for hearing 
on (8) motion of Ben Pivar, et al, creditors to dismiss the proceedings 
numbered 31,013-C, Bankruptcy, the court finds the corporation insolvent 
in both the bankruptcy and the equity sense at this time.”
Judge Jenney did not order liquidation. Had he ordered liquidation, it 
might be argued that we are in bankruptcy and ought to consider it as 
though an adjudication had been made upon an involuntary petition, 
and that it refers back to the date of the petition. But, he did not do so. 
He continued the efforts at reorganization. His only object in making the 
finding was to say to the reorganizers: “You may proceed to formulate a 
plan, and if that plan is approved by me, it will be confirmed when you 
secure the assent of two-thirds of the creditors. You do not need the assent 
of a majority of the stockholders.”
We cannot retroject into the past this finding, which says that in­
solvency exists “at this tim e” so as (in the language of the street) “to pin” 
insolvency on the corporation as of November 29, 1937.
The documentary evidence offered to show insolvency is insufficient. 
We have an auditor’s summary of the books of the company, which shows 
an operating loss, during a certain period of time. But an operating loss 
is not the equivalent of insolvency, either in the sense of inability to meet 
debts—which, of course, would not help us here—or in the sense that 
the assets, at a fair valuation, are less than the liabilities.
I am of the view, therefore, that the evidence does not show insolvency, 
so as to warrant the court in concluding that, on the date when these 
suits were instituted, between March and October, 1937, the stock was of 
no value, so as to entitle the plaintiffs to recover without proof of value.
I realize that there may be difficulties in proving value. But this type 
of legislation is novel. We know the opposition encountered when such 
legislation is sought to be enacted. A nd, no  doubt, because of this 
opposition, on the part of persons whose affairs had not been, heretofore, 
regulated by federal law,—an opposition which, indubitably, expressed 
itself in the Congress—a compromise had to be reached and the law made 
less harsh.
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Counsel themselves have adverted to the fact that recovery was greater 
under the original enactment. This indicates that, ultimately, the counsel 
of those prevailed who thought that liability should not be penal in 
nature, but merely compensatory, limited to the actual loss suffered. And 
as there can be no claim unless there is loss, the requirement that the 
plaintiff prove loss by showing depreciation in the value of his security, 
merely makes him prove what any person who has an action purely 
compensatory, must prove in a court of law. There is no such proof of 
loss here.
We now pass to another matter—the effect of the one-year limitation 
contained in Section 13, which reads: “No action shall be maintained to 
enforce any liability created under section 11 [77k] or section 12 [77l]
(2) unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue state­
ment or the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by 
the exercise of reasonable diligence, or, if the action is to enforce a liability 
created under section 12 [77l] (1), unless brought within one year after 
the violation upon which it is based. In no event shall any such action 
be brought to enforce a liability created under section 11 [77k] or Section 
12 [77l] (1) more than three years after the security was bona fide offered 
to the public, or under section 12 [77l] (2) more than three years after 
the sale.” 15 U. S. C. A. § 77 (m).
Statutes of limitation are statutes of repose. They are based upon 
the thought that the law should aid the diligent, and not him who sleeps 
on his rights. United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 1922, 260 U. S. 290, 
299, 300, 43 S. Ct. 100, 67 L. Ed. 261. They do not wipe out the debt. 
They merely destroy the remedy. So much so that the due process clause 
is not violated if a limitation is changed. See Canadian Northern R. Co. 
v. Eggen, 1920, 252 U. S. 553, 559, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. Ed. 713.
In interpreting limitations, the general rule is that the statute begins 
to run from the time the right of action accrues. And the right of action 
accrues when an act, amounting to either a breach of contract or a breach 
or violation of duty takes place, regardless of concealment or discovery. 
The extent to which courts have gone in applying this principle to statutes 
of limitation is illustrated by Staples v. Zoph, 1935, 9 Cal. App.2d 369, 
49 P.2d 1131, which arose before me while a Judge of the Superior Court 
of California. A woman sent an anonymous letter to another person 
reflecting on the character of the plaintiff—also a woman. The plaintiff 
did not discover the identity of the sender until after the expiration of one 
year, which is the California statutory limitation in actions for libel. The 
plaintiff alleged that fact in an endeavor to take the case out of the statute. 
I held that there were no exceptions to the rule which starts the running of 
statutes of limitations from the accrual of the right of action, except in 
the case of fraud, and that the fraudulent concealment of the identity of 
the defendant did not extend the period of limitation.
On appeal, the District Court of Appeals, Second District, affirmed the 
judgment, stating: “Concealment of the identity of the party liable 
cannot be deemed the same as concealment of a cause of action. * * * 
This rule does not operate unjustly to plaintiff, since at any time within 
one year after accrual of her cause of action she could have filed suit 
naming a fictitious defendant.” As stated, the only exception to this rule 
is that obtaining in fraud cases. In California, an action for relief, upon 
the ground of fraud or mistake, must be brought within three years. But 
the cause of action is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery by
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the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. Califor­
nia Code of Civil Procedure, § 338.
While the wording of this section is different from the limitation in 
Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933, the meaning of both sections is the 
same. They both mean that the action must be brought within one year 
after discovery. More, the statute under discussion goes further. Instead 
of merely speaking of discovery, it gives recognition to imputed discovery, 
i. e., discovery which should have been made by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence.
I think that, ultimately, the courts would have interpreted the statute 
in like manner. For that has been the general rule. See, Foster v . Mans­
field, Coldwater, etc. Ry., 1892, 146 U. S. 88, 13 S. Ct. 28, 36 L. Ed. 899; 
Johnston v. Standard Mining Co., 1893, 148 U. S. 360, 370, 13 S. Ct. 585, 
37 L. Ed. 480; Victor Oil Co. v. Drum, 1920, 184 Cal. 226, 193 P. 243; 
Bancroft v. Woodward, 1920, 183 Cal. 99, 190 P. 445; Consolidated, etc., 
Co. v. Scarborough, infra. When we deal with the statute of limitations 
as applied to fraud, discovery becomes a part of the cause of action.
In Lady Washington Consolidated Co. v. Wood, 1896, 113 Cal. 482, 
45 P. 809, 810, the court says: “The right of a plaintiff to invoke the aid 
of a court of equity for relief against fraud, after the expiration of three 
years from the time when the fraud was committed, is an exception to the 
general statute on that subject, and cannot be asserted unless the 
plaintiff brings himself within the terms of the exception. It must appear 
that he did not discover the facts constituing the fraud until within three 
years prior to commencing the action. This is an element of the plaintiff’s 
right of action, and must be affirmatively pleaded by him in order to 
authorize the court to entertain his complaint.”
This case has been followed consistently. In Original Mining Milling 
Company v. Casad, 1930, 210 Cal. 71, 290 P. 456, the court gives the allega­
tions which the complaint must contain in order to show discovery. They 
are: (1) When the fraud was discovered; (2) the circumstances under 
which it was discovered; (3) facts to show that plaintiff is not at fault in 
failing to discover the fraud sooner, and that the plaintiff has no actual or 
presumptive knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on inquiry. Among 
the latest California cases on the subject is Consolidated Reservoir & 
Power Co. v. Scarborough, 1932, 216 Cal. 698, 16 P.2d 268, where the older 
cases are reviewed and approved. These cases express a general rule, 
which has the sanction of the Supreme Court of the United States.
In Wood v . Carpenter, 1879, 101 U. S. 135, 140, 25 L. Ed. 807, the court, 
in interpreting the Indiana statute relating to limitations of actions in 
fraud, laid down a similar rule: “In this class of cases the plaintiff is held 
to stringent rules of pleading and evidence, ‘and especially must there be 
distinct averments as to the time when the fraud, mistake, concealment, or 
misrepresentation was discovered, and what the discovery is, so that the 
court may clearly see whether, by ordinary diligence, the discovery might 
not have been before made.’ [Citing case.] ‘This is necessary to enable 
the defendant to meet the fraud and the time of its discovery.’ * * * 
A general allegation of ignorance at one time and of knowledge at another 
are of no effect. I f  the plaintiff made any particular discovery, it should 
be stated when it was made, what it was, how it was made, and why it was, 
not made sooner.” (Italics added.)
The opinion concludes;
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“There must be reasonable diligence; and the means of knowledge 
are the same thing in effect as knowledge itself.
“The circumstances of the discovery must be fully stated and proved, 
and the delay which has occurred must be shown to be consistent with 
the requisite diligence.” (Italics added.)
And see, Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Sartor, 1935, 5 Cir., 78 F.2d 924; 
United States v. Christopher, 1934, 10 Cir., 71 F.2d 764.
As the basis of the right to recover under the Securities Act is fraud, and 
the limitation is made dependent upon discovery, these principles should 
be applied to it.
The rule which allows discovery to be the starting point of limitation 
is made for the benefit of the person who claims to be injured by the 
fraud of another. It works to the disadvantage of the person charged with 
the fraud. If we apply it to stockholders seeking redress under the civil 
liability sections of the Security Act, no hardship or injustice results. 
Stockholders are in a position to inquire, and to detect fraud on the part 
of the officers of a corporation, in matters of record, as they have access 
to its books and records.
The maximum time provision in Section 13, to the effect that, in no 
event, shall an action be brought more than three years after the security 
was offered to the public, does not extend the limitation period. This 
provision means that if discovery is not made within three years, no action 
lies, under any circumstances. Otherwise put, if more than three years 
have elapsed since the offer of the security, the discovery of defendant’s 
fraud comes too late. The object of this clause is merely to set the 
maximum period during which a person might be held liable, under any 
circumstances, by reason of any false statements in the registration state­
ment. It does not dispense with the requirement that any person who 
brings an action within the three year period, must do so also within one 
year after the discovery of the falsity of the statement or the omission.
There is no proof as to the date of discovery, although the complaints 
contain allegations of discovery in May, 1938. Nor were facts stated in 
the complaint or proved at the trial explaining why discovery was not 
made sooner. Unless I hold that such proof is unnecessary, the actions are 
clearly barred. For the reasons stated, I cannot so hold.
It follows that the motions to dismiss should be granted as to all the 
defendants. It is so ordered. The causes are also dismissed as to 
defendants named but not served.
SECTION 5
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IPSWICH MILLS v. DILLON *
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1927. 260 Mass. 453, 157 N. E. 604.
Suit in equity by the Ipswich Mills against William Dillon and an­
other, to require defendants to turn over to plaintiff papers and docu­
ments in their possession. On reservation and report. Decree to be 
entered for plaintiff in accordance with opinion.
Carroll, J. The question involved in this suit in equity is the owner­
ship of certain papers. The plaintiff is a manufacturer of hosiery. The 
defendants are accountants, father and son, who have been partners since 
January 1, 1921. In 1912 or 1913 the father, and later the firm, were 
employed by the plaintiff as accountants to make an annual audit, to 
prepare tax returns, and to perform services on matters of bookkeeping, 
cost accounting and statements for banks. This employment continued 
until December, 1925. In 1922 or 1923 the defendants were employed 
to conduct a federal tax case before the Bureau of Internal Revenue as at­
torneys in fact for the plaintiff. While a federal revenue agent was making 
an examination of the plaintiff’s returns for the years 1922, 1923, 1924, he 
was sent by the plaintiff to the defendants to examine certain papers in 
their possession relating to the plaintiff’s affairs, more particularly the 
defendants’ “work sheets” relating to the revaluation of the plant assets 
and to certain adjusted inventories developed in their work on the tax 
case. The defendants refused the revenue agent access to these papers. 
On January 6, 1926, the plaintiff demanded of the defendants “all papers 
in your possession belonging to Ipswich Mills.” No papers were delivered 
and this suit was instituted.
All the papers involved which were in the defendants’ possession were 
produced by them at the trial. They were examined by the parties, 
grouped, initialed and impounded, awaiting the final decision of the 
case. Group A consisted of papers that originated in the plaintiff’s office 
or in the office of its selling agents, or of some one associated with them, 
including papers relating to the 1917 federal tax return of the plaintiff. 
The defendants conceded that the plaintiff is the owner of these papers 
in group A, and entitled to possession of them. Group B included copy 
of the amended federal tax return of the plaintiff for the year 1918, and 
certain papers (not work sheets) relating thereto. In group C there were 
copies of the plaintiffs tentative and amended tax return for 1919 with 
work sheets and correspondence in connection therewith. In group D 
were papers and work sheets of the revaluation of the plaintiffs plant 
assets. The papers in group E were the defendants’ work sheets of their 
July, 1922, report. Group F included papers, reports, returns, copies,
* This case is discussed at p. 54 f. supra.
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work sheets, data, correspondence and memoranda respecting the tax 
case, together with some letters originating in the plaintiff’s office.
It was found by the trial judge that work sheets meant papers on 
which original compilations, computations and analyses are made by 
accountants, which later are gathered together in a summary form and 
the figures rendered in a schedule, exhibit, report or return upon which 
the accountant is working. The judge ruled that the plaintiff was the 
owner of the papers in groups B, C, D and E, and entitled to the imme­
diate possession of them, the defendants being entitled to take and pre­
serve such photostatic copies as they desired. W ith reference to the 
papers initialed F, the judge ruled that the parties were jointly interested 
in these particular papers, with the right in the plaintiff to take them 
temporarily from the defendant. An order for a decree was made. The 
case was then reported to this court.
Concerning the papers marked B, which consist of “copy of amended 
federal tax return of the plaintiff for 1918 and certain papers (not work 
sheets) relating thereto,” the judge found:
“T he defendants were under employ as accountants—auditing, checking up  and 
verifying, and making a research for the original costs of the plaintiff’s plant assets then 
in use and applying depreciation figures decided upon by the directors with respect to 
the different classes of property. It was work of a character requiring accounting skill 
and experience, and good judgment in reaching sound and dependable conclusions 
where original entries were obscure or vouchers missing. I t was fully paid for by the 
plaintiff.”
We assume that the original tax return was delivered to the plaintiff 
and the copy of this return retained by the defendants. The defendants 
were not the agents or servants of the plaintiff, they were independent 
contractors. In the making of the documents and papers and in collect­
ing the information involved in them, the defendants were independent 
accountants engaged in their own occupation. See Pearl v. West End 
Street Railway, 176 Mass. 177, 179, 57 N. E. 339, 49 L. R. A. 826, 79 Am. 
St. Rep. 302; Leverone v. Arancio, 179 Mass. 439, 443, 61 N. E. 45. They 
had the right to make and retain copies of the tax return. It might be 
necessary to have possession of the copies if the accuracy of their work 
was questioned. There was nothing in the contract of employment which 
required the defendants to surrender this copy and in the absence of 
such an agreement they could not be compelled to surrender it.
The other papers relating to the federal tax return of 1918, mentioned 
in group B, we understand are office copies of letters sent by the de­
fendants. The defendants could retain copies of these letters as well as 
copies of the schedules which are indicated by the evidence as being a 
part of the “papers * * * relating thereto.” This copy of the return 
and the papers relating thereto may have contained information of im­
portance to the plaintiff. The right of the plaintiff to restrain its publi­
cation is not before us. Even if it be assumed that the defendants could 
be enjoined from the publication of the contents of these papers, the title 
to them was in the defendants.
Group C consisted of (1) carbon copies of letters from the defendants 
to the plaintiff; (2) original letters from the plaintiff to the defendants;
(3) original letters to the defendants from the plaintiff’s attorneys; and
(4) carbon copies of letters from the defendants to the collector of internal 
revenue.
The carbon copies of the defendants’ letters to the plaintiff were the 
property of the defendants, The plaintiff did not own these copies and
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was not entitled to their possession. The contract of employment did 
not require the defendants to furnish these copies to the plaintiff.
The original letters from the plaintiff to the defendants belonged to 
the defendants. They were the recipients, and therefore owned them. It 
was decided in Baker v . Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 606, 97 N. E. 109, 37 L. R. 
A. (N. S.) 944, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 551, after an exhaustive review of the 
authorities, that as a general rule the publication of letters may be re­
strained by the author, but in the absence of some special arrangement 
the recipient of the letter is the owner. “The author parts with the 
physical and material elements which are conveyed by and in the envelope. 
These are given to the receiver. The paper upon which the letter is 
written belongs to the receiver. Oliver v . Oliver, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 139; 
Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 2 Bush (65 Ky.) 480, 486, 92 Am. Dec. 509; 
Pope v. Curl, 2 Atk. 341; Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co. 
(C. C.) 142 F. 827, 830. A duty of preservation would impose an un­
reasonable burden in most instances. It is obvious that no such obliga­
tion rests upon the receiver, and he may destroy or keep at pleasure.” 
The same principle is applicable to the letters sent from the plaintiff’s 
attorneys to the defendants. As the defendants were the receivers of these 
letters, they were the property of the defendants.
The carbon copies of the defendants’ letters to the collector of internal 
revenue did not belong to the plaintiff. Whatever right it may have to 
examine these copies, or take copies of them, which point we are not called 
upon to decide, the defendants’ copies did not belong to the plaintiff; 
they were owned by the defendants. The fact that the copies of these 
letters concern the plaintiff is not a sufficient reason for depriving the 
defendants of their property. In writing the letters the defendants were 
not the plaintiff’s servants.
In group C there are copies of federal tax returns. These, as we under­
stand from the record, were the defendants’ office copies. The record 
shows that copies of all returns and schedules prepared by the defendants 
for the plaintiff were sent to the plaintiff. Even if the plaintiff has a 
right to require further copies, a question not involved in this suit, it 
has no right to demand of the defendants the surrender of these office 
copies. They were the property of the defendants.
The work sheets, as defined by the trial judge, were the defendants’ 
property. They were made by them while engaged in their own business. 
The paper on which the computations were made belonged to them. 
They were not employed to make these sheets. The sheets were merely 
the means by which the work for which the defendants were employed 
might be accomplished. The title to the work sheets remained in the 
defendants after the computations were made. In the absence of an 
agreement that these sheets were to belong to the plaintiff, or were to 
be held for it, they were owned by the defendants. It may be that these 
papers contained information confidential in its nature and of impor­
tance to the plaintiff; but the defendants did not receive this information 
as the plaintiff’s servants. It has been held that plans prepared by an 
architect employed for that purpose belong to the one for whom they are 
made. Walsh v. St. Louis Exposition & Music Hall Association, 101 Mo. 
534, 535, 14 S. W. 722; Gibbon v. Pease [1905], 1 K. B. 810. See Kutts v. 
Pelby, 20 Pick. 65, 66. But it has never been decided so far as we know 
that the preliminary plans and sketches of an architect belong to the 
person by whom the architect is employed, see in this connection Rutan
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v. Coolidge, 241 Mass. 584, 136 N. E. 257; nor has it been held so far as 
we are aware that the preliminary sketches and drawings of an artist em­
ployed to paint a portrait belong to the sitter; or that memoranda made 
by a physician of his examination of a patient, or the notes and records 
of a lawyer, his preliminary drafts of legal documents or his minutes of 
testimony, belong respectively to the patient or client. See Anonymous 
Case, 31 Me. 590; In re Wheatcroft, 6 Ch. Div. 97. As to property rights 
in a negative where a photograph is taken for pay in the usual course, 
see Boucas v. Cooke [1903], 2 K. B. 227, 238; Pollard v. Photographic Co., 
40 Ch. Div. 345. The interest of the plaintiff in the information collected 
and copied by the defendants and the confidential nature of this informa­
tion do not give title to the plaintiff of the defendants’ working papers. 
They were made by the defendants solely for their own assistance in pre­
paring the tax returns.
W ith reference to group F, the letters addressed to the defendants, 
copies of letters written by the defendants, copies of returns furnished 
to the plaintiff, and work sheets relating to the tax case, are the sole prop­
erty of the defendants, and this true of the papers and reports collected 
by the defendants in the preparation of the tax case. The plaintiff is not 
jointly interested with the defendants in these documents. We do not 
understand that any of these reports, papers and returns were property 
of the plaintiff which had been placed in the defendants’ custody by the 
plaintiff or merely delivered to the defendants. If there are any papers 
belonging to the plaintiff which were lent to the defendants, the plaintiff 
is entitled to them; but as we construe the record, the papers referred 
to in group F were gathered and collected by the defendants in the course 
of their business, and were not papers of the plaintiff placed by it in the 
defendants’ possession.
On the record of the evidence disclosed in this case the defendants 
were under no legal obligation to surrender their working sheets or other 
papers to the plaintiff. The testimony of Leonard and Dillon does not 
prove that the defendants gave the plaintiff any right or title in them. 
It is apparent that at one time papers in the possession of the defendants, 
including their working papers, were turned over to the plaintiff, for 
which receipts were given by the plaintiff to the defendants. These papers 
were again returned to the defendants. The plaintiff contends that by 
this transaction the plaintiff’s rights of property and possession of all 
these papers were settled. Dillon testified that these papers were merely 
lent to the plaintiff. An investigation of the letters and receipts, and an 
examination of the record, do not satisfy us that the defendants in placing 
these documents in the possession of the plaintiff intended to part with 
their title and property in them.
It follows that the papers in group A belong to the plaintiff. The 
other papers and documents belong to the defendants. A decree is to 
be entered for the plaintiff, directing that the plaintiff is the owner and 
entitled to immediate possession of the documents described in group A
Ordered accordingly.
Estate of WILLIAM H. DENNIS *
Surrogate’s Court of New York County, 1936. 95 n. y. law journal 827.
This was a proceeding for an accounting in which numerous objections
* This case is discussed at p. 56 supra.
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by creditors were first disposed of. The Court then continued:
The executrix of the estate and the beneficiary named in clause Fourth
of deceased’s will ask for a construction of it. Its text is:
Fourth: I give and bequeath all of my office files and records to Amelia Dale, residing 
at 147 West 55 Street, Borough of M anhattan, New York, N. Y.
Deceased was an accountant by profession. In his office files no doubt 
are papers which represent work done by him for clients and such papers 
contain no doubt information given to deceased in confidence. In respect 
of such working papers and data of a confidential nature it is the duty 
and obligation of the executrix to return to the clients of deceased such 
copies of papers or other data as they furnish to deceased, or if that cannot 
be done to destroy such papers. The executrix should likewise destroy the 
work sheets of deceased relating to such confidential work. Before taking 
the irrevocable step of destruction of any record, the executrix must assure 
herself that there is no basis for claims against the estate which would 
require the preservation of the papers for the protection of the estate. In 
so far as the office files and records are non-confidential they will pass 
under this provision of the will. Though the accounting has shown that 
such items have no value they are nevertheless tangible things which are 
capable of manual delivery and so the executrix should make them avail­
able to the legatee so that the latter may take them at her own cost. If 
possession of them is not sought by the legatee within a reasonable time 
after notice that they are available, such articles may be destroyed by the 
executrix.
In re FRYE *
Supreme Court of Ohio, 1951. 155 Ohio St. 345, 98 N. E. 2d 798.
Syllabus by the Court
1. In the absence of a privilege created by constitution or statute not 
to disclose available information, a witness may not refuse to testify to 
pertinent facts in a judicial proceeding merely because such testimony 
comprehends a communication or report from himself as agent to his 
principal or as independent contractor to his employer, no matter how 
confidential may be the character of the communication itself or the 
relationship between the parties thereto.
2. A witness possessing knowledge of facts material to the vindication 
of the rights of another may be compelled by judicial process to appear 
and as to such facts give evidence or produce documents and papers 
within his possession and control in behalf of such other, notwithstanding 
the evidence thus coerced may involve the private papers of the witness.
3. A witness who is not a party to a legal proceeding has no right, 
upon the taking of his deposition in such proceeding, to refuse to answer 
any question upon the advice of his counsel merely because such counsel 
believes that the testimony sought is irrelevant, incompetent or im­
material.
4. Section 55 (f) (1), Title 26 U. S. C. A., a part of the Internal Revenue 
Act, which provides, among other things, that “it shall be unlawful * * * 
for any person to print or publish in any manner whatever not provided
* This case is discussed at p. 57 ff. supra.
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by law any income return, or any part thereof or source of income, 
profits, losses, or expenditures appearing in any income return,” does 
not inhibit the disclosure by a witness as evidence in a proper judicial 
inquiry of the operative financial data relating to the business of a tax­
payer, even though such data comprehends the elemental facts and in­
formation from which his income tax return is necessarily made up.
In November 1948 Raymond J. Saile instituted an action against Meri­
dian Plastics, Inc., hereinafter called Meridian, in the Common Pleas 
Court of Guernsey County, which action is still pending. Saile was a 
sales agent employed by the defendant. In the first cause of action set out 
in his petition he alleges that a certain amount of money is due him as 
commissions earned under a contract with Meridian to be computed on a 
percentage basis on all sales of merchandise made by Meridian to dis­
tributors established by him and on all sales made by him directly to 
retail outlets. In the second cause of action he alleges there is due him 
from Meridian on a quantum meruit basis a certain amount of money.
Saile in the prosecution of that action served a subpoena duces tecum 
on Marion A. Frye, a resident of Lorain county, a certified public ac­
countant and auditor for Meridian, to appear before a notary public 
in Cuyahoga county for the purpose of giving testimony. She is not a party 
to that action.
The material part of the subpoena reads as follows: “Please bring with 
you all records or copies of records in your possession relating to the 
financial condition or operation of Meridian Plastics, Inc., from the date 
of its organization to the present day; including copies of all * * * tax 
returns, state or federal * * *.”
Upon receiving notice of the taking of Frye’s deposition and before 
it was taken, counsel for Meridian filed a motion for an injunction, as 
follows: “Now comes the defendant and moves the court that the plaintiff 
or his attorneys be enjoined from taking the deposition of Marian A. 
Frye which deposition is scheduled for hearing on the 16th day of Decem­
ber, 1948, at 10 a. m. * * *.”
T hat motion was overruled, whereupon Meridian perfected an appeal 
to the Court of Appeals for Guernsey county, and that court, in January 
1949, affirmed the judgment of the Common Pleas Court.
In a written opinion, that court, in part, said: “It would be impossible 
for this court in advance to know what questions would be asked or what 
answers might be given by said witness. We do not know whether they 
would be incompetent or irrelevant. This court cannot speculate on these 
matters, and in the final analysis the competency or relevancy of the 
testimony must be determined by the trial judge.”
No appeal was taken from the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and 
the time for such appeal has expired.
On February 7, 1949, Saile, pursuant to the subpoena theretofore 
served, proceeded to take the deposition of Frye, he and Meridian each 
being represented by counsel. Frye was not represented generally by 
counsel. She testified, without objection, that she had been Meridian’s 
auditor since its organization; and that she had present the papers called 
for by the subpoena and had her work sheets covering the account of 
Saile as to commissions owing to him from Meridian for the years 1946, 
1947. She submitted them to be marked as exhibits in connection with 
her testimony. In all, 30 exhibits, consisting of examination reports on
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the books of the company, financial statements and commission statements, 
were identified by the witness.
The taking of the deposition was adjourned until February 14, 1949, 
for the purpose of having photostats made, when Frye appeared with her 
own counsel who objected to the introduction in evidence as a part of 
the deposition Frye’s personal work sheets or photostatic replicas thereof.
On that date, on examination of Frye by her own counsel, she testified 
that she was not an officer or employee of Meridian, but did work for it 
as an independent contractor in the capacity of auditor; that she had no 
records which belonged to Meridian; that the records which she had 
previously identified were her own personal records; and that when she 
made up the tax returns for the company she gave it the originals and 
copies for its files and the company did the filing.
Counsel for Frye then stated that he refused to permit either the origi­
nal work sheets or the photostatic copies to be made a part of the deposi­
tion. Upon Frye’s refusal to surrender the exhibits which had previously 
been identified by her, she was placed under technical arrest and tech­
nically committed to jail by the sheriff of Cuyahoga county.
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus for the release of Frye was filed 
in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County. The issues were made 
up by the submission of an agreed statement of facts by counsel for Saile 
and Frye.
The stipulation covered a copy of the petition in the Saile action, a copy 
of a motion for injunction, the appeal proceedings in the Court of Appeals 
for Guernsey County, a copy of the opinion of the Court of Appeals, a 
copy of the journal entry of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment 
of the Common Pleas Court, a copy of the transcript of the deposition, 
in which Frye substantiated the fact that plaintiff’s exhibits 1 through 
30 were her work sheets and copies of her reports made as auditor of 
Meridian, a copy of the articles of commitment of Frye by the notary 
public and a statement that the taking of the deposition, the subpoena 
of the witness, the attendance of the witness and the taking of her testi­
mony were all in conformance to law.
Frye was discharged from custody by the Common Pleas Court of 
Cuyahoga County. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the judgment 
of the Common Pleas Court was affirmed without opinion, one judge 
dissenting. The cause is now in this court by reason of the allowance of 
a motion to certify the record.
H art, Judge. The general rule is that a witness, especially when not 
a party to the controversy, may be required to testify upon any subject 
concerning which judicial inquiry is made and upon which he possesses 
specific personal information. To this general rule, there are certain 
well recognized exceptions. A witness may always claim as privileged that 
which tends to incriminate him. Article V, Amendments, U. S. Constitu­
tion, and Section 10, Article I, Constitution of Ohio.
Also, under Section 11494, General Code, a witness who stands in either 
of several relationships named in the statute shall not testify, with certain 
exceptions, because the subject matter under the statute is privileged. 
See, generally, In re Martin, Jr., 141 Ohio St. 87, 47 N. E. 2d 388; In re 
Hyde, 149 Ohio St. 407, 79 N. E. 2d 224; In re Keough, 151 Ohio St. 307, 
85 N. E. 2d 550; Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N. E. 2d 245, 169 
A. L. R. 668.
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Frye seeks to broaden the area of these privileges. In the first place, 
she claims that the papers and documents sought to be introduced in evi­
dence through her are her own personal property—work sheets and 
memoranda made by her, not as an employee but as an independent con­
tractor in her private and confidential employment as a public account­
ant, from the private books and papers of her employer made at large 
expense to the latter; and that she should not be required to disclose this 
confidential information and to part with her property for attachment 
to an official court document.
In support of her position she relies on the case of Ipswich Mills v. 
Dillon, 260 Mass. 453, 157 N. E. 604, 53 A. L. R. 792. In that case, a 
corporation, to gain possession of certain documents, brought a suit in 
equity against certified public accountants who had been theretofore 
employed by it to make annual audits, prepare tax returns and statements 
for banks and to conduct a federal tax case before the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue. It appeared that there had been no special agreement between 
the parties as to the ownership of the documents. All the papers involved 
which were in the possession of the accountants were voluntarily produced 
by them at the trial, were examined by all the parties and were submitted 
to the trial court as evidence in the case. The court held that the public 
accountants were not the agents or servants of the corporation but were 
independent contractors and as such owned and had a right to retain 
their work sheets and copies made by them of papers and documents of 
the corporation used in its business. In that case the papers were not 
under subpoena in the hands of the accountants to produce them in court. 
Doubtless they were subject to subpoena but this question was in no way 
before the court. The sole question determined was the ownership of 
the papers. Doubtless in a proper case a court will protect the owner 
of papers and documents so far as their custody is concerned by requiring 
the party calling for them for evidential purposes to make photostatic or 
other proper copies of the same so that the owner may retain the originals. 
Such an offer was made to Frye by the plaintiff in the instant case but the 
offer was rejected.
A further claim is made by Frye that the papers and documents sought 
to be introduced in evidence are not the best evidence and are therefore 
incompetent. The answer to this claim is that it is not the function of 
the witness to pass upon the relevancy or competency of evidence to be 
offered in any court action. T hat is the function of the trial court.
This question was decided by this court in In re Martin, Jr., supra 
[141 Ohio St. 87, 47 N. E. 2d 389], wherein this court held: “A witness 
who is not a party has no legal right upon the taking of his deposition 
to refuse to answer any question, upon the advice of his attorney, merely 
because the attorney believes that the testimony sought is irrelevant, in­
competent or immaterial.” See, also, In re Hyde, supra.
F urtherm ore, it  is im possible, before the tim e of the tria l of a case 
in which the deposition is taken, to determine what is the “best evidence,” 
as such determination depends upon other circumstances surrounding the 
case appearing at the time of trial.
As a further reason for Frye’s refusal to again produce documents to 
be attached to her deposition, notwithstanding she had already produced 
and identified them, and notwithstanding they had already been intro­
duced in evidence, she claims that by so producing them she may in­
criminate herself and possibly subject herself to a federal criminal prose­
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cution, and to a possible revocation of her license as a certified public 
accountant. She predicates her claim in this respect on the provisions 
of Section 55 (f) (1), T itle 26, U. S. C. A., the pertinent parts of which 
are as follows: “It shall be unlawful * * * for any person to print or 
publish in any manner whatever not provided by law any income return, 
or any part thereof or source of income, profits, losses, or expenditures 
appearing in any income return * * *.”
This claim is necessarily based upon the assumption that the docu­
ments sought to be produced through the witness are federal tax returns 
or copies of the same. The deposition itself does not support this assump­
tion. No income tax returns or copies of tax returns were offered in evi­
dence. She testified on this subject only that she had made up tentative 
tax returns and had sent them to Meridian for it to execute and forward to 
the proper revenue collector. The record does not show any violation 
or proposed violation of the statute.
Furthermore, there is no infraction of the statute involved in this 
proceeding. The latter part of the statute above quoted prohibits any 
person from printing or publishing tax returns or sources of income, 
profit, losses or expenditures appearing in any income return, in any man­
ner “not provided by law.” This statute does not and could not legally 
inhibit the disclosure, as evidence in a proper judicial inquiry or where 
required by law, of the operative financial data relating to the business 
of a taxpayer, even though such data comprehends the elemental facts 
and information from which his income tax return is necessarily made 
up. The law could never sanction such a sweeping prohibition of dis­
closure of the essential facts of the business world. It must be evident 
that the statute in question has no such purpose or intent.
This statute, penal in nature, must be strictly construed in favor of a 
witness called upon to testify concerning business transactions affecting 
a taxpayer. The court in the case of United States v. Baltimore Post Co., 
D. C., 2 F.2d 761, 764, in construing this specific statute said: “To ‘publish’ 
is to make public; to make known to people in general. In the statute, 
it does not cover the private communication by one person to another. 
It is not synonymous with ‘communicate,’ as it may be in the law of 
libel or slander. Other provisions of the law make this clear.”
Frye could not be guilty of any criminal intent and therefore is not 
amenable to the statute, under the circumstances here presented. She 
is called upon to make certain disclosures under the compulsion of court 
process. In so doing she is protected from criminal prosecution. 12 Ohio 
Jurisprudence, 69, Section 23.
Finally, assuming there was no self-incrimination involved, there has 
been a complete waiver of any privilege on the part of Frye, if she ever 
had one, from testifying in the Saile action. She has already testified 
freely and without objection to all phases of the subject matter disclosed 
by the books of Meridian relating to the issues involved in the Saile action. 
In connection with her testimony she has identified all the exhibits sought 
to be attached to her deposition. It is now too late to refuse to allow 
them to be made a part of her deposition in regular course, especially 
since Saile is w illing  to reim burse h er for any expense in  producing  copies 
of the exhibits to be used in lieu of the originals. Burke v. State, 104 Ohio 
St. 220, 229, 135 N. E. 644; 42 Ohio Jurisprudence, 66, Section 52.
In the absence of a privilege created by constitution or statute not to 
disclose available information, a witness may not refuse to testify t o
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pertinent facts in a judicial proceeding merely because such testimony 
comprehends a communication or report from himself as agent to his 
principal or as independent contractor to his employer, no matter how 
confidential may be the character of the communication itself or the 
relationship between the parties thereto. See Robertson v. Com., 181 Va. 
520, 25 S. E. 2d 352, 146 A. L. R. 966. And where one possesses knowledge 
of facts which are pertinent to a judicial inquiry, he may be required 
to testify or to produce papers and documents as to such facts.
In discussing this subject, 58 American Jurisprudence, 40, Section 32, 
states the rule as follows: “It is a general rule that a witness possessing 
knowledge of facts material to the vindication of the rights of another 
may be compelled by judicial process to appear and give evidence in 
behalf of that other party, notwithstanding the evidence thus coerced 
may uncover the witness’s private business. This rule is also generally held 
applicable when the information sought is contained in books and papers. 
Accordingly, it has been held that it is no ground for the refusal of a 
witness to produce books and papers, when required by lawful authority, 
that they are private. The duty of witnesses to disclose the details of their 
private business for the benefit of third persons when required in the 
administration of justice, is one devolving on them as members of a 
civilized community.” See McMann v . Securities and Exchange Commis­
sion, 2 Cir., 87 F.2d 377, 109 A. L. R. 1445.
Since a commissioner or notary public is not invested with the ultimate 
authority to pass upon the relevancy, competency or materiality of testi­
mony taken before him on deposition, Ex parte Bevan, 126 Ohio St. 
126, 184 N. E. 393, he may order the witness to answer any question, even 
though objection is made thereto, subject only to the exclusion of the 
testimony by the court when offered at the trial. A witness refuses to an­
swer any question at the risk of commitment for contempt, even though 
an answer would infringe any personal privilege or right granted by the 
Constitution or statutes of the state. If committed for contempt, the 
witness is entitled in a habeas corpus proceeding to have the relevancy 
and competency of the matters inquired about in taking his deposition 
determined by the court. In re Martin, Jr., supra.
It must be recognized that this is cumbersome procedure with which 
to determine the rights and privileges of a witness whose deposition is 
being taken before a commissioner appointed by a court or before a 
notary public. In cases where the nature and subject matter of the testi­
mony sought by deposition can be anticipated in advance of the taking 
of the deposition, a witness may protect himself from the enforced dis­
closure of a privileged or harmful subject matter by an appeal to a court 
of equity where equitable principles may be applied in determining the 
specific rights of a witness.
An attempt to follow this method of procedure was made in the Saile 
action, so far as the rights of Meridian were concerned, but the courts 
denied the remedy because the injunctive relief sought was either too 
broad or lacked merit, or both.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is 
remanded to the Common Pleas Court for proceedings according to law, 
consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed.
SECTION 6
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
In re FISHER * 
District Court of the United States, S. D. New York, 1931. 51 F. 2d 424.
In Bankruptcy. In the matter of A. Edward Fisher, bankrupt. William 
Bernstein, being called to testify, refused to answer certain questions upon 
the basis of privilege arising from the attorney-client relationship with 
bankrupt.
Knox, District Judge. It appears that the witness William Bernstein 
acted as bankrupt’s accountant for a number of years, and, after his ad­
mission to the bar, also acted as bankrupt’s attorney. Upon the basis of 
the privilege arising from the attorney-client relationship, he has re­
fused to answer questions relating to bankrupt’s books and to produce 
in evidence monthly account sheets made by accountants in his employ 
in course of auditing bankrupt’s books.
There is no privilege with regard to communications made to ac­
countants. The information given to the witness and to the accountants 
in his employ for the purpose of making financial statements and doing 
other work characteristically performed by accountants is not privileged, 
despite the fact that the witness may also have rendered legal advice on 
the basis of such data. See Matter of Robinson, 140 App. Div. 329, 125 
N. Y. S. 193, where it was held that an attorney for a corporation, who 
was one of its directors, could not refuse to disclose information about 
corporate affairs by claiming his professional privilege.
Furthermore, the privilege accorded to an attorney is the privilege 
of the client and not of the attorney. Baumann v. Steingester, 213 N. Y. 
328, 107 N. E. 578, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 1071. For this reason the attorney 
cannot claim privilege where the client has already disclosed the sub­
stance of the communication. Baumann v. Steingester, supra. Nor can 
he claim privilege where the communication was made with the under­
standing that it was to be imparted to third parties. Rosseau v. Bleau, 
131 N. Y. 177, 30 N. E. 52, 27 Am. St. Rep. 578.
In the case at bar it appears that the bankrupt has already testified 
with respect to the matters contained in his books and records. And the 
income tax returns and financial statements drawn up from the com­
munications made by bankrupt to the witness were obviously intended 
to be communicated to others.
F or these reasons, the  witness should be d irected  to testify w ith  regard 
to the bankrupt’s books and to produce in evidence the monthly work 
sheets made by the accountants.
* This case is discussed at p. 61 f. supra.
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HIMMELFARB v. UNITED STATES * 
Court of Appeals of the United States for the Ninth Circuit, 1949. 
175 F. 2d 924, cert. denied, 338 U. S. 860.
Stephens, Circuit Judge. Sam Ormont and Phillip Himmelfarb were, 
on January 22, 1947, jointly charged by a federal grand jury with four 
counts under Section 145 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. A. 
§145 (b). Count one charged that Ormont and Himmelfarb attempted 
to defeat and evade federal income tax owed by Ormont for the calendar 
year 1944 by filing a false tax return understating Ormont’s net income 
and income tax for that year. Count two contained similar charges 
against both in connection with Himmelfarb’s return for income and 
income tax for 1944. Counts three and four contained similar charges 
against Ormont as to his returns for the years 1942 and 1943. Individual 
returns were filed by Himmelfarb and Ormont at the proper times as to 
income received in the conduct of the Acme Meat Co. An information 
return was subsequently filed by them for “Miscellaneous Enterprises,” 
asserted by them to be a joint venture, for the fiscal year beginning May 1, 
1944, and ending April 30, 1945, in the sum of $71,388.84 with no deduc­
tions or other information stated and disclosing an equal division between 
them of income.
There is much in this opinion which applies to the cases of both 
defendants-appellants. There is considerable in the opinion which applies 
solely to either one or the other of the defendants-appellants. Generally 
speaking it will be obvious what portions appertain to either or both. 
Where it has seemed useful we have plainly stated the defendant- 
appellant concerned.
Motion for dismissal of the indictment was denied and a motion for a 
bill of particulars was denied in part and granted in part. Pleas of not 
guilty to each of the counts were entered. The court dismissed counts 
two, three and four as to Ormont and count one as to Himmelfarb. A 
jury trial was had, and Ormont was found guilty upon count one and 
Himmelfarb guilty on count two. Motions for acquittal and for a new 
trial were denied and each has separately appealed.
The evidence discloses that Sam Ormont owned and operated a whole­
sale meat business under the fictitious name of Acme Meat Co. in Vernon, 
California, and employed Phillip Himmelfarb who, prior to May 1, 
1944, had been a government licensed meat wholesaler and packer. After 
this latter date the two operated the business in partnership until (at 
least) April 30, 1945. The books of the Acme Meat Co. were kept on a 
calendar year basis. Shortly before the filing of the joint return, here­
tofore mentioned, investigations were made concerning the income tax 
returns of both appellants for the years 1942 to 1944 inclusive. Accord­
ing to the evidence, income from sales of meat, made within ceiling 
prices under OPA, were reported on invoices and recorded in  the com­
pany books and appellants’ returns for 1944 were based on these figures. 
It is indicated that “bonus” or “overceiling” payments of additional cash 
sums paid by customers of Acme Meat Co. were received but not reported 
on the books nor were they reported for income tax purposes for the 
year 1944; as to all of which both appellants were well aware.
Further, there is testimony that income from certain sales was shown on
* T his case is discussed at p. 62 supra.
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invoices which were not transmitted to the appellants’ bookkeeper and 
therefore were never entered nor included in the books from which the 
income returns were made. These unreported invoices or lists were kept 
in a desk drawer at the plant. There is also indication of some falsity 
in keeping of records which goes to the general intent of appellants to 
misrepresent their income.
Evidence is in the record of a partnership return declaring additional 
income of some $71,000.00, claimed to have come from the so-called 
“Miscellaneous Enterprises,” bank records and bank documents pertain­
ing to each appellant, records of business dealings, invoices, canceled 
checks, transcripts of portions of the records of the Acme Meat Co. and 
bond records.
There is testimony that Ormont made admissions to Internal Revenue 
Agents which were adverse to his interest and which were recorded at 
the time made in an affidavit signed by Ormont, and that Ormont later 
retrieved the affidavit by subterfuge and destroyed it. There is also testi­
mony to the effect that the appellants operated a partnership and divided 
profits therefrom equally; that the $71,000.00 claimed to have come from 
“Miscellaneous Enterprises” came from so-called “bonuses” received in 
the Acme Meat Co. business and not recorded in the company’s books. 
However, there is evidence that a private record thereof was kept by 
Ormont in a small memorandum book claimed to have been seen by 
government witness Bircher, Special Agent for the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue. He stated that he saw a page in the back of the book on which 
an amount a little in excess of $35,000.00 was itemized, something in 
excess of $11,000.00 being recorded as having been earned from secret 
and unrecorded charges or bonuses from May 1, 1944, to January 5, 1945, 
and the balance or some $23,000.00 being recorded as earned from such 
sources from January 5, 1945 to April 30, 1945.
* * * *
Objections are entered to any and all testimony offered by the govern­
ment witness, William S. Malin, an accountant employed by appellants’ 
attorney, Mr. Mirman, who acted for Mr. Ormont and Mr. Himmelfarb 
jointly. It is claimed that such testimony is within the rule of privilege 
and inadmissible. Testimony concerned a list of bonds and other exhibits 
and the mailing thereof. It is argued that communications between a 
client and his attorney and the latter’s agents include all persons acting 
as such, and are privileged, citing Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 8, 3rd Ed., 
p. 584. The record is not clear as to the source of the information recorded 
by Malin in the various exhibits offered through him by the Government. 
He testified that Mirman contacted him by telephone on May 21, 1945, 
requesting an appointment to discuss income tax matters of Mirman’s 
clients, Ormont and Himmelfarb, that he first met Ormont on May 21, 
1945, at his office in the company of Mirman, that there was another meet­
ing on May 22, 1945, at Mirman’s house, at which both Ormont and 
Himmelfarb were present. Certainly, not all of the data was supplied 
Malin at those meetings. We consider it unnecessary to determine whether 
the factual basis for the preparation of the written exhibits had its source 
in information, books, or documents, given or showed to Malin by either 
or both of the accused, or disclosed at the above meetings, or given by 
Ormont or Himmelfarb to Mirman who, out of the presence of either 
or both of the accused, informed or showed them to Malin. Privileged
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communications are not recognized as between a client and his accountant. 
Of course, communications from a client to his attorney are generally 
privileged. Assuming that Malin was Mirman’s agent (it appears that 
Mirman engaged Malin) and that disclosures were made at the meetings 
to Mirman and overheard by Malin, were such communications privi­
leged? Where the presence of a third person is indispensable in order for 
the communication to be made to the attorney, the policy of the privilege 
will protect the client, that is, his presence is required in order to “secure 
the client’s subjective freedom of consultation.” 8 Wigmore on Evidence 
(3rd Ed.), § 2311, p. 602. Malin’s presence was not indispensable in the 
sense that the presence of an attorney’s secretary may be. It was a con­
venience which, unfortunately for the accused, served to remove the privi­
leged character of whatever communications were made. Of course, com­
munications made by the client to such a third party in the presence of the 
attorney are not within the privilege. On the other hand, if the data 
was obtained through voluntary and indirect disclosures by the attorney 
of matters received in confidence from his clients, admission in evidence of 
what was disclosed would violate the privilege as much as would the 
attorney’s voluntary disclosures on the stand. However, granting that 
such voluntary extrajudicial disclosures by the attorney are generally 
inadmissible, we feel that special circumstances may show that the client 
impliedly authorized the attorney to make disclosures to the third person. 
See 8 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd Ed.), § 2325, p. 628. If such authority is 
found, the problem is no different than where the communication is 
made to the attorney in the presence of a third person who is not indis­
pensably necessary to the communication. Here, Ormont and Himmel­
farb were aware of Malin’s employment and even participated in one 
or more meetings with Malin and Mirman relative to their income taxes. 
Some of the exhibits offered indeed were signed by the accused at Malin’s 
request. It is reasonable to conclude that whatever disclosures were made 
by Mirman to Malin were authorized by the accused.
* *  *  *
[Judgments affirmed.]
GARIEPY v. UNITED STATES *
Court of Appeals of the United States for the Sixth Circuit, 1951. 189 F. 2d 459.
[Gariepy was convicted in the District Court of attempting to defeat 
and evade income taxes by filing false and fraudulent returns, and he 
appealed. This opinion is by Circuit Judge Simons.]
* * * *
The accountant’s testimony was not privileged. There is no evidence 
to show that the accountant, at the time he received and relayed the in­
formation to the investigators, was in the employ of counsel for the 
appellant, but even if so there is respectable authority that denies him the 
privilege status. Himmelfarb v. United States, 9 Cir., 175 F.2d 924; 
8 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed. § 2325.
* * * *
[Judgment affirmed.]
* This case is discussed at p. 63 supra.
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UNITED STATES v. STOEHR *
District Court of the United States, M. D. Pennsylvania, 1951. 100 F. Supp. 143, 
aff’d, 196 F.2d 276, cert. denied, 344 U. S. 826.
Murphy, District Judge. Defendant, found guilty by verdict of a jury 
of three violations of § 145 (b), Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. A. 
§145 (b), moves for a judgment of acquittal and in the alternative for 
a new trial. Defendant was charged with having wilfully and knowingly 
attempted to defeat and evade a large part of his income taxes due and 
owing to the United States of America for 1943, 1944 and 1945 by filing 
and causing to be filed a false and fraudulent income tax return for each 
year wherein he knowingly understated his net income and the amount 
of tax due thereon.
Defendant, as sole owner and proprietor, operated a retail household 
furnishing store at Scranton, Pennsylvania, under the name of Robert E. 
Stoehr, trading as Stoehr and Fister. Edith Passetti as bookkeeper was 
in charge of the books of original entry. August W. Tross, defendant’s 
office manager, did all the posting, was in charge of the general ledger 
cards, and prepared defendant’s financial statements. Donald C. Griffiths, 
a certified public accountant prepared defendant’s income tax returns. 
He never made an audit of or examined defendant’s book of account but 
relied solely on information prepared by Tross and submitted by de­
fendant or at his direction.
* * * *
In each of the three years after the true net income for the year was 
ascertained, two sets of financial statements were prepared, one set true 
for the eyes of defendant and Tross only, the other set false to be sub­
mitted to Griffiths for preparation of defendant’s income tax return. At 
defendant’s request and direction and with his knowledge, in order to 
reduce apparent net income and the amount of income taxes defendant 
would have to pay, false entries were made whereby a portion of inven­
tory was dropped, purchase and expenses overstated, sales understated. 
Likewise defendant’s living expenses, the purchase of $110,000 in United 
States government bonds, and the payment of $32,847.57 personal life 
insurance premiums, were disguised on defendant’s records—personal 
expenses charged as business expenses, life insurance premiums charged 
as furniture, carpet and drapery purchases. Bonds were not listed as an 
asset or as a reduction in capital account. None of the foregoing was 
shown on the statements furnished to Griffiths.
* * * *
March 15, 1946, defendant sold the business. In early 1947 Griffiths 
made repeated requests for a balance sheet and reconciliation of capital 
account in order to prepare defendant’s income tax return for 1946. When 
the information was not forthcoming, a return was prepared without the 
basic information and filed with a certificate that no audit of defendant’s 
books of account was made.
In order to get the facts involved, a meeting was arranged with de­
fendant and Tross. After much insistence he finally learned from papers 
then submitted that the figures furnished him for 1944 were false. When 
he confronted the defendant with this fact and asked if the same was
* See footnote 101 supra.
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true as to the other years, defendant broke down and admitted that the 
statements furnished Griffiths had been falsified to reduce defendant’s 
income taxes; that while he did not know the amounts, he knew what it 
meant, felt very bad about it, and offered to pay Griffiths any price, any 
fee, if he would keep the matter quiet.
On the witness stand defendant admitted that he signed the returns, 
caused them to be filed and paid the tax stated to be due thereon; that the 
1943 return was false; that in 1943 and 1945, sales and purchases were 
incorrectly stated; that they obviously varied from those shown in a private 
personal record prepared by Tross for defendant’s eyes only and kept in 
his possession; that the three years in question he paid far less taxes than 
were due; that Peterson, his accountant, advised him that for the three 
years there were taxes owed and unpaid of $278,000.
He insisted that he never examined more than the front page of the 
return; never compared the figures thereon with those in his possession, 
or checked the calculations made. Despite his many years experience and 
his close attention to details of his business he testified that he was not 
aware of what profits he made. He stated—and all the evidence is to the 
same effect—that Griffiths was in no manner responsible for the variance 
between defendant’s records and his returns. He denied making any 
requests or giving any directions to Tross to falsify his records on his be­
half, insisted he never had any knowledge that such things were done.
As to the accuracy of his books and records he relied on Tross. As 
to the correctness and accuracy of his returns he relied on Tross and 
Griffiths.
When Griffiths was unable to obtain the facts in connection with de­
fendant’s returns, prepared and filed by him and attested as having been 
correct, he reported the matter to the Group Chief of the Internal Revenue 
Office at Scranton, Pennsylvania, on April 23, 1947, advising that the 
defendant and Tross had admitted to him that the information furnished 
to him to prepare defendant’s returns was falsified, and that he no longer 
represented the defendant. An investigation was commenced immediately. 
Defendant was indicted March 1, 1950.
* * * *
Placed in their proper context, the lack of merit in defendant’s com­
plaints will be amply demonstrated. See Gariepy v. United States, 6 Cir., 
1951, 189 F.2d 459, at page 464. Tross testified that without his working 
papers then in defendant’s possession he could not state the amount of 
taxes defendant wanted to pay in 1943, 1944 and 1945, or identify re­
stored items. Defense counsel handed the witness a large “batch of 
papers,” apparently not in their regular order. See United States v. 
Michener, supra, 152 F.2d at page 885. Included were defendant’s private 
copies, papers of Stoehr & Fister, of the three corporations and of de­
fendant’s business from 1939 to 1946. Upon the court’s insistence they 
were marked and identified as defendant’s Exhibits 3 to 23 inclusive. 
The witness, asked by defense counsel to examine and describe each 
paper, was in the act of doing so (see R. p. 290-291) when defense counsel 
inadvertently or otherwise prodded him with a “Go ahead.” The wit­
ness asked not to be hurried; the court advised he would not be. The 
net result was that Tross testified that the papers contained the true and 
false income for each year but that the amount of taxes as such was never 
reduced to writing.* * * *
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We see no error (15F) in permitting defendant to be questioned and 
to state that he always thought Griffiths had a high reputation for 
integrity.
* *  * *
There was obviously no attempt on defendant’s part over the years 
to make a voluntary disclosure. Defense counsel sought to introduce 
evidence as to the Treasury Department’s policy in regard thereto (R. 
pp. 1151, 1179, 1182, 1690); to cross examine Griffiths as to his knowledge 
thereof, and as to why, after he had been deceived by the defendant, he 
did not advise him as to such policy and afford him an opportunity to 
make a voluntary disclosure before he reported the matter to the Internal 
Revenue Department.1 Did defendant already know the policy? Would 
he make a voluntary disclosure? Would he disclose that he had committed 
fraud? Would the Commissioner, notwithstanding, recommend prose­
cution? In the absence of a statute the right to immunity is only an 
equitable one. See United States v. Levy, supra, 153 F.2d at page 997, and 
see opinions of Attorneys General, Vol. 38 (1934-1937) p. 94; Mertens Op. 
Cit. supra, § 55.32, footnote 88. Defendant did not file an amended return 
or pay his taxes up to the time of trial. The answers to these questions are 
pure speculation; they presented collateral matters. See Ferreria v . Wilson 
Borough, 344 Pa. 567, 570-573, 26 A.2d 342. The answers thereto would 
not in our judgment in any way impeach the credibility of Griffiths, nor 
were the questions competent to show bias on his part. For these reasons 
they were excluded (5, 6) and we declined to include any reference thereto 
in our charge (14.49, 52).
[Defendant’s motion for a new trial denied.]
Petition of BORDEN CO. *
District Court of the United States, N. D. Illinois, 1948. 75 F. Supp. 857.
Barnes, District Judge. The petition of The Borden Company to 
quash a subpoena duces tecum issued out of the office of the clerk of this 
court and commanding that company to produce before a grand jury 
of this court on December 12, 1947, certain contracts, agreements, re­
ports, studies, memoranda, notes and other documents, came on to be 
heard and was heard on Tuesday, December 30, 1947.
* * * *
It is contended that the reports made by public accountants for The 
Borden Company, called for by the subpoena duces tecum in question, 
are privileged. Section 51, Chapter 110½, Illinois Revised Statutes 1947, 
provides:
“A public accountant shall not be required by any court to divulge 
information or evidence which has been obtained by him in his con­
fidential capacity as a public accountant.”
It is doubtful whether the privilege granted by this section to a public
l  Himmelfarb v. United States, supra, 175 F.2d at page 939. “Privileged communi­
cations are not recognized as between a client and his accountant.” And see United 
States v. Hiss, 2 Cir., 1950, 185 F.2d 822, a t page 832.
* This case is discussed at p. 66 supra.
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accountant extends to his written report after he has released it, but it 
is unnecessary for the court to decide whether the privilege created by 
the section does extend to the report after its release for the reason that 
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U. S. C. A. follow­
ing section 687, provides:
“The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges 
of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these 
rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as they 
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of 
reason and experience.”
At common law the reports of public accountants are not privileged. 
No act of Congress and no one of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides otherwise. Accordingly, the court concludes that the reports 
of public accountants are not privileged.
[Petition denied.]
FALSONE v. UNITED STATES *
Court of Appeals of the United States for the Fifth Circuit, 1953.
205 F.2d 734, cert. denied, 74 Sup. Ct. 103.
R ives, Circuit Judge. An Internal Revenue Agent, acting under au­
thority of 26 U. S. C. A. 3614 (a),1 served appellant, a certified public 
accountant, with summons to appear before him and testify in the matter 
of the tax liability of Salvatore Italiano and his wife, Maria, for the years 
1947 to 1951, inclusive, and to bring with him the following books and 
papers:
“All books, papers, records or memoranda in your files relating to: 
(1) Individual income tax returns of Salvatore Italiano and Maria Italiano 
for the years 1940 to 1946, inclusive. (2) Corporation income tax returns 
of Anthony Distributors, Inc., for 1940 to 1951, inclusive.”
In response to the summons, appellant appeared at the agent’s office 
but refused to produce the books, papers, records and memoranda called 
for in the summons or to testify regarding said documents.
The United States then filed in the District Court a petition to enforce 
the summons under 26 U. S.C. A. 3633 (a).* 12 Upon an ex parte hearing,
* This case is discussed at p. 66 supra.
1 “Sec. 3614. Examination of books and witnesses
“ (a) To determine liability of the taxpayer. T he Commissioner for the purpose of 
ascertaining the correctness of any return or for the purpose of making a return where 
none has been made, is authorized, by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue, including the field service, designated by him for that purpose, to examine 
any books, papers, records or memoranda bearing upon the matters required to be 
included in the return, and may require the attendance of the person rendering the 
return or of any officer or employee of such person, or the attendance of any other 
person having knowledge in the premises, and may take his testimony w ith reference 
to the m atter required by law to be included in such return, with power to administer 
oaths to such person or persons.” See 26 U. S. C. A. 3615 for Collector’s similar authority 
to summon witnesses and require the production of books of account.
2 “Sec. 3633. Jurisdiction of district courts
“ (a) To enforce summons. If any person is summoned under the internal revenue 
laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, or other data, the District Court
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the District Court entered an order directing the appellant to obey the 
summons and to retain all of said documents in his possession for com­
pliance with the summons or such other disposition as the court might 
direct.
A motion to vacate that order and to quash the summons of the In­
ternal Revenue Agent was filed by the appellant. After a hearing, the 
District Court denied that motion and ordered the appellant to appear 
before another special agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, to pro­
duce the documents requested, and to give testimony pursuant to the 
summons. From that order this appeal is prosecuted.
Although the appellee has not moved to dismiss the appeal, it is never­
theless incumbent upon this Court to ascertain whether the order of the 
District Court is final and appealable, and, hence, whether this Court has 
jurisdiction. The question is not without difficulty; it has apparently 
been answered in the affirmative by the Eighth C ircuit3 and by the Ninth 
Circuit,4 while a closely related question, the summons having been issued 
by the Collector under 26 U. S. C. A. 3615, has been answered in the 
negative by the Seventh Circuit.5 6In a similar proceeding, an appeal from 
an order entered earlier than the reported opinion in Torras v. Strandley, 
(Dist. Ct. Ga.) 103 F. Supp. 737, the present writer has heretofore denied 
supersedeas, because he was then of the opinion that the order of the 
District Court was not final.
It is settled that an order of the District Court denying a motion to 
quash a subpoena duces tecum requiring one to appear with papers and 
testify before a grand jury is not a final and appealable decision. Cobble­
dick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323. The power granted to the Com­
missioner of Internal Revenue by 26 U. S. C. A. 3614 is inquisitorial in 
character and has been compared to the power vested in Federal grand 
juries. Bolich v. Rubel (2nd Cir), 67 F. 2d 894, 895; Brownson v. United 
States (8th Cir.), 32 F.2d 844, 848. An important difference, however, 
is that, while the reports of grand juries are made to the court, the results 
of tax investigations are reported to the Commissioner and it is for him 
to determine what action, if any, is required under the law in view of 
the facts revealed.
Judge Learned Hand has indicated that the distinction to be observed 
is between orders which are merely interlocutory steps in judicial pro­
ceedings and are not appealable and court orders ancillary to an ad­
ministrative proceeding and final because they complete the court’s action. 
Capital Company v. Fox (2nd. Cir.), 85 F.2d 97, 99. Professor Moore 
seems to follow the same distinction. Moore’s Commentary on the United 
States Judicial Code (1949), pages 501, 502.6 In Cobbledick v. United 
States, supra, at p. 330, the Supreme Court recognized the difference
of the United States for the district in which such person resides shall have jurisdiction 
by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, 
papers, or other data.”
See 26 U. S. C. A. 3615 (e) for enforcement of Collector’s summons.
3 Brownson v. United States (8th Cir.), 32 F.2d 844.
4 Martin v. Chandis Securities Co. (9th Cir.), 128 F.2d 731.
5 Jarecki v. Whetstone (7th Cir.), 192 F.2d 121.
6 T hat distinction might explain cases where the administrative agency was pro­
ceeding under other statutes, such as Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 
U. S. 186; Endicott Johnson Corp., et al., v. Perkins, 317 U. S. 501; N.L.R.B. v. Anchor 
Rome Mills (5th Cir.), 197 F,2d 447. Compare the enforcement of agency subpoenas 
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. A. 1005 (c).
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between a proceeding “self-contained, so far as the judiciary is concerned” 
where the District Court’s direction to testify “is the end of a proceeding 
begun against the witness” and controversies “arising out of court pro­
ceedings unrelated to any administrative agency.”
In First National Bank of Mobile v. United States, 267, U. S. 576, the 
Supreme Court affirmed an order of the District Court [United States v. 
First National Bank of Mobile (Dist. Ct. Ala.), 295 Fed. 1942] requiring 
an employee of a bank to appear before an Internal Revenue Agent and 
to testify and produce books and records as to the transactions of one of 
the bank’s depositors; and, as the Eighth Circuit has aptly commented, 
“The affirmance of the order necessarily involved a holding that the order 
was appealable.” Brownson v. United States, supra, at p. 846. We hold, 
therefore, that the order in the present case was final and that this court 
has jurisdiction.
The pleadings which frame the issues for our decision consist of the 
petition to enforce the summons and the motion to vacate the ex parte 
order and to quash the summons. Attached to the petition was an af­
fidavit of the agent stating that, in his official capacity at the direction of 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, he was investigating the tax 
returns of Salvatore Italiano and his wife, Maria, for the years 1947 
through 1951 for alleged evasion of income tax; that his investigation 
had revealed that from the years 1942 through 1951 the taxpayers reported 
income of approximately $303,000.00, while their expenditures during 
that period had been in the approximate amount of $466,000.00; that it 
is necessary to make a determination of their income by means of the so- 
called net worth-expenditures method,7 and in order to determine net 
worth as of January 1, 1947, it is necessary to reconstruct the financial 
history of the taxpayers in prior years; that the official records of the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue disclosed that at times during the period 
1942 through 1951 Salvatore Italiano, as General Manager of Anthony 
Distributors, Inc., engaged in the purchase and sale of beverages over 
the O. P. A. Ceiling Prices to his personal benefit.
Appellant’s sworn motion and affidavit denying the District Court’s 
right to issue the order enforcing the summons is based essentially on the 
following facts and circumstances therein stated:
1. The appellant, Frank J. Falsone, is a certified public accountant of 
the State of Florida and enrolled to practice before the Treasury Depart­
ment; and Salvatore Italiano, Maria Italiano and Anthony Distributors, 
Inc., are “clients” of his whom he represents in Federal tax matters.
2. That the books, papers, records and memoranda in appellant’s files 
ordered produced by the District Court are of two classifications: (a) 
Those which are the personal and private books, papers, records and 
memoranda of his clients entrusted to him for the purpose of enabling 
him to prepare their tax returns; and the return of these has now been 
demanded by the clients. (b) Those which are the work papers and work 
products of the appellant based on information given to the appellant by 
his clients.
3. Concerning the information and documents for some of the years 
requested: (a) The statute of limitations has run. (b) The returns have
7 See United States v. Johnson, 319 U. S. 503, 517; Kenney v. Commissioner (5th 
Cir.), 111 F .2d 374; Pollock v. United States, No. 14,126 (5th Cir.), M/s, Decided Feb. 
27, 1953; Montgomery v. United States, No. 14,115 (5th Cir.), M/s, Decided April 17, 
1953.
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once been audited and fully examined by the Internal Revenue Bureau 
and the taxpayers have paid all taxes found to be due by said examina­
tions and audits.
In considering appellant’s contentions based on privilege, we make 
two preliminary assumptions in favor of the appellant: (1) T hat the 
conduct of investigations under this statute is subject to the same testi­
monial privileges as judicial proceedings.8 (2) T hat since the “client” is 
not a party, the agent or accountant may claim the privilege in his behalf.9
The taxpayer is required to keep records, 26 U. S. C. A. 54 (a) and the 
Commissioner, for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any 
return, is authorized by any officer or employee of the Bureau to examine 
the taxpayer’s books and records and to require the attendance of the 
person rendering the return and the taking of his testimony, 26 U. S. C. A. 
3614. (Footnote 1, supra.) Statutes granting such authorities have been 
held constitutional as against the contentions that they provide for un­
reasonable searches and seizures and compel the taxpayer to be a witness 
against himself. Ann. 103 A. L. R. 523; 47 Am. Jur., Searches and Seizures, 
Sec. 62; 51 Am. Jur., Taxation, Sec. 671; see also Bolich v. Rubel, supra; 
Shushan v. United States (5th Cir.), 117 F. 2d. 110, 117; Nicola v. United 
States (3rd Cir.)., 72 F. 2d 780, 784; Stillman v. United States (9th Cir.) 
177 F. 2d 607, 617; cf. United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141; Shapiro 
v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, 32.
The books and papers of a taxpayer, even though received by an at­
torney for purposes of consultation, cannot be regarded as privileged 
communications. (Footnote 9, supra.) Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 
74, 79; 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, Sec. 501. According to the last cited text, 
“The reason is obvious; the administration of justice could easily be 
defeated if a party and his counsel could, by transferring from the one 
to the other important papers required as evidence in a cause, thereby 
prevent the court from compelling the production of important papers 
on a trial.” Or, as more succinctly stated, “If documents are not privileged 
while in the hands of a party, he does not make them privileged by merely 
handing them to his counsel.” Edison Electric Light Co. v. U. S. Electric 
Lighting Co. (Cir. Ct., N. Y.), 44 Fed. 294, 297; 45 Id. 55. It seems clear, 
therefore, that, even if we should consider the relation between a taxpayer 
and his certified public accountant as confidential as that between client 
and attorney, the accountant would, nevertheless, be required to produce 
the books and records of the taxpayer.
8 In  McMann v. Securities & Exchange Commission (2nd Cir.), 87 F.2d 377, Judge 
Learned Hand said: “Therefore, although we assume, as we do, that the conduct of 
investigations under these statutes is subject to the same testimonial privileges as judicial 
proceedings, it will not serve McMann; he must erect a new privilege ‘ad hoc.’ ’’
9 “Furthermore, the privilege not being the attorney’s bu t the client’s, the attorney 
is not justified (when the client is a party to the cause) in refusing to obey a ruling 
(though erroneous) against the privilege; the client is the one to protect himself by 
appellate proceedings . . . ” 8 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.), Sec. 2321, p. 626.
See also 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, Secs. 519, 520, id. Secs. 48 and 49; Rogers v. United 
States, 340 U. S. 367, 370.
“It follows, then, that when the client himself would be privileged from production 
of the document, either as a party at common law, or as a third person claiming title, 
or as exempt from self-crimination, the attorney having possession of the document is 
not bound to produce; and such has invariably been the ruling. On the other hand, 
if the client would be compellable to produce, either by motion or by subpoena or by 
bill of discovery, then the attorney is equally compellable, if the document is in  his 
custody, to produce under the appropriate procedure." 8 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd 
ed.), Sec. 2307, pp. 592-593.
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The only other documents claimed to be in possession of the appellant 
and concerning which he might be required to testify are his work papers 
and notes. The terms of the subpoena are broad enough to require the 
production of such work papers and notes and, if it should appear to this 
court that the subpoena is too broadly drawn, it may be modified ac­
cordingly. N. L. R . B. v. Anchor Rome Mills, Inc. (5th Cir.), 197 F. 2d 
447, 449; Jackson Packing Co., et al. v. N. L. R . B. (5th Cir.), Ms. No. 
14,446, decided May 29, 1953. The motion avers:
“T hat the remaining books, papers, records and memoranda in the 
Respondent’s files are work papers and work products of the Respondent 
based upon information given to Respondent by the above-named clients 
and as such are privileged communications and Respondent is not legally 
empowered or authorized to divulge such information.”
Further, the terms of the subpoena are broad enough to authorize 
examination of the witness as to any matter, whether referred to in the 
books and memoranda or not, relevant to the tax liability of Salvator 
and Maria Italiano for the years 1947 to 1951, inclusive.
Appellant concedes, as he must, that at common law no privilege was 
attached to communications from “client” to accountant. If such a 
privilege exists, it can only arise from some Federal or state statute. Apel­
lant’s insistence is based upon both. He contends: (1) that the attorney- 
client privilege extends to certified public accountants who, like appel­
lant, are enrolled before the Treasury Department; and (2) that the 
State of Florida, by specific statute, has made privileged all communica­
tions between certified public accountants and their clients.
Professor Wigmore has stated the conditions necessary to the establish­
ment of a privilege,10 and has further cautioned us as follows:
“For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a funda­
mental maxim that the public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hard­
wicke) has a right to every man’s evidence. When we come to examine 
the various claims of exemption, we start with the primary assumption 
that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, 
and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional being 
so many derogations from a positive general rule. . . .
“. . . The investigation of truth and the enforcement of testimonial 
duty demand the restriction, not the expansion, of these privileges. They 
should be recognized only within the narrowest limits required by prin­
ciple. Every step beyond these limits helps to provide, without any real
10 “Looking back upon the principle of Privilege, as an exception to the general 
liability of every person to give testimony upon all facts inquired of in a court of 
justice, and keeping in view that preponderance of extrinsic policy which alone can 
justify the recognition of any such exception (ante, Secs. 2192, 2197), four fundamental 
conditions may be predicated as necessary to the establishment of a privilege against the 
disclosure of communications between persons standing in a given relation:
“ (1) T he communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be 
disclosed;
“(2) The element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory 
maintenance of the relation between the parties;
“(3) T he relation must be one which in the opinion of the community must be 
sedulously fostered; and
“(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communi­
cations must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of 
litigation.
“These four conditions being present, a privilege should be recognized; and not 
Otherwise.” 8 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.), Sec. 2285, p. 531,
necessity, an obstacle to the administration of justice.” (8 Wigmore on 
Evidence (3rd ed.), Sec. 2192, pp. 64, 67.)
On the other hand, Professor Wigmore has suggested that logically 
the reasons justifying a privilege for communications between clients 
and their attorneys practicing before a court of justice apply also to com­
munications between clients and their agents practicing before an ad­
ministrative tribunal, if its regulations treat the persons who appear be­
fore it representing parties in interest as a licensed body having the re­
sponsibility of attorneys, and subject to professional discipline. (8 Wig­
more on Evidence (3rd ed.), Sec. 2300 (a), pp. 583, 584.) He states, how­
ever, that judicial precedent in this field is scanty, and such rulings as he 
cites hold the relationship of client and agent not to be within the 
privilege.11
The Treasury Department has promulgated, pursuant to Section 3, 
Act of July 7, 1884, 23 Stat. 258,12 certain rules and regulations governing 
recognition of attorneys and agents representing persons before the Treas­
ury Department. This Circular 230 as revised December 9, 1951, known 
as Part 10 of Sub-Title A of Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
governs the admission of attorneys and agents and the conduct of such 
attorneys and agents before the Bureau of Internal Revenue and for 
“disbarment” proceedings.13
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11 Professor Wigmore’s footnote to the text that, “Naturally, judicial precedent in 
this field is scanty” reads:
“T he only rulings discovered to date are the following: McKercher v. Vancouver- 
Iowa Shingle Co., [1929] 4 D. L. R. 231, Br. C. (a patent agent is not within the privi­
lege); 1892, Brunger v. Smith, C. C. Mass., 49 Fed. 124 (patent interference proceeding; 
an agent practicing before the Commissioner of Patents was held not privileged to 
withhold information obtained from his client; the reasons offered in his argument are 
convincing, bu t the opinion is curt and gives no attention to the reasoning).” The 
decisions later than that footnote are likewise against the extention of the privilege. 
See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 89 F. Supp. 357, 360; Kent 
Jewelry Corp., et al., v. Kiefer, 113 N. Y. S. 2nd 12 , 18.
12 T he pertinent part of 23 Stat. 258 reads as follows:
“Provided, tha t the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe rules and regulations 
governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing claimants 
before his Department, and may require of such person, agents and attorneys, before 
being recognized as representatives of claimants, that they shall show that they are of 
good character and in good repute, possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable 
them to render such claimants valuable service, and otherwise competent to advise and 
assist such claimants in the presentation of their cases. And such Secretary may after 
due notice and opportunity for hearing suspend, and disbar from further practice before 
his Department any such person, agent, or attorney shown to be incompetent, dis­
reputable, or who refuses to comply w ith the said rules and regulations, or who shall 
with intent to defraud, in  any m anner willfully and knowingly deceive, mislead, or 
threaten any claimant or prospective claimant, by word, circular, letter, or by advertise­
ment.” This provision is brought forward as 5 U. S. C. A. 261.
13 Part 10.2, Sec. (f), provides the following:
“An agent enrolled before the Treasury Department shall have the same rights, 
powers, and privileges and be subject to the same duties as an enrolled attorney: Pro­
vided, T h a t an enrolled agent shall not have the privilege of drafting or preparing any 
written instrum ent by which title to real or personal property may be conveyed or 
transferred for the purpose of affecting Federal taxes nor shall such enrolled agent 
advise a client as to the legal sufficiency of such an instrum ent or its legal effect upon the 
Federal taxes of such client; And Provided Further, T ha t nothing in these regulations 
in this part shall be construed as authorizing persons not members of the bar to practice 
law."
In Section 10.3 T itle  1 Code of Federal Regulations qualifications for enrollment are 
set forth, and in part say:
“(a)(1) Persons of the following classes who are found, upon consideration of their
286 ACCOUNTANTS’ LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
The rules and regulations of the Treasury Department grant to en­
rolled agents the same “rights, powers, and privileges . . . .  as an enrolled 
attorney” in order to provide for the effective discharge of the duties of 
such agents. There is no provision that a client’s communications to an 
enrolled agent are privileged, and after all, the privilege, if any, belongs 
to the client and not to the agent. (See Footnote 9, supra.) If, however, 
the rules and regulations could be construed as so providing, then, it 
seems to us that they would be in conflict with the statute, 26 U. S. C. A. 
3614(a), (Footnote 1, supra), and that the statute must prevail.
Section 473.15, Florida Statutes 1951 (F. S. A. Sec. 473.15 formerly St. 
1927 c. 12290, Sec. 17, Comp. G. L. 1927 Sec. 3933) provides as follows:
“All communications between certified public accountants and public 
  accountants and the person for whom such certified public accountant 
or public accountant shall have made any audit or other investigation in 
a professional capacity, and all information obtained by certified public 
accountants and public accountants in their professional capacity concern­
ing the business and affairs of clients shall be deemed privileged com­
munications in all of the courts of this state, and no such certified public 
accountant or public accountant shall be permitted to testify with respect 
to any of said matters, except with the consent in writing of such client
or his legal representative.”
Appellant insists that this is a civil case, and, as such, subject to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, citing Rules 1, 81 (a) (3); McCrone v . 
United States, 307 U. S. 61; and, further, that under those rules the com­
petency and privilege of witnesses is governed by state laws. Rule 43 (a), 
5 Moore’s Federal Practice (2nd ed.), Secs. 43.06, 43.07, pp. 1330-1333. 
Both insistences might be conceded and it still would not follow that the 
privilege provided by the Florida statute would be applicable to appel­
lant’s testimony before the Internal Revenue agent under 26 U. S. C. A. 
3614. Appellant has failed to observe the important distinction between 
the administrative proceeding under that section and the court action 
to enforce the summons under 26 U. S. C. A. 3633(a). Rule 81(a)(3) 
makes the Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to “proceedings to compel 
the giving of testimony or production of documents in accordance with 
a subpoena issued by an officer or agency of the United States. . . .” That 
means that the rules are applicable to the court action to enforce the sum­
mons under 26 U. S. C. A. 3633 (a). To contend that the proceeding itself 
before the Commissioner or the Internal Revenue agent is also a civil case 
subject to the Rules of Civil Procedure, and particularly to Rule 43 (a) 
as to the admissibility of evidence, would be going too far. For, speaking 
generally, the system of rules of evidence in force for trials by jury or 
even in courts of equity is not applicable, either by historical precedent, 
or by sound practical policy, to inquiries of fact determinable by ad- *
applications, to possess the qualifications required by the regulations in this part may 
be admitted to practice before the Treasury Department as attorneys or agents re­
spectively:
“(i) Attorneys at law who have been admitted to practice before the courts of any 
State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, and who are lawfully engaged in the 
active practice of their profession.
“(ii) Certified public accountants who have duly qualified to practice as certified 
public accountants in their own names, under the laws and regulations of any State or 
Territory, or the District of Columbia, and who are lawfully engaged in active practice 
as certified public accountants."
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS 287
ministrative tribunals or officers.14 T hat is generally true as to Federal 
administrative officials [1 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.), Sec. 4c, p. 
44] and is more specifically applicable to disputes arising between tax­
payers and the Federal Government under the Internal Revenue Laws 
[1 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.), Sec. 4c, sub-div. 14, pp. 58, et seq.; 
see also 26 U. S. C. A. 1111, Rule 31; Sec. 3614, Sec. 3632; Whitlow v. Com­
missioner (8th Cir.), 82 F. 2d 569, 571]. Clearly, in the part of Rule 81 
(a) (3) quoted, supra, when construed in connection with Rule 43 (a), 
it was not intended to make so radical a change in administrative pro­
cedure as to require that such agencies be restricted by the rigid rules of 
evidence.15
We have heretofore noted that the power granted to the Commissioner 
by 26 U. S. C. A. 3614 is inquisitorial in character and is similar to the 
power vested in Federal grand juries. As said by the Eight Circuit in 
Brownson v. United States, supra, at p. 848, . .  the statutes involved . . .
should receive a like liberal construction in view of the like important 
ends sought by the Government.” Or as stated in United States v. Mur­
dock, 284 U. S. 141, 149, “Investigation for Federal purposes may not be 
prevented by matters depending upon state law.” See also Doll v. Com­
missioner (8th Cir.), 149 F. 2d 239. Or in the language of this Court, 
“These statutes, enacted to effectuate a Constitutional power, are the 
supreme law of the land. If they are in conflict with state law, constitu­
tional or statutory, the latter must yield.” Shambaugh v . Scofield (5th 
Cir.), 132 F. 2d 345, 346.
The appellant next insists that Section 3631, Internal Revenue Code,16 
prohibits unnecessary investigations and is a limitation on the power of 
the Bureau and of the Commissioner and not merely a personal right 
available to the taxpayer, citing Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., supra, 
and First National Bank of Mobile v. United States (5th Cir.), 160 F. 2d 
532, 535. T hat much might be conceded, but it does not appear that the 
investigation in aid of which this summons issued was unnecessary. True, 
the statute of limitations has run against the returns for some of the 
earlier years, but in order to determine tax liability under the net worth- 
expenditures method (see Footnote 7, supra), the Commissioner is re­
quired to establish a sound starting point and may well have to reconstruct 
the financial history of the taxpayers in prior years. It is not claimed that 
there has been any examination of the taxpayers’ returns for the years 
1949, 1950 and 1951.
We find no error in the record, and the judgment or order of the Dis­
trict Court is therefore affirmed.
14 Federal T rade Comm’n v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 705, 706; Opp Cotton 
Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126, 155; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 
U. S. 197, 229, 230; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44; Southern 
Stevedoring Co. v. Voris (5th Cir.), 190 F.2d 275, 277; Woolley v. United States (9th 
Cir.), 97 F.2d 258, 262; 42 Am. Jur., Public Administrative Law, Sec. 129, p. 461; 1 
Wigmore on Evidence 3rd ed.), Sec. 4a, p. 25.
15 In the Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules as to 81(a)(3) appears the 
following: “. . .  the provision allows full recognition of the fact that the rigid application 
of the rules in the proceedings themselves may conflict with the summary determination 
desired. . . . ”
16 26 U. S. C. A. Sec. 3631, reads as follows:
“No taxpayer shall be subject to unnecessary examinations or investigations, and 
only one inspection of a taxpayer’s books of account shall be made for each taxable 
year unless the taxpayer requests otherwise or unless the Commissioner, after investiga­
tion, notifies the taxpayer in writing tha t an additional inspection is necessary.”
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HOPKINS v. THE PEOPLE *
Supreme Court of Colorado, 1931. 89 Colo. 296, 1 P.2d 937.
[Defendant was convicted of embezzlement. On this appeal he con­
tends, inter alia, that it was error to admit the testimony of a certified 
public accountant who had been employed by the county to examine the 
court records of the estate for which the defendant was administrator.]
* * * *
3. Complaint is made to the admission and refusal to admit certain 
evidence. One Lindsay, a certified public accountant, was called by the 
people to testify to certain facts learned by him in the examination of the 
record in the Miers Fisher estate in the county court. The county court 
record was long and very much involved, and the evidence of Lindsay 
assisted the jury materially in determining certain facts which the district 
attorney considered important and which the trial court held to be 
proper evidence. It affirmatively appears from this record that Lindsay 
was employed by the county or county court, and that he had no business 
or professional connection with defendant. The testimony of Lindsay 
was objected to by defendant because of the provisions of section 1, par. 6, 
page 644, chapter 185, Session Laws of Colorado 1929, which provides that 
a certified public accountant shall not, under certain circumstances with­
out the consent of his client, be examined as a witness. The employment 
of Lindsay was not by defendant, and, in the absence of proof that de­
fendant was Lindsay’s client, the statute has no application whatever to 
the facts in this case.
* * * *
[Judgment affirmed.]
This case is discussed a t p. 68 supra.
